

CONFIDENTIAL.

(10035.)

PART XXVIII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

A F F A I R S O F P E R S I A .

October to December 1911.

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ERRATA.

Page 12, No. 35, line 1.—For "No. 477 of the 8th October" read "St. Petersburg telegram No. 234 of the 6th October."

Page 81, No. 168, last line. — For "No. 621" read "No. 521."

Page 187, No. 328, line 10.—For "British Government" read "two Powers."

Page 380, No. 709, 4th line from bottom.—For "Bahrein" read "Bushire."

Page 389, No. 732, *passim*.—For "Oudendyok" read "Oudendijk."

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

PART XXVIII.

[38559]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 458.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 2, 1911.

INCREASE in consular escorts.

Russian Government are consulting Russian Minister with regard to an increase in the Russian consular escort at Ispahan, which they suggest should co-operate with an escort for the protection of caravans proceeding in the direction of Shiraz. M. Poklewski will reply concurring in the reinforcement of the escort by 100 men, but recommending that they should be used for the protection of caravans leaving Ispahan for the north. He is also advising that the escort at Kazvin should receive a similar increase for use on the Kazvin-Hamadan road. He also proposes, I believe, the dispatch of the same number of troops to Enzeli.

The Russian Minister informed me of the above in strict confidence, but I presume you will be consulted by the Russian Government. I hardly see the necessity for the force at Enzeli, but the increase at Ispahan seems to be entirely reasonable, and that at Kazvin may also perhaps have justification.

[38565]

No. 2.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 459.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 2, 1911.

FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz :—

"I have received telegrams from Manchester and Bombay begging protection for agents of certain British firms ; also from Armenian archbishop recommending to me Christian community.

"Except in case of those who can thoroughly establish their right, granting of flags seems to involve too heavy responsibility, and if Persian soldiers are provided for any but Europeans they would be first to pillage.

"I am writing, as only measure offering some prospect of success, to all Arab chiefs informing them in detail that houses are inhabited by British subjects or protégés, and urging them, in the event of fighting in neighbourhood of these, to ensure that they be respected and to do all in their power to safeguard non-Mussulman population. I am also obtaining for Kawam instructions to same effect. This step, inadequate as it is, seems only one possible, and I fear that I am unable to give more than vaguest comfort to those applicants as well as to British subjects, whose interests I am by no means in a position to protect."

I have replied as follows, No. 197 :—

"British subjects and *bond fide* agents of British firms who have British-owned goods on their premises may fly flag, but no others.

"I approve your communication to Arab chiefs."

[38566]

No. 3.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 460.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 2, 1911.

SITUATION at Shiraz.

Mr. Acting Consul Knox telegraphs as follows (No. 330 of the 2nd October) :—

"The gravity of the situation is increasing. Governor-General and Soulet are growing desperate, and latter is speaking openly of an attack on the consulate to his intimates. The Arabs meanwhile, who have known no control for the last twelve months, are fast comprehending that they have nothing to gain or to lose from a Government whose every decision is revoked in a few hours, and are quite capable of settling matters to their own satisfaction by a general pillage of the town. Even Kawam reluctantly acknowledges this possibility.

"A state of panic prevails among all Persian merchants. Shortage of cash places the Imperial Bank in a most serious position, while Europeans generally are becoming hourly more nervous, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the town is in the hands of some 5,000 armed savages.

"I have constantly endeavoured in the course of the last few weeks to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the gravity of the state of affairs prevailing here, and I am unable, now that the property and lives of British subjects are certainly threatened with danger, to afford any semblance of adequate protection.

"I believe that were I to be authorised to warn Soulet in the terms suggested in my telegram No. 298 of the 19th September before this evening, and at the same time to impress the extent of their responsibilities in respect to British lives and property equally strongly upon the Arab chiefs, tension might in a certain measure still be relaxed. It is urgently necessary in any case that 300 men should be dispatched to Shiraz."

Following is my reply (No. 198 of the 2nd October) :—

"You can tell Soulet from me that unless he immediately removes himself and his men from the neighbourhood I shall recommend my Government to take immediate steps to protect our interests, and to visit the penalty for any damage to these directly upon himself and Nizam.

"You can also warn Arab chiefs that I shall recommend my Government to take steps to exact full reparation for any harm to British lives and property."

I have also again drawn attention of Persian Government to the menacing situation, and urged them to warn the various chiefs of the necessity of preventing harm to British subjects.

[38644]

No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 3.)

Sir,

India Office, October 2, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of Secretary Sir E. Grey, copy of a telegram received from Major C. B. Stokes, military attaché at Tehran, regarding his desire to resign his commission in the Indian Army.

The Marquess of Crewe would be glad to receive at an early date the views of Sir E. Grey on this communication.

Copy of a telegram addressed to the Government of India is enclosed.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Major Stokes to the Marquess of Crewe.

September 27, 1911.

(Telegraphic.)

JULY 30th I telegraphed resignation commission Indian Army through Secretary Foreign Affairs. August 3rd was informed had been referred to India. August 20th enquired whether resignation was definitely refused, if so, on what grounds. Received no reply. Respectfully request information whether Indian Government or any other authority claims right refuse resignation commission by officer Indian Army, if so, on what grounds? Should no such right be claimed, earnestly request acceptance my resignation be telegraphed me without delay.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

India Office, September 30, 1911.

(Telegraphic.)

MAJOR STOKES, Tehran, has addressed me by telegram as to delay in dealing with application to resign his commission in Indian Army. Please inform him that I am in communication with Foreign Office, and grant him leave, after Captain Fordham's arrival, pending further orders.

[38747]

No. 5.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 3, 1911.

A RUMOUR reaches me, which is confirmed by Regent, that Persian Government intend to engage a number of Swedish officers to organise a small Persian army.

[38688]

No. 6.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 462.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 3, 1911.

SITUATION at Shiraz.

In continuation of my telegram No. 460 of the 2nd October, I have the honour to repeat following personal telegram which Lieutenant Wilson, who is now at Shiraz, has addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire :—

"I fully share acting consul's view of seriousness of situation. We both concur in thinking that matters have now reached a stage when it is doubtful that even the strongest warning would serve any purpose, and I think that Europeans do undoubtedly stand in serious danger.

"There appears to me no possibility of things settling down."

I submit that the 300 men destined, in the event of the concurrence of the Government of India in our scheme for the roads, for Shiraz and Ispahan should be dispatched without delay and the fact made public forthwith.

Such a step is justified independently of the roads by the situation at Shiraz.

[38565]

No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 459 : Shiraz.

Your action approved.

[38688]

No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 289.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 3, 1911.

I HAVE communicated to India Office your telegrams Nos. 460 and 462 of yesterday and to-day respecting the serious situation at Shiraz, and have asked them to have 300 sowars sent at once for employment there and at Ispahan. When they and Government of India have assented to request I will telegraph again.

[38745]

No. 9.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 580.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 3, 1911.

SWEDISH chargé d'affaires asks us to let them know as soon as possible whether we should object to seven more officers being sent to Persia for gendarmerie in accordance with vote of Medjliss reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 417 of the 21st September.

Have Russian Government any objection? We have none.

[38908]

No. 10.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 4th October, 1911, relative to Persian escorts.

India Office, October 4, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 10.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, October 4, 1911.

PERSIAN escorts. See your telegram dated the 30th ultimo.

Further consideration will be accorded to scheme regarding roads proposed by resident, Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Minister, Tehran; and your views as to possible consequences, immediate and future, will be given due weight. But reports from His Majesty's representatives in Persia make it clear in the meantime that British subjects in Shiraz are in danger, and that it is necessary that consular guard should be considerably strengthened. Please dispatch as soon as possible 300 sowars, who are asked for by Minister and resident. You may, however, use your discretion within reasonable limits if you think it necessary to modify the number proposed. I will take up immediately with the Treasury the question of division of cost. Estimate of initial, terminal, and recurring cost should be sent in due course.

[38915]

No. 11.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 460 of 2nd October.

Following from Shiraz, No. 331:—

"I delivered both warnings at 9 A.M., but up to 6 P.M. no reply has been received from Soulet. If this is not forthcoming to-night, I will request immediate answer in

the morning. Arab chiefs have returned satisfactory verbal reply, and state that they are writing.

"There is a very strong rumour that Nizam will leave to-night, and town is quieter."

[38910]

No. 12.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 465.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 438 of 26th September.

Medjliss yesterday approved engagement of Mr. New for three years at Ministry of Telegraphs.

I understand that his post is to be that of Financial Comptroller.

[38922]

No. 13.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 231.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 4, 1911.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier. Your telegram No. 568 of the 28th September.

M. Poklewsky has been informed, by telegraph, that the Russian Government also prefer the first of the two answers proposed.

The Russian Government suggest the advisability of the two Ministers at Tehran recommending to the Persian Government that, if unsettled questions are referred to The Hague Tribunal, the Persian Government should ask the two Governments to assist them in the choice of jurists to act for Persia in the arbitration proceedings.

[38923]

No. 14.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 229 of the 27th September: Proposed loan to Persia by Messrs. Seligman.

In a conversation on the above subject which I had with M. Nératof to-day, his Excellency told me that he was not yet in a position to give a definite answer. He foresaw, however, that the answer of his Government must necessarily be an unfavourable one unless some modifications were introduced into the bases of the proposed transaction as at present laid down.

Viewed from the financial standpoint, Seligmans' requirements as to security covered too wide a field. If they were conceded the two banks would find it impossible to conduct any further operations in Persia. M. Nératof thought it possible that Seligmans' representative in Tehran might, by entering into pourparlers with the representative of the Russian Bank there, find some basis on which an arrangement acceptable to the bank could be concluded. He might, perhaps, invite the two banks to take up part of the proposed loan.

Viewed from the political standpoint, the two proposed conditions as to the exercise of powers of control by Seligmans' representative and as to the maintenance of the office of treasurer-general amounted to an attempt to establish over the whole administration of Persia a kind of external influence, to which exception must be taken by the Russian Government.

[38924]

No. 15.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 233.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, October 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 580 [of 3rd October]: Swedish officers for Persia.

Russian Government have no objection.

[1524]

C

[38908]

No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 292.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 4, 1911.

SOWARS for Shiraz and Ispahan.

Telegram sent to Viceroy yesterday to send 300 sowars to Shiraz as soon as possible, using reasonable discretion if he considers number should be modified. You may inform Persian Government as soon as he replies.

Tell consul at Shiraz to arrange for accommodation there, and send 100 of them to Ispahan, if you think proper.

[38747]

No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Reirne.

(No. 583.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 4, 1911.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 461 of 3rd October.

You should enquire if the Russian Government has heard of this proposal, and, if they have, what are their views upon it. The proposal is evidently quite distinct from the additional officers proposed for the gendarmerie. (See Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 417 of 21st September.)

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 290.)

[38997]

No. 18.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, October 4, 1911.

WE hand you enclosed copy of letter, dated the 20th September, from the Muin-ut-Tujjar, in which he expresses the hope that, in case we have to appear at the Persian Legation, we will mention the assurances which we have obtained from His Majesty's Government with reference to the oxide business.

The Muin-ut-Tujjar further states that he reserves the right to do what is necessary on this subject as soon as it is confirmed that he is in the right.

We do not quite understand what he means by this, but we hand you enclosed a copy of our reply which we propose to send to him, and on which we shall be glad to have your views before posting our letter.

Yours, &c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

P.S.—We shall be glad to hear what news you have from Sir George Barclay as to the representations made in our letter of the 15th June, of which you sent him a copy.

E. AND CO.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Muin-ut-Tujjar to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Dear Sirs,

Tehran, September 20, 1911.

I HAVE just received your telegram of the 18th instant, informing me that you had seen the legation, which is awaiting further news from Tehran.

The legation had asked for the papers relating to this affair, and the Foreign Office is to send these papers this week.

I have sent a copy of my pamphlet, with a copy of the contract, to Messrs. Strick. I believe that the legation intends to submit the case to an expert in London. I hope that in case you have to appear you will mention the assurances which you have got from the British Government. For my own part, I reserve the right to do what is necessary on the subject as soon as it is confirmed that I am in the right, because it is certain that all I had to undergo came from the confidence which I had in these assertions and assurances.

In case the Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet sent the papers this week, I shall ask him to do it the next week without fail.

Please send me a copy of your correspondence with the Minister for Foreign Affairs if there has been anything since the 31st March.

I am just having printed the collection of all decisions of the Government given in my favour, and I shall send you a copy of it as soon as it is ready.

At the same time please tell me your opinion about my first book.

Yours, &c.

MUIN-UT-TUJJAR.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 18.]

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Muin-ut-Tujjar.

(Draft.)

Dear Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, October 4, 1911.

WE are in receipt of yours of 20th September, contents of which we note. If we are invited to furnish explanations to the Persian Minister in London, you can rely upon our doing so, and we do not expect there will be any objection to our speaking of the assurances we have from time to time received as regards the oxide business from His Majesty's Government.

As far as you are concerned, we cannot see that there can be the slightest objection to your speaking of these assurances, as His Majesty's Government have permitted us to send you copies of our correspondence with them, in which full reference is made to the assurances given.

We are asking the Foreign Office for their permission to send you further copies of correspondence, and will come back upon this matter.

It is difficult for us to give an expression of opinion on your first pamphlet, as the whole question seems to turn upon the interpretation of your firman of 1904, which is in Persian.

As commercial men, however, we have no hesitation in saying that, judging from the translation of the documents with which we have been furnished, the action of the Persian Government in confiscating your concession is an arbitrary and autocratic act, contrary to all law and justice, which, in our opinion, no constitutional Government should have committed.

We are, &c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

[38967]

No. 19.

*Enclosure in India Office Letter.—(Received October 5.)**Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 4, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 4th instant.

One regiment of cavalry can, in opinion of my military advisers, be sent without risk to Shiraz. Orders have therefore been given for transport to be collected immediately and other necessary arrangements to be made for one Indian cavalry regiment with their two Maxims to be dispatched to Shiraz at once.

[39026]

No. 20.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 466.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

MY telegram No. 460 of 2nd October: Shiraz.

Soulet and Nizam have not yet replied to my warning, but they are apparently preparing to leave. Their baggage left yesterday morning in a southerly direction under strong escort.

Arab chiefs have replied that they will do their utmost to protect European life and property and will leave Shiraz as soon as the Kashgais have gone. They enclose a telegram from the Prime Minister instructing them to remain for the present to assist the Government.

[39056]

No. 21.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 467.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

MR. O'BEIRNE'S telegram No. 228 of 26th September.

What Shuster needs is advice and assistance of Stokes in capital, and he most emphatically rejects the idea of localising him at Ispahan as "out of the question, of course, both on principle and as matter of practicability."

Shuster is most anxious for reply "stating plainly whether two Governments intend to continue opposing appointment of Stokes on lines which he has mentioned or not."

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[39052]

No. 22.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 468.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

ACTING consul reports Kashgais leaving Shiraz in great numbers.

[38922]

No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 294.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 5, 1911.

HIS Majesty's Government share view of Russian Government, conveyed in Mr. O'Beirne's telegram of yesterday, as to form of Persian reply to Porte in regard to Turco-Persian frontier.

You can now answer Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[39026]

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 5, 1911.

PREPARATIONS are being made in India for dispatching a cavalry regiment to Persia immediately. In view of your telegram No. 466 of to-day do you think action should be suspended, or that proposed increase of force is still urgent.

[39106]

No. 25.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 6.)

Sir.

India Office, October 4, 1911.

IN reply to your letters dated the 18th and 27th September, 1911, respectively, regarding the proposed agreements of the Indo-European Telegraph Company for the working and maintenance of certain telegraph lines in Northern Persia, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of a note by the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department as to the terms of the communication that might be made to the company in the matter.

The Marquess of Crewe concurs in the suggestions of Mr. Kirk, which are in general accord with the proposal made in your letter of the 18th September.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Note by the Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated September 29, 1911.

THE Foreign Office have now sent a copy of the reply of the Indo-European Telegraph Company regarding the inclusion in its scheme of telegraphs in Persia of an extension of the telegraph line from Meshed to Herat. The company engages not to take steps with regard to this extension without previous consultation with the British Government. It has, however, to be noted that nothing is said about a Meshed-Herat line in the proposed agreements with the Russian and Persian Governments; it is referred to only in Mr. Pagenkopf's letter to M. de Klemm, with which he sent the proposed agreements.

In my note of the 25th instant below* I wrote that I thought the proposal contained in the last paragraph of the Foreign Office letter of the 18th September might be accepted. The Foreign Office propose to give the substance of my memorandum of the 5th July last to the Indo-European Telegraph Company. There seems no objection to the views expressed in paragraph 2 of the memorandum being explained to the company. With regard to paragraphs 3 and 4, it would be sufficient to explain to the company that our arrangement with the Russian Government is for that Government to take over the control of the Tehran-Meshed line and of the line from Meshed up to Khaf, while the line from Khaf to Seistan would come under British control, so that the proposal of the company to maintain the line "from Meshed to Birjand" should be altered to "from Meshed to Khaf." It might also be pointed out to the company that the control of the Tehran-Meshed line could not be made over to it until the exchange of the control of that line from the British to the Russian Government, and of the Khaf-Seistan line from the Russian to the British Government, had been carried out by arrangement with the Persian Government. The company might also be informed that, under an agreement which has been come to with the Russian Government, British signallers, after the exchange of control of the lines had taken place, would work at the terminal stations of the Tehran-Meshed and Meshed-Khaf lines at intervals daily.

There appears to be nothing in paragraph 5 of the memorandum that should be communicated to the company.

H. A. KIRK.

[39196]

No. 26.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 469.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, October 6, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 292 of 4th October and my telegram No. 453 of 30th September.

I presume that sanction of Government of India for Wilson's detention can be counted on.

[39202]

No. 27.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 470.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 6, 1911.

FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz, No. 335:—

"Nizam and Soulet left at noon and are encamped now some 6 miles away. Latter

[1524]

* Not sent to Foreign Office.

D

before leaving openly declared his intention of disturbing Bushire road. Behaviour of Arabs is for the moment exemplary, and it is hoped that they will leave town to-morrow."

[39203]

No. 28.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 471.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 6, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 295.

I am consulting acting consul, and advise suspending action meanwhile.

[39210]

No. 29.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 234.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 6, 1911.

PERSIA. Mr. New's appointment.

I was informed to-day by M. Nératof that no objection will be raised by the Russian Government to the appointment of Mr. New. At the same time they hope that this appointment will be regarded as exceptional, and that it will not be looked upon as a precedent for the introduction into the Persian administration of a series of British subjects. I replied that the appointment of Russian subjects to similar posts would, I felt sure, be welcomed by His Majesty's Government.

(Confidential.)

The proposal that Seligman's representative should be installed in the financial department appears to have caused some alarm to M. Nératof.

[39259]

No. 30.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 472.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, October 7, 1911.

GOVERNMENT forces have occupied Hamadan. Salar-ed-Dowleh, who had retreated thither, has now fled towards Murajird.

[39328]

No. 31.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 474.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 7, 1911.

ESCORT reinforcements.

Reference to my telegram No. 471, dated the 6th October.

Acting Consul Knox telegraphs as follows [No. 338 of the 6th October]:—

"I venture to urge very strongly that no delay should occur in dispatching reinforcements. Winter sets in after the end of November, and lack of supplies will then render the road impassable for 200 men. Furthermore, it will be impossible to ensure winter supplies for men and horses here unless local action is taken immediately if, as appears extremely probable, there will shortly be a great scarcity.

"Situation continues to be very strained, and I think general disorders are impending on the roads. This afternoon some inhabitants of suburb fired on kawam as he was leaving the consulate and killed some of his men. It is not improbable that further trouble in the town may arise out of this incident."

I do not think there should be any delay in dispatch of reinforcements in view of above telegram.

Subject to your approval, I would propose following wording for my communication to the Persian Government:—

In consequence of the general disorder prevailing in southern Persia, His Majesty's Government have decided to increase the British consular escorts at places where British trade interests require temporary protection.

These escorts will be occasionally employed for the protection of British caravans.

These reinforcements will be withdrawn as soon as a gendarmerie adequate for the protection of the southern trade routes has been organised by the Persian Government.

I would propose to make this communication to Persian Government as soon as I receive your authorisation to do so. Persian Government have already learnt that our scheme has appeared in the press from their Minister in London.

[39402]

No. 32.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 475.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 7, 1911.

SHIRAZ. Please refer to my telegram No. 474, dated the 7th October.

Persian Government have now appointed Ala-ed-Dowleh Governor-General of Fars in the place of Farman Farma, who made difficulties about proceeding to Shiraz. Deputy governorship has been entrusted to Kawam, who has left the consulate. Acting consul is assured by Kawam that he will forthwith send the more unruly tribesmen in charge of his son to a distance of 50 miles from the town, and that he will keep only those in whom he has confidence.

Cox, who I gather has been consulted by the Government of India respecting the immediate need for British troops, has replied urging their immediate dispatch in the interests of security of British subjects and merchandise as well in Shiraz as on the roads. Adverting to Kawam's departure from the consulate, he says that this relieves anxiety on the score of the safety of the consulate, but there is no ground for supposing that it will lead to a restoration of order and security in Shiraz. He adds:—

"Nizam and Soulet have withdrawn a few miles solely in consequence of our definite threat and of the rumours of our preparations to carry it out. Latter, however, is unlikely, even were Nizam to leave Fars willingly, to retire from an active rôle in the province, and if we fail to carry out our decision, which is now generally known, forces of disorder will gain a new impetus, and the damaging impression that there is no fear of our carrying our decision into effect will be revived. The state of the roads is worse than ever hitherto."

[39389]

No. 33.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, October 7, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 583 [of 4th October] and Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 461 [of 3rd October].

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had not heard of the proposal, and seemed unwilling to express any opinion upon it until he had more detailed information as to numbers and proposed functions of the Swedish officers. He said that he would communicate with the Russian Minister at Tehran.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[39390]

No. 34.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 238.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 7, 1911.

PERSIA. Proposed increase of consular guards.

My telegram No. 227 of the 26th September.

In an *aide-memoire* addressed to the embassy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that the reasons for the contemplated measure are appreciated by the

Russian Government, who have no objection to the proposal that the guard attached to the British Consulate at Ispahan should be increased.

The *aide-memoire* goes on to say that on their side also the Russian Government are preoccupied by the general state of insecurity which prevails not only in the district lying between Ispahan and Tehran, but in North Persia also, where fresh disorders have broken out. The Russian Government, unless absolutely compelled to take such a step, would certainly not send in a military force as they did in 1909, but it is probable that the guards of some of their consulates in North Persia may have to be strengthened, and that the Ispahan escort may also have to be increased in order to keep communications open and protect Russian caravans passing from Ispahan to Shiraz and Tehran respectively. The Russian Government express a hope that they may be kept informed of any further steps in this matter which His Majesty's Government may decide to take.

[39404]

No. 35.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 477.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 8, 1911.

SELIGMAN loan.

In reply to your telegram No. 477 of the 8th October, I have the honour to report that I believe that the final paragraph of Mr. O'Beirne's telegram refers to the stipulation for the maintenance of a representative of Messrs. Seligman at Tehran to supervise expenditure of proposed loan. This stipulation is contained in article 24 of the Seligman loan contract.

Reference is also made to this article at the end of St. Petersburg telegram No. 232 of the 5th October.

[39609]

No. 36.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 479.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 8, 1911.

ESCORT reinforcements.

A member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited me yesterday, and urgently begged me on behalf of the Minister to advise His Majesty's Government to abandon intention of increasing consular escorts at Bushire, Shiraz, Ispahan, Bunder Abbas, and Kerman, which had been reported in the British press. He urged that since my note of the 14th October last year Persian Government had made every effort to improve matters, but their energies had been diverted to the suppression of the insurrection. He begged us still to have patience, more especially in view of the improvement of the situation at Shiraz and the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars.

I replied that the state of the southern roads had been, even before the ex-Shah's return, more insecure than ever, that the three main channels of our trade with Persia had been for some time practically closed, and that, though I believed no decision had been taken, I had recommended a scheme for increasing certain British consular escorts with a view to protecting British lives and trade independently of the situation at Shiraz. Scheme was now under consideration. He asked me how the escorts could protect trade, and I replied that they might occasionally be used to escort caravans.

Your telegram No. 299 of the 8th October reached me after I had drafted above. Am I now authorised to make official communication to Persian Government on the lines indicated in your instructions? I await announcement that dispatch of troops has been definitely decided upon before doing so. Please refer to my telegram No. 474 of the 7th October. I have not yet been informed whether the Government of India have agreed in my view that dispatch of reinforcements should not be suspended.

[39328]

No. 36⁰.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 8, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 475 of 7th October: Indian troops for Shiraz.

You should confine your announcement to the Persian Government to a simple statement that, owing to possible danger to British lives and properties at Shiraz and elsewhere, His Majesty's Government are compelled to strengthen the consular guards at Shiraz and possibly also at Ispahan and Bushire.

You should say nothing as to patrolling roads or escorting caravans.

[39497]

No. 37.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 176.)

Sir,

Gulahek, September 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit translation of a note from the Persian Government forwarding copy of a note addressed to my Russian colleague, expressing the hope that the Russian Government will not afford protection to the ex-Shah. The Persian Government ask for "the moral assistance of His Majesty's Government for carrying out the aims of the Persian Government for the pacification of the country," or what is presumably meant that His Majesty's Government should urge the Russian Government to refuse asylum to the ex-Shah.

I have not considered it worth while reporting the receipt of this note by telegram, as the message sent me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th instant, and which I reported in my telegram No. 399, was on the same lines as the note to the Russian Legation, and, moreover, I see from your telegram No. 532 to Sir G. Buchanan that you have already communicated with the Russian Government on the subject.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Muktadir-ul-Mulk to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, September 14, 1911.

AS the British Legation is also a signatory of the protocol of the 7th September, 1909, regarding Mohammed Ali Mirza, the deposed Shah of Persia, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note which has been addressed by the Foreign Office to the Russian Legation respecting Mohammed Ali Mirza's flight, and I ask for the moral assistance of the British Government for the carrying out of the Persian Government's aims for the pacification of the country.

I have, &c.

MUKTADIR-UL-MULK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Note addressed by the Persian Government to the Russian Legation.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

[Undated.]

I HAVE the honour to inform you that when Mohammed Ali Mirza and his followers (in spite of the fact that the Russian Government, by virtue of article 11 of the protocol of 1909, had undertaken to prevent them from intriguing), taking advantage of the negligence of the Russian Government, and having, according to the allegation of the Russian Government, evaded the vigilance of the Russian police, finally succeeded, contrary to the just and lawful expectation of the Persian Government, in landing at a Persian port from a Russian steamer and causing considerable moral and material injury to the Persian Government—such as loss of life, outrages on women, expenditure of Government treasure, including the proceeds of the loan, for putting a stop to the mischief, the incitement of the people against the present Government, the obstacle placed in the way of the Government in the work of reform, and such like considerations, the enumeration of which would be superfluous—he has now been entirely defeated in consequence of the measures taken by the Persian Government.

In accordance with information received, Mohammed Ali Mirza and his followers on the 8th instant (September), finding that resistance to the Government forces was no longer possible, took advantage of the marshy ground and fled to Savad Kuh with a few followers for Sari and subsequently for Karn-teppeh, and from there by a boat which was waiting for them took refuge at Gumish-teppeh, where they are at the present moment.

It is possible that, in order to evade the punishment due to him for the injuries caused to the country, and to find an asylum from whence to make further preparation—

for subsequent mischief, thereby renewing the regrettable events from the consequences of which the Persian Government has not as yet recovered, Mohammed Ali Mirza may attempt to take refuge in Russian territory or upon a Russian ship. As such an eventuality is most likely, I consider it necessary to draw your Excellency's attention to the following facts:—

Firstly, in accordance with article 10 of the protocol referred to above, the persons who were in refuge at the legation at the time the protocol was concluded were to have been expelled from Persia conformably with the provisions of article 9. If they returned to Persia they were not again to be given protection by the legation, and would not be admitted to "bast." This provision, which was made with respect to "bast" in the legation in connection with Mohammed Ali Mirza's followers, must, *a fortiori*, apply to the taking of refuge in Russian territory or on Russian ships, and will also apply to Mohammed Ali Mirza himself; because it is obvious that the aim of the two contracting parties was to prevent rebels from taking advantage of Russian protection, and it is clear that the consequences of Mohammed Ali Mirza's refuge in Russian territory or on Russian ships would be still greater.

Secondly, in your note of the 31st July, in which the principle of non-intervention is laid down, it is expressly stated that the Imperial Russian Government will take no part whatever in the struggle that has unhappily occurred in Persia. It is clear that if the Russian Government should allow Mohammed Ali Mirza to take refuge in Russian territory, on Russian Government ships, or on those of their subjects, this would constitute a form of intervention, would leave his treason unpunished, and the measures taken by the Government would be frustrated. Other persons opposed to the Government would thereby be encouraged in the hope of eventually finding such an asylum and refuge. The principle of non-intervention would be completely violated, and would, in fact, be exchanged for a form of intervention advantageous to those in opposition to the Government.

In view of the above explanations, I expect of your Excellency's sense of justice and also of the impartiality of the Russian Government, that the point of view of the Persian Government hereby exposed will receive particular attention. In view of the moral assistance which the Persian Government expects to receive from the Russian Government, it is the hope of my Government that the Russian Government will not by protecting Mohammed Ali Mirza and his followers frustrate the measures taken by the Persian Government for the maintenance of peace and order in the country.

I avail, &c.

[39461]

No. 38.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 277.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, September 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that, having received your telegram No. 559 of the 25th September, I yesterday handed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs an *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy is enclosed, relative to the proposed increase of the British consular escorts at certain places in Persia and the proposed creation of a British vice-consulate at Bam.

M. Nératof stated to me without hesitation that he had no objection to offer to any of the proposed measures, including the increase of the consular escort at Ispahan. I explained to his Excellency the manner in which His Majesty's Government contemplated employing the increased escorts for the protection of traffic on the southern roads.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BÉIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Aide-mémoire communicated to M. Nératof.

EN vue du désordre toujours croissant sur les routes du midi de la Perse et de l'interruption continue du trafic dans ces régions, il se peut que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté trouvera nécessaire d'établir un vice-consulat à Bam et d'augmenter les escortes des consulats britanniques à Bouchir, Chiraz, Kerman et Bender Abbas

ainsi qu'à Ispahan. Le Gouvernement britannique se plaît à croire que le Gouvernement Impérial ne soulèvera pas d'objections à l'augmentation de l'escorte consulaire à Ispahan, ville qui se trouve incluse dans la sphère d'influence russe. Le seul but de la mesure projetée est la protection du commerce britannique dans le midi de la Perse, lequel a subi des pertes si importantes et les dispositions que le Gouvernement britannique a en vue représentent le minimum de ce qu'il peut entreprendre dans les circonstances actuelles, étant donné qu'il désire éviter toute occupation militaire dans le midi de la Perse, laquelle entraînerait l'envoi d'un nombre considérable de troupes. L'inclusion d'Ispahan dans la mesure projetée est nécessaire à son efficacité.

L'augmentation des escortes serait de 200 hommes à Chiraz et à Bam et de 100 hommes aux autres villes susmentionnées.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 13 (26) septembre, 1911.

[39420]

No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 662.)

Sir,

Therapia, September 29, 1911.

IN reply to your despatch No. 240 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that I have been unable to obtain any confirmation of the rumours therein mentioned as to the intrigues on the part of the Turkish consul at Kermanshah, having for their object the restoration of the Province of Zohab to the Ottoman Empire. The Persian Embassy replied, with evident surprise to the enquiries which I caused to be made there, that they had heard nothing of any activity on the part of the Turkish consul, and knew nothing of any Turkish designs on the province in question, the position of which was clearly defined in article 2 of the treaty of Erzeroum, and said that there was no dispute about the frontier near Khanikin and Kasr-i-Shirin.

I have seen no indications of any designs in this direction on the part of the Porte, and in gauging the value of Mr. Wilson's information on this point it would be necessary to ascertain and take into consideration the character of the Turkish consul in question, who may well be a chauvinist hot-head of the type of his colleagues at Bunder Abbas.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[39519]

No. 40.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 173.)

Sir,

Stockholm, October 6, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to statements which have appeared in the press, Captain Hjalmarsson, one of the Swedish officers who have gone to Persia, induced the Persian Medjliss to pass a measure for the appointment of five more officers and an intendant for the gendarmerie. A telegram to this effect has reached the Ministry of War, which has now the matter under consideration. No decision seems yet to have been taken, but the service in Persia appears to be popular, and several candidates have come forward. It is stated that the officers who have already arrived in Tehran are engaged there in organising the future gendarmerie.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[39533]

No. 41.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 435.)

Sir,

Paris, October 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a memorandum giving an account of statements made to me to-day by the Persian Minister in Paris

and by Sardar Khan, the Bakhtiari chief, who is returning to Persia in about three weeks' time.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Memorandum.

THE Persian Minister called at the embassy with Sardar Khan, the Bakhtiari chief. They told the Ambassador that Sardar was returning to Persia in about three weeks' time on the termination of a treatment which he was undergoing for his health. He very much wished His Majesty's Government to be informed of the following:—

Soon after the Persian revolution Sir George Barclay advised Sardar to exert all his influence in Persia in favour of a policy being followed friendly to Russia. At that time Sardar found it very difficult to follow the advice of His Majesty's Minister owing to the state of excitement in Persia against Russia. Since then, however, the anti-Russian feeling has calmed down to a great extent. The Persian Minister in Paris (who was Special Ambassador at King Edward's funeral) sent telegrams to the Persian President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs counselling a policy of *entente* and mutual confidence with Russia. He even sent a telegram in the same sense to the Regent through the Minister for Foreign Affairs so that the telegram could not be suppressed. The Regent had in consequence made a declaration to Parliament in that sense—the declaration was well received by numerous influential deputies, and feeling in Persia was now much less anti-Russian. A proof of this was to be found in the fact that the concession for a petroleum pipe from Resht to Enzeli had been granted to a Russian company.

Sardar was anxious that His Majesty's Government should know that on his return to Persia he would do his utmost to bring about that policy of *entente* with Russia which Sir George Barclay had in the past recommended.

Paris, October 7, 1911.

[39683]

No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 9.)

Sir,

India Office, October 9, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th September on the subject of the increase of consular escorts in Persia, and subsequent telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, I am directed by the Secretary of State to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of the telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India noted in the margin.*

It will be seen that the Government of India are arranging for the immediate dispatch of a regiment of Indian cavalry to Shiraz:—

Maximum field service strength—

Rank and file	483
Native officers	17
British officers	13

This is in excess of the number asked for by Sir G. Barclay, but the decision is doubtless determined by consideration of the risks involved in sending comparatively small bodies of men up-country in the state of disorder at present prevailing.

Lord Crewe understands that Sir E. Grey's intention is that these troops should be employed solely for the protection of the life and property of British subjects in Shiraz, and not in pursuance of the wider scheme suggested in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 401 of the 14th September. His Lordship feels very strongly that, in view of the criticisms contained in the Government of India's telegram of the

* To Government of India, September 27; Government of India, September 30; to ditto, October 4; Government of India, October 4, 1911: already printed.

30th September, and of other considerations which he is prepared to state when required, that scheme should be subjected to further examination before he could commit the Government of India to the political, military, and financial responsibilities which may be involved in it. He accordingly ventures to hope that such instructions may be given to the local consular authorities as will ensure that the strictly limited scope of the present operations is carefully kept in view.

A separate communication will be sent to you regarding the division of the cost between India and the Imperial Exchequer.

It is for consideration whether, if further troops should at any time be required for the protection of life and property at Shiraz or elsewhere, infantry are not better adapted for the purpose than cavalry.

I am, &c.

L. ABRAHAMS.

[39616]

No. 43.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th October, relative to the sending of troops to Shiraz.

India Office, October 9, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 43.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 7, 1911.

AFFAIRS at Shiraz. Please refer to my telegram dated the 4th instant.

Director of Indian marine informs us that the 26th October is earliest date by which necessary transport for conveyance of regiment of cavalry with requisite supplies to Bushire can be prepared. Regiment thus could not arrive before the 11th November at Shiraz, and it would not be possible for relief to be afforded to consulate at early date.

I propose, in these circumstances, and having regard to improvement in situation at Shiraz, as reported in telegram, dated the 5th instant, from His Majesty's consul, that chartering of transports and incurrence of other additional expenditure for dispatch to Shiraz of a full regiment of cavalry should be postponed until question of employment of British cavalry for protection of road has been definitely decided.

[39683]

No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 9.)

Sir,

India Office, October 9, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th September on the subject of the increase of consular escorts in Persia and subsequent telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, I am directed by the Secretary of State to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India.

It will be seen that the Government of India are arranging for the immediate dispatch of a regiment of Indian cavalry to Shiraz:—

Maximum field service strength—

Rank and file	483
Native officers	17
British officers	13

This is in excess of the number asked for by Sir G. Barclay, but the decision is doubtless determined by consideration of the risks involved in sending comparatively small bodies of men up-country in the state of disorder at present prevailing.

[1524]

F

Lord Crewe understands that Sir E. Grey's intention is that these troops should be employed solely for the protection of the life and property of British subjects in Shiraz, and not in pursuance of the wider scheme suggested in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 401 of the 14th September. His Lordship feels very strongly that, in view of the criticisms contained in the Government of India's telegram of the 30th September, and of other considerations which he is prepared to state when required, that scheme should be subjected to further examination before he could commit the Government of India to the political, military, and financial responsibilities which may be involved in it. He accordingly ventures to hope that such instructions may be given to the local consular authorities as will ensure that the strictly limited scope of the present operations is carefully kept in view.

A separate communication will be sent to you regarding the division of the cost between India and the Imperial Exchequer.

It is for consideration whether, if further troops should at any time be required for the protection of life and property at Shiraz or elsewhere, infantry are not better adapted for the purpose than cavalry.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 44.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 27, 1911.

CONSULAR escorts in Persia. See my telegram dated the 25th September, 1911.

The Foreign Office request that additional men may be held in readiness, and ask for my assent in principle to increase proposed. Unless you see urgent reason to the contrary, necessary orders should be issued for men to be in readiness. I request that you will reply with least possible delay to my telegram.

Instructions were sent on the 25th September to Sir G. Buchanan to inform Russian Government that we may find it necessary to take the steps proposed, that protection of British trade in the south is our sole object, and that it is our desire that any military occupation in south, which would entail dispatch of a large body of troops, should be avoided. Intimation was made on the 26th September by Russian Government that there is no objection on their part.

Enclosure 2 in No. 44.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 30, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegrams dated the 25th and the 27th instant.

Scheme of resident, Persian Gulf, for protection of trade caravans, as defined in telegram No. 401 from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, has received our careful consideration. Dispatch of two regiments of native cavalry, to be distributed in manner shown below, would, in opinion of our military advisers, be preferable course. Proposed distribution:—

1. Kerman area—

Two squadrons and head-quarters at Bam with new vice-consulate, one squadron at Kerman, and one at Bunder Abbas.

2. Shiraz area—

Two squadrons and head-quarters at Shiraz, and one squadron each at Ispahan and Bushire.

Only a small addition to proposal of resident is entailed. Orders for men to be held in readiness are being issued. Heavy cost will be involved, as troops seem likely to be required for one or two years, and possibly for longer period. It will be necessary to provide barracks or shelters and stabling, as existing accommodation is non-existent at places indicated. Full complement of mules must be taken from India by regiments. We trust that Imperial Exchequer will agree to bear not less than two-thirds of entire

cost, in view of the predominance of British trade and of inevitable necessity, once protective measures are undertaken, for foreign as well as British and Indian trade to be protected.

As regards squadrons proceeding to Shiraz and Ispahan from Bushire, no great difficulty in regard to supply and transport is anticipated; but it will probably be necessary to make extensive arrangements for squadrons proceeding to Kerman and Bam from Bunder Abbas, and instructions should be sent to resident at earliest possible moment immediately it is decided to dispatch troops.

It is pointed out by the military authorities that our political responsibilities will be increased by addition of travelling escorts of cavalry, unless it is held that no cause for punitive expeditions will be regarded as being afforded by attacks on these escorts, but that reprisals of another kind, such as fine, &c., will be the punishment for such attacks. It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that, although in principle a decision in this sense may be accepted, punitive measures would be entailed, if only to keep roads open, if a powerful tribe were successfully to attack and destroy a convoy. We cannot overlook these risks, and must deal on its merits with each case.

Military measures in the interior of Persia, costly in themselves, for a period the duration of which cannot be foreseen, are entailed by the proposal. Conflict between our officers and men and local administration is not unlikely to ensue from these measures. Hitherto our policy has been to confine our efforts to the maintenance of order in the ports of the Persian Gulf by naval action and by occasionally disembarking troops or sailors temporarily to protect British residents and interests at ports in question. As Sir G. Barclay points out, events in Shiraz may be precipitated by the policy now advocated, our responsibilities in the interior will undoubtedly be extended, and a military occupation of Southern Persia—a measure which we believe there is every desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to avoid—might in certain circumstances result. We have thought it our duty in any case to point out clearly the risks involved, though we presume that His Majesty's Government, by whom this preliminary step is being pressed on, cannot have overlooked such contingencies.

Enclosure 3 in No. 44.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, October 4, 1911.

PERSIAN escorts. See your telegram dated the 30th ultimo.

Further consideration will be accorded to scheme regarding roads proposed by resident, Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and your views as to possible consequences, immediate and future, will be given due weight. But reports from His Majesty's representatives in Persia make it clear in the meantime that British subjects in Shiraz are in danger, and that it is necessary that consular guard should be considerably strengthened. Please dispatch as soon as possible 300 sowars who are asked for by Minister and resident. You may, however, use your discretion within reasonable limits if you think it necessary to modify the number proposed. I will take up immediately with the Treasury the question of division of cost. Estimate of initial, terminal, and recurring cost should be sent in due course.

Enclosure 4 in No. 44.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 4, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 4th instant.

One regiment of cavalry can, in opinion of my military advisers, be sent without risk to Shiraz. Orders have therefore been given for transport to be collected immediately and other necessary arrangements to be made for one Indian cavalry regiment with their two Maxims to be dispatched to Shiraz at once.

[39056]

No. 45.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 300.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 9, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 467 of 5th October.

Unless some arrangement satisfactory to the Russian Government can be arrived at we cannot approve of Stokes's appointment.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 595.)

[39609]

No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 301.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 9, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 479 of 9th October.

Persian Minister called here to express hope that His Majesty's Government would not send increased escort to Shiraz, but leave Persian Government to re-establish order, which they had been hitherto prevented from doing by ex-Shah and other agitators. He was told that His Majesty's Government appreciated Persian Government's difficulties, but that latter's measures in this respect could not be efficacious for some time, and if, in the meanwhile, untoward incidents occurred affecting British lives and property, responsibility of Persian Government would be great, and British public opinion would compel His Majesty's Government to exact all kinds of reparations and compensations, and His Majesty's Government would itself be blamed for confiding in Persian assurances. It was therefore in interest of Persian Government that His Majesty's Government should take steps to accord necessary protection to British lives and property. We had no desire to occupy and no intention of retaining increased consular guards longer than was absolutely necessary.

Persian Minister then said his Government's troubles were due to encouragement and underhand support of ex-Shah by Russians. He was told that if Russians had really done so Persian Government would have found ex-Shah more difficult to deal with than had actually been the case.

You should now make official announcement as instructed in my telegram No. 299 of 8th October.

[39123]

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 122.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 9, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at the Foreign Office on the 4th instant and questioned Sir A. Nicolson as to the announcement in the "Times" of that morning in respect to the dispatch of Indian cavalry regiments to Persia. Sir A. Nicolson replied that for some weeks past the situation at Shiraz had been going from bad to worse, while the condition of the whole of southern Persia approached very closely to anarchy. During the last two or three days the position at Shiraz had become really critical, and there appeared to be real danger to the lives of British subjects. We were, therefore, contemplating a considerable and immediate increase to our consular guard at Shiraz and possibly at one or two other places. We had abstained from taking any such steps as long as possible in the hope that the situation might possibly improve, but our last telegrams were of so alarming a character that we could no longer defer taking measures to protect our own people.

Mirza Mehdi Khan asked if we could not give the Persian Government a little more time wherein to organise some protective measures. Sir A. Nicolson replied that we really could not wait longer, as we might be endangering the lives of our subjects; that he did not wish to blame the Persian Government, who doubtless had had to contend with great difficulties, but the case of our people was urgent and pressing, and it would be wrong for us to abstain from giving them such protection as was possible.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[39695]

No. 48.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 480.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 10, 1911.

SHIRAZ.

Acting consul reports that the town is fairly quiet and that some of the disorderly Arabs have left, but good behaviour of the rest cannot be counted upon.

Kawam has issued proclamation that his only wish is to see order restored, and that there will be no reprisals for the past.

Whereabouts of Nizam and of Soulet unknown.

[39821]

No. 49.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 481.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 10, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 301 [of 9th October: Shiraz escort.]

I have this morning made announcement as instructed in your telegram No. 299 [of 8th October].

[37878]

No. 50.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 239.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 10, 1911.

M. KOKOVTSOFF showed, in a conversation which I had with him yesterday, that he is keenly interested in foreign affairs.

He remarked that, in so far as Persia was concerned, our *entente* had not been giving satisfactory results. I asked him to specify, and he replied by citing the question of Major Stokes's appointment. I said that everything that the Russian Government could have asked in connection with the matter had been done by His Majesty's Government. M. Kokovtsoff acknowledged that this had now been done, but complained that it had only been done after great delay. I explained that, in order to meet Russian wishes, His Majesty's Government had taken a very strong course, and that the refusal to accept the resignation of Major Stokes raised questions of the gravest difficulty.

His Excellency then passed to the supposed designs of Turkey upon Persia, and appeared to attach importance to the rumoured intention of Turkey to recoup herself for Tripoli by acquiring Persian territory. The authorities of the Caucasus, he said, were constantly reporting that the Turks were steadily strengthening themselves in those regions in such a way as to menace the strategic position of Russia. Russia would be absolutely obliged to take action if this state of things continued. I assured him, of course, that in the Turco-Persian frontier question we should continue to co-operate with the Russian Government.

Next Saturday M. Kokovtsoff goes to have an audience with the Emperor in the Crimea.

[39124]

No. 51.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at the Foreign Office on the 4th instant, and told Sir A. Nicolson that the Persian Government were disappointed that the Russian Government had not agreed to refuse an asylum to the ex-Shah should the latter seek one. The Russian Government had stated that if the ex-Shah re-entered Russian territory he would be treated as a prisoner. Sir A. Nicolson told Mirza Mehdi Khan that, in his opinion, the Persian Government should be satisfied with this assurance. If the ex-Shah was interned and a strict surveillance maintained over him, he would

[1524]

G

be rendered harmless, and the Persian Government could then be easy in their minds. To expel a political refugee from Russian territory was, to an English mind, a very strong and unusual step. We in England on several occasions had not refused admittance to gentlemen who had been endeavouring to upset the Government of their country and had failed. We had even admitted and declined to surrender men who had committed political murders. Mirza Mehdi Khan said that the Persian Government were also disappointed that His Majesty's Government had not urged the Russian Government to refuse asylum to the ex-Shah. Sir A. Nicolson observed that we could not well have urged the Russian Government to take a step from which we ourselves would have abstained.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39993] No. 52.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 482.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October 11, 1911.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Shiraz, No. 342:—

"Disorders on roads are increasing. Telegraph gholam was robbed of horse and instruments 4 miles from Shiraz on the road to Bushire, and a second, accompanied by Government sowar, is surrounded by Kashgais 8 miles north of Shiraz. Up post from Bushire robbed on 7th October. There is every probability that the Bushire road will be as completely closed in a day or two as that to Ispahan has been for the last month and will undoubtedly continue to remain."

[39970] No. 53.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 483.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, October 11, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 461 of 3rd October.

Medjliss yesterday approved project for the engagement of twenty Swedish officers for the organisation of the army.

[39056] No. 54.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 11, 1911.*
WITH reference to your letter of the 2nd October, transmitting copy of Major Stokes's telegram of the 27th September, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that he is of opinion that that officer's resignation of his commission in the Indian army should not be accepted. Sir E. Grey, in his telegram No. 242 of the 18th August, instructed Sir G. Barclay to inform the Persian Government that Major Stokes's resignation could not be accepted, in view of the well-founded objections of the Russian Government to his appointment, and the Russian Government have expressed their thanks for this decision. His Majesty's Government are therefore committed to the refusal of Major Stokes's resignation. I am to transmit to you a copy of a telegram from Sir G. Barclay, and of the reply which has been returned to him on this subject. Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn on what grounds, in the opinion of the Marquess of Crewe, the refusal to accept the resignation of an officer in the Indian army should be based in these circumstances.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[40064]

No. 55.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 485.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 12, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 294: Turco-Persian frontier.

Russian Minister and I yesterday advised Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed.

[40151]

No. 56.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 243.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburg, October 12, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 603 of 11th October and my telegram No. 237 of 7th October.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet heard from Russian Minister at Tehran, and feels a difficulty in expressing any views. He thinks that much depends on whether Swedish officers are to have superior command or only position of organisers. He is again telegraphing to Russian Minister, and remarks that Swedish Government will not give their assent without consulting us.

[40239]

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.*

PERSIAN Minister here states that Ala-ed-Dowleh will proceed to Shiraz with a considerable force, and that Soulet and Kawam have settled their differences and have promised to assist Government in restoring order at once. I should like to have your opinion as to whether any satisfactory and immediate improvement in situation is likely to result if above facts are true.

[39878]

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 607.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.*

YOU should express to M. Kokovtsoff my sincere regret that he should consider the working of the Anglo-Russian *Entente* in Persia to have been unsatisfactory (see your telegram No. 239 of the 10th instant).

You should point out to his Excellency that, whereas the inconvenience caused to Russian trade by the Persian Government's inability, through lack of funds and other causes, to maintain order on the roads is comparatively slight, the constant disorders in the south have practically rendered impossible the continuance of British trade in Southern Persia.

As regards the question of the Turco-Persian frontier, His Majesty's Government have acted in the closest harmony with the Russian Government, and have always shown every possible desire to co-operate with them.

Again, in connection with the Stokes question, although the appointment of that officer would doubtless have facilitated the task of organising a force to deal with disturbances on the roads, His Majesty's Government, in deference to the wishes of the Russian Government, took strong and exceptional action which blocked the appointment. At the time, the Russian Government expressed their thanks to His Majesty's Government for their action in the matter.

Our conduct and attitude since the signature of the Anglo-Russian convention has thus been in perfect loyalty to its letter and spirit, and the fidelity with which it has been observed in regard to Persia has been on several occasions a cause of mutual congratulation for both Governments. His Majesty's Government have co-operated with Russia throughout all Persian difficulties, even when by so doing they have exposed themselves to criticism in Parliament and outside.

[40482]

No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 263.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day what M. Kokovtsoff had said to Mr. O'Beirne about the *entente* in Persia and Major Stokes.

I also told him what I had instructed Mr. O'Beirne to say, and I pointed out to Count Benckendorff that, as the organisation of the gendarmerie would remedy the injury to British trade in Persia, our action in supporting the Russian objection to the employment of Major Stokes ought to be recognised as extremely loyal to the *entente*. I recognised the natural objection of Russia to the employment of a British officer to command gendarmerie in the north of Persia, and I understood that Major Stokes had expressed strong anti-Russian views. But none the less, in view of the fact that Russian trade was not suffering in the same degree as British trade, and might, by the blocking of the southern trade routes, positively be gaining what we were losing, it was not fair for M. Kokovtsoff to complain of the working of the *entente* from the Russian point of view.

Count Benckendorff admitted the force of all this, but told me he gathered from what he heard that M. Kokovtsoff felt that the *tout ensemble* in Northern Persia was becoming increasingly British. Mr. Shuster seemed to select British people, and an Englishman had been appointed to control the Posts and Telegraphs. The general tendency seemed to be towards an increase of British influence in Northern Persia.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[39210]

No. 60.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that as the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's representative at St. Petersburg that his Government will make no objection to Mr. New's appointment in the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs, Sir E. Grey approves the proposed loan of Mr. New's services to the Persian Government.*

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[40237]

No. 61.

Memorandum.

THE Persian Minister read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from his Government again urging that the increased consular guards should not be dispatched. The Ala-ed-Dowleh had been appointed Governor-General, and was proceeding with an armed force to Shiraz, while a force of Persian Cossacks was also being sent thither from Kashan. The Kawam and Soulet-ed-Dowleh had made peace with each other and had intimated their intention of assisting the Government in the restoration of order and in making compensation for any losses incurred by Europeans. In these circumstances the Persian Government trusted that His Majesty's Government would reconsider their decision to dispatch the reinforcements.

Sir A. Nicolson told the Minister that our last telegrams from Sir G. Barclay did not indicate any permanent improvement in the situation at Shiraz, and that he felt sure that if Sir G. Barclay saw any prospect of order being satisfactorily restored and tranquillity ensured he would be the first to inform us, but we had heard nothing from him to that effect.

Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.

* See No. 59, copy of which has already been sent to India Office.

[40271]

No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th October, regarding the dispatch of troops to Shiraz.

India Office, October 13, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 12, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram of the 10th October, 1911.

It has been ascertained that transport of two squadrons of cavalry with their transport mules, and their landing at Bushire by the 27th instant, can be arranged by the Indian Marine. By the above-mentioned date a half-company of infantry, which can act as baggage guard to the cavalry on the march, will be at Bushire. Provided country is considered by Cox sufficiently open for that force to proceed, troops could start for Shiraz as soon as they land. Two remaining squadrons could be dispatched soon after the two first. If infantry were sent, collection of transport for them would involve considerable delay.

[40289]

No. 63.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 486.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 13, 1911.

ENGLISH lady doctor, Miss Ross, travelling with a large caravan of merchandise from Isfahan to Shiraz, has been badly beaten near Abadeh by Kuhgeluis, who captured caravan. Miss Ross escaped alone, and has arrived at Abadeh on foot.

[40291]

No. 64.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 488.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 13, 1911.

MY telegram No. 432 of 25th September.

A combined force of Persian Cossacks, under two of the Russian officers of the Cossack brigade, and Bakhtiari is attacking Naib Hussein at Kashan to-day.

[40292]

No. 65.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 489.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 13, 1911.

MY telegram No. 481 of 10th October.

Following is substance of reply of Persian Government:—

Persian Government attribute ill-success of their special efforts to restore order in Fars (? to) Kawam incident and his bast in British consulate. Subsequently insurrection of ex-Shah, &c., in suppression of which moral support of His Majesty's representative was not forthcoming, diverted energies and [group undecypherable] resources of Persian Government.

Now that the Government were free from embarrassments in the north and west and were about to direct their whole efforts to restoration of order and security in south, step contemplated by British Government, which might form a precedent for others, would be extremely unexpected on the part of a friendly Power.

[1524]

H

Steps enumerated as being taken by Persian Government are:—

1. Cossack detachment numbering 350 men, now at Kashan, will be ordered to proceed to Shiraz as soon as they have dealt with Naib Hussein (see my telegram No. 488 of 13th October).
2. Ala-ed-Dowleh, with necessary force, will shortly leave Tehran for his new post.
3. Swedish officers are busily engaged on organisation of a gendarmerie. Their work will soon show a result, and a sufficient force for the protection of the southern roads will be dispatched.
4. Reconciliation of Soulet and Kawam, who have undertaken to obey absolutely orders of Government.

Persian Government are confident in eventual success of these measures. In the meantime every measure will be taken for protection of British lives and property. In these circumstances Persian Government beg me to dissuade His Majesty's Government from taking step contemplated, "so that the Persian Government may have time to complete the measures they have undertaken, and that an uncalled-for step on the part of the British Government may not delay achievement of their plans."

[40414]

No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th October, 1911, relative to cavalry for Shiraz.

Telegram to Viceroy, dated the 10th October, on the same subject is also enclosed.

India Office, October 14, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, October 10, 1911.

POSITION at Shiraz. See your telegram dated the 7th October, 1911.

You should send troops with least possible delay, as they are required for protection of life and property, not of roads. If considered suitable for the present purpose, and if it would reduce delay, infantry may be substituted for cavalry. Postponement of despatch until the 26th instant is in any case most undesirable.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 13, 1911.

SHIRAZ. Please refer to your telegram dated the 10th October, 1911.

We are dispatching with all expedition four squadrons of cavalry, of which it is expected that the two first will embark on the 22nd October at Bombay, and the other two a few days after.

[40480]

No. 67.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 14.)

Sir,

India Office, October 14, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 11th instant, regarding the resignation of Major Stokes, and, in reply, to say that the Government of India will be instructed by telegram to refuse it.

As regards the reason to be assigned in replying to him, I am to observe that he is in the employ of the Foreign Office, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is better acquainted with the grounds on which it has been decided to refuse to accept his resignation than the Marquess of Crewe, who was not consulted before the decision was taken. But, on the information before him, his Lordship would suggest that the explanation might be that His Majesty's Government are unable to advise the King to accept the resignation of an officer who tenders it for the sole purpose of taking service under a foreign Power in circumstances which, in their judgment, make his action detrimental to British interests.

Sir E. Grey has doubtless not overlooked the fact that it will not be possible to maintain this attitude indefinitely, and that if in a few months' time Major Stokes again tenders his resignation on private grounds it will be exceedingly difficult to refuse it.

The draft of a telegram which, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, it is proposed to address to the Government of India is enclosed.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[40519]

No. 68.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 490.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 14, 1911.

SHIRAZ and southern roads.

Reference to your telegram No. 304, dated 12th October.

I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 455 of 30th September that Ala-ed-Dowleh was reluctant to take up his post at Shiraz. His Excellency has now availed himself of the pretext of the proposed dispatch of British troops, and informs me that if they are sent he will not proceed. Although he assures me that he will go if His Majesty's Government cancel their decision, I am rather doubtful whether, in that case, he would not discover some other excuse for refusing the appointment.

The considerable force to which Persian Minister referred is composed partly of the Cossacks who, as I reported in my telegram No. 488 of 13th October, are now operating against Naib Hussein at Kashan, and I do not believe that the Russian colonel will permit them to go so far unaccompanied by the two Russian officers who are with them at present. Moreover, I do not know whether we should wish to see Russian officers at Shiraz. In addition to the Cossacks, I believe it has been arranged to send a force of ordinary Persian troops with Ala-ed-Dowleh, but it has been proved in the past that such soldiery melts away at Shiraz.

In their representations to me, Persian Government have laid great emphasis on agreement concluded between Kawam and Soulet. Such a reconciliation is, however, scoffed at by Ala-ed-Dowleh, and, in reply to my enquiry, acting consul at Shiraz telegraphs at follows (No. 350 of 13th October):—

"About ten days ago a document was sealed by Kawam, which had previously been sealed by Soulet, and which was subsequently sealed by Mirza Ibrahim, the chief stipulations of which were, that the ruling of the Persian Government in the matter of the Governor-General and the immediate dismissal of their forces should be accepted by both parties, that Soulet should protect traffic on the Bushire road, and that looted property should be returned by both sides. No importance was attached to document by Kawam, who signed it without oath and without keeping a copy—both parties intending signature merely to be a demonstration of public spirit. It is unnecessary to add that all its conditions have remained unfulfilled, and the general situation cannot conceivably be affected by it.

"It did not previously occur to me that this document could be contemplated in the light of a settlement, seeing the little importance attached to it at the time."

Mr. Knox also informs me that Kawam is constantly telegraphing to the Premier, urging dismissal of Soulet from the Ikhaniship of the Kashgais, and that Soulet is, on his side, engaged in active intrigues against Kawam. In view of these reports, I am forced to regard any real settlement with some scepticism.

It cannot, however, be denied that situation in the town has shown momentary improvement since the time when the decision was come to to send British troops. If, therefore, this step has been decided on solely on account of the situation in Shiraz

itself, the improvement already noted and the prospect, which it seems justifiable to entertain, that if Ala-ed-Dowleh proceeds a further amelioration will occur, perhaps warrant our holding our hand. In these circumstances, if, as I infer from your telegram No. 299 of 8th October, the state of the roads is to be left out of consideration, Persian Government might be informed that we will postpone the dispatch of troops for a week, but that, unless Ala-ed-Dowleh is on his way to Shiraz when that period has elapsed, they will then leave for that town.

The roads, however, are in a truly desperate state, and pending the organisation of an efficient gendarmerie, which is remote, there is no likelihood of any real improvement on them. In addition to the assault on Miss Ross, of which I informed you yesterday, a large robbery of British goods has occurred near Bunder Abbas, and latest reports from His Majesty's consul at Kerman show that no road between that town and Bunder Abbas is passable, and that conditions are worse than consul has yet known them. I append two telegrams which reached me yesterday from acting consul at Shiraz and His Majesty's consul-general, Bushire.

Shiraz telegram No. 346 of 13th October:—

"All telegraph lines to Bushire have been totally interrupted for last forty hours. Another gholam sent out to investigate was robbed of everything and severely beaten. Loss of tools and telephones in these robberies is causing much inconvenience to department. So far as can yet be ascertained, damage already done is most serious, line being cut in several places and large quantities of wire carried off. It is at present impossible to obtain guards for working parties, and there is consequently little hope of prompt repair."

Bushire telegram No. 261 of 13th October:—

"Ala-ed-Dowleh telegraphs to Governor of Gulf Ports that Nizam and Soulet, who are in rebellion against the Government, are on their way to Kazerun to raise coin; he continues that governor must at all costs oppose them, and should raise the khans on the road and in Tangistan against them, and that Nizam's estates are forfeited to the Government and should be taken possession of. Action on above lines can only result in continued and violent disorder on road."

Cox's telegram then recapitulates a series of outrages on telegraph employés.

[40474]

No. 69.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 491.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, October 14, 1911.

PERSIAN Government inform me that Soulet-ed-Dowleh has been dismissed and Zeigham appointed Ikhami of Kashgais.

[40457]

No. 70.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 246.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 14, 1911.

I SAW the president of the council last night and gave him your message, as instructed in your telegram No. 607 of the 13th October.

Your message appeared genuinely to impress M. Kokovtsoff, who begged me to convey to you his hearty thanks for your courtesy in affording those explanations, and asked me to assure you that it was his one wish to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in complete understanding. He said that at the present moment it was more important than it had ever been before that our *entente* should work effectively.

Turning to the Turco-Persian frontier question, M. Kokovtsoff again spoke strongly in the sense of our previous conversation, reported in my telegram No. 239 of the 10th October. On my enquiring whether there were any definite steps in which our co-operation was desired by the Russian Government, M. Kokovtsoff replied that he would be frank with me. A proposal had been made by the Viceroy of the Caucasus that Russian troops should be sent to Khoi. This proposal had been negatived by the Russian Government, who had, however, dispatched to Khoi one of

their consular officers, a man of energetic character, and given him an escort consisting of about 100 men, so as to enable him to act with firmness. I said that it was inconceivable to me that the Turks should at the present juncture contemplate any action calculated to provoke Russian hostility; but M. Kokovtsoff disagreed with me, and asked whether any objection would be raised by His Majesty's Government to the step which Russia was taking. I said that, personally, I felt sure that His Majesty's Government would not raise objections.

(Confidential.)

It is evident that the Russian Government mean to act energetically, and M. Kokovtsoff spoke as if they had seriously considered the question of a military occupation.

[40271]

No. 71.

Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 307.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 14, 1911.

INCREASE of escorts in South Persia.

Telegram from Calcutta states that arrangements for transport of two cavalry squadrons and their transport mules can be made by Indian Marine. This detachment to land on 27th October at Bushire. By that date there will also be a half-company of infantry at Bushire; this could accompany the cavalry as baggage-guard on the march. Force thus constituted could start as soon as landed for Shiraz, provided country is, in the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, sufficiently open. Two squadrons would remain, and will be sent a few days subsequently.

Decision as to whether the force should proceed simultaneously or in two different detachments is left to you and Lieutenant-Colonel Cox; you should consult on this point with His Majesty's consul at Shiraz.

[38997]

No. 72.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, October 14, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, with reference to your letter of the 4th instant, that he sees no objection to your mentioning at the Persian Legation the assurances which you have received from His Majesty's Government in regard to your oxide business in Hormuz.

With regard to the request of Muin-ut-Tujjar, contained in his letter to you of the 20th ultimo, that he may be supplied with copies of the correspondence which has passed between you and the Foreign Office since the 31st March last, I am to say that if you will be good enough to furnish Sir E. Grey with a list of the documents which you propose to communicate to Muin-ut-Tujjar he will consider the matter.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has no objection to the terms of the letter which you propose addressing to Muin-ut-Tujjar in reply to his letter of the 20th ultimo.

Sir G. Barclay has not yet reported the result of the representations which he was instructed to make to the Persian Government upon the receipt of your letter of the 15th June last.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[40500]

No. 73.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 492.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 300 of 9th October: Major Stokes.

The Russian Minister is to-day informing Shuster that, as it is unfortunately

[1524]

I

found impossible to restrict Stokes's services to the south, the Russian Government must adhere to their protest to his engagement to organise Treasury gendarmerie.

[40501]

No. 74.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 493.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

MY telegram No. 488 of 13th October.

Government force occupied Kashan yesterday after some fighting. Naib Hussein escaped.

[40502]

No. 75.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 494.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 305 of 13th October: Swedish officers.

Bill passed Medjliss on 10th October provides for engagement for three years of the following two Swedish officers: "for the administration, organisation of military instruction and scientific tuition of the Persian army." One major or lieutenant-colonel as head of the mission, nine captains, seven lieutenants, and three non-commissioned officers. Their duties are enumerated in detail, and the [group undecypherable] appears to include both organisation and command.

A year's credit, about 11,000*l.*, has been voted for payment of these officers.

[40503]

No. 76.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 495.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

MISS ROSS.

In reply to your telegram No. 306 of the 14th October, I have the honour to report that, in accordance with my usual custom in important robbery cases, I brought the facts to the notice of Persian Government, stating that if the claim which would be presented at Shiraz by His Majesty's consular officer were not settled locally, I should be compelled to claim from the central authorities.

I am now addressing a further note to Persian Government, as I hear this morning that all Miss Ross's surgical instruments have been stolen, pointing out the urgency of a restitution of the articles carried off or payment of their value.

I can, however, hold out no hope of any early settlement, except in the event of our accepting some payment as an act of grace, and such a step would, I fear, preclude the hope of obtaining any compensation over and above the value of the property stolen.

I await your instructions on this point. Unless we proceed on these lines I fear settlement of case will be delayed until a general settlement of our numerous outstanding claims is forced upon Persian Government. For Persian Government to settle Miss Ross's claim otherwise than as an act of grace, would be tantamount to an admission on their part of their liability for robbery cases.

[40504]

No. 77.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 496.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

RUSSIAN instructors for Persian army.

(Very Confidential.)

Please see my telegram No. 494 of to-day's date.

My Russian colleague is, I believe, advising the Russian Government to propose

to the Persian Government the engagement of Russian instructors, and to consult you as to any reserves which you may desire to make as to their engagement.

The above information is of such a confidential nature that it should not be used by His Majesty's Embassy at St. Petersburg.

[40627]

No. 78.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 181.)

Sir,

Stockholm, October 12, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 29 of the 5th October, I have the honour to inform you that Baron Ramel stated to me on the 10th instant that the Swedish Government had received a request for the appointment of seven more officers for service in Persia, in order to organise the gendarmerie, in addition to those already sent to Tehran. Besides these officers a request had also been received, through the Persian Minister in Paris for the loan of an officer of superior rank, in order to hold the chief command. He had, he added, no knowledge of any intention on the part of Persia to ask for the loan of Swedish officers in order to organise a small army, as stated in the press. I have since ascertained that as many as fifty officers have volunteered for service, and these are for the most part men of good standing in their profession who are attracted mainly by the desire for adventure and novelty. Baron Ramel thought that, although the army authorities had not been averse to the employment of a few officers in Persia, as this would afford them useful experience and training there might be some difficulty in sparing a large number. He could, however, say nothing definite. As I have remarked before, I believe the type of officer who is volunteering is one likely to be of considerable service to Persia under present circumstances. Count Ehrensward expressed his satisfaction at the friendly attitude adopted in this matter by the Governments of Great Britain and Russia.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[40717]

No. 79.

Mirza Mehdi Khan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

THE Persian Minister has the honour to refer the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to his conversations with Sir Arthur Nicolson on the 4th, 7th, and 12th instant regarding the intention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to strengthen their consular guards in Shiraz and possibly elsewhere. When on the 4th instant Sir Arthur Nicolson informed the Persian Minister of the intention of His Britannic Majesty's Government, Mirza Mehdi Khan stated that, in his opinion, such an action at the present moment was most undesirable and unnecessary. The Persian Government had, before the recent lamentable events (viz., the return of the ex-Shah under the circumstances already well known, and the activities of Salar-ed-Dowleh) taken elaborate measures to keep the province of Fars and the trade routes secure.

As His Britannic Majesty's Government well know, the efforts of the Persian Government had not remained fruitless; order and security was maintained, and this fact was recognised by His Britannic Majesty's Government. The recent deplorable and serious events, however, diverted the attention of the Persian Government to the northern and western districts. Just at the time when they were busy initiating reforms and putting things in order, when they had, on the one hand, contracted a loan and on the other brought foreign experts to assist them in the reorganisation of the Departments of State, the events referred to took place; the Persian Government had therefore to devote attention, energy, and money to save the country from so great a danger which was threatening it. Now that they had done so, they would concentrate their whole attention to the province of Fars and to the southern districts and the trade routes; the Swedish military officers have been brought to Persia to organise a gendarmerie for this very purpose. The Persian Minister further pointed out to Sir Arthur Nicolson that, in view of the above facts, any action by Great Britain would produce a bad impression, and would be taken as a departure from the generous policy always pursued by His Britannic Majesty's Government. Mirza Mehdi Khan said that

in his opinion the situation in Shiraz, however unsatisfactory, was not such as to be of danger to Europeans, and begged that His Britannic Majesty's Government might not take any action.

After reporting this conversation to his Government, Mirza Mehdi Khan received a telegram from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he communicated to Sir Arthur Nicolson on the 7th instant. The Minister for Foreign Affairs approved what Mirza Mehdi Khan had said in his conversation of the 4th instant, but asked him to add that, had His Britannic Majesty's Government given Persia their moral support, the Persian Government would have been able to devote their whole attention to the south. The Persian Government therefore begged that now, instead of increasing their consular guards, His Britannic Majesty's Government might give them this so-much-needed moral support which it is their right and obligation to give. The Persian Government are daily harassed by most serious interferences of the Russian authorities—interferences to which the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government has every time been drawn. The Persian Government needs the support of Great Britain to put a stop to these interferences, which encourage malefactors and lower the prestige of the Government.

On the 12th instant the Persian Minister communicated to Sir Arthur Nicolson another telegram from his Government. In view of the communications made through Mirza Mehdi Khan to the Foreign Office, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had been surprised to receive a note from Sir George Barclay saying that it was intended to increase the consular guards in Shiraz and possibly in Ispahan and Bushire. The Persian Government had taken measures to restore order immediately. The Ala-ed-Dowleh had been appointed Governor-General of Fars and was on the point of leaving Tehran with a strong military force. A detachment of Cossacks, which had been sent to Kashan, had orders to proceed to Shiraz. The Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the Kawam-ul-Mulk had made peace and had undertaken to act in perfect unison in assisting the Central Government to keep order. They had further solemnly promised to obey the Central Government in every matter, and had sent out of Shiraz all their armed followers. The Soulet-ed-Dowleh had further undertaken to keep the Shiraz-Bushire road secure. Moreover, the Swedish officers who have been engaged by the Persian Government for the purpose of organising a gendarmerie and protecting the trade routes arrived in Persia some time ago and are well advanced in their work.

Under the circumstances the Persian Government do not see the need of any action on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The sole cause of unrest in Shiraz was the dissension between the Kashgais and the Kawamis; this has been put right by the fact that the Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the Kawam-ul-Mulk have made peace and are working in unison. European subjects are not exposed to any danger, and their safety is, as it has always been, the special care of the Persian Government. But Shiraz is already quiet, and, in view of the measures taken by the Persian Government and the fact that they are now able to devote their whole attention to the south, there is not the least cause for anxiety as to the future.

The Persian Minister therefore, on behalf of his Government, begs to repeat the request that His Britannic Majesty's Government might not take the contemplated action.

Persian Legation, London, October 13, 1911.

[40786]

No. 80.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 497.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 307 of 14th October.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general, Bushire, No. 264:—

"Dispatch of cavalry. I have understood all along that three squadrons of cavalry only were going to Shiraz and one remaining at Bushire. If this is so I consider force should move up in one body. Knox only questions feasibility of this course on account of supply difficulties at the Shiraz end, but these can be surmounted from Bushire. But if, however, four squadrons are to be sent up, I see no objection to their proceeding in two detachments unless any untoward development occurs between now and 27th October."

I conclude that four squadrons are intended for eventual distribution between Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan, and on this assumption I would propose that three squadrons should move up to Shiraz simultaneously, four squadrons [? fourth squadron] remaining at Bushire.

[40785]

No. 81.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 16, 1911.

PERSIA.

My telegram No. 246 of the 14th October.

I asked M. Nératof to-day about the intended dispatch of a Russian consular officer to Khoi. His Excellency replied that, according to information which had reached him, a certain defile in the neighbourhood of Khoi was held by Turkish troops. When the Russian consular officer arrived he would have to judge what attitude he should adopt.

Things are said to be in a very disturbed condition in the neighbourhood of Resht, and the Russian Government are consequently sending 100 Cossacks to that place.

[40503]

No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 309.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 16, 1911.

ATTACK on Miss Ross. See your telegram No. 495 of yesterday.

If you can obtain value of property stolen you should accept it, but reserve the right to insist later on the Persian Government paying an indemnity to Miss Ross.

[40757]

No. 83.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr O'Beirne.

(No. 622.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 246 of 14th October.

His Majesty's Government will raise no objection respecting dispatch of consular escort to Khoi.

[39683]

No. 84

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 16, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th October respecting the consular escorts in Persia. I am to state that Sir E. Grey has taken due note of the desire of the Secretary of State for India that these troops should be employed solely for the protection of the life and property of British subjects in Shiraz, and instructions in this sense have been sent to His Majesty's representative at Tehran. In the present circumstances, Sir E. Grey will not press the matter of the wider scheme suggested in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 401 of the 14th September, but if the disorders on the southern roads continue, and if the local authorities and Sir G. Barclay consider that there will be no risk in occasionally escorting caravans, Sir E. Grey will, in view of the considerable British interests involved, bring the matter up again in accordance with the Marquess of Crowe's desire that the scheme should be subjected to further examination before acceptance of the responsibilities which may be involved in it.

I am to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your further letter

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of the 12th instant enclosing a telegram from the Viceroy of India, in which his Excellency reports that the dispatch to Shiraz of the 37th Central India Horse is being expedited.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[40874]

No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 17.)

Sir,

India Office, October 16, 1911.

IN continuation of Mr. Abrahams' letter of the 9th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you on the subject of the scheme for the protection of caravans on the roads of Southern Persia, suggested by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in his telegram No. 401 of the 14th September.

The views of the Government of India on this proposal were expressed in their telegram of the 30th September, copy of which was enclosed in my letter above quoted, and have the entire concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe. In his Lordship's opinion, it would be quite impossible in practice to differentiate attacks upon travelling escorts of cavalry from attacks upon any other of His Majesty's forces on foreign soil. That is to say, in the event of such attacks being made, it would be essential, for the purpose of maintaining the prestige in virtue of which alone such small bodies of men can safely move about the country at all, to undertake punitive measures against the tribes to which the assailants belong; and when once that process began, the consequences foreseen by the Government of India would surely follow.

Those consequences Lord Crewe naturally regards mainly from the Indian point of view; and I am to say that alike on political, military, and financial grounds he is in the highest degree averse from taking any step that is likely to precipitate them. The present commotion in the Moslem world is reflected in the numerous appeals for the good offices of His Majesty's Government in behalf of Turkey that have been received from Indian Moslems. And a military occupation of Southern Persia—or anything that could be misrepresented as such—following on recent events in Morocco and Tripoli would, in his Lordship's opinion, have a deplorable political effect in India.

Nor would the political effect of adopting the proposals be confined to the Moslems. As Sir E. Grey is perhaps aware, the military expenditure of the Indian Government is already an object of unfavourable criticism by important sections of Indian public opinion. The difficulty of rebutting such criticism will be greatly increased if it is seen that the Government of India are able to maintain even two regiments of cavalry for an indefinite time on foreign service, while it seems improbable that so small a force will long prove sufficient.

But apart altogether from this political aspect of the question, I am to say that neither the military nor the financial resources of India are such as to justify any material extension of Indian responsibilities at so great a distance from her frontier. The developments of Chinese policy on the north-east and east are already necessitating increased expenditure, and may not improbably involve some redistribution of the Indian army upon those frontiers; while a widespread disturbance on the north-western frontier—for which the existing acute antagonism between Moslem and Christian Powers is a predisposing condition—might at any moment call into action the full strength of the field army. And in this connection it should be mentioned that by 21 & 22 Viet. cap. 106, sec. 55 the consent of both Houses of Parliament is required before the revenues of India can be applied to the conduct of military operations beyond its external frontier.

These are the domestic considerations which lead Lord Crewe to view with apprehension the dispatch of troops even for the protection of life, and which make it impossible for him (as at present advised) to recommend the Council of India to sanction the expenditure, or any part of it, involved in the adoption of Sir G. Barclay's scheme. But there are two further considerations, arising from the state of Persia itself, which his Lordship wishes to submit to Sir E. Grey.

It is not to be supposed that the occasional passage of an escorted caravan along the roads will of itself suffice to restore order in the country, nor is it proposed to use the troops directly for that purpose. But it is the now chronic disorder which, by destroying the purchasing power of the people and the credit of the merchants, and by

driving peaceful inhabitants into predatory habits, is far more damaging to British trade than the mere insecurity of the roads; and until it is removed, by measures which the Persian Government alone can take, his Lordship fears that any beneficial result that the introduction of Indian troops might have would be wholly incommensurate with the danger and the expense.

In conclusion, his Lordship feels strongly that the dispatch of large bodies of troops to Persia, contrary to the express wishes of the Government, except for the actual protection of life, cannot be justified on any grounds that would satisfy reasonable public opinion in this country.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[40925]

No. 86.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 498.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 17, 1911.

REGENT yesterday sent me a very confidential message to the effect that intrigues on the part of the extremists have brought about a Cabinet crisis. Three Ministers have already tendered their resignation, and in consequence Prime Minister has decided to resign. This decision will take effect in a week, when the Regent will announce to the Medjliss that he will appoint a new Prime Minister of their choice, and that he will then himself resign the Regency. Regent tells me that he cannot face the prospect of intercourse with an extremist Cabinet, with whom he must be in constant conflict.

[40966]

No. 87.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Stockholm, October 17, 1911.

SWEDISH Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard nothing as yet from the Persian Government as to engagement of twenty officers to organise army. Swedish Government will probably consent to the loan of seven officers for the gendarmerie, but it is not certain whether twenty more can be spared. In any case, they will take no steps without consulting London and St. Petersburg. I explained difficulties as to the Cossack brigade, &c., which the Minister for Foreign Affairs quite appreciated.

[41265]

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 128.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at the Foreign Office to-day to renew the request of his Government that the dispatch of reinforcements to the consular guards should be postponed. Sir A. Nicolson went over all the old ground again with him and read to him the substance of most of the telegrams which we had received, and pointed out to him the extremely critical situation at Shiraz about a fortnight ago, and the deplorable condition of the roads at the present moment. Although Shiraz was for the moment fairly tranquil, this temporary improvement was largely owing, we understood, to the knowledge that we were dispatching additional escorts, and there was no guarantee whatever that a recrudescence of the former critical state of things would not take place if we were to postpone sending our detachments. We really could not wait till some indefinite day for the Persian Government to take necessary and, above all, efficient measures themselves. The presence of our increased escorts would in reality be of assistance to the Persian authorities, and we could not admit that they would diminish the prestige of the Ala-ed-Dowleh or any other Governor-General, as the Persian Minister asserted. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was afraid that the Minister must inform his Government that, with every possible desire to show our good will to them, we could not postpone measures undertaken for the protection of British lives

and property. We had allowed a very long period to elapse before deciding on these steps in the hope that the situation would improve.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38296]

No. 89.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 17, 1911.*
IN consequence of the anarchy which has recently prevailed at Shiraz and of the insecurity of the trade routes down to the Persian Gulf, it has been found necessary to send troops from India to Southern Persia.

The recommendation made by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire a month ago was that the mounted escorts at Ispahan, Bushire, Kerman, and Bunder Abbas should each be increased by 100 men; the escort at Shiraz by 200; that a vice-consulate should be established at Bam with an escort of 200; and that these escorts should be employed to protect British caravans.

These recommendations have been supported by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and the Government of India, who were consulted on the subject, have proposed a scheme which involves the employment of two native regiments and their distribution at the places mentioned above. They pointed out that the cost of mule transport and of providing barrack accommodation would be very considerable, and they asked that two-thirds of the expenditure might be borne by the Imperial Government.

It has been decided to dispatch one native cavalry regiment at once to Persia, to be stationed mainly at Shiraz with, possibly, a detachment at Ispahan.

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to take the earliest opportunity of bringing this matter to the notice of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury. Further information will be supplied in due course with regard to the actual number of troops and their destinations, but in the meantime it is important to consider what proportion of the cost should fall upon the Imperial Government and from what vote such expenditure should be defrayed.

Sir E. Grey sees no sufficient reason why His Majesty's Government should undertake to pay more than one-half of the outlay involved, but even that share would amount to a much larger sum than could be made available from the diplomatic and consular vote, and it appears to him that the dispatch of troops for the protection of British subjects in Southern Persia, owing to the general state of insecurity now existing, cannot be regarded in the same light as the maintenance of small escorts at the principal diplomatic and consular posts in that country.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[41027]

No. 90.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received October 18.)

*Winechester House, Old Broad Street, London,
October 17, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that during the past few months repeated messages have been received through the medium of the Imperial Commissioner, Sadigh-es-Sultanch, to the effect that the Persian Government desires the prompt removal of the company's launch and barges on the Upper Karun River, and as these are still necessary to the company's transport operations, I have protested strongly, and Mr. Brown, the company's agent in Tehran, has been in communication with His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.

Last month I was advised by our agents at Mohammerah that the launch in question would have to be shortly replaced by a new one, as she was practically worn out owing to the extremely heavy nature of the work she had performed and to damage received on the way out from this country. Apprehending that the instalment of a new launch in replacement of the present one may further complicate and reopen a question which, in the opinion of Mr. Brown writing on the 6th ultimo, would

probably be allowed to drop, I wrote to him on the 22nd ultimo asking him to obtain His Britannic Majesty's Minister's views on the subject.

I have now received his cabled reply as follows:—

"Referring to your letter of the 22nd ultimo, British Minister, Tehran, apprehending great difficulties, suggested sounding treasurer-general. Latter informs me he has been requested by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tehran, to go thoroughly into everything concerning Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) and deal with it. Treasurer-general informs me he will go through everything with me and settle all points definitely, and nothing will be allowed to stand in way to delay Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) giving Persian Government royalties. He is strongly of opinion there will not be objections new steam-launch, but will give definite decision within a week."

It is essentially necessary that the company should be in a position to carry their own material on the Upper Karun, instead of being dependent upon the vagaries of launches belonging to the Muin and others, who have at times as much (or more) general cargo as they can carry, and I trust that the final decision of the treasurer-general will be a favourable one.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

[41019]

No. 91.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 500.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

ESCORT reinforcements.

Reference to my telegram No. 489 of the 13th October.

Minister of Foreign Affairs has addressed a further appeal to me begging me to prevail upon His Majesty's Government not to increase the guard of the Shiraz consulate. His Excellency's letter declares that such a step could in no case be justifiable, and that a pretext for it cannot be found in the state of affairs in Shiraz, where British lives and property are in no danger.

Minister of Foreign Affairs enumerates the measures taken by Persian Government, and states that over 3,000 men will be sent to Shiraz. Some of the seven additional Swedish gendarmerie officers will, on their arrival in December, be dispatched to Fars, exclusively for service in that province.

The communication ends as follows:—

"It is absolutely necessary for the pacification of the south that Ala-ed-Dowleh should proceed to Shiraz, and an insurmountable obstacle will be placed in the way of his departure by the measure proposed by His Majesty's Government."

Your telegram No. 207 of 14th October leads me to assume that it has been decided to dispatch as many as 400 British troops, and that, consequently, the impression I had received from your telegram No. 209 of 8th October (please see my telegram No. 490 of 14th October) that the condition of the roads was to be left out of consideration was incorrect, * and that the troops are intended as part of our scheme for the roads. In these circumstances I venture to submit that it might be politic to inform Persian Government of the possibility of British caravans being escorted by the reinforced escorts, and further, that these reinforcements will be withdrawn as soon as effective results have been obtained from measures taken by Persian Government to restore security on the roads, and to maintain order in Shiraz?

If I am not authorised to make a communication on these lines it will be somewhat difficult to answer Persian Government's appeals, for if Ala-ed-Dowleh takes up the appointment, situation in Shiraz, which is already better, will probably improve still more.

* I have inserted these words in the paraphrase to make my meaning clearer. As the telegram was drafted my meaning does not seem to have been understood.—G. B.

[41059]

No. 92.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 501.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

I am informed by Persian Government that they suspect Mohammad Ali Mirza to be at present staying in governor's house at Ashkabad and to be planning a descent upon Meshed.

My Russian colleague scoffs at the idea of His Majesty being at former place. From the last information that he had received it would appear that Mohammad Ali Mirza was proceeding to Bujnurd from the Astrabad district, possibly en route for Meshed.

[41068]

No. 93.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 502.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

In continuation of my telegram No. 501 of to-day's date.

Major Sykes telegraphs that the Governor of Bujnurd expects Mohammad Ali Mirza shortly to arrive at that town.

[41070]

No. 94.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 503.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

SITUATION at Shiraz.

Reference to my telegram No. 491 of 14th October.

Mr. Acting Consul Knox telegraphs as follows, No. 358, dated 17th October:—

"There seems no indication at present of Kashgaris quieting down. Ilkhaniship of the tribe is already being claimed by Soulet-es-Sultaneh, the brother of Soulet-el-Dowleh, and it is reliably stated that the latter has written to the chief mullahs in Shiraz to the effect that he is impelled by the rumours reaching him from the town to stir up general disorders in the south. A telegram has also been received from Zeighum-es-Sultaneh stating that he will delay his departure until a force of Arabs is sent to meet him on the road. Principal Arab chiefs quitted Shiraz this morning, presumably with this intention."

[40786]

No. 95.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 18, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from Sir G. Barclay respecting the arrangements for the dispatch and distribution of the regiment of cavalry about to be sent from Bombay to Bushire.* Sir G. Barclay's assumption respecting the eventual distribution of the troops is evidently based upon Sir E. Grey's telegram to him, No. 299, of 5th October, of which I also transmit herewith a copy for convenience of reference.† I am to add that Sir E. Grey would propose to inform Sir G. Barclay, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, that his assumption is correct, but that the question of distributing the force is left to his discretion to decide in consultation with the local British consular representatives.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 80.

† Not printed.

[40925]

No. 94^c.*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.*

(No. 625.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 18, 1911.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs should be informed of substance of Tehran telegram No. 498 of yesterday. You should also suggest that, in view of importance attached by Great Britain and Russia to Nasr-ul-Mulk's remaining as Regent, the two Ministers should receive instructions to urge His Highness not to resign. We would propose that latitude should be allowed to Sir G. Barclay and M. Poklewski, as they may decide, regarding whether, or not, to carry out the above instructions.

[41118]

No. 96.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 19.)

Sir,

India Office, October 18, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, and, in reply, to say that he will arrange for the loan of the services of Mr. G. E. New, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, to the Persian Government for a period of three years.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[41101]

No. 97. -

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 505.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that Major Stokes has been granted leave by the Government of India while his application to resign is under consideration.

Stokes is awaiting a reply to his application, and, should his resignation be refused, an answer to his demand as to the reasons for such a refusal before deciding upon further action, which may conceivably be defiant. In the meanwhile I have privately urged him to quit Tehran and spend his leave in England.

At present he is staying with the Treasurer-General, and is doubtless assisting him in gendarmerie organisation. It is consequently possible that representations may be made to you by Russian Government with a view to his recall to India.

[41205]

No. 98.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 506.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 19, 1911.

INCREASE in consular escorts.

Please see my telegram of to-day's date to Sir A. Nicolson.

At an audience which I had this afternoon with the Regent, His Highness begged me to advise His Majesty's Government not to increase the consular escort at Bushire; he said that that port was easily accessible to our ships should any emergency arise. As regards Shiraz, he asked that our reinforcements might be limited to some 50 men; 200 or 300 were, he observed, not enough for an army of occupation, and too many for an escort.

It is, in my opinion, more than ever desirable that, provided His Majesty's Government adhere to their intention to dispatch the troops, we should make the announcement that it is our intention to utilise them as escorts to our commercial caravans on the roads. There has never been any necessity of increasing the Bushire or Ispahan consular escorts, except as part of our road scheme, while as regards Shiraz, the situation in that town has changed since I was obliged to telegraph to urge His Majesty's Government to accelerate the dispatch of that part of the troops which was needed for our road scheme.

[41202]

No. 99.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, October 19, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 625 of 18th October: Regent.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is sending instructions to Russian Minister in sense suggested.

[41203]

No. 100.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 19, 1911.

A VERY serious communication on the subject of Persia was made to me this afternoon by M. Nératof. His Excellency said that a most pessimistic telegram had reached him from M. Poklewski, and that he feared that it would be impossible for Russia to refrain much longer from "measures of extreme rigour"—from an occupation, in fact, of the northern provinces of Persia. As reasons for such action he cited the increase of disorder in the district of Ardebil, accompanied by attacks on Russian convoys, &c.; the prospect of the confusion in Persian affairs in general still further increasing; and Shuster's attempts to control the administration in a manner entirely incompatible with the interests of Russia. It was evident that with M. Nératof this last consideration was the governing one, and he referred to the alleged intention of Shuster to obtain from the Medjliss full powers with regard to the negotiation of loans and railway concessions.

I remarked that the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to occupation were already known to his Excellency. In the event of North Persia being occupied by Russia, the task of defending the further co-operation of Russia and Great Britain in Persian affairs would be so difficult for you that I foresaw that our whole *entente* would be exposed to the gravest dangers. I was convinced therefore that every possible step would be taken by His Majesty's Government to remove the causes which, in the opinion of the Russian Government, rendered occupation necessary. I then reminded M. Nératof that up to the present the action of the Russian Government had been confined to vetoing every scheme put forward for introducing into Persia a Government on stable lines, and asked him what they now wished to be done.

His Excellency said that in the first place Shuster should be made to understand that he must proceed in co-operation with the two Powers and take their interests into account. He feared, however, that such an attitude was hardly compatible with the character of a man like Shuster. The reforms contemplated in the Persian administration must also be carried out gradually and in a manner in harmony with the interests of Russia; finally, in general, it must be understood that Russia's interests must be consulted.

I received the impression that although Russia is very near taking action, her hand may still be stayed if she gets satisfaction in the matter of Shuster's activity.

[41318]

No. 101.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 507.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 20, 1911.

SITUATION.

Please refer to your telegram to St. Petersburg No. 625 of the 18th October.

Regent, with whom I had an audience yesterday, seemed to take a somewhat more hopeful view of the situation, and no longer spoke definitely of resigning office. His Highness informed me that the difference in the Cabinet had been settled, and that the Ministers who had resigned had agreed to continue in office.

His Highness took exception to the way in which Mr. Shuster had identified himself with the extreme Nationalists, stating that it was the treasurer-general himself who had directly brought about the crisis in the Cabinet. Owing to a dictatorial letter from Shuster in which he complained of the settlement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of an unimportant Russian claim without reference to himself, Minister for Foreign Affairs had resigned, but had withdrawn his resignation when he saw that it had produced a serious crisis.

[41324]

No. 102.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 509.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 20, 1911.

ESCORT' reinforcements.

Please refer to my telegram to Sir A. Nicolson and to my telegram No. 506 of 19th October.

I received late last night a very confidential suggestion from treasurer-general, which he believed might avoid the necessity for strengthening the consular escorts at Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan.

Following is a summary of Shuster's proposal:—

Major Stokes's resignation might be accepted, and he might be forthwith sent, having signed his contract in its original form, to accompany Ala-ed-Dowleh to his post, supported by one or more Swedish officers and an adequate force with Maxims. At Shiraz Stokes should organise and direct an efficient gendarmerie with a view to restoring and maintaining order on the road. Treasurer-general went on to say that he would do his best to arrange this, and that he would not allow Stokes to leave Shiraz, so long as he, Shuster, judged his services to be necessary there. I understand that treasurer-general is confident of being able to induce Persian Government to agree to this scheme, but that he has not yet broached the matter to them, and without our encouragement will not do so.

Proposals seems at first sight to be worthy of consideration, but I defer comments pending receipt of your reply to my telegrams under reference, upon which any observations I could offer must in a certain degree depend.

[41334]

No. 103.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 510.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 20, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

Major Sykes telegraphs that Mohammad Ali Mirza has apparently betaken himself to Tashkend in Transcaspiia.

My Russian colleague has no confirmation of this rumour.

[41317]

No. 104.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 253.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 20, 1911.

PERSIA. My telegram No. 252 of the 19th October.

In our conversation yesterday M. Nératof expressed the opinion that in the event of the extreme party gaining the upper hand at Tehran there would no longer be any Government there with which we could deal. From this remark it is clear that the risk of Russian intervention would be greatly increased by the resignation of the Regent.

Another remark of M. Nératof's was to the effect that, in the present "uncertain situation," Russia could not favour the scheme for appointing Swedish officers to reorganise the Persian army. In reply to my complaint that every scheme of reform put forward in Persia had been met by Russian opposition, M. Nératof said that he regretted the obstructive rôle which Russia had been obliged to play, but that circumstances were alone to blame for her attitude.

[41459]

No. 105.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of

[1524]

M

he Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th October, 1911, relative to the increase of consular guards in Persia and the affairs of Kerman.

India Office, October 20, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 19, 1911.*

RESIDENT, Persian Gulf, telegraphs to following effect:—

"Consul at Kerman telegraphs as follows:—

"It will, I hope, be decided to send to Kerman at least one squadron. It is from Fars that principal robbers come [?], and there will be an increase of disorder here if order is restored on the Bushire-Shiraz-Ispahan road. Merchants pointed this out last year at the time the British note was presented, and I promised that I would represent, and did represent, the matter to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. If interests of merchants in Kerman, where our trade needs fostering, are again to be ignored it will, I submit, be very hard."

[41344] No. 106.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 21.)

Sir, *India Office, October 20, 1911.*
I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant regarding the destination of the Indian cavalry regiment now under orders for Persia.

In reply, I am to say that, provided that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is satisfied that the dispatch of the regiment is still necessary for the actual protection of life—a point on which recent telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran have thrown some doubt—the Marquess of Crewe is content that it should be left to the discretion of Sir G. Barclay, in consultation with the local consular authorities, to distribute it as may be necessary for that purpose. His Excellency will doubtless be given clearly to understand that the protection of the roads is not in question; and it should be borne in mind that the smaller the detachments, and the greater the distances to be traversed, the greater will be the risk of those complications deprecated in my letter of the 16th instant.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[41513] No. 107.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 512.) *Tehran, October 21, 1911.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 510.

Our agent at Astrabad reports that ex-Shah is in neighbourhood of Gumnash Tepe.

[41522] No. 108.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 513.) *Tehran, October 22, 1911.*
(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please refer to St. Petersburg telegrams Nos. 252 and 253, dated 19th and 20th October respectively.

I am not aware that the situation in the north of Persia has become sensibly

worse. I presume that the pessimistic telegram from M. Poklewski, to which Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs refers, is the one in which he informed them of Nasr-ul-Mulk's message to me, and which I reported in my telegram No. 498 of 17th October. In commenting on this message my Russian colleague stated that it was evident that intrigues were starting once again, and that complications were to be expected.

The principal feature of the situation in Tehran is the manner in which the extremists and the treasurer-general are co-operating. There is very great tension between Shuster and the Cabinet. The threatened ministerial crisis was avoided by a proposal to induce the Medjliss to curtail treasurer-general's powers, but this idea appears for the time being to have been tacitly abandoned, in consequence of the opposition of the Medjliss, who feared it would cause Shuster to resign office.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whom I saw yesterday, expressed himself very bitterly in regard to treasurer-general. His Excellency gave me to understand that the Cabinet greatly resent the firm control Shuster is exercising over Government funds, and that they are alive to the danger which his defiant attitude towards the two Powers involves.

I see no reason to suppose that Persian Government are responsible for treasurer-general's recent utterances in the British press, which I hear will be followed by a more detailed indictment of the policy of Great Britain and Russia in Persia.

Apart, however, from these publications, Shuster has taken no specific step, such as could justify action on the lines indicated in St. Petersburg telegram No. 252 of 19th October. Russian Government must however find the general trend of his policy obnoxious.

[41523] No. 109.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 514.) *Tehran, October 22, 1911.*
(Telegraphic.) P.

A PROPOSAL has been made by the Prime Minister to the Regent to arrest and expel some of the prominent extremists. The Prime Minister when telling me of this yesterday stated that the Regent had dissuaded him from taking such a measure, saying, that he would prefer to tender his resignation before the Government took such a step.

[41524] No. 110.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 515.) *Tehran, October 22, 1911.*
(Telegraphic.) Decode.

RECENT incidents on southern roads.

Three hundred soldiers Hamdan Regiment accompanying post encountered 200 Kuhgeluis near Yazdikhaat on Shiraz-Ispahan road, and were routed by them after severe conflict. Four bales piece-goods, property of Messrs. Ziegler, robbed on Shiraz-Bushire road 13th October. Messrs. Dixon notify loss of goods value 1,400l. on the same occasion as attack on Miss Ross. 400l. worth of property of Messrs. Weir robbed 3rd October near Kanarij on Shiraz-Bushire road.

[41595] No. 111.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 177.) *Gulahck, September 23, 1911.*
Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 393 of the 11th September, I have the honour to transmit herein extract of a letter from the British vice-consul at Sultanabad respecting the situation in that district after the defeat of Amir Mufakham.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Vice-Consul Strauss to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Sultanabad, September 16, 1911.*
I HAVE the honour to confirm my yesterday's wire running thus:—

"Royalists took Sultanabad on the 14th September."

On the 10th September Amir Mufakham departed with his people, marching via Gulpeighan and Khonsar to the Bakhtiari country, and the same day Sardar Zaffar Bakhtiari left towards Kum. Both together had about 1,500 well-armed men, and it made an unfavourable impression in the town that they gave up their position here without firing a shot in defence of it. The Sultanabad people then wrote to Salar-ed-Dowleh for protection. They got the reply that, if their letter would not have reached him the very same day, he would have started for Sultanabad with 30,000 men and 22 guns to destroy the place entirely. Two days later he sent about 400 men to take possession of the town. Most of them were people of the well-known robber Abbas Khan Chenari.*

During his short stay in Sultanabad Sardar Zaffar collected about 50,000 toman of taxes ("maliat"). The poor peasants of our province had to suffer great losses; they were robbed by Salar-ed-Dowleh's men as well as by the Bakhtiaris.

The news is spread that Salar-ed-Dowleh has appointed Hajji Seif-ed-Dowleh, the brother of Ain-ed-Dowleh, Governor of Sultanabad. People say he will be here in about two days. His park and castle were looted and destroyed by Amir Mufakham.

I have, &c.

T. L. STRAUSS.

[41596]

No. 112.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 178.)

Sir, *Gulahak, September 25, 1911.*
WITH reference to my despatch No. 137 of the 5th August, I have the honour to transmit herein copy of the fourth diary of the British and Russian delegates on tour on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 112.

Diary of Itinerary of the British and Russian Delegates from Soujboulak to Baneh, July 27 to August 2, 1911.

AS stated in the diary of our Itinerary No. 3, we arrived at Soujboulak on the 10th July. The delay (seventeen days) at this latter place was unavoidable, partly owing to the difficulty of communication with Tehran, for, although a telegraph-office exists at Soujboulak, there is no wire, the nearest station from which telegrams can be sent being Miandoab, some seven hours distant, and partly owing to the fact that we were waiting the final instructions from our legations respecting the question of our own escort accompanying us through the district situated in the neutral zone. The time, however, was not wasted, for, availing ourselves of the exceptional position of Soujboulak, which is a centre, both political and commercial, for the whole of Northern Persian Kurdistan, we gained much valuable information which could not have been obtained while travelling under Turkish control.

* Particular mention should be made of the most willing assistance which we met with on the part of Mahomed Hussein Khan, Sardar Mukri, who endeavoured to facilitate our task by all the means in his power. At length, on the 26th July, we were informed by Rifat Bey, the Turkish consul in Soujboulak, that a telegram had been received by him from head-quarters, to the effect that our escort accompanied where necessary by the Turkish escort would be allowed to proceed with us through the districts not incontestably Turkish. On our part we informed Rifat Bey that we proposed to make our way to Sakiz travelling along the eastern limit of Turkish

* Is responsible for nearly all Messrs. Isaacs' robberies.

occupation in that district, and begged him to instruct the Turkish escort to be ready to meet us between the last-mentioned place and Baneh. We accordingly left Soujboulak the following day, the 27th July, at 8.25 A.M., and, after a march of some four hours along the fringe of the territory in Turkish occupation, arrived at Beiram. This village, belonging formerly to the heirs of Malik-ul-Tajjar, of Soujboulak, had, we found, been seized only a few months before our arrival by Pasha Khan, a Begzade Kurd (grandson of the former Persian Governor of Soujboulak, Muzaffer-ed-Dowleh), and a near relative of the Sardar Mukri, he, Pasha Khan, having previously given "dakhlet." The latter, in conversation with us, even ventured to say that Mukri always belonged to the Turks, but in a tone which implied that he did not expect to be taken seriously. He further informed us that he had just returned from Bordesht, where some sixty Kurdish aghas had also gone to pay their respects to the new kazi of that lace, who was at the same time acting as kaimakam.

We then proceeded to Golja Tepe, passing on the way the village of Beradjo, which, being in the possession of Pasha Khan, is considered to be under Turkish jurisdiction, while the village of Tokhta (situated on the other side of the river within the zone of Turkish occupation, and belonging to Kazi Fettah of Soujboulak) still retains its Persian allegiance, according to the statement made to us by Kazi Fettah's agent, who came specially to meet us on the road, and who was loud in his complaints against the Turks. The history of Golja Tepe, where we arrived at 6.20 P.M., is as follows: Together with the villages of Achidere, Oghan, Koital, Glenan, and one-third of Zarade, it belonged to a certain Iskender Khan Koroyants now living in Tehran, and supposed to be a Turkish subject. All these villages were seized by the Ashiret Kurds, but Golja Tepe, Achidere and Oghan, held by Golabi Agha, cousin of Baiz Pasha of the Mangurs, have since been restored to the former proprietor by Ahmet Refik Bey, the frontier commissioner who, in the spring of this year, sent a certain Edhem Effendi with instructions to expel Golabi Agha and the other Mangurs. Since then the four villages in question have been administered by Koroyantz's agents, but still remain politically under Turkish rule. These agents, when necessary, apply for directions to the commander of the detachment stationed at Eski-Bagdad. Leaving Golja Tepe at 7.25 P.M. we reached, after half-an-hour's ride, the summit of the pass of the Zaz Mustapha, the range of which is now supposed to form the frontier between Persia and Turkey. We then passed through a village of Kan-i-Resh, arriving at the large village of Sordarabad at 9.10 P.M. This latter place was built by the celebrated Aziz Khan Sardar, the grandfather of the present Sardar Mukri, but passed in the course of time into the hands of the Dehbokri chiefs, now the richest of the Mukri Kurds. Its present proprietor is Samsam-es-Sultan (son of Ali Agha, son of Kadir Agha), who informed us that the Turks occasionally interfered in the affairs of his villages. Subsequently, we were told that he himself had given "dakhlet" shortly before our visit.

Note.—Villages belonging to Samsam-es-Sultan:—

								Houses.
1. Serdarabad	160
2. Husseinabad	50
3. Kan-i-resch	50
4. Hama	80
5. Yengidjo	15
6. Ashugolan	15

July 28.—Left Serdarabad at 9 A.M. for Boker, where we arrived at 2.20 P.M. after a long ride, during which we suffered severely from the extreme heat, passing on the way the villages of Adjikent, Taza Kala, and Sheikhler. At Boker we met with the most kind and hearty reception at the hands of the Sardar Mukri, the greater part of the population of the place which contains over 1,000 houses turning out to welcome us. The Sardar Mukri, as far as we were able to judge, has from the first been a consistent opponent of the extension of the Turkish power in these districts. He appears, in fact, to be the only man capable of preserving some remnant of Persian influence in Kurdistan, providing he receives from his Government the support to which he is entitled, and of the lack of which he bitterly complained to us.

We learnt during our stay that on the eve of our arrival some 30 Turkish cavalry (36th Regiment) under Lieutenant Djemal Effendi, destined for the guard of the consulate at Soujboulak, had passed through, a fact which appeared to be the cause of some preoccupation to our host, the Sardar Mukri. We also met at Boker several Kurdish representatives who, being materially interested in the frontier question, came to consult us on their affairs.

July 29.—We left Boker at 6 P.M., reaching Kahrabad at 7.50 P.M., where we

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made a short halt for the purpose of visiting the proprietor, Izam-ul-Mulk, the last Persian Governor of Serdesht, and a large land-owner possessing some eleven villages in the neighbourhood. The latter in the course of conversation with us complained very much of the lack of attention shown to him by the Persian Government, who, notwithstanding the fidelity he had always maintained to Persia, left him entirely to his own resources to defend his lands against Turkish encroachments. The latter, he alleged, had on several occasions endeavoured to incite the Ashiret Kurds against him but unsuccessfully, owing to his readiness to repulse their attacks. Leaving Kahrabad at 8:40 p.m. we reached, after an hour's ride, the village of Shahrkend, on the right bank of the Talaro River, belonging to the representatives of the very influential family of the Mukri tribes known by the name of "Feizullah Bays Sons," who received us in a very hospitable manner, and who pointed out to us the difficulty of their position, situated as they were on the borders of the Turkish advance.

July 30.—We left Shahrkend at 9 a.m., reaching, after twenty minutes, the vicinity of Kura-gwez, a village originally belonging to Izzetullah Khan (a relative of Sardar Mukri, and who has remained true to his Persian allegiance), but which in the spring of the present year was handed over by Ahmet Refik, the frontier commissioner, to Mumin Khan of the Mukri Kurds, who had given "dakhlet," at the time when Lieutenant-General Fasil Pasha was at Serdesht. The new proprietor came to meet us on the outskirts of his village, and was very hospitable to us. He expressed his great satisfaction with the Turks, and mentioned that some forty soldiers (107th Regiment) under command of the officers Abdullah and Ahmet Effendis, were stationed in the neighbouring village of Eski-Bagdad, where he himself lived. At 10:35 a.m. we left Kura-Gwez, arriving at 12:50 p.m. at Toordjan, a large village of some 150 houses, the proprietors being four brothers of the tribe of Koch-Khan, to which latter individual a pension, it appears, had been granted "for his beard" during the time of Feth Ali Shah. Here we found a most abnormal state of things prevailing. Three of the brothers above referred to have remained Persian subjects, while the fourth one, Feth Ali Beg, who was formerly the valiah's honorary master of the horse at Tabreez, has lately given "dakhlet" to the Turks who now protect his rights to one-fourth of the village, which is still held by the brothers in condominium. The Turks, it is said, intend shortly to establish a military station in the place. Our Turkish escort, it may be mentioned, stopped at Toordjan on its way to Bane, enjoying Feth Ali Beg's hospitality. We learnt further that an analogous state of things existed in the village of Karali, belonging to the three brothers of the above-mentioned Mumin Beg, of whom one has given "dakhlet," the three others refusing to do so. Thus, while two-thirds of this village remain Persian the other third professes itself Turkish. We left Toordjan at 4:15 p.m., and after a long and somewhat fatiguing march, owing to the fact that we were obliged to cross successively Mount Westa Mustapha, the crest of which forms the boundary between Sajibonbak and Sakkiz, and Mount Venowska, at the foot of which is the large and thriving village of Markhuz, belonging to Seif-ed-Din Khan of Sakkiz, we arrived at Sakkiz at 10:20 p.m.

July 31.—Passed by us at Sakkiz, a well-built town of some 2,000 houses at the head of a fertile plain stretching from west to east. The Government of Sakkiz belongs to the family of the local khans themselves, a branch of the Beni Ardelan, a tribe still ruling in Sinne and acknowledged even by the Turks to belong to Persia. The present governor, Seif-ed-Din Khan, was at the time of our visit absent from the town, having left as his deputy a certain Mahommed Hassan Khan, a sort of "ferrash bashi" (subaltern police official), and it was not without a certain interest to observe the busy life of the town, no one appearing to trouble himself with the almost complete absence of authority. Administratively, Sakkiz belongs to the province of Persian Kurdistan, of which Sinne is the capital. The Turks, according to the statement of Mahommed Hassan Khan, first came to the place in the autumn of 1908, their forces consisting of 300 soldiers and some 1,000 horsemen of the Bane Kurds, three men being killed on this occasion. The Turks subsequently retired, but returned again in 1909 and 1910. We afterwards learnt, however, from a trustworthy source, that the Turks were invited, not, as stated to us in Sakkiz, by the Turkish consular agent, but by Seif-ed-Din Khan himself, who, fearing the opposition of an Ajujman organised by certain individuals discontented with his proceedings, had given "dakhlet" to the Ottomans. We were further informed that the occupation of Sakkiz, which occurred during the passage through the town of M. Benzengre in March 1910, Russian consul in Moussoul, was disapproved by the Turkish Government—Abdul Mahan Effendi, the officer in charge of it and the same individual who first came to Lahidjan, being recalled. But, however this may be, of the 120 villages of Sakkiz, only some thirty or

forty are left to Persia, the remainder having been placed by the Turks under the jurisdiction of Bane, the khan of the latter place having been allowed to take possession of many of them.

The custom-house at Sakkiz was closed in 1906 and only reopened last year (in the month Agreh of the Takkoo-il year). There is a Turkish consular agent in the town depending on the consul at Sinne. Though born at Sakkiz, he gives himself out as an Ottoman subject.

August 1.—We left Sakkiz at 8:40 a.m. for Bane, travelling by the usual caravan road. At 9:50 a.m., at a point just before the village of Kabaghloo, we were met by Lieutenant Mirza Effendi and the Turkish escort, in whose company we proceeded together with our own escort to the last-mentioned place, being received with military honours by a detachment of some forty soldiers of the 108th Regiment (the labour being stationed at Bane), under the command of Lieutenant Ismail Effendi. At Kabaghloo, where we made a short halt, we were received in a very friendly way both by the Turkish officers and the local landowners. On our questioning the latter, they replied without hesitation that they were Sakkiz Begzades, and belonged to the Beni Ardelan of Sinne. Leaving Kabaghloo at 11:45 a.m., we halted during the afternoon at the village of Mirade. This latter place, with its district consisting of some thirty-five villages, always formed part of Sakkiz, to which it belongs geographically, but since the Turkish occupation has been under Bane. It is perhaps worth while that on the outskirts of the village we met a young Kurd, who, after enquiring who we were, expressed the hope that it might again come into the possession of the Persians. Starting on our journey again at 5:30 p.m., we arrived at 9:10 p.m. at a place called Kelishin, the inhabitants of the adjoining village of that name having abandoned it for their summer yaklaks.

August 2.—From Kelishin, situated at a very considerable altitude, we began at 8:20 a.m. our ascent of the pass of Keli Khan, dividing Bane from the former Sakkiz district. This pass we were told is closed for about a fortnight in winter owing to the snow, the same being asserted of the pass leading to Sulemanie, communications through which are interrupted for an even longer period. In winter Bane is thus for a certain time completely cut off from intercourse from the outer world. Passing the old caravanserai in the gorge of Keli Khan, we reached the summit of the pass at 10:10 a.m., from which point a view—most unusual in Persia—is obtained of hills covered with forests. After a descent which offered us particular difficulty we reached Bane at 12:45 p.m., a town of somewhat poor appearance notwithstanding the fact that it contains about 1,000 houses. Near to the town we were met by the new kaimakam, Suleiman Bey (brother of the late Seyyid Pasha, a Kurd, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Council of State), who had arrived only the day before ourselves, the military authorities, the chief Kurdish notables, and a large crowd of the inhabitants, whose behaviour was very quiet and orderly. We were afterwards told by Suleiman Effendi that he himself considered that any demonstration would be out of place, as it could only give rise to suspicions on our part as to the authenticity of its origin. We stayed for a time at the house of the local chief, Mohammed Khan, who gave "dakhlet" at the time of Fazil Pasha's visit to Serdesht, and who was appointed honorary kaimakam of the town, and allowed to increase the number of his villages by appropriating those belonging to the other people. The arrival, however, of the Turkish official representative was a severe blow to Mohammed Khan, who, we have good reasons to believe, bitterly regrets the time when he himself was governor of the town under Persia.

The military occupation of the place began some five years ago, when Captain Seyyid Riza arrived with some thirty men and abolished the Persian Custom-house, the director of which was a certain Mirza Seyfullah Khan. (The Turks are said to have the intention of shortly replacing this former custom-house by one of their own.) Soon after this a whole labour arrived at Bane, and has been permanently maintained there ever since, while new barracks have been built on a hill commanding the town. About a month ago the above-mentioned labour (107th Regiment) was sent to Serdesht, from which place it originally came, being replaced by a labour of the 108th Regiment, this latter labour arriving direct from Sulemanie. At Bane we made the acquaintance of the kazi, Mullah Mohammed Emin Effendi Karadaghli, appointed only a month ago, and of certain Kurdish aghas, relatives of Suleiman Bey, occupying various posts in the Turkish administration in Erbil and Keni Sanjak.

The old family of the Ikhtiar-ed-Dini khans seems to be almost extinct in Bane, its place (after Kerim Khan Ikhtiar-ed-Dini) being taken by its former servant, Wenys (Yoonos) Khan, who was succeeded by his son, Mohammed Khan.

In the evening we had a visit from the kaimakam, Suleiman Bey, who developed to us at some length his plans for the education of the Kurds in constitutional principles. He further insisted on the necessity of foreign occupation of various parts of Persia in order to save the population from the horrors of the land-owners' tyranny. He also alleged the necessity of the Turkish advance in Persia owing to the fear of Russian progress from the north.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

Urmia, September 4, 1911.

Appendix 1.

Diary of Itinerary No. 4.

Résumé of the Frontier Line in Mukri.

As far as we could ascertain on the spot the following line might be taken as representing the limit of the zone of Turkish occupation in the Mukri district, going from north to south:—

1. The lower course of the Gadyr Chai (past the bridge of Mammiend).
2. The range of the hills dividing Sulduz from Mahalli-Shahrivan.
3. The line in the gorge of Mammad Shah (uniting Sulduz with Soujboulak) passing between the villages of Gol (Turkish) and Kahrize (Persian).
4. The latter line then crosses the Mountain of Nureddin (left bank of the Soujboulak River), and goes to the south between the following villages:—

Turkish.	Persian.
*Dehbokr.	*Beiramshah.
Deshitemoor.	*Ouzun Dere.
*Hamzava.	Berdespian.
Beitas.	Kyzuldja.
Amed.	Issakend.
Girdeberdan.	*Tokhta.
*Beiram.	*Kani resh (the frontier is supposed to be the range of Mir Kaz).
*Berudjo.	Noubihar (half of which is under Turkish protection).
Hadgi Dere.	*Derbeser.
*Golgatepe.	*Akhtabar.
Faragha.	*Sheikler.
Chardivan.	Bagcho.
Bashbulagh.	*Sharikend.
*Kara-gwez.	Ghirdighilan.
Kazanta.	*Zembil.
*Eski-Bagdad.	*Shilanova.
Kocroocha.	*Zaglava.
Agh-Watman.	*Toordjan (a quarter of which is in Turkish hands).
Myetoo.	(Here the mountain of Westa Mustapha is evidently considered by the Turks to be the frontier.)
*Kyshlak No. 2.	Kyshlak No. 1.
Tamootal.	*Aichi.
*Miredeh.	
Kabaghloodja.	

Note.—The villages marked with an asterisk are those through which we passed or saw on the road.

5. Eastwards from Kyshlak No. 2 and Kabaghloo lies the Sakkiz district, which is still in Persian hands, and to the west of these two villages the district of Miredeh,

which had formerly been under Sakkiz, but has been since annexed by the Turks and placed under the jurisdiction of Bane.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

Appendix 2.

Diary of Itinerary No. 4.

List of the Villages of the District of Miredeh formerly belonging to Sakkiz.

Names of Villages.	Names of the Proprietors.
1 Hidjannan	One-sixth Gowrik Kurds, five-sixths Sakkiz Bagzades.
Kabaghloo	Sakkiz Bagzades.
Kyshlakh I	"
" II	Gowrik Kurds.
Tamooqha	" "
Baledjar	"
Kara-gwez 1	Sakkiz Bagzades.
Kondalan	People from Sinne.
Tahir Bogda	"
10. Myeto	Gowrik.
Cheragh Veis	"
Mazoo-dara	"
Kabaghloodja	Local Agha (Seid Faradj).
Kendesoor	Gowrik.
Bire Oneman	Djaf Kurds.
Tamoota	Gowrik.
Kamechar	"
Keleshin	"
Khapoorade	Mohammed Khan, of Bane.
20. Korader	Gowrik.
Miredo	Mohammed Khan, of Gowrik.
Siader	Gowrik.
Hamze Katanian	"
Boboktan	Fath Ali Beg Mukri, of Toorjan.
Kaniban	"
Gyureza	Gowrik.
Sheikh Chopan	"
Merge Nakhshina	"
Kahraiman	"
30. Leibagha	"
Hadgi Abad	"
Darabi	"
Yoozmala	Local Seyyida.
Keroyan	Seyyid Faradj.
35. Shivetoo	Gowrik.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

[41597]

No. 113.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 179.)
Sir,

Gulahak, September 29, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 18th March, 1910, I have the honour to report that I have acquiesced in the release of Hajji Mohammed Baquir, who was imprisoned in February 1910 in connection with the murder of certain Ismailis in the district of Nishapur. In my decision not to insist on the man's further imprisonment I was actuated by the desire not to add to the many embarrassments of the Persian Government. Early this year the Persian Government begged me to permit the man's release, as the clergy were agitating strongly on his behalf, and in reply to the repeated instances of Mohtashem-es-Sultana in the early spring I told his Excellency that I would consider the matter in the autumn. I was reminded of this promise a

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day or two ago, and I said that I would raise no further objection to Hajji Mohammed Baquir's release if the man was not allowed to return to the Nishapur district.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs promised that he should be exiled for a time, and that on his return to Persia he would not be allowed to return to the neighbourhood of Nishapur.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY

[41598]

No. 114.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 180.)

Sir,

Gulahak, October 1, 1911.

IN my despatch No. 162 of the 4th ultimo respecting the proposed appointment of Major Stokes to organise a Treasury gendarmerie, I reported that the Russian Minister had enquired of Mr. Shuster in pursuance of instructions from the Russian Government as to the strength and the scope of the proposed force.

In his letter to Mr. Shuster, M. Poklewski has also asked, for his own information, whether it would be possible to give a written undertaking confirming the promise given by Mr. Shuster on the 26th August, that, after six months' service in Tehran, Major Stokes would be sent to the south. Mr. Shuster replied on the 4th ultimo, giving the desired information regarding the scope and the strength of the Treasury gendarmerie, but stating it was impossible to give "an expression of any conditions concerning Major Stokes working outside the so-called Russian zone." This seemed to M. Poklewski inconsistent with Mr. Shuster's verbal promise of the 26th August. Mr. Shuster's letter was, moreover, couched in somewhat arrogant terms, and seemed to close the door to further negotiations. Mr. Shuster, however, to whom I had pointed out through a friend that his letter was not calculated to advance matters, lost no time in addressing to M. Poklewski a more conciliatory communication, asking for a further interview. M. Poklewski acceded to this request, and even withheld a telegram which he had already drafted to his Government, which would have effectually prevented any further negotiations. I was present at the interview, which took place on the 6th ultimo, when Mr. Shuster explained clearly that it was impossible in view of the attitude of the Medjliss to give any undertaking in writing such as was desired, and said that he much regretted that he should in his former conversation have misled M. Poklewski and made him think that such an undertaking was possible. All he could do was to assure M. Poklewski verbally that it was his intention to send Major Stokes to the south after the six months in Tehran. It was then suggested that Major Stokes's contract should cover only a period of from six to nine months, during which time he should assist Mr. Shuster in Tehran in the organisation of the Treasury gendarmerie, the question of his further employment being left for later consideration. M. Poklewski appeared to have some hope that his Government would consent to this arrangement, and he telegraphed to St. Petersburg in a favourable sense. At the same time, Mr. Shuster withdrew his letter of the 4th ultimo, and substituted for it a shorter one, merely giving the data as to the strength and scope of the gendarmerie. I transmit a copy of this amended letter.

The reply of the Russian Government to M. Poklewski's telegram showed that they saw no objection to the proposed appointment for even so short a period as six months. It spoke of Mr. Shuster as having already monopolised the financial administration of Persia and as now apparently seeking to obtain control of the gendarmerie. To this I understand that M. Poklewski replied that even if Major Stokes were not employed, Mr. Shuster would still proceed with the organisation of his gendarmerie, and the refusal to consent to Major Stokes's employment in Tehran would merely delay the organisation of a force which was needed for the restoration of order. The Russian Government have not yet answered this telegram, but I notice from Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 228 that there is no hope of a favourable decision.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Mr. Shuster to M. Poklewski.

September 4, 1911.

My dear Minister,

IN reply to your letter, I take pleasure in laying before you all the data which I possess as to the number and composition of the Treasury gendarmerie and its functions. As the name implies, the main purpose of the proposed organisation is to collect the taxes by direct intervention under the orders of the different representatives of the treasurer-general by producing the feeling of public security and order, without which in this country at least the collection of the internal taxes becomes impossible; the composition will be Persian, with the exception of a few European or American supervising officers; as to the number, I estimate that from 12,000 to 15,000 will eventually be necessary to perform the work properly throughout the Empire, though we will probably be unable to reach that strength for eighteen months or more; as to whether there will be another gendarmerie, my own view is very positively that two gendarmerie forces would be both unnecessary and uneconomic in view of the existence of a regular army. This, however, is only my personal opinion. The mere presence, in most instances, of a well-organised and disciplined force would be sufficient to maintain public order; such attempts at local disturbance as might arise from time to time could well be repressed by a force having general police powers, unless the disorders became serious enough to demand the attention of a regular army.

I have sought, my dear Minister, to give you with entire frankness my views on this matter, and I trust that your Government will see by this statement that what is contemplated is but a necessary and proper organisation for the accomplishment of the difficult task which I have undertaken.

I have, &c.

W. MORGAN SHUSTER.

[40638]

No. 115.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 181.)

Sir,

Gulahak, October 2, 1911.

WITH reference to Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 225 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that I received a visit from Muin-el-Vezireh, "chef de cabinet" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who came to deliver a message to me from the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the attitude of the Russian Government in regard to the treatment to be accorded to the ex-Shah should he seek refuge in Russia.

Muin-el-Vezireh said that the Persian Government were disappointed by the answer given by the Russian Government to the Persian chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg to their representations on this matter, and still more so by the view of the Russian Government as stated by you to the Persian Minister in London. These answers were vague, and did not afford sufficient assurances that the ex-Shah would be prevented from raising further rebellions.

Muin-el-Vezireh expressed on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope that His Majesty's Government would endeavour to induce the Russian Government to give more satisfactory assurances.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[41599]

No. 116.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 182.)

Sir,

Gulahak, October 2, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 440 of the 27th ultimo, reporting that Lieutenant Wilson had been robbed and roughly handled by Kashgais, I have the honour to report that Lieutenant Wilson thinks that there is no need to ask for compensation, as the value of the articles which he has lost is negligible.

As reported in my telegram above mentioned, Soulet-ed-Dowleh ordered restitution of the stolen property, and the greater part of it was restored, Lieutenant Wilson being escorted from the scene of the outrage to the consulate.

I am inclined, in the circumstances, to agree with Lieutenant Wilson that no compensation need be asked for, and for the present I have confined myself to a formal protest, merely reserving the right to claim compensation in case you should not concur in Lieutenant Wilson's view.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[42533]

No. 117.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 183.)

Sir,

Gulahak, October 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note which I have addressed to the Persian Government in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegrams No. 162 of the 22nd May and No. 237 of the 16th August, presenting the claim on behalf of Messrs. A. Weir and Co. and Messrs. Ellinger arising from the dispossession of Muin-ul-Tujjar from the Hormuz oxide mines and the consequent breach of contract.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 117.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

September 9, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to draw the attention of your Excellency to various notes which since August 1909 have been addressed by this legation to the Persian Government, and more particularly to my note of the 16th April, 1910, to the effect that His Majesty's Government would hold the Persian Government liable in damages for any losses caused to British subjects through the violation of Muin-ul-Tujjar's contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and Messrs. Ellinger and Co. for the exclusive supply of red oxide from the island of Hormuz.

His Majesty's Government understand that the Muin-ul-Tujjar held a concession for the Hormuz mines granted by a firman dated 1895, and for a period of ten years. In 1901 this concession appears to have been confirmed by a further firman for an indefinite period.

Without prejudice to the question as to whether or no the Persian Government had the right at all to dispossess Muin of his concession, His Majesty's Government consider that the terms of the second firman, together with the fact that Muin was in undisputed possession in 1908, justified British firms in entering at that date into a contract with Muin for the exclusive purchase of oxide for a reasonable period ahead.

The same consideration applies to the firm undertaking the duties of agency with its responsibilities, and outlay as regards business engagements reaching into the future.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the British firms concerned had every right to expect respectively that their contract would be respected and their agency maintained. The Persian Government have, however, failed to protect these legitimately acquired British interests, and consequently, in pursuance of the warnings given to the Persian Government, I have the honour, under the instruction of His Majesty's Government, to claim as compensation for damages arising from the arbitrary dispossession of Muin-ul-Tujjar and the breach of his engagement the sum of 21,033*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.* on behalf of Messrs. Weir and Co., and of 4,011*l.* 18*s.* on behalf of Messrs. Ellinger and Co., as tabulated in the accompanying statement, which also indicates certain sums which will fall to be deducted from the first-named claim.

The amount of these claims is, however, only reckoned up to the 1st October, 1910; the contract between Muin and Messrs. Weir and Ellinger would not have expired until the 31st March, 1912, and until that date the realisation on favourable terms of the stocks of oxide held by Messrs. Weir is prejudiced by the continuance of shipments

by another firm. Consequently I am instructed to warn your Excellency that His Majesty's Government will be obliged to present a supplementary claim to the Persian Government which, in addition to the further damages suffered by the British firms, will also include interest on the whole of the sum now claimed from the Persian Government.

In conclusion, I have the honour to add that, inasmuch as the Persian Government have on previous occasions referred me to a certain undertaking entered into with them by Messrs. Strick with reference to this subject, I am to point out that the claim which I am now presenting on behalf of Messrs. Weir and Co. and Messrs. Ellinger can only lie against the Persian Government, and any counter-claim which the latter consider they have to make on this head against Messrs. Strick and Co. is a matter for separate settlement between the Persian Government and that firm.

I avail, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 117.

Claim by Messrs. Weir and Co.

Stock held by Messrs. Weir on forcible termination of their contract:—

	£	s.	d.
4,095 tons of oxide at Avonmouth at 68 <i>s.</i> 2 <i>d.</i> per ton	18,957	2	6
2,488 tons at Nordenham at 75 <i>s.</i> 11 <i>d.</i> per ton	9,444	0	8
	28,401	3	2
Loss of profit on undelivered balance of 5,218 tons	2,652	0	8
	26,053	12	10

From which amount there falls to be deducted the price secured for the oxide as and when sold, less storage charges, interest, &c., after the 1st October, 1910.

Claim by Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

	£	s.	d.
Loss of commission on undelivered balance of 5,218 tons of oxide ..	554	8	0
Damages for loss of agency, say, five years' commission, which on the average sales of 1907-11 would have exceeded the claim made above by	3,487	10	0
	4,041	18	0

[41600]

No. 118.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 184.)

Sir,

Gulahak, October 2, 1911.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 78 of the 13th July respecting the state of security on the Kerman Bunder Abbas road, I requested His Majesty's consul at Kerman to furnish a report on the subject. I have now the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch which I have received from Colonel Haig describing the deplorable condition of the trade route in question.

Since the date of this despatch there has been, as reported in my telegram No. 372 of the 2nd September, a further large robbery, in which Messrs. Castelli lost heavily, and there have also been other robberies in which British Indians have suffered.

With regard to other trade routes in Persia, I regret to have to report that no improvement in the state of affairs described in my despatch No. 163 of the 5th September can be said to have shown itself, and the political chaos prevailing at Shiraz, as reported in my recent telegrams, naturally prevents any organised attempt on the part of the local authorities to restore order on the trade routes leading to that city.

Further north the dislocation caused by the advance of the rebellious Salar-ed-Dowleh, and the organisation of the military expedition sent to meet him, has rendered the safe conduct of travellers and caravans even more precarious than formerly. The Bakhtiaris, however, seem convinced of the necessity of restoring order on their road,

[1524]

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and are contemplating measures which may fructify as soon as the khans can turn their undivided attention to them.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *October 3.*—Since writing the above I have been informed by the Persian Government that the Government of Behbahan has been entrusted to the Bakhtiari khans. As you will remember it was the appointment of a governor inimical to Bakhtiari interests which was the signal for an outbreak of disorders on the Bakhtiari road.

G. B.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Consul Haig to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Kerman, August 24, 1911.

WITH reference to the question asked in the House of Commons on the 10th July, 1911, regarding the trade routes between Kerman and Bunder Abbas, I have the honour to inform you that I have received no report of the robbery of any carpets subsequent to the robbery of those belonging to Messrs. Nearco, Castelli et Frères in April last, but owing to the insecurity of the road a large caravan conveying carpets has been delayed for several weeks past between Kerman and Baft, and has not yet been able to proceed on its way.

2. There are three roads between Kerman and Bunder Abbas ordinarily used by caravans: (1) by Jiruft and Rudbar, (2) by Baft and Daulatabad, and (3) by Sirjan, and the condition of all three during the past three months has been deplorable. The sufferers have been Hindu traders in Kerman and Bunder Abbas, British-Indian subjects, whose caravans were robbed on the 2nd July, at Tizirk (near Sirjan), when property to the value 1,898.50 krans was stolen, on an uncertain date early in July, when property worth 11,007.75 krans was stolen by Bashakirdis in Rudbar, and on the 20th July, when property worth 9,735.50 krans was stolen at the Gudar-i-Surkh, on the Jiruft road. The value of the property stolen amounts to 22,647.55 krans, or about 453*l.*, and the freight paid on it to about 262*l.*, the direct and immediate loss of the Hindu merchants being thus about 715*l.* To this sum must be added the interest charged by their vendors, and the loss caused by their missing their market. Loss under these two heads is incurred not only on goods actually stolen, but also on those delayed owing to the insecurity of the road.

3. Not only is there no prospect of any improvement in the condition of the roads, but on the contrary every probability that matters will become worse. There is no governor in Rudbar, and the Bashakirdis, who inhabit this district, are not even nominally under control. On the Baft road two sections of the Afshar tribe have taken the field against each other, and the whole of this road between Kerman and Daulatabad is insecure. I have just been informed that 3,000 of the Baharlou tribe from Fars, with two guns, are marching to plunder the villages in the Sirjan district, in order to avenge a defeat suffered by them there last year, and that 350 robbers of the Baharlou and Aymarlu tribes are raiding the villages of the Rafsinjan district. On the other hand, it is commonly reported that the acting governor is wilfully exaggerating the numbers of the robbers for the purpose of filling his own pockets by obtaining sanction from Tehran to military expenditure on an extravagant scale. I am unable at present to say whether the estimates of the strength of the robbers or the rumours of the acting governor's dishonesty are more likely to be true, but whichever be true the prospect is sufficiently lamentable. Until lately, I should have hesitated to suspect the present acting governor of wilfully magnifying the woes of his country, but I have recently been reluctantly compelled to accept the view that this official regards his position merely as means of filling his own pockets. If the robbers are, indeed, so numerous as is reported there is very little chance of any effective action being taken against them, for the present acting governor, who also holds the appointment of commander of the provincial forces, is the Sardar-i-Nusrat, who recently retreated from Persian Baluchistan before Said Khan and Bahram Khan, and his lack of prowess in the field is not counterbalanced by any administrative ability. Most of the provincial troops are inferior in courage, mobility, and other soldierly qualities to the robbers against whom they may have to serve, their pay is in arrears, and their

strength is short of the sanctioned establishment. I would add, to their credit, that I believe they are as willing to fight as their leader is.

4. I observe that reference is made in the question asked in the House of Commons to the uncertainty of the payment of compensation, and I should remark that I regret the expression as infelicitous. Since my arrival in Kerman, on the 31st May, 1910, I have failed to recover from the local government any compensation for highway robberies, and my failure has not been due to lack of importunity. The local government has not been sufficiently strong to compel robbers to disgorge and the general revenues have not sufficed for the settlement of claims. Baluchistan has paid no revenue for the past four years, excepting an insignificant sum plundered by the Sardar-i-Nusrat during the recent expedition. The collections in other parts of the province have been imperfect and irregular and a large part of the money collected has gone into the pockets of rapacious governors, of whom Kerman has had five during the past year, and of the heads of departments established by the constitutional government, which in this province is neither understood nor appreciated except by those who hope to enrich themselves by the tenure of some office in the administration. I see no prospect of being able to obtain satisfaction of any of the claims which I have put forward and am constantly pressing on the local government, and the disproportion between the amount of these claims and the available resources of the Government has rendered the local officials hopeless and apathetic so that they no longer regard the satisfaction of claims as being within the range of practical politics.

I am, &c.

T. W. HAIG, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

[41601]

No. 119.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 185.)

Sir,

Gulahak, October 4, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 164 of the 4th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the total defeat of Arshad-ed-Dowleh, reported in my telegram No. 381, and the rout of Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces, reported in my telegram No. 447, have broken the back of the insurrection. Each was completely decisive as regards the danger threatening the capital from the east and west respectively. In the former fight a mixed Government force, 1,000 strong, of Armenians and Bakhtiaris, under Yephim and the Bakhtiari Khans, Sardar Mohtashem, Sardar Bahadur, Amir Mujahid, and Zaigham-es-Sultaneh, assisted by a former German non-commissioned officer Herr Haase, who has long been in Persian service, routed the insurgents, who numbered about 2,000, at Imam Zadeh Jaafer, in the district of Veramin, on the 5th ultimo, capturing Arshad-ed-Dowleh, who was afterwards shot. As a result of this engagement and of a smaller victory of the Government troops under Sardar Mohy, in the Saved Kuh district, two or three days later, the Turcomans, who formed the bulk of Arshad-ed-Dowleh's force, made the best of their way back to their own country, the movement on behalf of the ex-Shah in Mazanderan collapsed, and His Majesty left Savad Kuh, took boat at Kara Tepe on the Caspian, and arrived at Gumesht Tepe with only seven followers. When last heard of he was reported to be near Astrabad with a following of some 400 Turcomans.

Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces, after defeating Amir-i-Mufakham in the Malayir district on or about the 6th ultimo, occupied Sultanabad, the Bakhtiaris who were in that town under Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang retiring to Kum. Salar-ed-Dowleh himself skirting Sultanabad advanced to Noberan with a force of some 4,000 men with the intention of proceeding either via Saveh or Zarrud to Tehran. His telegrams to Tehran showed that he was now playing for his own hand. In them he used a Persian expression equivalent to the use of the first person plural by sovereigns. As soon as it became known that he was taking the Zarrud route a well-equipped Government force of some 1,200 Armenians and Bakhtiaris under Yephim, Sardars Mohtashem and Bahadur, was dispatched to deal with him. The encounter which ensued and in which the Bakhtiaris from Kum under Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang took part, took place on the 27th ultimo in the neighbourhood of a village named Bagh-i-Shah, 8 miles from Saveh. The combined Government forces must have numbered some 2,000 men. The insurgent force was a horde of miscellaneous tribesmen—Kalhurs, Lurs, and others—4,000 strong, commanded by Daoud Khan chief of the Kalhurs, and other tribal chieftains. The fighting, the official telegraphic reports of which I enclose, resulted in

the rout of the insurgents with the loss of 500 killed, the loss on the Government side being trifling. The defeated insurgents fled westwards and Salar-ed-Dowleh who appears to have taken no part in the fighting and to have awaited the issue at Noberan, is now reported to be in the neighbourhood of Hamadan closely pursued by the Government troops.

The only undefeated force on the ex-Shah's side which now remains is that of Shuja-ed-Dowleh in Azerbaijan. This force has been successful in several petty combats in the near neighbourhood of Tabreez, capturing Basminch a village some thirty minutes east of Tabreez, and even occupying the suburb of Karamalik, ten minutes west of that town. Except for the Julfa road which still remains open, Tabreez is completely invested but for a fortnight there has hardly been any fighting. The defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh appears to have discouraged Shuja-ed-Dowleh's followers as defections from his force are reported, and His Majesty's consul at Tabreez states that the opinion is gaining ground that he is only holding out in the hope of making terms for himself.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 119.

Telegram from Assiabek to Tehran.

ON the 22th September, after a march of 40 miles from Robat Kerim, the Government forces arrived at Assiabek. The advance guard of Salar-ed-Dowleh, numbering over 600 men, was posted there and withdrew without fighting as soon as the Government forces arrived in sight. Sardar Bahadur, Sardar Moltashem, and Yeprem Khan thought of pursuing them, but, as their horses were tired after the long journey, it was decided to give them a rest before attacking Salar-ed-Dowleh. On the evening of the 26th September messengers arrived from Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang bringing the news of their move from Kum to Saveh, which they captured after a severe engagement with the insurgents. For the present the environs of Saveh are occupied by the Bakhtiariis. To-day, the 27th September, before daylight Yeprem Khan left with the army corps for Saveh and Bagh-i-Shah. Obviously, Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces were at Bagh-i-Shah and Gheitanich—8 and 20 miles respectively from Saveh. Since the departure of the army from Assiabek, from two hours after sunrise and thenceforth, an increasing roar of cannon has been heard from here. Evidently at a place within 8 or 12 miles Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces have been encountered between the mountains, and the fight has begun. I will telegraph the result later.

Enclosure 2 in No. 119.

Telegram from Sardar Moltashem, Sardar Bahadur, and Yeprem Khan to the Government.

HAVING previously arranged with Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang that we must to-day (27th September) completely annihilate Salar-ed-Dowleh's army, which is in occupation of the Bagh-i-Shah district, some 8 miles from Saveh, the army corps was drawn up in proper order opposite the forces of the rebels. Nazar Ali Khan, of Laristan, who had occupied all the ravines and hills on the side of Saveh, was seriously engaged by the forces of Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang. Bat Daoud Khan Kalhur, the son of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, the mounted irregulars of Hamadan and Kurdistan, and the sons of Zahir-ul-Mulk, of Kermanshah, and Haji Ali Reza Khan, of Gerrous, with five Austrian guns of 5 and 8 centim., began fighting with our force. The battle lasted two and a-half hours, and thank God that with the successive valiant dashes of our troops the enemy was at last defeated and put to flight. Truly, such an astonishing victory has not so far been achieved in this country. Of the insurgents, close upon 500 men of the mounted irregulars of Laristan and Kermanshah, who were distinguishable by their clothing, were killed, and all their tents were left behind. The five guns of the enemy have all been captured. The insurgent forces numbered in all over 4,000. Our casualties are ten Bakhtiariis killed and wounded. One hundred of the enemy were captured.

[41602]

No. 120.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edvard Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 186.)

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 327 of the 12th August, I have the honour to transmit herein copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire furnishing what may be regarded as a satisfactory account of the attitude and intentions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah at the present time.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Bushire, August 17, 1911.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Shiraz telegram No. 254, dated the 12th August, 1911, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter from Captain Haworth, in which letter, dated the 12th August, 1911, he gives what appears to me to be a satisfactory account of the attitude and intentions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah at this juncture.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political*
Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His
Majesty's Consul-General for Persia, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Captain Haworth to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

August 12, 1911.

I SAW the sheikh for a few minutes on the 10th. Owing to the cholera he does not wish to see any one from the infected area, and has asked me to visit him on urgent matters only. I told him that we had heard that the Nizam and the Soulet were talking of taking some definite steps, and impressed upon him the necessity of a neutral attitude at the present crisis.

He answered that he had to keep in with his friends with polite answers, but had no intention of entangling himself in any way, and added that he had sent both to the Medjliss and to Kerbela telegrams stating his good wishes to the constitution and for the welfare of his country. He said to me that he would not enter into the struggle, nor indeed could he have done so had he wished to do so, for his Arabs would always refuse to leave Arabistan.

He showed me the telegrams which he had sent to the Medjliss and to Kerbela. I assured him that with a correct attitude he could always be sure of his position, since we should be there to support him, and I do not think there is any likelihood of his acting injudiciously.

[41604]

No. 121.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edvard Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 188.)

Sir,

Gulahck, October 4, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, as reported in my telegram No. 417 of the 21st September, the Medjliss on the 19th ultimo adopted, on a motion of urgency without debate, a project for the engagement of seven more Swedish officers in connection with the organisation of the gendarmerie and police. Further details are to be found in the monthly summary.

The project was presented by the Minister of the Interior, whose French adviser, as well as some at least of the Cabinet Ministers, is understood to be not at all inclined to favour Mr. Shuster's project of merging the national gendarmerie with the fiscal gendarmerie under the undivided control of the treasurer-general.

[1524]

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It is also not unlikely that the Swedish officers, being under the official protection of and the personal influence of the French Minister, whose animus against Mr. Shuster is alluded to in another despatch, would prefer to be directly under the orders of the Ministry of the Interior, by which they have been engaged.

It has also been rumoured that the Persian Government intend to engage twenty-one Swedish officers to reorganise their army. In reply to my enquiries, the Regent recently informed me that some such project was under the serious consideration of the Government, who desired to form a small efficient military force (report says under 12,000 men) with the assistance of an as yet undetermined number of Swedish officers. This force would be required to deal with any tribes revolting on a scale too large for the gendarmerie, with its necessarily scattered units, to deal with.

I have, &
G. BARCLAY.

[41605]

No. 122.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 189.)

Sir,

Gulshak, October 4, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 163 of the 4th ultimo I have the honour to transmit herewith the monthly summary of events in Persia up to date.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Monthly Summary of Events for September 4 to October 3.

Tehran.

Military Operations.—The force which left Tehran on the 3rd September under Sardar Mohtashem, Sardar Bahadur, and Yeprim to operate against Sardar Arshad, found the enemy at Imunzuleh Jafer, 2 miles east of the village of Veramin and about 40 miles east of Tehran. The German maxim instructor, Colonel Haase, was in charge of the maxim, and the fire of this weapon apparently demoralised Sardar Arshad's Turkomans, some 1,400 in number, who fled at once in great confusion. Between 60 and 70 of the enemy are said to have been either killed or wounded, while about 250, including Sardar Arshad, were taken prisoners. This engagement took place on the 5th September, and Sardar Arshad was shot early the following morning.

On the 8th September the ex-Shah's forces at Savad Kuh were defeated by the Government contingent under the Bakhtiari khan Muin-i-Homayun and Sardar Mohy. The ex-Shah fled towards the north, and on the 12th September news was received of his return to Gumeshtepo with seven followers. Thus ended the invasion from the north.

Amir Mufakham, the Bakhtiari khan (referred to in the last summary under the heading "Luristan and Irak"), was defeated near Malayir by Salar-ed-Dowleh on or about the 6th September. Morteza Kuli Khan returned to Tehran, Amir Mufakham left for his home in the Bakhtiari hills, and Sardar Zafar fell back on Kuan with the remainder of the Bakhtiari force. He was there joined by a force of Bakhtiari from Kashan and another under Sardar Jang from Tehran. Salar-ed-Dowleh, whose force was estimated by the Bakhtiaris to be about 4,000 men, arrived at Noheran on the 25th September. Sardar Mohtashem, Sardar Bahadur, and Yeprim, who left Tehran on the 24th September with over 2,000 men, came in touch with the enemy's outposts at Savad two days later and drove them back. The Government forces are reported to have joined, and a big engagement is said to have taken place in the Zand district on the 27th September. The Bakhtiaris were apparently victorious, for there is no doubt that Salar-ed-Dowleh retired in confusion, and is now at Hamadan. The telegram from the Bakhtiari sardars and Yeprim announcing the victory reports that 500 were killed and wounded and 100 taken prisoners, besides five guns and a quantity of baggage. Precise details are as yet lacking. After the departure of the Government forces for the front,

the defence of Tehran was placed under Amir Mujahid Bakhtiari, and the three Swedish officers were placed directly under him. A number of volunteers were enrolled to defend the ramparts, and guns were mounted at a number of the town gates.

The Medjliss.—At the sitting of the 10th September, the Medjliss discussed the details of a concession to be granted to a Russian firm for the laying of a pipe-line for petroleum from Enzeli to Resht. The Democratic party opposed the measure and it was nearly defeated, but under threat of resignation the Cabinet obliged the Medjliss to agree and the concession was eventually passed on the 19th September.

At the sittings of the 17th and 26th September, the renewal of the contracts of eight Belgian customs officials was discussed and agreed upon. The salaries are as follows:—

	First Year.	Second Year.	Third Year.
	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.
Director at Enzeli	17,000	18,000	19,000
" Bushire	17,000	18,000	19,000
" Julfa	15,000	16,000	17,000
Deputy Director at Urmia ..	9,000	9,500	10,000
Director at Astara	14,000	15,000	16,000
" Bunder Abbas	13,000	14,000	15,000
" Meshed-i-Ser	13,000	14,000	15,000
Inspector in Azerbaijan ..	9,000	9,500	10,000

The contract of an eighth official, temporarily employed at Tehran as director of posts, was not renewed owing, it is said, to his alleged hostility to Mr. Shuster.

At the sitting of the 19th September a report presented by the educational committee dealing with the proposed institution of five primary schools was read and passed. One school is for Tehran and the others for the provinces. The Government is to subsidise the Tehran school at the rate of 600*l.* a-year and the provincial schools at 480*l.* a-year each. Half the pupils will have to pay fees and the other half will receive tuition free.

At the same sitting the Minister of the Interior presented a project for the engagement of seven more Swedish officers, i.e., one captain and six lieutenants. The captain is to organise the supply departments of the gendarmerie and police, while the lieutenants are required to form a gendarmerie training college. For this purpose a credit of 28,000 tomans was asked for and agreed upon without any debate.

The re-engagement of Mr. George New, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, by the Persian Telegraph Administration, a step which is strongly supported by Mr. Shuster, is now before the Medjliss. When the question was first raised, the Medjliss refused to agree to the proposal, but Mr. New's engagement for three years at 800*l.* a-year was sanctioned on the 3rd October.

On the 26th September the Electoral Law was sent by the Medjliss to the Cabinet for revision.

Yeprim has been granted a life pension of 3,600 tomans a-year.

The Press.—The "Majliss" is the only newspaper which now appears, and it contains nothing of much interest.

Refugees.—Those in refuge at the Russian Legation have now left.

Tabreez.

Early in September, Shuja-ed-Dowleh, working in the interests of the ex-Shah, moved to within a few miles of Tabreez, and threatened to attack the town if not recognised as Governor-General on behalf of Mohammed Ali. Since then Shuja-ed-Dowleh has invested the town and only the Julfa road has remained open. There has been little real fighting between the force defending the city and Shuja's irregulars, and in view of events elsewhere it seems that Shuja is now anxious to make terms.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

The province of Ghilan has remained quiet, and Mazanderan is now again under the authority of the central Government. Several Mazanderan chieftains who joined the ex-Shah have been captured and brought to Tehran. Amir Mukarrem has taken

refuge with the Russian consular agent at Barfrush. There is as yet no real Persian authority at Astrabad, and it is only through the action of Russian consular officers there that order is maintained. There have been several outrages on Russian subjects in the district.

Meshed.

The province of Khorassan has remained normal under an acting governor. The appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General was announced on the 27th September, but he is now being urged to go to Fez instead.

Ispahan.

All the roads leading to Ispahan have been unsafe, and robberies are reported on nearly all of them. Several posts from and to Tehran have been robbed, the caravans have been plundered on the Ahwaz road and goods carried off on other roads.

The Kashan district has been the scene of fighting between the Bakhtiari and Naib Hussein's followers. On the 22nd September, Naib Hussein attacked Kashan and succeeded in capturing the town after two days' fighting with the Bakhtiari defenders. Ten Russian Cossacks travelling up to Tehran were held up by the naib, who robbed them of their horses, arms, and other equipments. He apparently thought better of this later and released the prisoners, returning their effects to them. A detachment of the Persian Cossack Brigade under two Russian officers is being sent from Tehran against the naib.

Yezd.

The state of affairs at Yezd is deplorable. There appears to be no authority whatever, and the town and district is dominated by roughs. The new Governor of Kerman was ordered by the Government to restore order at Yezd on his way to his post, but he has been unable as yet to enter the city. Some of the Government officials have taken refuge at the telegraph office. Absolute anarchy prevails in the district.

Shiraz.

Since the 4th September, the date of the last summary, sixty-four telegrams have been received from Shiraz respecting the situation there which has grown even more serious and threatening than when last reported upon. During the same interval the legation has sent twenty telegrams to the Foreign Office on the same subject, and no less than forty-eight to Shiraz.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh has now been dismissed; Soulet-ed-Dowleh has entered the city with Kashgai reinforcements, and has taken up his quarters with Nizam-es-Sultaneh at Government House: the Arab tribes have received 1,500 reinforcements, while desultory and occasionally severe fighting has been going on in the town for some time.

Two messages have been sent by His Majesty's Minister to Soulet-ed-Dowleh, one on the 19th September, to the effect that his presence and that of his tribesmen at Shiraz can only lead to trouble, and that should intervention be made necessary by any harm coming to British lives or property, he will be responsible for the consequences. This message is reported to have been treated by Soulet with considerable contempt. On the 2nd October the following further warning was communicated to him through His Majesty's acting consul. His Majesty's Minister declared that unless Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his followers left the neighbourhood of Shiraz at once, he would urge His Majesty's Government to take immediate measures to safeguard British interests, and to hold Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Nizam-es-Sultaneh directly responsible for any injury to these interests.

Farman Farma's appointment as Governor-General, was announced on the 25th September, and Nizam-es-Sultaneh was subsequently offered the governorship of Arabistan. This plan, however, was in the nature of a half measure, as Farman Farma is friendly both to Soulet and the Nizam. After the successes gained by the Bakhtiari over Salar-ed-Dowleh, they proposed to take more energetic measures, and invited Ala-ed-Dowleh to go to Shiraz, supported by a strong Bakhtiari detachment, and contemplated sending Zaighan-ed-Dowleh from Tehran as a successor to Soulet. These plans are at present under discussion. In the meantime His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz describes the local situation to be extremely grave, and apprehends danger to British subjects. Lieutenant Wilson arrived at Shiraz on the 25th September, after having been robbed and ill-treated.

Seistan.

The roads all round Seistan continue to be unsafe. The Kainat is still quiet. Mr. Howson left Birjand on the 2nd October, and Mr. Forkgen took charge of the vice-consulate.

Kerman.

Amir Azam has not yet reached his post, and Sardar-i-Nosret is acting in the interim.

The state of the roads, especially that to Bunder Abbas, is extremely unsatisfactory, and robberies are of constant occurrence, and British trade is greatly suffering in consequence. The matter is reported upon in a separate despatch, No. 184 of the 2nd instant.

Kermanshah.

Since the departure of Salar-ed-Dowleh, the town has been fairly quiet, as all the bad characters left with the army. Kerim Khan at Kasr-i-Shirin is reported to be in a state of panic, being on bad terms with everyone on both sides of the border. Two cases of cholera were reported on the 16th September from Kasr.

Hamadan.

After his defeat on the 27th September, Salar-ed-Dowleh retreated towards Hamadan, hotly pursued by the Government forces. It is reported that he reached Hamadan at the beginning of October, and prepared to defend himself there. The telegraph line having been cut, the only communication with Tehran is over the Russian telephone via Kazvin. Accurate information is at present unavailable.

Gulf Ports.

There is nothing of interest to report from Bushire or the Gulf ports this month.
G. P. CHURCHILL

[41606]

No. 123.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 190. Confidential.)

Sir,

Gulabek, October 4, 1911.

THE Russian Minister has been trying for many months to obtain for Nobel and Co. permission to lay a pipe-line from Fuzeli to Resit with a view to the easier handling of Russian petroleum in Persia, and I am happy to say that the present Cabinet has at last succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the Medjliss for this concession.

I mention this matter as of interest, as showing that the present Cabinet is really trying to give effect to the desideratum expressed in the programme enclosed in my despatch No. 145, of the establishment of better relations with Russia, and I may mention, as a further indication of the satisfactory disposition of the present Cabinet, the fact that, since the defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh, the Government have given such comforting assurances to the many reactionaries who have for some time been enjoying the shelter of Zerguendeh, the Russian Legation village, that these have now returned to Tehran, thus relieving the Russian Minister of considerable embarrassment.

I should also mention, as evidence that the Russian Minister is responsive to these little marks of good-will, that he has recently used the discretion given him by his Government as to whether to allow or to forbid the employment of the Russian officers of the Cossack brigade on active service to accede to the request of the Persian Government, that some of the Russian officers might be dispatched with a force of Persian Cossacks to deal with the outlaw Naib Hussein, who, as reported in my telegram No. 432 of 25th ultimo, has occupied Kashan, and two of the Russian officers left with a force of some 300 men for Kashan yesterday.

On the whole, and notwithstanding abundant complaints from the Persian Government regarding the high-handed action of some of the Russian consuls in the interest

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R

of Mohammed Ali, the relations of the present Cabinet with the Russian Minister are satisfactory, and it is therefore to be hoped that it will be able to tide over the three weeks which still remain before the Medjliss terminates. Unfortunately, this is by no means certain, for, although it is in appearance democrat in its composition, it is distrusted by the ultra-Nationalists, who are, I am told, anxious to upset it and to place in power a more advanced Ministry before the restraining influence of the Medjliss is temporarily removed. Moreover, the success of the Cabinet in dealing with the insurrection has in one respect rather weakened than strengthened its position, for the all-important part played by the Bakhtiaris in the struggle has earned for them a good deal of envy and distrust, and intrigues are said to be more than usually active against the Bakhtiar Prime Minister, Samsam-es-Sultaneh. A further element of weakness lies in the Cabinet's aloofness from Mr. Shuster, who enjoys the entire confidence of the ultra-Nationalists. There is, indeed, a disposition on the part of both Mr. Shuster and the Cabinet to work separately. You will have noticed that in the matter of the Seligman loan negotiations the Cabinet has not figured at all, and though many weeks ago Mr. Shuster asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to apply to the two legations for their good offices in the matter we have received no written communication in regard to it from Yossouk-ed-Dowleh, and whenever the latter has alluded verbally to the loan it has always been in such sense as to imply a disclaimer of responsibility for it. It is perhaps natural that a Persian Cabinet should look askance at one who keeps the purse-strings as tight as Mr. Shuster, but, owing to his influence with the ultra-Nationalist section of the Medjliss, his backing would be so important an asset that somewhat closer co-operation with him would seem to be politic.

In connection with Mr. Shuster's position, I ought to mention that my Russian colleague sees indications that his influence is waning with the moderate section of the Medjliss. I am not sure how far this is true. Certainly the decision of the Medjliss reported in my telegram No. 465 of to-day to engage Mr. New of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, which was taken under pressure from Mr. Shuster, and in the face of active lobbying by the corrupt Vice-Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Assadullah Khan, points to the contrary. In any case his influence with the ultra-Nationalists is as strong as ever, and, as I have often said, this party has in large measure the monopoly of ability and energy in the Medjliss.

It is a disagreeable feature of the situation that any opposition to Mr. Shuster is likely to find encouragement from some of the foreign representatives in Tehran, whose hostility he has managed to incur. In most cases this is, I believe, due to personal pique at Mr. Shuster's independent attitude towards them, but in the case of the French Minister the feeling probably lies deeper, and is doubtless largely due to his annoyance at Mr. Shuster's having replaced M. Bizot and having met with very different success with the Medjliss from that which attended M. Bizot's mission. I should imagine also, from a conversation I have had with M. Dumorguy, the French assistant at the Ministry of the Interior, that both he and M. Perny, the French assistant at the Ministry of Justice, do their utmost to foster M. Lecomte's dislike of Mr. Shuster. M. Dumorguy is evidently intensely jealous of him, and spoke of him to me in the most disparaging terms. It was quite evident that he intended to do his best to thwart Mr. Shuster's plan of merging with his own gendarmerie the force which is to be organised by the Swedish officers. The dislike felt by the French element for Mr. Shuster would not concern me greatly were it not that, knowing M. Lecomte as I do, I feel pretty sure that he does his best to prejudice my Russian colleague against him. For this M. Lecomte has a handle in the close relations of Mr. Shuster with the ultra-Nationalists, though to my mind Mr. Shuster's connection with this party has its advantages, as it gives him a better chance to influence them on the side of reason.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[41559]

No. 124.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 289.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the receipt of your telegram No. 559 of the 25th ultimo I handed an *aide-mémoire* to M. Nératof informing his Excellency that His

Majesty's Government might find it necessary to establish a vice-consulate at Bam and to strengthen various consular escorts in Persia. I now have the honour to transmit copy of the reply which I have received from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Mr. O'Beirne by M. Nératof.

PAR son *aide-mémoire* daté du 13 (26) courant, l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu communiquer au Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères le projet du Cabinet de Londres de créer un vice-consulat à Bam et d'augmenter l'effectif des escortes des consulats britanniques à Bouchir, Chiraz, Kerman et Bender-Abbas, ainsi que du consulat anglais à Ispahan, si toutefois le Gouvernement russe n'y avait pas d'objections, étant donné que cette dernière ville se trouve dans la sphère d'influence russe.

Le Gouvernement Impérial apprécie à leur juste valeur les considérations qui ont amené le Cabinet de Londres à recourir à la mesure dont il s'agit et déclare n'avoir aucune objection au renforcement de l'escorte consulaire anglaise à Ispahan.

De son côté, le Gouvernement Impérial est également préoccupé de l'état d'insécurité générale qui règne non seulement dans la région entre Ispahan et Téhéran, qui a été tout dernièrement encore le théâtre d'agressions répétées de la part de bandes de brigands, mais encore dans les provinces du nord de la Perse, où les troubles, qui avaient commencé à se calmer en présence des troupes russes, reprennent leur essor. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement russe ne voudrait en aucun cas recourir, sans y être absolument forcé par les circonstances, à l'envoi de nouvelles troupes en Perse, ainsi que cela avait lieu en 1909; mais, si les troubles continuent à se propager, il se verra probablement obligé de renforcer également les escortes de quelques-uns de ses consulats du nord de la Perse, ainsi que celle d'Ispahan, afin d'assurer les communications et le commerce russe entre cette ville, d'un côté, et Téhéran et Chiraz, de l'autre.

Le Gouvernement Impérial aime à espérer que le Cabinet de Londres voudra bien le tenir au courant des démarches ultérieures qu'il compte entreprendre dans la présente affaire.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 23 septembre, 1911.

[41560]

No. 125.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 292.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that on the 28th ultimo, having received your telegram No. 566 of the previous day, I addressed to the Acting Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs the *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy is enclosed, with reference to the proposed temporary employment of Mr. New in the Persian Telegraph Department.

I reminded M. Nératof of the subject at a conversation which I had with him yesterday. His Excellency, after an allusion to the question of Major Stokes's appointment and to the proposal to install a representative of Seligman's in the Persian Finance Department, said (though not ill-humouredly) that things looked much like a wholesale appointment of British subjects to posts in the Persian administration, and that the matter was causing serious uneasiness to the Russian Government. I demurred to this suggestion, and reminded his Excellency that the Russian Government had already agreed to Mr. New's appointment. M. Nératof said that the Russian Government would not make any objection to the present appointment, but they hoped that it would be regarded as an exceptional case, and that it would not be one of a series of engagements of British subjects in the Persian service. It would be necessary that Russians also should be employed. I said I was sure that His Majesty's Government would gladly see Russians taking similar posts.

I did not think it necessary to inform M. Nératof that it is understood, as stated in

Sir George Barclay's telegram No. 465 of the 4th instant, that Mr. New's appointment will be that of financial comptroller in the Persian Posts and Telegraph Department.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

P.S.—Since the above despatch was written, I have received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the *aide-mémoire* of which a copy is appended (Enclosure No. 2).

H. O'B.

Enclosure 1 in No. 125.

Aide-mémoire communicated to M. Nératof by Mr. O'Beirne.

PAR l'aide-mémoire du 28 décembre, 1909 (10 janvier, 1910), le Gouvernement Impérial a bien voulu faire savoir à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre qu'il ne voyait aucun obstacle à ce qu'un employé de l'Indo-European Telegraph Department fût mis temporairement à la disposition de l'Administration des Télégraphes persans pour aider à la réorganisation de cette dernière.

Un projet de contrat donnant suite à cette proposition a dernièrement été soumis à l'approbation du Medjlis, et quoiqu'il ait soulevé quelques objections de la part de l'Assemblée nationale, Sir G. Barclay est d'avis que ces objections pourront être écartées dans un très bref délai.

Le fonctionnaire du Telegraph Department en question est Mr. New, le même dont il s'agissait en 1909. Le Ministre de Russie à Téhéran a fait savoir à Sir G. Barclay qu'il ne voyait actuellement aucune objection à l'arrangement projeté, et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se plaît à espérer que le Gouvernement Impérial y donnera son assentiment.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 15 (28) septembre, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 125.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Mr. O'Beirne by M. Nératof.

PAR son aide-mémoire en date du 15 (28) septembre, année courante, l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu informer le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères du désir de mettre à la disposition de l'Administration des Télégraphes persans Mr. New, employé de l'Indo-European Telegraph Department, pour aider le Gouvernement persan à réorganiser cette dernière.

De son côté, le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas d'objections, à titre tout à fait exceptionnel, à la réalisation de la mesure projetée.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 28 septembre (11 octobre), 1911.

[41561]

No. 126.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 293.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that I called yesterday on M. Kokortzoff for the first time since he took office as President of the Council. I had a conversation of some length with his Excellency, and I was struck by the keen interest which he showed in foreign affairs, and by his apparent intention to take an active part in directing the foreign policy of the country. No doubt this will be the case, especially while the Department of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of an official who only temporarily replaces the Minister.

After some reference from his Excellency to the Turco-Italian conflict, I remarked that the Triple *Entente* appeared to me to have given a good account of itself in the Morocco question. M. Kokortzoff cordially assented, but said immediately afterwards that the Anglo-Russian understanding had not been working satisfactorily in Persia. I said that I should be very glad if he would specify the instances which he had in mind. He said that, since I put the question to him, he alluded to the Stokes affair. I

replied that in that matter His Majesty's Government had done everything which the Russian Government could have asked. M. Kokortzoff recognised that they had now done so, but said that there had been much delay. The *Entente* had not worked promptly. I told his Excellency that His Majesty's Government had at first considered that, in requiring Major Stokes to resign his commission in the British army before accepting the appointment offered to him by the Persian Government, they had taken a step which would be completely satisfactory to Russia. I also explained to him fully that, according to English practice, there were the gravest difficulties about refusing to accept the resignation of an officer who desired to take some other appointment, and that by so doing in the case of Major Stokes, His Majesty's Government had taken a very strong course solely in order to be agreeable to Russia. I think M. Kokortzoff had previously not at all appreciated the difficulty with which His Majesty's Government had to deal in this respect, and that the explanations which I gave him threw some new light on the matter so far as he was concerned.

His Excellency then passed to the subject of Turkish designs on Persia. He said that nowadays one was so liable to be surprised by the suddenness of events (a reference to Italy's action in Tripoli) that one could not afford to neglect any indications of impending trouble. He had seen a report that Turkey would seek to recoup herself in Persia for the loss of Tripoli. He could tell me confidentially that the Caucasus authorities did not cease reporting that Turkey was steadily strengthening herself in the region adjoining the Russian frontier in such a manner as to endanger Russia's strategic position. This could not be allowed to continue, and it would be absolutely necessary for Russia to take action to prevent it. While saying that the suggestion that Turkey might obtain compensation in Persia was probably no more than the conjecture of a journalist, I assured his Excellency that His Majesty's Government would continue to co-operate with the Russian Government in the Turco-Persian frontier question.

I afterwards spoke to his Excellency about the Russian fisheries question, and I am reporting what passed in my despatch No. 170, Commercial, of to-day's date.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[41564]

No. 127.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 300. Confidential.)

St. Petersburg, October 14, 1911.

Sir,

HAVING had the honour to receive yesterday your telegram No. 607 of the 12th instant, I asked the President of the Council for another appointment, and he received me at 9.30 the same evening. I had a very friendly conversation with his Excellency, in which I gave him at length the message contained in your telegram, adding some explanations on points of detail which occurred to me. I think that M. Kokortzoff was thoroughly satisfied of the loyalty with which His Majesty's Government have acted up to their understanding with Russia in Persia and elsewhere. He did not at all contest any of the considerations put forward by you, and he begged me to thank you most heartily for the assurances and explanations which you had given him, and for the courtesy with which you had treated him. He asked me to assure you that his one desire was that the *entente* between the two countries should work effectively and well; he considered this to be more than ever essential in the unsettled times which, as he believed, lay before us.

In the course of conversation, his Excellency remarked that he did not think there was any room for misunderstanding as to the policy pursued in Persia by the Russian Government. The objects which he had in view were the integrity of Persia, the maintenance of our respective spheres of influence, and the necessary protection of the Persian frontier from Turkish encroachment. He also referred to the necessity of preventing the intrusion of Germany into that country. I said that in all these objects His Majesty's Government were thoroughly at one with the Russian Government, and I felt sure that His Majesty's Government quite understood the Russian attitude regarding Persia. On our side we were anxious that the Russian Government should understand that when cases arose in which we were not able immediately and fully to meet Russia's wishes, this was not at all from any want of good-will on our part or of

[1524]

loyalty to our understanding, but because there were really serious difficulties, from the point of view of British interests, in the way of our doing all that Russia desired.

Although M. Kokovtsoff spoke, as I have above reported, of the integrity of Persia as being one of the chief objects of Russia's policy, I should mention a remark which he let fall, which seems to indicate that his attachment to the principle in question is rather of the platonic kind. When I was speaking to him of the destructive effect on British commerce of the disturbances in South Persia, and of the consequent necessity for us of putting the Persian Government in a position to restore order, his Excellency said, "Why do you not occupy the country? I suppose it is out of regard for that phantom, the Constitutional Régime in Persia?" I said that His Majesty's Government were reluctant to send troops into Persia because they knew how difficult it would be to withdraw them; and to this proposition his Excellency of course agreed. Indeed, he thought it necessary afterwards, when informing me of the step which the Russian Government are taking at Khoi, to say that Russia, like England, was averse to the idea of military occupation. I am reporting the communication which he made to me regarding the Turkish frontier question in my immediately following despatch.

Speaking of the working of the Triple *Entente* in connection with the Morocco negotiations, his Excellency said that so far, at any rate, the *entente* had produced very good results, and he added that the course of the negotiations would, in his opinion, have been very different if Great Britain had taken up less firm an attitude. In general, from his Excellency's tone quite as much as from what he actually said, I could not but have the impression that he is a resolute supporter of Russia's present system of relations with the Western European Powers.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[41565]

No. 128.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 301. Confidential.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 14, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to state that when, in my conversation with the President of the Council yesterday, I touched, in carrying out your instructions, on the Turco-Persian frontier question, his Excellency expressed himself strongly in the same sense as at my interview with him of the 9th instant. He laid stress on the strategic significance of Turkey's advance into the Urubah district and on the absolute necessity of Russia taking steps to protect her position. He observed also that it was a curious thing that the suggestion as to Turkey obtaining compensation in Persia for what she lost in Tripoli should have come from a German source.

I asked whether there were any particular steps in which the Russian Government desired the co-operation of His Majesty's Government. M. Kokovtsoff, after a moment's hesitation, then said that he would be quite frank with me. The Viceroy of the Caucasus had proposed that Russia should send troops to Khoi. He (M. Kokovtsoff) and M. Nératof had opposed this suggestion. Russia like England was averse to the idea of a military occupation. It had therefore been decided not to send a military force, but the Russian Government had selected a vice-consul, M. Preobrajensky, who was an able and energetic officer, to proceed to Khoi with a sufficiently large escort to enable him to take a firm line ("parler haut"). In answer to questions which I put to him his Excellency added that the escort would be of about 100 men, that M. Preobrajensky would reach Khoi in two or three days and that the Turks had actually withdrawn from Khoi, though at one time they had occupied it.

I had already, as reported in my despatch No. 293 of the 10th instant, suggested to the President of the Council that the idea which had been put forward as to Turkey obtaining territorial compensation in Persia was probably nothing more than the suggestion of a newspaper correspondent. I now said that I could not believe that Turkey would be so foolish as to take any action at the present moment which would draw down upon her the hostility of Russia in addition to her other difficulties. M. Kokovtsoff said that he was not so sure on that point, and he referred to the vexatious action of the Ottoman Government towards Russia in the matter of grain shipments from the Black Sea. If the attitude of the Turks on the Persian frontier

proved satisfactory, the consular guard at Khoi would, his Excellency said, be reduced to twenty-five men.

M. Kokovtsoff enquired whether His Majesty's Government would raise any objections to the steps which had been decided upon by the Russian Government. I said that personally I was sure that they would not do so. The proceedings of the Turks in the direction of Maku during the course of the past eighteen months make it, I venture to think, difficult to criticise the counter-action of Russia, so far at any rate as it has actually developed.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[41566]

No. 129.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 304.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 17, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 301, Confidential, of the 14th instant, I have the honour to state that I put some questions to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday regarding the dispatch of a Russian vice-consul with a strong escort to Khoi.

His Excellency said that the Turks had not lately made any fresh move on the Turco-Persian frontier. There were no Turkish troops at Khoi except (I understood his Excellency to say) a small escort with the Turkish consul at that place. But there were, as was shown by the report made by Messrs. Shipley and Minorsky, some Turkish troops in possession of a certain defile in the neighbourhood of Khoi. When M. Preobrajensky reached his post he would be able to form a judgment as to what should be done next.

I said that, while fully appreciating the reasons for Russia's action, I felt that she would probably be accused of taking advantage of Turkey's present difficulties to make a move in Persian territory, and that capital would be made of this at Constantinople. M. Nératof replied that it was only a question of a consular guard.

On reference to the itinerary of the British and Russian delegates on the Turco-Persian frontier, of which copy is enclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 110 of the 1st July, 1911, I do not find any statement as to the presence of a Turkish force near Khoi.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[41835]

No. 130.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st October, 1911, relative to troops for Persia.

India Office, October 23, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 21, 1911.

SEE our telegram dated the 12th instant regarding dispatch of troops for Persia.

Two squadrons of cavalry sailed for Bushire 20th and 21st instant in two transports. If the two other squadrons are to be dispatched immediately, taking up of extra shipping at great expense will be necessitated. My assent has therefore been given to the 3rd and 4th squadrons awaiting the return from Bushire early next month of the transports already chartered for two months, and then following in

those vessels. I should be glad, in view of difficulties as to transport, to have instructions at earliest possible date in the event of dispatch to Bunder Abbas of second cavalry regiment being decided upon. I still maintain the existence of the serious political objections, which my telegram of the 30th ultimo foreshadowed, to this proposal.

[41805]

No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 314.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
ESCORTS.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

(R.) You may assure Persian Government that, if they will devise an effective scheme to restore security or protect the roads, the British escorts will be used solely as consular guards to protect consulates and British lives and property in the towns where they are located, and will not patrol roads or make expeditions pending the execution of Persian scheme. When Persian scheme is in operation and effective, increased escorts will be withdrawn. (End of R.)

The escorts have already started, and their distribution between Ispahan, Shiraz, and Bushire is left to your discretion.

[41961]

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 639.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

RUSSIAN relations with Persia.

I saw Count Benckendorff, and urged upon him that I could see nothing which necessitated an occupation of North Persia. So strong a step as occupation, or even as a military expedition, would, I said, necessitate a revision of that part of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1908 which concerned Persia, as it would put an end to Persian independence.

Count Benckendorff replied that M. Nératof had been rendered most anxious by the prospect that the control of affairs in Persia was falling into Shuster's hands. It was impossible for his Government to allow the predominance in Persia of a Power which took no account whatever of them. He had, however, not heard that a military expedition was contemplated.

To this I replied that, although I quite understood that Russia must protect her own interests if they were being undermined, I thought the danger was overestimated. Shuster, I said, complained that he had been unable to effect anything. Seligman had as yet come to no arrangement for a loan, Stokes's appointment had been prevented by His Majesty's Government, and the Persian Railway Syndicate had been recommended to send a representative to arrange matters with Russia because they could not obtain the concession for which they were applying unless the railway went into the Russian sphere. I said that, according to my most recent information, even the Persian Government were dissatisfied with Shuster, and I pointed out that it was not a sufficient reason for destroying Persian independence that Shuster, as a private individual, had spoken adversely.

Please speak to M. Nératof in sense of the above.

[41101]

No. 133.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th October respecting the resignation of Major Stokes, and to inform you, in reply, that he approves of the terms of the draft telegram to the Viceroy which was therewith transmitted.

I am further to call your attention to paragraph 2 of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 505, copy of which is annexed for convenience of reference, and to suggest that, in these circumstances, it might be advisable, if the Secretary of State for India concurs, to offer Major Stokes some post in India or request him to rejoin his regiment, with a view to finding for him active employment out of Persia.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[39105]

No. 134.

Foreign Office to Indo-European Telegraph Company.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

IN the letter which, by direction of Secretary Sir E. Grey, I addressed to you on the 7th April last, I communicated to you, for the confidential information of your board, certain arrangements which had been concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government in 1907 respecting the control of telegraph lines in Persia. Subsequently, on the 10th June, M. Pagenkopf communicated to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg copies of proposed agreements with the Russian and Persian Governments in this matter, adding, in a letter dated the 8th September, that the Indo-European Telegraph Company was prepared to accept any modifications which the Russian Government might deem necessary to bring the agreement into line with arrangements entered into with the British Government.

I am now directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that His Majesty's Government have had the terms of the proposed agreement between your company and the Russian and Persian Governments under careful consideration, and, with a view to preventing misunderstanding, I am to offer the following observations.

The first agreement, dealing with the remuneration which the company proposes, should be granted to it by the Russian Government for telegraph work in the erection or reconstruction of the main telegraph lines in the Russian sphere, and for the subsequent maintenance and working of these lines, is a question which concerns the Russian Government and your company.

With regard to the second of the agreements headed "Proposed Agreement between the Imperial Russian and Persian Governments and the Indo-European Telegraph Company," I am to observe that His Majesty's Government's arrangement with the Russian Government provides that the latter Government should eventually take over the control of the Tehran-Meshed line and of the line from Meshed up to Khaf, while the line from Khaf to Seistan would come under British control, so that the proposal of your company in article 3 to maintain the line "from Meshed to Birjand" should be altered to "from Meshed to Khaf." I am also to point out that the control of the Tehran-Meshed line could not be made over to your company until the exchange of the control of that line from the British to the Russian Government, and of the Khaf-Seistan line from the Russian to the British Government, has been carried out by arrangement with the Persian Government. I am further to inform you that, under an agreement which has been come to between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, British signallers, after the exchange of control of the lines had taken place, would work at the terminal stations of the Tehran-Meshed and the Meshed-Khaf lines at intervals daily.

I am to add that, in a letter addressed to M. de Klerin on the 23rd March (5th April) last by M. Pagenkopf, copy of which the latter communicated to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg in his letter of the 10th June, M. Pagenkopf alludes to "a continuation of the Meshed line to Herat." I take this opportunity of reminding you, for the information of your board, that, as Sir G. Buchanan has already pointed out to M. Pagenkopf, there can of course be no question of such an extension without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[42069]

No. 135.

Minute by Sir Edward Grey.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF informed me that M. Kokovtsoff agrees to the Seligman loan provided it is issued by the Russian bank. Seligman has said that he does not object to this if the British Government will agree.

I observed that I thought there had been some idea that both banks should participate in the issue of the loan. Count Benckendorff said that the British bank had alone issued the previous loan. I admitted, but said I thought it was for a smaller amount, and that I must consider the matter.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

[41939]

No. 136.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received October 24.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, October 23, 1911.*
I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 17th instant relative to the proposed dispatch to Persia of two native Indian regiments in view of the state of disorder now existing in Southern Persia.

My Lords have not as yet been placed in possession of particulars sufficient to enable them to judge of the necessity for sending so large a body of troops, but, as they assume that Secretary Sir E. Grey has satisfied himself of the urgency of the matter, and that a more economical method of meeting the difficulties of the situation is not feasible, they are prepared provisionally to accept as a charge to the British exchequer half the expenditure involved. They agree fully with Sir E. Grey that there is no sufficient reason for departing in this instance from the general principle that India and this country should each bear half the cost incurred in protecting the life and property of British subjects, and in securing the safety of the trade routes. These my Lords understand to be the objects for which the military force is being sent, and it accordingly appears to them desirable that the diplomatic and consular vote should continue to bear the consequent charges.

They will await the further particulars promised in the letter under reply with regard to (1) the probable cost and number of troops, and (2) their destination and distribution.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[41905]

No. 137.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 516.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 314.

I have made communication to Persian Government indicated in your telegram No. 314, and have authorised British consul-general at Bushire to send 200 men to Shiraz and 100 to Ispahan as soon as possible.

[41993]

No. 138.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 517.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

LUAN of Mr. New's services for three years as financial aide to the treasurer-general in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

Please see telegram No. 234 from St. Petersburg.

I trust that there is no hitch in sanctioning the loan of Mr. New's services. No

reply has yet been received here, though it is ten days since the Director of the Indo-European Telegraph Department telegraphed to the Director-in-Chief that the Persian Government had applied officially for New's services.

[41995]

No. 139.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, October 24, 1911.

I TO-DAY communicated to M. Nératof the views expressed in your telegram No. 639 of the 23rd October. His Excellency had not yet heard from Count Benckendorff.

He said that Russia was no less anxious than Great Britain to respect Persia's independence, and would not resort to action of the nature which she had contemplated so long as nothing was done to the detriment of her interests.

I asked M. Nératof to specify the arrangements which, in his opinion, would render it unnecessary for Russia to resort to strong measures. He suggested that the two Powers might consult as to the most convenient way of convincing M. Shuster that he must act in concert with them. The negotiation of the proposed Seligman loan might afford an opening for this. Messrs. Seligman, he understood, were sending a representative to St. Petersburg in connection with the matter. The two Powers might attach certain conditions to their consent to the loan, one of which would be the participation of the Russian Bank (and presumably also of the Imperial Bank of Persia) in it.

M. Nératof added that it was essential that the Persian Government should in general act in concert with Great Britain and Russia.

[41905]

No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 319.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 24, 1911.

INCREASE of consular escorts.

See your telegram No. 516 of the 24th October.

According to telegram from the Viceroy, two squadrons sailed from India on the 20th and 21st October. You should discuss with Colonel Cox the advisability of these two squadrons being sent to Shiraz immediately.

I have agreed with the Viceroy's proposal that the transports used for conveying the first two should return to Bombay for the two remaining squadrons. They will thus not arrive until November.

[42103]

No. 141.

Note communicated to Sir Edward Grey by M. Cambou, October 25, 1911.

LE Gouvernement persan vient d'offrir à un Français, M. Latter, professeur de physique à l'Institut polytechnique, des fonctions équivalentes à celles de conseiller au Ministère de l'Instruction publique. M. de Solves a donné pour instructions au Ministre de France à Téhéran de ne pas faire échouer la candidature de M. Latter, si cette candidature ne soulevait pas les objections des Légations d'Angleterre et de Russie.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 24 octobre, 1911.*

[42132]

No. 142.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 518.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MR. NEW.

Please see my telegram No. 517 of last night.

I now learn that the necessary sanction has been received for the loan of Mr. New's services.

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

[42136]

No. 143.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 519.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

INCREASE in consular escort.

I have requested Ala-ed-Dowleh to send instructions to the local khans between Bushire and Shiraz to do everything in their power to facilitate the passage of our troops. His Excellency readily consented to do so.

Apparently he has determined to proceed to Shiraz to take up his post, and he even observed that the presence of our troops would be of moral assistance to him in preserving order.

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

[42147]

No. 144.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 520.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MISS ROSS.

Please see your telegram No. 309 of the 16th instant.

I can, I think, obtain 255*l.* forthwith as a compassionate grant in settlement of Miss Ross's claim.The matter will be considerably, possibly indefinitely, delayed if any reservation is made as regards an additional indemnity for the beating. If I can obtain the sum of 255*l.* I would strongly recommend her accepting it.

Do you approve provided she consents?

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

[42148]

No. 145.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 521.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SOUTHERN roads.

British merchants at Shiraz are most anxious to forward goods to Ispahan and Bushire, and have approached His Majesty's acting consul on the subject. The roads are very insecure, and it would be better that caravans should await the arrival of the British troops if the latter might be used as escorts. The communication which I made to the Persian Government yesterday presumably precludes this, however, at any rate, until the Persian Government have been given reasonable time to elaborate an effective scheme and to put it into execution.

As soon as the cavalry reaches Shiraz the sepoy guard should be leaving that place: their connection with the consulate will then have been severed, and they will be travelling to Bushire in the ordinary course of events.

Do you think it would be too inconsistent with the spirit of my communication to the Persian Government if the opportunity, which is certainly a tempting one, were taken to send a commercial caravan to Bushire under British escort?

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

[40717]

No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

SECRETARY Sir E. Grey has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mirza Mehdi Khan's memorandum of the 13th October respecting the state of affairs in Southern Persia and the decision of His Majesty's Government to strengthen their consular escorts there.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to state, in reply, that, as Mirza Mehdi Khan has already been informed verbally, the reinforcement is now under orders, and that it is too late to counterorder it. The escorts will be located to certain specified towns in Persia for the protection of the consulates and British life and property. His Majesty's Government will welcome any measure which the Persian Government may take for restoring security and for reopening the roads to peaceable trade intercourse, and when these ends have been attained the reinforcements will be withdrawn from Persia. Sir E. Grey would remind Mirza Mehdi Khan that His Majesty's Government have already on many occasions received assurances of the Persian Government's ability to restore order, and that these assurances have so far not resulted in any satisfactory action. His Majesty's Government do not, therefore, feel justified in accepting them at the present juncture, when, owing to the powerlessness of the Central Government, a state of practical anarchy exists in the province of Fars and elsewhere. This anarchy culminated in a situation at Shiraz which threatened the gravest danger to British life and property, and which is apparently liable to recur at any moment. The nomination of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars, and the reconciliation between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Kawam-ul-Mulk, to which Mirza Mehdi Khan alludes in his memorandum, scarcely seem likely to have the pacifying effect which Mirza Mehdi Khan anticipates. Indeed, His Majesty's Government have received recent information to the effect that an English lady doctor has been robbed and badly beaten near Abadeh, on which occasion Messrs. Dixon lost goods to the value of 1,000*l.*; that a telegraph ghulam has been robbed of his instruments and his horse within 4 miles of Shiraz; that a second ghulam, accompanied by a Government sowar, is surrounded by tribesmen at 8 miles distance from that town. The post from Bushire has been robbed, the road south from Shiraz is so dangerous as to be practically impassable, while that leading to the north has been completely closed for the past month. Soulet-ed-Dowleh, so far from assisting the Central Government to keep order, as Mirza Mehdi Khan states that he has promised to do, has, according to His Majesty's Government's information, openly threatened to renew trouble. His Majesty's Government are further informed that 300 soldiers of the Hamadan regiment were recently worsted by a large band of Kuhgeluis, near Yazdikhast, after a severe conflict; that on the 13th October four bales of piece-goods, the property of Messrs. Ziegler, were seized by robbers on the Shiraz-Bushire road; and that earlier in the month Messrs. Weir were robbed of goods to the value of 400*l.* near Kamarij.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government cannot consider the state of Southern Persia in general, and of Shiraz in particular, as being other than menacing to British life and property, and it has become incumbent upon them to provide British subjects with that adequate protection which is at present beyond the power of the Persian Government. As soon as security is established in the disturbed region, His Majesty's Government will withdraw the additional escorts which they have now been reluctantly compelled to dispatch from India.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1911.

[41905]

No. 147.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd October, transmitting copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st October, respecting the transport of the four squadrons of cavalry from Bombay to Bushire. I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in the Viceroy's proposal, that the transports carrying the first two squadrons should return from Bushire early in November to embark the third and fourth squadrons, and to transmit to you herewith,

[1524]

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to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram which he has sent to Sir G. Barclay in this sense.*

With regard to the concluding sentence of the Viceroy's telegram, I am to add that Sir E. Grey presumes the Marquess of Crewe is informing Lord Hardinge that it is not necessary to send a cavalry regiment to Bunder Abbas.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[42227]

No. 148.

Indo-European Telegraph Company to Foreign Office.—(Received October 26.)

Sir, 18, Old Broad Street, London, October 25, 1911.
WE have to acknowledge, with thanks, receipt of your letter of the 23rd October, 1911, and are indebted to your department for the information given us respecting telegraph lines in Northern Persia.

The various observations contained in your letter have been carefully noted, and a copy of the same will be sent to the company's representative in St. Petersburg, with instructions to modify the draft agreements referred to in accordance with your wishes.

It is noted in particular that the control of the Tehran-Meshed and Meshed-Khaf lines cannot be made over to this company until the exchange of the control of the Tehran-Meshed line from the British to the Russian Government and of the Khaf-Seistan line from the Russian to the British Government has been carried out by arrangement with the Persian Government.

It is also noted that, by arrangement between the British and Russian Governments, British signallers will eventually work at the terminal stations of the Tehran-Meshed and Meshed-Khaf lines at intervals daily.

The provision referred to by the department with reference to the mention in Mr. Pugenkopf's letter of the 23rd March (5th April) last to M. de Klerin of a possible continuation of the Meshed line to Herat is, so far as we know, not based on any expressed wish of the Russian Government, and was referred to owing to a wish to cover all eventualities and to make the scheme a comprehensive one. In any event, this company would take no further steps whatever in that direction without previously consulting with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
T. W. STRATFORD ANDREWS,
Managing Director.

[41559]

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 648.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 254 of 24th October: Consular escorts.

I agree that independence of Persia must be one that is not unfriendly either to Russia or us, and I realise that geographical situation would make it impossible for Russia to tolerate a Government at Tehran that disregarded Russian interests. We shall certainly, when necessary, say this to Shuster, and, indeed, have practically said so by refusing our consent to Stokes's resignation.

I think it is important that Persia should get some money, otherwise the southern roads will remain blocked to our trade. I hope, therefore, that the Seligman loan will be arranged, as regards which we have from the first informed Seligman that Russian concurrence was necessary. We have no objection to half issue in Russia.

You can speak in sense of this telegram on first convenient opportunity.
(Repeated to Tehran, No. 321 of 26th October.)

[41559]

No. 148*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 646.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.*

YOUR despatch of 7th October.

You should inform Russian Government that we have for the present abandoned the proposals respecting Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and Bam, and that we are only sending 400 men for distribution between Bushire, Shiraz, and Isfahan at the discretion of Sir G. Barclay in consultation with local consular authorities. The first portion of this force will arrive at Bushire on 26th October; the second half will arrive in November. You should also say we have informed the Persian Government that decision to send increased escorts has only been taken owing to danger to British life and property at Shiraz and elsewhere, that we shall welcome any measures which Persian Government may take to restore security and reopen roads to peaceable trade, and that when these ends have been attained reinforcements will be withdrawn from Persia.

[42147]

No. 149*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 520 of the 25th October: Miss Ross.

I approve if Miss Ross consents.

[42433]

No. 150.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 27.)

Sir,

India Office, October 27, 1911.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th instant, regarding the conveying of caravans by Indian troops in Southern Persia, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite attention to the telegram dated 25th instant from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, from which it would appear that Sir G. Barclay is not yet fully aware of the position, as the Marquess of Crewe understands it, with regard to the employment of troops for such purposes. His Lordship would therefore suggest that categorical instructions should be sent to Sir G. Barclay without delay that in no circumstances are troops to be so used. He also considers it very important that these instructions should at once be communicated to the local British consular authorities.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[42103]

No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 655.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Foreign Office, October 27, 1911.

M. LATTEUR'S appointment.

I was told by French Ambassador that a Frenchman, M. Latter, has been offered by Persian Government a post amounting practically to that of adviser to Minister of Education, and that French Government had instructed their Minister at Tehran not to offer opposition to appointment provided there are no objections raised by British and Russian colleagues.

You should ask Russian Government if they have received similar information, and, in these circumstances, what their views are, seeing that this appointment is hardly of the same character as those earlier in the year of MM. Demorgny and Perny. The latter's functions were not advisory, but purely professional.

[42534]

No. 152.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 192.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 183 of the 2nd October, transmitting a copy of the note which I addressed to the Persian Government presenting the claims of Messrs. Weir and Ellinger arising from the dispossession of Muin-ut-Tujjar from the Hormuz oxide mines, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of the note which I have now received from the Persian Government in reply.

The Persian Government maintain that the firman of 1904, by not fixing a period for the duration of Muin's lease, left them the right of cancelling it at any moment. I think it would be difficult seriously to dispute this pretension of the Persian Government, especially in the case of one of its own subjects. But as the contract with Messrs. Weir and Ellinger was made before the lease was cancelled, and was only for such a reasonable period ahead as was required by the exigencies of commerce, we can very fairly contend that the Government, on taking possession, should have carried out the provisions of the contract as I called upon them to do in my notes to the Persian Government of the 11th and 12th April, 1910.

It is true that, if we admit the legality of the Persian Government's action, their second argument, founded on the terms of Muin's supplementary agreement (No. 3, in enclosure in Messrs. Ellinger and Co.'s letter to the Foreign Office of the 26th July, 1910), has to be met. I think, however, that it may be pointed out that this agreement merely relieves Muin from personal liability for damages, and does not relieve the Persian Government from their obligation to carry out the *bonâ fide* engagements of Muin existing at the time he was summarily ejected.

When this question was first discussed it was assumed by the Foreign Office that

either Muin entered fraudulently into his contract with Messrs. Weir and Ellinger, or that the Persian Government acted illegally in dispossessing him. I think that it is now clear that neither of these assumptions is necessarily correct, but that Muin, so long as he was in undisputed possession under his indefinite firman, was entitled to make reasonable contracts, especially with the proviso contained in the supplementary agreement, and that the Persian Government were equally entitled to cancel his lease when they pleased. They should, however, in lieu of reasonable notice being given, have respected Muin's current engagements, and their third argument, that the contract should have been countersigned by the Government, falls to the ground, as the absence of this formality does not, according to the Commercial Treaty of Turcomanahai, invalidate the contract of the defendant; in this case Muin acknowledges his signature. Moreover, by my note of the 8th August, 1909, the Persian Government, some time before the actual cancelling of the lease, were warned of the existence of the contract. The supplementary agreement to which the Persian Government attach importance was equally devoid of the formality in question.

The rest of the Persian Government's note deals with the question of Messrs. Strick's responsibility under article 12 of their contract for any legal claim arising from the non-fulfilment of Messrs. Weir and Ellinger's contract, and hints that if Messrs. Strick do not meet this responsibility, their contract will also be treated as null and void.

It will thus be seen that, while not disputing the right of the Persian Government to dispossess Muin when they did, it would still not be difficult to make out a good case for the claim for compensation on account of the violation of Muin's contract with Messrs. Weir and Ellinger, yet if I restrict my arguments to those advanced above, there remains little or no justification for the additional claim of Messrs. Ellinger for the sum of 3,487*l.* 10*s.* for loss of agency. This claim, I take it, can only be based on the illegality or Muin's dispossession, and insistence on this point would be, I venture to think, deeply resented by the Persian Government, and thus be prejudicial to future dealings between them and British firms of all kinds.

In these circumstances, I have the honour to request your instructions as to the reply which I should make to the Persian Government.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 152.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, September 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 9th September last respecting the claims of Messrs. Weir and Messrs. Ellinger in connection with the oxide of the Hormuz mines. In reply, I have the honour to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the point that the Persian Government, by not fixing the terms in the firman of the year 1904, had reserved to itself the right of cancelling the lease of the Hormuz mines at any moment, and it has been for the same reason that the Muin-ut-Tujjar, in making the contract, has, by separate documents, made conditions with the above-mentioned firms to the effect that, should the Government make such changes in the administration of the Hormuz mines which might define or abolish the Muin's control over them the contract would be cancelled and the firms would have no right to claim compensation. The acceptance of these conditions by the firms in question points to the fact that they have been aware of the right of the Government to cancel the firman at any time. It was necessary that the firms should have done this business with the knowledge of the Persian Government and have their contracts countersigned by the Government. Having failed to respect this point, which would have strengthened their contract, and having had no dealings with the Government in this connection, the firms cannot bring any claims which might be allowed by His Majesty's Government to be enforced against the Persian Government, which has legally cancelled the lease held by its own lessee and its own subject.

By article 12 of their contract, Messrs. Strick undertake full responsibility for meeting the legal claims of Messrs. Weir and Ellinger, so that no loss may be incurred by the Government or the Muin-ut-Tujjar in connection with this case.

On the 5th July last, the Persian Legation in London warned Messrs. Strick that

if in twenty days the claims of Messrs. Weir and Ellinger are not put an end to Messrs. Strick would be responsible for damages.

If the British Government consider the claims of Messrs. Weir and Ellinger legal, they must also hold Messrs. Strick responsible for their settlement. If the British Government do not consider the claims legal, why should they prefer them against the Persian Government?

Your Excellency has considered the responsibility of Messrs. Strick and the claims of Weir and Ellinger to be two different questions, and has stated in the note under reply that "any counter-claims which the latter consider they have to make on this head against Messrs. Strick and Co. is a matter for separate settlement between the Persian Government and that firm." In reply, I have the honour to state that this is not a claim which could be settled between the Imperial Government and Messrs. Strick, but it is a full responsibility incurred by that firm in connection with the business in question, and they are bound to get it settled. In case Messrs. Strick fail to meet their responsibility, the business entered into by them will be null and void.

In view of the above circumstances, I have full confidence in your Excellency's sense of justice that you will admit the observations made by the Persian Government, and that you will inform your Government accordingly.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

[42535]

No. 153.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 195.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 14, 1911.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 301 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herein copy of the note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th instant, stating that His Majesty's Government had decided to increase the guard at His Majesty's consulate at Shiraz.

I also enclose a translation of his Excellency's reply, the substance of which I had the honour to communicate to you in my telegram No. 489 of last evening.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 153.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Gulahck, October 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, under instructions from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, owing to possible danger to British lives and property at Shiraz and elsewhere, His Majesty's Government are compelled to strengthen the consular guard at Shiraz, and possibly also the consular guards at Ispahan and Bushire.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 153.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 11, 1911.

I HAVE taken note of the contents of your Excellency's note of the 10th instant respecting the increase of the consular guard at Shiraz. In reply, I have the honour to state that, as your Excellency is aware, the maintenance of order in the southern provinces and the improvement of affairs in Fars, being the principal matters of concern to the Persian Government, were receiving special consideration. When the Government were taking fresh measures, and were about to succeed in bringing about the improvements in view, the Kavan incident and the taking of refuge by him

in the British consulate frustrated this intention. Immediately afterwards, the insurrection of the deposed Shah, Salar-ed-Dowleh, and their followers broke out, and the Government's efforts had to be directed towards their extermination and the reparation of the mischief caused by them, which was indispensable for public security. The Government were therefore unable to direct their energy, as they wished, towards the settlement of affairs in the south. The money which had been prepared for fundamental reforms, and should have been expended on necessary undertakings, has been misspent. Furthermore, the moral assistance of the British Government, which might have given support to the measures taken by the Persian Government against the deposed Shah, was not forthcoming.

Now that the Government are free from embarrassments in the north and west, and are about to direct their attention to the south by employing their whole efforts to restore order and security, the step contemplated by the British Government, which might form a precedent for others, would be extremely unexpected and unwelcome on the part of a friendly Power.

The steps contemplated by the Persian Government in regard to Fars, which are communicated for your Excellency's information, are as follows:—

Firstly, order will be given to the Cossack detachment, numbering 350 men (horse, foot, and artillery), now on their way to Kashan, and who left Kum yesterday, to proceed at once to Shiraz after accomplishing their task at Kashan.

Secondly, Ala-ed-Dowleh, the new Governor-General of Fars, will shortly leave Tehran for his post, with the necessary force.

Thirdly, the Swedish officers, who have been specially engaged by the Persian Government for the organisation of the gendarmerie and the maintenance of security on the roads, are busily engaged, and the result of their work will soon be apparent. A sufficient force for the protection of the southern roads will be sent.

Fourthly, the Persian Government have taken steps to bring about a reconciliation between Navam-ul-Mulk, Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, and their followers, whose animosities were chiefly responsible for the complications in Fars, and these steps have now proved entirely successful. The two persons above named and their followers have resolved to make up their differences, and in accordance with a written agreement, sealed by Mirza Ibrahim Muftahid, they have undertaken in future to absolutely obey the orders of the Government, and to take no measures tending to complicate the affairs of the country.

In view of the steps which have been and are being taken, I feel confident that within a very short time the defects still existing in the south will be entirely removed, and that perfect security will be established. In the meantime, every measure will be taken for the protection of British lives and property and those of other foreign subjects.

Under these circumstances, it is expected that your Excellency, who represents a friendly Power in whose friendship the Persian Government have complete reliance, will dissuade the British Government from taking the step contemplated, so that the Persian Government may have time to complete the measures they have undertaken, and that an uncalled-for step on the part of the British Government may not delay the achievement of their plans.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

[42458]

No. 154.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 185.)

Sir,

Stockholm, October 24, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 15 of the 17th instant, relative to the employment of Swedish officers in Persia, I have the honour to inform you that as many as seventy officers have applied to the military authorities for leave to serve in the Persian gendarmerie. The War Office is now making its selection. I understand that the reason why so many are applying is that promotion is slow, and that the prospect of an adventurous life in Persia presents great attractions. I will not fail to send home details as to the officers who may eventually be appointed.

With regard to the separate question of the employment of twenty Swedish officers to reorganise the army, I have the honour to state that no intimation whatever has

reached the Swedish Government from the Government of Persia as to the resolution recently passed by the Medjliss. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that, having learnt through a Reuter telegram of the decision of the Persian Parliament, he had given the whole question his careful consideration. From the internal point of view it appeared to him that although it would be advantageous to the commercial interests of Sweden that Swedish officers should be employed to reorganise the army, and thus make the name of Sweden favourably known to the Persian public, yet the War Office might with good reason object to parting with so large a number as twenty officers, and Parliament might also raise questions on the ground that Swedish officers were trained and paid for service in Sweden. From the external point of view he quite understood that difficulties might arise of a personal character between the Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade and the Swedish officers engaged in army reorganisation. Apart from these personal questions, the employment of Swedish officers in the manner proposed might well be opposed by Russia on political grounds. It was the object of the Swedish Government to live on good terms with all the world, and to avoid raising any difficult question with other Powers. He had not yet received any intimation from the Persian Government, possibly because the Russian representative in Tehran had raised objections. If such an official intimation reached him he would not reply to it until he had consulted the wishes of the two Powers principally interested in Persia, namely, England and Russia.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[42530]

No. 155.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 312.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 25, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 289 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a private letter which I have received from M. Nératof on the subject of the increase of the Russian consular guards at Ispahan and Rescht.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 155.

M. Nératof to Mr. O'Beirne.

Cher Mr. O'Beirne,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 11 (24) octobre, 1911.

JE vous ai fait savoir par mon aide-mémoire du 23 septembre (11 octobre) dernier qu'il était possible que le Gouvernement Impérial se vît obligé de recourir au renforcement de quelques-unes de nos escortes consulaires en Perse, vu l'état de choses peu satisfaisant dans ce pays.

Mes prévisions se sont réalisées; nous avons décidé maintenant de renforcer les escortes de nos consulats à Ispahan et à Rescht, la première de 150 hommes et la deuxième de 100. Les contingents en question vont être expédiés sous peu.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

A. NERATOF.

[42599]

No. 156.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 522.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that Messrs. E. C. Haycock and Schindler, British subjects, have been appointed by treasurer-general at Ispahan and Shiraz respectively as his agents.

It is possible that appointment of Mr. Haycock may lead to objections on the part of the Russian Government, as His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan reports that his Russian colleague has openly expressed his indignation at the appointment of a British subject in the Russian zone of interest.

I understand that Mr. Haycock, who is married to an Armenian, has been since 1897 in Ispahan, where he has been engaged in business. I have no reason to believe that he is in any degree Russophile.

M. Poklewski quite understands that the appointment was made entirely without my knowledge, and that I could not have stopped a private individual from accepting post offered to him by treasurer-general.

[42612]

No. 157.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 523.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

M. LATTÈS.

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

In reply to your telegram No. 323 of the 27th October, I have the honour to report that M. Poklewski and I have informed French Minister that the proposed appointment of M. Lattès, who has already served three years under Persian Government as professor, appeared to us to be unobjectionable. As his new duties will not oblige him to vacate his chair, his professional character is quite as marked as that of MM. Demorgny and Perry.

[42613]

No. 158.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 524.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ESCORT reinforcements.

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

Reference to my telegram No. 469 of the 6th October.

I venture to suggest that Lieutenant Wilson may be authorised to remain at Shiraz in order to accompany to Ispahan the squadron destined for His Majesty's consulate-general at that town. Troops would greatly benefit during their march up by his knowledge of Persia.

It would not be necessary to retain him for very long, as one of the squadrons now being disembarked at Bushire will proceed to Ispahan.

42629]

No. 159.

Consul-General Grahame to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Ispahan, October 28, 1911.

MISS ROSS left Abadeh for Shiraz 27th October under escort of local authorities.

[41939]

No. 160.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 28, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th September transmitting copy of a telegram from the Viceroy of even date, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that, in reply to a letter which he addressed to them on the 17th October respecting the increase of the consular escorts in Southern Persia, the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury have, in view of the urgency of the matter, now signified their readiness to accept provisionally as a charge to the British Exchequer, half the expenditure thus involved. The Lords Commissioners state further that they consider there is no sufficient reason for departing in this instance from the general principle that India and this country should each bear half the cost incurred in protecting the life and property of British subjects in Persia.

Their Lordships will await further particulars as to the probable cost of the

expedition, and I am therefore to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished in due course with any available information as to the cost of the transport and maintenance of the troops.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[42614]

No. 161.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 525.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

EX-SHAH.

Tehran, October 29, 1911.

It would appear, from information which has reached my Russian colleague, that Mehemet Ali Mirza has still a sufficient number of supporters to cause trouble to Persian Government.

Two or three engagements have been fought lately between His Majesty's troops and Government forces near Bender Gez, on the Caspian. A Government force of 1,500 men is reported to have been defeated in the last of these.

[42609]

No. 162.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 260.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SELIGMAN loan.

St. Petersburg, October 29, 1911.

Your telegram No. 648 of the 26th October.

M. Seligman has arrived in St. Petersburg. M. Nératof has promised me that he will keep the embassy informed of the course of any communications on the subject of the proposed loan which may pass between M. Seligman and the Russian Government. I will take steps to get into touch with M. Seligman myself.

[42610]

No. 163.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

FRENCH official for Persia.

St. Petersburg, October 29, 1911.

No objection is raised by M. Nératof to the proposed appointment of a Frenchman mentioned in your telegram No. 655 of the 27th October. The only point on which his Excellency feels any apprehension is that the appointment might afford a pretext to Germany for claiming posts of a similar nature for her own nationals. He thinks, however, that in view of the recent conclusion of the Russo-German agreement, such a claim is not likely to be put forward in the present case.

[42780]

No. 164.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 196.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 195 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit herein copy of a further note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against the dispatch of reinforcements for the consular guard at Shiraz. The substance of the note was telegraphed to you this morning in my telegram No. 500.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[1524]

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Enclosure in No. 164.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

WITH reference to my note of the 11th October in answer to your Excellency's respecting the increase of the consular guard at Shiraz, I have the honour to inform you that the situation in Fars has improved on account of the appointment of his Excellency Ala-ed-Dowleh to the post of Governor-General, and at present the town is quiet and there is no disturbance in the neighbourhood. As you have already been informed, the Cossack force at Kaslan has been ordered to proceed to Shiraz with the guns and ammunition now with it, and another force consisting of 2,000 men will be sent by degrees. The Swedish officers are at present making plans for the formation of a gendarmerie for Fars, so that after preliminary arrangements two of the new Swedish officers, who will arrive on the 1st December, will be sent there with a staff of Persian officers. In order to hasten the execution of this plan, instructions will be sent that before the arrival of the Swedish officers the men required for the gendarmerie shall be enlisted, so that when the officers arrive at Shiraz they will be able to begin their effective duties without delay. Orders have been given to some companies of soldiers who have arrived at Shiraz from Behbahan to guard the foreign consulates.

Although the Persian Government was not entirely free from its embarrassments in the north and west, and had, without delay, turned its attention to the south with the object of establishing full security in that region, the news of the proposed dispatch of 500 Indian troops from Bombay on the 24th October is contrary to the expectation of the Persian Government and inconsistent with the friendship existing between the two States. The confidence of the Persian Government in its success in the task of restoring order in the south will be replaced by a feeling of disappointment, and Ala-ed-Dowleh, who is considered by the Persian Government to be the only person who can restore order in Fars, would be prevented from taking up his appointment.

I hoped that, in view of the explanations contained in my note of the 11th instant, your Excellency would dissuade your Government from sending the Indian troops in question. Now that the news of their intended dispatch has been received, it is obvious to what extent the Persian Government's plans will be hampered. Ala-ed-Dowleh, for instance, on hearing the news, gave up the intention of going to Fars, saying that he could not admit of the taking of such a measure during his governorship.

It is obvious that the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh, the dispatch of the forces mentioned, and the measures contemplated by the Persian Government, the preliminaries of which are already in hand, are better means for the restoration of order in Fars than the dispatch of Indian troops, which may possibly bring about consequences contrary to those intended, and render the measures of the Persian Government ineffective.

Therefore I earnestly hope that your Excellency will inform your Government without delay of the measures taken and in contemplation by the Persian Government, and that you will dissuade your Government from dispatching the Indian troops so that Ala-ed-Dowleh should start as early as possible and put affairs in Fars in order.

In the hope of receiving a favourable reply, I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

[42821]

No. 165.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 527.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

INCREASE in consular guards.

Please see my telegram No. 516 of the 24th instant.

I have received a long telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, in which he urges that, as His Majesty's Government have decided that the reinforcements of the consular guards which are now arriving at Bushire may not be used for

the purpose of escorting caravans "pending the execution by the Persian Government of an effective scheme," our dispositions should be made in such a way that the greatest moral effect on the security of the roads is obtained, and also the best return for the heavy expenditure which His Majesty's Government have incurred. Cox therefore makes the suggestion that instead of leaving one squadron at Bushire it should be stationed at Kazerun for the present. Kazerun is on the Bushire-Shiraz road, in the middle of the most unsafe part. The squadron will not of course ever move out of Kazerun, but the knowledge, which will naturally circulate rapidly, of its presence there will, in Cox's opinion, have a most excellent effect on the lawless element in the neighbourhood, and the Governor-General will find this effect as helpful to himself as we shall. The local authorities would, Cox thinks, strongly favour this alternative as relieving Bushire of the stigma of insecurity, and he does not anticipate any objections from them. It is true that we have no consulate at Kazerun, and Persian Government might possibly raise objections on this score. Cox suggests that the two squadrons which are due to arrive next month should leave Bushire ostensibly for Shiraz. Wilson and Chick are laying in supplies at various stages along the road. The former will presumably be going to Ispahan (please see my telegram No. 524 of the 28th instant). When the cavalry reach Kazerun one squadron would be left there primarily with the object of waiting to ensure passage back to Bushire of Wilson and Chick. Kazerun is an important centre, and Chick, as His Majesty's vice-consul at Bushire, could, if necessary, make his head-quarters for some weeks there to examine trade conditions.

I concur in the views of His Majesty's consul, but as I do not know the considerations which were in view when the wording, laid down in your telegram No. 314 of the 23rd instant, of the communication to the Persian Government was being prepared, I do not like to recommend a course which might provoke adverse comment elsewhere as not being entirely consistent with the communication in question, though I could defend the course here.

[42889]

No. 166.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 528.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

INCREASE in Russian consular guards.

Please see telegram No. 238 from St. Petersburg of the 7th instant.

I am informed by the Russian Minister that 100 Russian troops have been disembarked at Enzeli, the objective being to increase the consular guard at Resht. I am under the impression that he is expecting another 200 for the increase of his consular escort at Ispahan.

The Russian Minister has read the terms of my announcement of the 24th instant to the Persian Government, and is asking his Government for instructions as to the terms of any announcement he should himself make to the Persian Government.

[42900]

No. 167.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 529.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair.

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

MY telegram No. 504 of 18th October.

Miss Ross telegraphs that she has been again attacked by robbers; her escort fled on seeing robbers, who numbered 400. Her money and some of the clothes she was wearing were taken, and several shots narrowly missed her. She telegraphs from Abadeh, to which place she was apparently obliged to return.

[42433]

No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 325.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ESCORTS.

I presume our consuls realise that troops just sent must not be employed as caravan escorts.

The sepoy guard should not be used for escorts.

Reference is to your telegram No. 621 of the 25th October.

Foreign Office, October 30, 1911.

[42908]

No. 169.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 310.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that I called yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to make a communication to him, in the sense of your telegram No. 625 of the 18th instant, regarding the proposed resignation of the Persian Regent, and his Excellency, after agreeing to send instructions to Tehran as you suggested, said that he wished to speak to me about a very pessimistic telegram which he had received from M. Poklewsky. It seemed from M. Poklewsky's report that the outlook in Persia was exceedingly dark; things were going from bad to worse; disorders were increasing, and he (M. Nératof) did not think that the Russian Government could much longer refrain from taking "measures of extreme rigour," and, in fact, proceeding to an "occupation" of Persian territory. In answer to various questions which I put to him, his Excellency said that the disorders were particularly serious in the Ardabil region, where the Shahsevens were on the move, and there had been frequent attacks on Russian convoys. Another element of disorder was that Ephrem, who had at least maintained the outward semblance of a police force, was now reported to be quarrelling with the Persian Government and leaving his post. Speaking of the pending Cabinet crisis, M. Nératof said that if the "extremists" obtained control at Tehran there would be no authority left in Persia with which to deal. He then went on to speak of Mr. Shuster. He complained strongly of that gentleman's attempt to obtain a control over the whole Persian administration such as was quite incompatible with Russian interests, and referred particularly to Mr. Shuster's declared intention of obtaining a free hand from the Medjliss in regard to railway concessions and loans.

I said that his Excellency already knew what were the views of His Majesty's Government regarding an occupation of Persia. If Russia occupied North Persia, I thought it would become a matter of such extreme difficulty for you to defend before British public opinion our further co-operation with her in that country that personally I foresaw the greatest danger to the *entente* between the two Powers. I was therefore certain that His Majesty's Government would do everything in their power to remove the causes which, in the opinion of the Russian Government, called for Russian intervention. I reminded M. Nératof that Russia had recently vetoed the various proposals put forward with the object of enabling the Persian Government to restore order in the country—proposals which, for our part, we had welcomed as affording some hope of an improvement in the state of things in the south. Russia had objected to these proposals, but she had suggested nothing to take their place. I begged his Excellency to tell me frankly what it was that the Russian Government wished done.

M. Nératof replied that the first thing necessary was that Mr. Shuster should understand that he must act in concert with, and in accordance with the interests of, Russia, and of course, his Excellency added, of Great Britain also. The Persian reforms must be proceeded with gradually and in such a manner as to take Russian interests into account. It must be remembered that the question was not merely one of the good of Persia, but also of the special position of Russia. If Mr. Shuster obtained a free hand from the Medjliss in regard to railway concessions and loans, it would be necessary that he should give an undertaking, in such a way as to inspire confidence that he would keep it, to the effect that he would act entirely according to the wishes of the two Powers. Mr. Shuster, however, was hardly the man to give an

undertaking of that kind. His Excellency regretted that Russia should play an "obstructive rôle" in Persia, but it had been forced upon her against her will.

I left his Excellency, saying that I would report his remarks to you. This morning, fearing that the Russian Government might possibly take some immediate action, I addressed a private letter, of which a copy is enclosed, to M. Nératof, saying that I thought I had understood from him that the Russian Government had not yet taken a definite decision with regard to the proposed measures in Persia, but begging him, in the contrary case, to give me the earliest possible notice. I have the honour to enclose also a copy of his Excellency's reply, stating that the Russian Government were at present only considering the necessity of a military expedition, and that they counted on the assistance of His Majesty's Government in endeavouring to avoid active intervention on a large scale.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 169.

Mr. O'Beirne to M. Nératof.

Mon cher M. Nératof,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 7 (20) octobre, 1911.

JE pense avoir bien compris, de ce que votre Excellence m'a dit hier, que pour le moment le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas pris la décision de procéder à des "mesures de rigueur" en Perse, telles que l'envoi d'une expédition militaire, quoiqu'il ait envisagé l'adoption d'une pareille mesure si l'état de choses dont vous vous plaignez en Perse ne s'améliore pas.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que si, au contraire, la décision d'envoyer une expédition militaire avait déjà été arrêtée (ce que j'espère très vivement n'est pas le cas), j'attacherais la plus grande importance à ce que vous vouliez bien m'en prévenir au plus tôt.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 169.

M. Nératof to Mr. O'Beirne.

Mon cher Mr. O'Beirne,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 7 (20) octobre, 1911.

VOUS avez eu parfaitement raison en supposant que rien n'a encore été fait chez nous en vue d'une expédition en Perse. Certes, nous envisageons seulement la nécessité de le faire et, le cas échéant, vous serez averti au préalable, puisque nous tenons beaucoup à continuer notre politique de coopération. Aussi, nous comptons sur le concours du Gouvernement britannique pour tâcher d'écarter l'éventualité d'une intervention effective dans de grandes proportions.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

A NÉRATOF.

[42910]

No. 170.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 25, 1911.

I CALLED yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and communicated to him your views, as expressed in your telegram No. 639 of the 23rd instant, on the subject of the threatened Russian action in North Persia.

M. Nératof, commenting on your reference to the question of Persian independence, said that Russia also desired the independence of Persia, but the dispatch of a military expedition would not destroy it. The dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin did not have any such effect, and the presence of Russian troops at Tabreez had, on the contrary, undoubtedly saved that town from falling into the hands of the ex-Shah's supporters. His Excellency seemed in fact disposed to argue that the more Russian

[1524]

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troops there were in Persia the better the independence and integrity of the country were safeguarded. I reminded him that he had spoken to me of an "occupation," and he said that "occupation" was perhaps too strong a word. M. Nératof's tone on this occasion was altogether mild and cheerful, and in marked contrast to that which he used at my conversation with him of the 19th instant. He appeared quite to appreciate the force of your observation that Mr. Shuster had been able to effect nothing to which the Russian Government objected, and he said that so long as that was the case Russia would take no action of the kind contemplated.

I endeavoured, but without much success, to induce his Excellency to indicate more precisely what were the arrangements with regard to existing difficulties in Persia which he would consider satisfactory, and which would remove all cause for strong measures on the part of Russia. He reiterated that Mr. Shuster should be made to understand that he must act in consultation with the two Powers. I asked how he thought that could best be done. Should it be through the Persian Government? Should instructions on the subject be sent to the two representatives? He replied that we must think over the matter. It had occurred to him that certain conditions might be laid down in connection with the proposed Seligman loan? If the loan was to be made, it was a *sine qua non* that the Russian bank should have a participation in it, and he supposed we should also wish the Imperial Bank to participate. He had learnt from the Russian Ambassador in London that Messrs. Seligman proposed to send a representative to discuss the question at St. Petersburg, as Colonel Bekdoes was making no headway at Tehran. In settling the terms of the loan M. Nératof seemed to think that conditions could be laid down which would make Mr. Shuster's position clear. He did not apparently anticipate that Mr. Shuster would resign sooner than acquiesce in arrangements which would satisfy the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[43037]

No. 171.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received October 31.)

Sir, THE Muin-ut-Tujjar writes us under date of the 7th October, and we hand you enclosed extracts from his letters, together with extracts of our reply which we propose to send him, and upon which we shall be glad to have your views before posting our letters.

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, October 30, 1911.

We are, &c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

Enclosure 1 in No. 171.

Extract of Letter, from the Muin-ut-Tujjar, dated October 7, 1911.

ACCORDING to the report of our Ambassador in London, you have been visiting him, but as he has not received any instructions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs he could not enter officially into relation with you on that subject.

However, last week the information relating to that matter has been sent to the Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

As Messrs. Strick have taken on themselves to answer all your legal claims, the Minister thinks this matter has to be referred to an arbitration or tribunal.

I myself believe that there is no other course to take, and that you must have recourse to one of these two, as Messrs. Strick's opinion is that you have no legal right.

Consequently a tribunal must decide if you are right or not, in order to oblige Messrs. Strick to settle the engagement which they have made.

As this matter has lasted for a long time, it would be good if you would do your best to complete the affair as early as possible.

With the information which has been sent to the Minister for Persia when the matter was referred to him, I believe that same could be settled more quickly.

If Messrs. Strick will not go to the tribunal, and if our legation informs the Minister for Foreign Affairs of this, perhaps the Persian Government will prevent other shipments until the matter is settled definitely.

Enclosure 2 in No. 171.

Extract of Letter dated October 7, 1911, from the Muin-ut-Tujjar to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

THE Chamber of Ministers has sent a proposal to the Medjliss to entrust to me the oxide mines of Hormuz on certain conditions, and we are awaiting the decision now of the Medjliss.

Perhaps I shall be able to obtain from the Government the authorisation to cancel the contract of Messrs. Strick and Co., on the grounds that they have not fulfilled their engagement, as they have not settled your claim as they had promised. But certainly in that case the Government will make me responsible for the consequences.

As I have sent to you a copy of the contract of Messrs. Strick, I beg to ask you if in your opinion the Government or myself can cancel the contract without undergoing the consequences of my claim of Messrs. Strick?

Besides this, do you believe that your Foreign Office, now, as it is convinced that this concession has been taken from me unjustly, and that Messrs. Strick have been the cause of it, will reject all claims raised by Messrs. Strick, in case their contract is cancelled?

Enclosure 3 in No. 171.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to the Muin-ut-Tujjar.

Dear Sir,

October 30, 1911.

WE are in receipt of your two letters of the 7th instant, and, with reference to the shorter of the two letters, we note that the Cabinet Ministers have put a proposition before the Medjliss to entrust to you again the oxide mines at Hormuz, subject to certain conditions, which we trust will be satisfactory.

We note, further, that you may be able to obtain from the Government authority to cancel the contract with Messrs. Strick on the grounds that they have not fulfilled their engagements, in so far as they have not regulated our claims as they had undertaken to do, and that in this case the Government would certainly hold you responsible for the consequences.

In reply to your question whether Messrs. Strick and Co. could have recourse against the Persian Government or yourself in the event of their contract being cancelled, we beg to state that our legal advisers have unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. can have no right of action against the Persian Government, nor could they enforce any legal claim against you in respect of a contract between the Persian Government and themselves to which you were no party.

With reference to the following paragraph of your letter, we regret to say that we have not yet succeeded in securing an admission from our Foreign Office that your concession has been unjustly taken away, but His Majesty's Government contends, on the other hand, that the question has not yet been proven by either the Persian Government or yourself.

With reference to the enquiry contained in this paragraph of your letter as to whether Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. could obtain the assistance of His Majesty's Government in support of a claim for the cancellation of their contract with the Persian Government, we have no hesitation in saying that His Majesty's Government are under every conceivable moral obligation to see that our rights and those of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. under the contract between us and you are not interfered with.

We must further point out that they have previously promised to give you all the protection they unofficially can in relation to this concession.

We also draw your attention to our letter to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 9th December, 1910, in which we wrote:—

"It has been intimated that His Majesty's Government must preserve an even balance between two British subjects, but we have to point out that there is no question

of equality of treatment of ourselves and Messrs. Strick in this matter if the Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession cannot be shown to have lapsed. Mr. Strick's oxide contract with the Persian Government was made long after the contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., with full knowledge of the existence of the contract between the Muin-ut-Tujjar and this firm and of the risk he was running should the Muin-ut-Tujjar's right to the concession be established, and after being twice told he could not rely upon the support of His Majesty's Government, who were pledged to support us, and we venture to submit without hesitation that from first to last the whole sequence of events shows that upon a conflict of interests Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves are, upon every principle of fairness, entitled to ask for this support in preference to any claims of Mr. Strick, based, as his are, and can only be, upon a contract which he knew to be made in violation of the Muin-ut-Tujjar concession."

To this letter the Foreign Office replied on the 15th December, 1910, and in reference to the paragraph we have just cited wrote:—

"As regards your second request, I am to observe that it is quite true that Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. have acted in this matter with full knowledge of the circumstances of the case and of the risk of loss to themselves which would be involved in a failure on the part of the Persian Government to prove that the Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession lapsed as they assert. Messrs. Strick are also aware of the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to yourself and to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and have themselves never received or even solicited any promise of support."

We again wrote to the Foreign Office on the 5th January, and our letter contains the following sentence:—

"Both the Persian Government and Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. were distinctly warned by His Majesty's Government—the former, that they would be held responsible for any injury to British interests, and the latter, that His Majesty's Government were pledged to support the contract with the Muin-ut-Tujjar."

In face of this, it is quite clear to us that His Majesty's Government would under no circumstances assist Messrs. Strick and Co. in putting forward any claim for damages consequent upon the Persian Government doing any act which would have for its effect the reinstatement of yourself in the rights of your concession and of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves in the rights of our contract.

The letters from which we have quoted you extracts have been sent to you by permission of His Majesty's Government, and there can be no doubt that you are entitled to make any use you think fit of their contents.

There are, moreover, other reasons why His Majesty's Government could not give support to any claim of this description as against you.

You will doubtless recollect that when the possibility was under discussion of the formation of an English limited company for the working of this oxide business, in an interview between Mr. Marling and yourself the former told you that once the company was formed the legation would be legally bound to give it its best protection, and that so long as there were British shareholders in the concern you could trust them at all events to see that their interests were properly cared for. Mr. Marling further told you that you had had dealings for many years with us, and if you had the same confidence in us that we reposed in you, you need feel no uneasiness, but that we would safeguard your just interests to the best of our ability, and see that the concern obtained the assistance and protection to which, as a British company, it would be entitled at the hands of His Majesty's Government.

It is quite true that the company was never formed, but as the contract was made instead of the company, and pending its formation, with the full knowledge and consent of His Majesty's Government, who gave assurances of protection, there is no doubt in our mind of the binding nature of the assurances given to you by Mr. Marling, nor, indeed, does His Majesty's Government repudiate the obligation to protect the contract.

We, moreover, wrote you at the time that His Majesty's Government would not and could not, in respect of other questions, make any improper use of the position of dependency in which you might be placed as regards the oxide company, but that His Majesty's Government has also satisfied us that any promise of protection made in respect of this business would not be used in bringing pressure to bear upon you in other matters where your interests conflict with those of other British subjects.

This assurance was given to you upon the highest authority, and you will be quite

safe in assuming that His Majesty's Government will not support, as against you, any claim such as that in question.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND CO.

Enclosure 4 in No. 171.

Extract of Letter from Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to the Muin-ut-Tujjar, dated October 30, 1911.

WE reply in this letter to the longer of your two letters of the 7th instant.

We note the view expressed to you by the Minister that as Messrs. Strick have taken on themselves to answer all our legal claims in this matter (by which we understand you to mean our claim) has to be referred to arbitration [*sic*], and that a tribunal must decide whether we have or have not a legal right.

We note also that the Minister's view appears to have been favourably regarded by you, and that you would wish us to act in the way suggested.

We must point out at once that the Minister's suggestion is founded upon a totally mistaken view of our position.

Messrs. Strick have nothing to do with our claim, and no contract between them and the Persian Government can have anything to do with our rights.

Our Foreign Office have all through recognised that our contract was entered into with the active support of His Majesty's Government, and that they are pledged to support our claim against the Persian Government if that Government acted wrongly and otherwise against you. Whether the Persian Government can fall back upon Mr. Strick in the event of our claim being made good against them is a matter that does not concern us in any way, and we could not allow any question regarding our rights to be dealt with in any arbitration or by any tribunal, whose only duty could be to ascertain whether the Persian Government are entitled to any protection as between themselves and Messrs. Strick.

[43063]

No. 172.

Sir G. Barendse to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 531.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

DISSEMBARKATION of first contingent of cavalry was completed yesterday. No casualties.

[42821]

No. 173.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barendse.

(No. 326.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, October 31, 1911.

CONSULAR escorts.

India Office concurs in view that consular guards should be stationed at Shiraz, Bushire, and Ispahan, and agrees that a place where there is no consulate does not require the protection of a squadron.

Reference is to your telegram No. 527 of 27th October.

[43478]

No. 174.

Question asked in the House of Commons, October 31, 1911.

Colonel Yate.—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, considering the effect a Trans-Persian railway will have on British and Indian trade in Southern Persia, steps will be taken to fix the break of gauge between the Indian and Russian railways at Ispahan, or to the north or west of that place, and not anywhere to the east or south of it.

[1524]

2 A

Answer.

The whole question is still under consideration, and is not sufficiently advanced for decisions to be taken on all points of detail; but, of course, if a scheme for a Trans-Persian railway matures sufficiently, such points as that referred to in the question will be carefully considered.

[43479]

No. 175.

Question asked in the House of Commons, October 31, 1911.

Mr. King.—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Indian troops have been sent to Persia; if so, whether the Persian Government concurred in this action; whether the object for which the troops were sent has been attained; and whether a probable date can be named for their return.

Answer.

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The Persian Government have not concurred. The object for which the troops were sent—namely, the safety of British lives and property at Bushire and elsewhere—has not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, yet been attained. The Persian Government have been informed that, as soon as they have succeeded in putting into operation an effective scheme for the restoration of security, the reinforcements of the British consular escorts will be withdrawn. It is not yet possible to name a probable date when the measures in question will have been executed by the Persian Government.

[43177]

No. 176.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th October, 1911, relative to the desire of the Russian military attaché in Seistan to travel by the Seistan-Quetta trade route.

India Office, October 31, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 176.

Consul O'Connor to Government of India.

Sir,

Birjand, August 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have recently received, through the intermediary of the Russian consul, a letter from Captain Tsvetkoff, the Russian military attaché in Seistan, in which Captain Tsvetkoff informs me that on the expiration of his term of service in Seistan at the beginning of next year (1912) he is anxious to visit India, and he asks me to submit to the Government of India his application for permission to travel to India via the Nushki route. If the Government of India will favour me with a reply to this application I will duly transmit it to Captain Tsvetkoff.

I have, &c.

W. F. O'CONNOR, Major.

Enclosure 2 in No. 176.

Government of India to Consul O'Connor.

Sir,

Simla, October 12, 1911.

I AM directed to refer to your letter dated the 17th August, 1911, communicating a request made by Captain Tsvetkoff, the Russian military attaché in Seistan, that he may be permitted to travel to India via the Quetta-Seistan trade route.

2. The Government of India regret that they are unable to sanction the proposal, and I am to request that a suitable reply in this sense may be communicated to Captain Tsvetkoff.

I have, &c.

E. H. S. CLARKE,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

[43269]

No. 177.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 352.)

Sir,

Berlin, October 31, 1911.

THE "Vossische Zeitung" of last night contained an article in regard to Persia entitled "The Russian mask falls," written in connection with the news of the landing of Russian soldiers at Enzeli, and a report that the adherence of the ex-Shah had received the armed support of Russian troops in an engagement with the Government forces.

This article asserts that the fact of the simultaneous landing of Russian and British troops in North and South Persia respectively clearly revealed the existence of a previous arrangement between the two Powers aimed at the subjugation of Persia. It could no longer be doubtful, it says, that definite agreements existed between Great Britain and Russia, not only in regard to their respective spheres of influence in Persia, but also providing for the support of the *coup d'État* attempted by the ex-Shah, Mohammad Ali. Denials had been issued by both Governments, but Russia had now thrown off her mask. Hitherto the ex-Shah had met with nothing but reverses, but now Russian troops were marching with him and, in order to ensure his safe advance, Russia was sending reinforcements to Persia.

The article adds that, as the "Vossische Zeitung" announced in July last, the Russo-Persian arrangement provided that, in return for the support of Mohammad Ali, Russia was to be permitted to undertake the "unification" of Northern Persia. England had, it says, expressed her concurrence in this scheme, on the understanding that she should be allowed to take similar action in Southern Persia.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

[43357]

No. 178.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 532.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

RUSSIAN troops at Resht.

Please see my telegram No. 528 of the 30th ultimo.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that he has made a verbal communication to the Persian Government to the effect that the hundred men who have just disembarked at Enzeli are reliefs for the Russian consular escort at Resht.

There are certain outstanding Russian claims at Resht, and I gather that the time-expired men will be retained there pending a settlement.

[43360]

No. 179.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 533.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

IN a private telegram I reported on the 16th October that the Russian consul-general had interfered by force with the seizure of certain properties of the ex-Shah's brothers, which had been confiscated in consequence of the part their owners had taken in the insurrection.

The circumstances were briefly reported to the "Times" in telegrams from Tehran, dated the 9th October and the 10th October, as follows:—

(1.)

"Tehran, October 9.

"The treasurer-general, in accordance with an order of the Cabinet, to-day sent an official of his department with five Treasury gendarmes to make an inventory of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's Tehran property, which the Government has confiscated to the Crown. Two members of the Russian consulate in uniform, with ten Russian Cossacks, ordered them to retire, threatening to fire. The party retired.

"The incident so far is unexplained, as Shoa-es-Sultaneh claims Turkish, not Russian, protection. The matter has now been referred to the Russian Minister."

(2.)

"Tehran, October 10.

"Two further incidents took place yesterday in connection with the confiscation of the various properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh. Russian Cossacks with consular officials were present at each property. They arrested five Treasury gendarmes who were sent with a Treasury official to make the inventory, and took them on mules to the Russian consulate.

"To-day a strong body of Treasury gendarmerie marched to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's principal property, where they found a small guard of Persian Cossacks only. They evicted the guard and took possession. The Russian Cossacks are now said to have withdrawn from all the properties.

"All these proceedings appear to have been due to the initiative of M. Pokhitonoff, the Russian consul-general. The Russian Minister has rectified the matter, and the incident now seems to be closed, except that the Persian Government is addressing a protest against the action of the consul-general."

As you will see from these telegrams, the action of the Russian consul-general was directed against the seizure of certain properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, who is not a Russian subject.

Russian Minister is to-day demanding, in accordance with orders from St. Petersburg, the withdrawal from the Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties of Shuster's gendarmes, who have been in possession since the disavowal by the Russian Minister of the consul-general's action. These properties being mortgaged to the Russian bank, and one of them being leased to a Russian subject, the Russian Minister, while disapproving the consul-general's action, had made all proper reserves with the Persian Government as to Russian rights, but the Russian Government bases its demand on the fact that Shuster's gendarmes were sent to take possession without previous notice having been given to the Russian consulate-general.

M. Poklewsky is further to demand a formal apology for an incident alleged to have occurred on the 10th October at the principal property in question, when the gendarmes in possession are said to have pointed their rifles at two passing officials of the consulate-general and at the consulate-general itself, which is close to the property. This story is disputed by the officer commanding the gendarmes, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had offered the Russian Minister reparation for this incident in the event of confirmation of the story of the Russian consular officials after a joint enquiry. The Russian Government reject this proposal, and demand an apology forthwith.

[43506]

No. 180.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 534.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of Lecoffre.

Mr. Lecoffre, a British subject and a man with strong sympathies for the Persian Nationalist party, has been appointed by Shuster as a treasury agent at Tabreez.

For the last two years Lecoffre has been employed by the Persian Government, but before that he was in the Imperial Bank's service.

[43684]

No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 133.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 2, 1911.

THE Persian Minister came to ask me to-day, privately and confidentially, whether I had reason to suppose that Russia intended to occupy Northern Persia, or to send a large force there.

I replied that the Russian Government had taken no decision, except to send 100 men to Resht and 150 to Ispahan as an increase of consular guards. Should they decide to do anything else, we should, of course, hear of it from them.

The Persian Minister pressed me a great deal as to Russian intentions.

I said that I could not tell him any more than I had already told him, but I was sure that, if the Persian Government maintained a friendly attitude towards the Russian Government, the latter would not take any such step as he feared.

He remarked that a Russian gun-boat had assisted the Turcomans who were fighting for the ex-Shah, and had landed troops to the west of Astrabad.

I said that I had not heard of this, but I would enquire from you.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[44100]

No. 182.

Question asked in the House of Commons, November 2, 1911.

Mr. Dillon.—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what grounds the British Government supported the Russian Government in resisting the appointment of Major Stokes by the Persian Government, and whether he can now lay upon the table all the correspondence which passed between the British and the Russian Governments and the British and the Persian Governments in reference to this proposed appointment.

Answer.

What we have done is to refuse to facilitate the appointment of Major Stokes by accepting his resignation. The ground for doing so is that it is not consistent with the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement that we should directly or indirectly promote the employment of a British officer to control gendarmerie in the north of Persia. We might ourselves have taken objection if the Russian Government had promoted the employment of a Russian officer to control gendarmerie in the part of Persia next to the Indian frontier, and we are bound to act reciprocally. It is not proposed to lay separate papers on this point, but I will see if they can be included in the next Persian Blue Book.

[43405]

No. 183.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 27th October, 1911, relative to Major Stokes.

India Office, November 2, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 183.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, October 27, 1911.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 30th ultimo. Acceptance of Stokes's resignation should now be refused, and he should be informed that, in the case of an officer who tenders his resignation solely for the purpose of taking service under a foreign Power in circumstances which make his action detrimental to British interests, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the latter are unable to advise the King to accept the resignation.

If you see no objection, Stokes should be ordered to rejoin his regiment with least possible delay, as it is very desirable that he should leave Persia as soon as possible.

[43406]

No. 184.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th October, 1911, relative to troops for Persia.

India Office, November 2, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 184.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, October 28, 1911.

TROOPS for Persia. See your telegram dated the 21st October. I approve arrangements proposed. Regiment of cavalry for Bunder Abbas is not required.

[43455]

No. 185.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 3.)

Sir,

India Office, November 2, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th August regarding the proposed survey of the country between Bushire and Shiraz with a view to the construction of a motor road, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India reporting the estimated cost of the operation (939*l*.) I am to suggest that the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury should be moved to accept half of this amount as a charge on British revenues.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 18, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 31st August, 1911. Hopkins estimates cost of survey between Shiraz and Bushire, proposed duration of which is three months, as follows:—

1,200 rupees per mensem for salary; 300 rupees per mensem for travelling allowance; 400 rupees per mensem for deputation allowance; 600 rupees per mensem for two surveyors with khallasies and 600 rupees per mensem for transport; 100 rupees per mensem for escort of local levies; 100 rupees per mensem for ferrashes and khallasies; 100 rupees per mensem for transport. Estimate also includes following lump sums: 1,168 rupees for passages to and from Bushire of surveyors and khallasies; 2,000 rupees for tents, instruments, &c.

Total for three months, 14,086 rupees, including 5 per cent. contingencies.

[44208]

No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 135.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called this afternoon and complained that the Russian consul at Astrabad was encouraging and assisting the ex-Shah, and that several Russian Turkomans were in the following of the latter.

He also complained that the ex-Shah had ordered arms and ammunition in France and Germany, and that these consignments would have to pass through Russian territory.

In regard to the first complaint the Russians had denied that their authorities were in any way encouraging the ex-Shah, and in regard to the second, they had promised to give orders to their customs officials to prevent the transit of the munitions, though they could not guarantee that the articles might not be smuggled through.

Sir A. Nicolson asked the Minister what he wished us to do. We could not intervene in the matter, and we could not go to the Russians and say that we disbelieved all they said and gave credence to all the reports which reached the Persian Government. Sir A. Nicolson said that he doubted if the Russians were really encouraging the ex-Shah, as the latter would be more formidable if they were doing so.

The Minister said there were Russian Turkomans with the ex-Shah. Sir A. Nicolson said that there were also Russian Circassians and Russian Armenians with the nationalist forces, so the balance was maintained.

Sir A. Nicolson regretted not to be able to give him anything to console him; but we had no ground for intervening.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[43552]

No. 187.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 535.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 505 of 19th October.

In case of enquiry from Russian Government as to doings of Stokes, Russian Minister telegraphed yesterday that he was living with Shuster and probably helping in organisation of gendarmerie.

[43684]

No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
EX-SHAH.*Foreign Office, November 4, 1911.*

I have received a complaint from Persian Minister that troops have been landed west of Astrabad by a Russian gun-boat, which has assisted Turcomans who were fighting on ex-Shah's side.

Please ascertain and report if there is any confirmation of this.

[43672]

No. 189.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)(No. 536.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Tehran, November 5, 1911.*

ALLEGED Russian support for ex-Shah.

A story has been current here that Russian troops landed and took part in the fighting reported in my telegram No. 525 of the 29th October. The statement made to you by the Persian Minister (see your telegram No. 329 of yesterday's date) is probably a version of this story.

No confirmation of the story has reached me. My only reliable source of information for events in the Astrabad district is the Russian Minister, who states that the story has no foundation.

A few bluejackets were landed at Bender Gez after the fighting was over, because the Turcomans showed signs of looting. The Naval station at Asurade gave medical assistance to the wounded. Some of the wounded Government troops were taken to the hospital for treatment, and are now there.

A few of the Government troops are still in the shelter of the Russian agency at Bender Gez, where a large number took bast after the fighting.

[43673]

No. 190.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)(No. 537.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Tehran, November 5, 1911.*

CONFISCATED properties and Russo-Persian incident.

I see no sign yet of the Persian Government yielding to the humiliating demands which I reported in my telegram No. 533 of the 2nd November as being made by the Russian Minister. It is clear that these demands are aimed at the treasurer-general.

A message reached me this morning from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which his Excellency urged me to use my influence with the Russian Minister for moderation.

I replied that the Persian Government would do well to comply with the demands, and I pointed out that the Russian Minister could not modify demands which his Government had formulated after careful deliberation.

[43686]

No. 191.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)(No. 316.)
Sir,*St. Petersburg, October 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the receipt of your telegram No. 646 of the 26th instant, I communicated to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs an *aide-memoire*, of which copy is enclosed, informing them of the steps which His Majesty's Government are taking with a view to strengthening the consular guards at Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Aide-memoire communicated to M. Nératof by Mr. O'Beirne.

PAR son aide-memoire daté du 23 septembre (6 octobre), le Ministère Impérial a bien voulu exprimer le désir d'être tenu au courant de la suite qui serait donnée au projet du Gouvernement britannique de renforcer les escortes consulaires en certaines villes du midi de la Perse ainsi qu'à Ispahan.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a maintenant décidé de ne pas, pour le moment, mettre en exécution les mesures projetées en ce qui concerne Bender Abbas, Kerman et Bam, et d'envoyer en Perse un effectif de 400 hommes seulement, qui seront répartis, dans la discrétion de Sir George Barclay, entre les consulats de Bouchir, Chiraz et Ispahan. Le premier contingent de ces hommes devait arriver à Bouchir hier, le 13 (26) octobre, et le second arrivera dans le courant de novembre (N.S.).

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a fait savoir au Gouvernement persan que seul le danger qui menaçait la personne et la propriété de sujets britanniques à Chiraz et ailleurs avait motivé le renforcement des escortes consulaires; que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté verrait avec plaisir que le Gouvernement persan prenne lui-même des mesures pour ramener l'ordre, et pour rétablir la sécurité sur les routes suivies par le commerce, et que, aussitôt ce but atteint, les renforts des escortes consulaires seront retirés de la Perse.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 14 (27) octobre, 1911.

[43690]

No. 192.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)(No. 322.)
Sir,*St. Petersburg, November 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 260 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to state that I had a somewhat hurried conversation yesterday with Mr. Seligman, who left for London the same evening. I gathered from him that he is fairly satisfied with the result of his interviews with M. Kokovtsoff and M. Nératof. It appears to have been arranged that if the proposed loan is concluded the Russian Bank will appear as signatories of the loan contract jointly with Messrs. Seligman, and they participate to some extent in the loan. Mr. Seligman expressed to me his perfect willingness that the Russian Bank, and also, if desired, the Imperial Bank should be represented on any kind of board of control that might be set up in Tehran to watch over Persian Government expenditure. His sole anxiety was, he said, to ensure that the proceeds of the loan should not be squandered. He also did not seem at all inclined to insist on the treasurer-general having the sole selection of the various officials mentioned in article 22 of the draft contract enclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 165 of the 4th September, 1911.

M. Nératof, however, spoke to me on the 1st instant as if the question of the loan was still far from being decided. He said that it occurred to him that for the Russian Bank to join in it might be considered to be taking sides in the struggle against the ex-Shah. I asked whether he thought that the ex-Shah still had any chances of success, and he replied in the negative, but he then referred to the fact that the Crown lands in Azerbaijan, which were part of the proposed security, were at present to a great extent out of the control of the Persian Government. In general, his Excellency gave me the impression that the Russian Government have not yet made up their minds on the subject of the proposed transaction.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[43904]

No. 193.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)(No. 538.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Tehran, November 6, 1911.*

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident in connection with Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.
Please see my telegram No. 537 of last night.

[1524]

2 C

I think that the upholding by the Russian Government of the violent action of their consul-general and the demands which they are making of the Persian Government, can only have been dictated by the determination on the part of Russia to upset the treasurer-general, for, as has in vain been pointed out to the Russian Government, by M. Poklewski, the ejection on the 9th October by the Russian Cossacks of Shuster's gendarmes from the property in question fully cancelled whatever offence there may have been in the Treasury gendarmes taking possession without previous formal notice being given to the Russian consulate-general, and as a result of assurances exchanged between Poklewski and Shuster the property was peaceably occupied on the 10th October.

Shuster will, I fear, not agree to withdraw his gendarmes from the property, and he appears prepared to face all consequences of such action.

You may be taking some steps with the Russian Government in the interest of moderation. If that is so, I should be grateful if you would treat the information that a divergence of view has existed between the Russian Minister and his consul-general as entirely private and confidential.

[43908]

No. 194.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 539.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

EX-SHAH.

Tehran, November 6, 1911.

I am informed by the Persian Government that a Berlin firm reports that ten maxims has been ordered for a Persian Pasha in Russia. The Persian Government conclude that these guns are destined for Mohamet Ali who, I am informed, has also given an order in France for 5,000 rifles.

The Russian Government have been informed of the above by the Russian Minister. It might, however, be advisable in order to prevent the smuggling of these arms through Russia, to urge the Russian Government to issue the necessary instructions to their Customs' officials to exercise due vigilance with regard to their passage.

[43903]

No. 195.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 540.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 6, 1911.

MY telegram No. 534 of 2nd November.

Russian Minister has been instructed to protest against Lecoffre's appointment at Tabreez.

He tells me that his Government expect me to join this protest.

Have you any instructions?

[43925]

No. 196.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 541.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 6, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident with regard to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.

The Persian reply to the Russian demands reported in my telegram No. 538 of the 6th instant is dignified and temperate in tone, but it formally rejects the demands stating that they are inconsistent with the dignity of Persia and with the friendly relations existing between Russia and Persia.

The Persian Government maintain their innocence and declare that the Russian Government cannot have fully grasped the facts of the case when forming their judgment. They invite a full elucidation of all the circumstances and declare themselves ready to hold an enquiry.

As the Russian Government formulated their demands after long deliberation they can hardly be expected to draw back. The reply of the Persian Government thus

creates a serious situation, and this is enhanced by the fact that the Russian Minister having expressed his disapproval of an incident which arose through the unprovoked violence of his consul-general, the predicament of the Russian Government of having to press the incident to a finish becomes a still more awkward one.

The above information can be used at St. Petersburg, if necessary, as I have drafted this after consultation with my Russian colleague.

[43926]

No. 197.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 265.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 6, 1911.

PERSIA.

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof to-day, his Excellency again spoke pessimistically about the situation in Persia, and said that at present extremely strained relations existed between the Imperial Government and that of Persia. He alluded to an incident which took place some time ago, when some of Shuster's gendarmes came into conflict with Persian Cossacks, whom the Russian consul-general had placed as a guard over certain property. The Russian bank had interests in the property in question which the Persian Government desired to seize. In consequence of this incident, the Persian Government had demanded that the Russian consul-general should be recalled. The note formulating this demand had of course been returned to the Persian Government by M. Poklewski. The incident would be considered closed if the Persian Government agreed to accept the return of the note, but in the event of their persisting in demanding the recall of the consul-general, the situation would be rendered very serious. He did not know what the action of the Imperial Government would be in that case.

M. Nératof further said that three Englishmen had now been appointed by Mr. Morgan Shuster to be assistant treasurers at Tabreez, Shiraz, and Ispahan respectively. To the Shiraz and Ispahan appointments the Russian Government raised no objections, but the Tabreez appointment was to be given to a M. Lecoffre, who was known for his personal hostility to Russia. Instructions had accordingly been sent to M. Poklewski to protest against M. Lecoffre's appointment, and it was essential that the Persian Government should give way on this point.

M. Nératof readily accepted an assurance which I gave him that Sir G. Barclay had had no previous knowledge of these appointments. I begged that his Excellency, in the event of the Persian Government giving an unsatisfactory reply on the subject or their demand for the consul-general's recall, would let me have early notice of the fact, and this he promised that he would do.

[43927]

No. 198.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 266.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 6, 1911.

MY telegram No. 265 of the 6th November.

In our conversation to-day, M. Nératof discussed the question of how Mr. Shuster could be prevented from persisting in his defiant action. He still seemed to be of opinion that the desired end could be achieved by attaching to the Seligman loan, in the event of that loan being concluded, certain conditions with regard to financial appointments, control of expenditure, &c. M. Nératof did not seem to think that any joint action was called for at present on the part of the two representatives at Tehran.

It is possible that the whole question of Mr. Shuster's position may be brought to a point by the proposed nomination of M. Lecoffre at Tabreez.

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No. 199.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barelay.

(No. 320.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 6, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of M. Lecoffre: see your telegram No. 534 of 2nd November.

Russian Government are sure to be annoyed at this appointment, and it is not unlikely that they will defend their interests by energetic measures, which might even go as far as an occupation of Northern Persia. You should advise Shuster most strongly to do all in his power to conciliate the Russian Legation, and point out the probable result of continued provocation on his part. He should be made to understand clearly that Russian Government have it in their power to employ means which would seriously impede the discharge of his duties, and which it would be impossible for him to withstand. He must be made to see that the Russians are sure to take measures for the protection of their own interests if administrative posts in their sphere of interest are filled by British subjects, and that His Majesty's Government cannot deprecate such measures, as it would be contrary to the spirit of the convention of 1908.

His Majesty's Government are pledged to avoid any displacement of Russian influence by British in the north, and the Russians are gaining the impression that under cover of Shuster's administration this is being done.

[42612]

No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

SECRETARY SIR E. GREY has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum which M. Cambon was good enough to address to him on the 24th October, respecting the offer by the Persian Government to M. Lattes of an appointment at the Ministry of Public Instruction, and to inform M. Cambon in reply that His Majesty's Government have no objection to M. Lattes accepting the post.

*Foreign Office,**November 6, 1911.*

[44016]

No. 201.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, November 4, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Mallet's letter of the 8th August, 1911, we have now had an opportunity of considering the observations made by Sir George Barelay.

We were originally told by Mr. Maxwell that the concession had been taken away from the Muin because the Persian Government claimed that it had lapsed in 1906, and that Mr. Marling had seen the document upon which the statement was based, and it seemed to afford good grounds for the contention.

Mr. Langley further wrote us on the 20th July, 1910, that the Vekil-ul-Roya's contention was that the firman of 1904 did no more than alter some and confirm others of the provisions of the firman granted in 1895, but did not extend it, and, further, that the Muin-ut-Tujjar had produced what professed to be a copy of the alleged firman, but that the paper was obviously worthless, and the inference was that the signatures were forged.

The Muin-ut-Tujjar was told when he came to the legation that the balance of evidence appeared to be against him, and that he must produce proofs.

His Majesty's Government at this stage stated it to be their opinion, from all the evidence available, that the concession appeared to have lapsed at an earlier date.

Mr. Langley, in the same letter of the 20th July, in a résumé of the position, writes to us:—

"There is as yet no absolute conclusive evidence to show whether the contention of the Persian Government or that of the Muin is valid, but the balance of evidence is

distinctly in favour of the former, since Muin consistently refuses to produce the documents by which, as he asserts, he could establish his rights, and thus declines to take the step by which, if he is telling the truth, the controversy could at once be ended in his favour."

On the 7th March, 1911, Mr. Langley writes us that Sir George Barelay could not say what proof the Persian Government could produce of their contention that the lease was revocable at will except that afforded by an assertion that their action was taken in virtue of their sovereign rights and in conformity with religious law and with custom. He accordingly proposed to ask for an opportunity to inspect the different firmans bearing on the case, and made the application, but was informed in reply that the Persian Government were not in possession of copies of the original lease and firman, and that it was in the absence of these documents that the firman of 1904 was granted in confirmation of the Muin-ut-Tujjar's lease.

You will thus see that the Muin-ut-Tujjar was originally condemned and refused the protection to which he was entitled, and of which he had been assured by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, on the ground that he would not produce the original firman of 1895, and that later this protection was still withheld on the same ground, although the Persian Government were also unable to produce the firman in question, and had stated that the firman of 1904 had been granted because the original firman was not in existence.

We may here point out that it is not strange that the Muin-ut-Tujjar could not produce the firman of 1895, seeing that the Persian Government could not produce it, nor His Majesty's Legation, who had been present at an investigation of the Muin-ut-Tujjar's rights under that firman as against those of Messrs. Malcolm under a firman which they held, and had sanctioned a decision favourable to the Muin.

It now appears from the concluding paragraph of Mr. Mallet's letter of the 8th August, 1911, that the Muin-ut-Tujjar's rights to the concession rest entirely on the interpretation of the firman of 1904 and no other, and we must here respectfully point out that His Majesty's Government are in a better position to interpret the document impartially than either the Persian Government or the Muin-ut-Tujjar, and that they, at a time when there was no dispute or question, and after they had seen the firman and rescript at the legation, put on them a construction favourable to the Muin-ut-Tujjar, and gave us assurances as to the perpetuity of the muin's rights for confidential use in direct relation to very important financial operations.

We beg to remind His Majesty's Government of the promises of support which have been given from time to time to the Muin and to us as his agents.

As far back as the 8th October, 1906, the late Sir E. Gorst wrote that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran would take such unofficial action as he properly could, to assist the Muin-ut-Tujjar in case of foreign interference with its concession, and would write a letter to the Muin-ut-Tujjar to this effect.

On the 16th June, 1908, we wrote asking for assurances that the transfer from Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. would not interfere with the benevolent support which the Muin-ut-Tujjar had been allowed to understand he would receive from His Majesty's Legation in Tehran, in case of foreign interference with his concession at Hormuz; and on the 17th July Sir F. A. Campbell wrote us that as long as the enterprise remained in British hands, and we continued to fulfil the conditions subject to which the support of His Majesty's Government was originally promised to us, we would continue to receive that support through His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

Mr. Mallet further wrote us on the 14th September, 1908, that in the course of a report received from Mr. Marling he expressed the opinion that the Muin-ut-Tujjar suspects that one reason for the warm interest which His Majesty's Government are displaying in this question is that they are seeking to induce him to place his Hormuz concession so far under British protection that the legation will be able to use its position to bring pressure to bear on him in other matters in which there are British interests opposed to his own, and that if we could disabuse the Muin-ut-Tujjar's mind of this suspicion, which Mr. Mallet states is of course quite unjustified, the chief difficulty in the way of retaining the trade in British hands would be removed.

We pointed out in our reply dated the 24th September that, whilst we had told the Muin-ut-Tujjar, in the identical words used by Mr. Marling, that His Majesty's Government would not and could not in respect of other questions make any improper use of the position of dependency in which the Muin-ut-Tujjar might be placed as regards the oxide company, and that His Majesty's Government had also satisfied us

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that any promise of protection made in respect of this business would not be used to bring pressure to bear upon him in other matters where his interests conflicted with those of other British subjects, notably with those of Messrs. Lynch, it appeared to us that if the Muin really entertained such suspicions, as we believed he did, His Majesty's representative on the spot, and he alone, would be able to reassure him, to which Sir F. A. Campbell on the 30th September replied, that although Sir Edward Grey was of opinion that our firm was in a better position to reassure the Muin as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards him than His Majesty's chargé d'affaires, the latter would not, however, lose sight of the views expressed in our letter of the 24th September.

In the summer of 1908, in view of the difficulties encountered in the formation of the company which had been projected, the late Mr. Wilson Fox tried to bring about a contract with Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.

He wrote from Norway to Mr. Ellinger, on the 5th August:—

"If the proposed contract for the Muin-ut-Tujjar breaks down, you will let the Foreign Office know at once. I greatly hope you will be able to smooth away the difficulties and complete the contract between Messrs. Strick and the Muin."

On the 10th August Mr. Ellinger wrote to the late Mr. Wilson Fox that the proposed contract with Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. had fallen through, and suggested that the best thing would be to go ahead with the formation of the company.

On the 10th August Mr. Mallet wrote to Mr. Ellinger that he was much surprised to hear that Messrs. Strick and Co. refused to go on with the negotiations, and that it was very disappointing after all the trouble taken by Mr. Wilson Fox and Sir R. Ritchie we should not have been able to come to terms.

On the 17th August the late Mr. Wilson Fox wrote to Mr. Ellinger that His Majesty's Government would prefer the matter to go through in the form of a contract with Messrs. Strick and Co., if possible; and in another letter of the same date he wrote as follows:—

"I trust that you will use every endeavour to come to terms with Mr. Strick. Surely you can smooth over the difficulties? They cannot be insuperable. I hold a very strong opinion that a contract between the Muin and Mr. Strick for two and a-half years is the best policy, and we can consider the company question later on. Pray make a serious effort again to get a contract through. If I can be of any use, wire to me here, and I will return."

We further wrote on the 18th November that we had heard from the Muin that a British firm was negotiating with the Persian Legation in London for the purchase of the concession from the Persian Government, and that we presumed that we would be quite correct in informing the Muin-ut-Tujjar that so long as the sale of the oxide was in our hands, no application to the British Government by any other British subjects for the grant of the concession of the Island of Hormuz, and consequent confiscation of the concession now held in perpetuity by the Muin-ut-Tujjar would receive the support of His Majesty's Government here or the British Legation in Tehran, to which we received a reply on the 25th November from Mr. Langley, stating that we would be quite in order in giving the Muin-ut-Tujjar this assurance.

We further wrote to the late Mr. Wilson Fox on the 20th November that, in accordance with the suggestion made by Sir Richmond Ritchie at the last interview, we had pointed out to the Muin-ut-Tujjar that although he could rely upon the absolute protection of his property in the event of a company being formed and upon the benevolent protection of the British Government during the currency of a *bond fide* contract, he could not count upon our being able to induce His Majesty's Government to protect him, should the necessity arise, if we based our application upon a contract made after the urgency had arisen and having the appearance of being made for the purpose of securing this protection.

It is thus quite clear that the Muin-ut-Tujjar was fully led to rely upon the benevolent protection of His Majesty's Government and the assistance and support of His Majesty's Legation in Tehran in the maintenance of his rights and of his concession as interpreted already by them, so long as we retained the trade in British hands, and that this protection would not be withdrawn nor pressure be brought to bear upon him because his interests might be in conflict with those of other British subjects.

All this, however, we regret to say His Majesty's Legation in Tehran appears to

have entirely overlooked from the commencement of the controversy which arose early in 1910 in this matter.

We were informed at the outset, and we were compelled to agree, that if it could be shown, as His Majesty's Government assured us, contrary to their previously expressed opinion, they believed to be the case, that the Muin-ut-Tujjar at the time of making his contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves was not entitled to the concession, and was now basing his claim to the same upon forged documents, we would not be able to enlist the support of His Majesty's Government in upholding the Muin-ut-Tujjar's position. But, as it now appears that the belief then expressed by His Majesty's Government as to the outcome of the investigation was not correct, and that the whole question turns upon the interpretation of the firman of 1904, we now can and do claim as the Muin-ut-Tujjar's agents the support and protection which was promised to him.

We must point out that the support of His Majesty's Legation in Tehran appears to have been withheld from the Muin-ut-Tujjar prior to the receipt of the information given by Vekil-ul-Roaya.

On the 27th August, 1908, we were informed by Mr. Mallet that a telegram had just been received from the chargé d'affaires at Tehran, reporting that there existed a serious danger that the Persian Government might attempt to raise money by cancelling the Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession and selling a similar concession to somebody else for a term of years, and on the 31st August, 1909, Mr. Mallet wrote that the existence of the contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. had been known for some time past to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co., and that the obligation to maintain secrecy as to the contract was a source of difficulty to Sir Geo. Barclay in endeavouring to prevent the cancellation of the Muin's concession. He also stated that these concessions appear to be an imminent danger, and that Sir G. Barclay, by Sir E. Grey's instructions, was doing all he could on the Muin-ut-Tujjar's behalf.

Sir F. A. Campbell wrote further on the 16th September that Sir Geo. Barclay was of opinion that the Muin had come to terms with the committee in regard to his concessions.

Now, in the spring of 1910, when the concession was actually confiscated and the oxide sold to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co., no such warning was given to us, although, in view of what had been previously communicated to us in the letter of the 31st August, 1909, to which we have just referred, it is impossible to suppose that what was being done was not fully known to His Majesty's Government.

On the 8th July, 1910, when the Muin-ut-Tujjar called at the legation in Tehran, he was told that the legation had no wish to injure his interests, but was obliged to act in accordance with the appearance of facts, which appeared to be against him, but if he would produce proofs and not mere assertions, due weight would be given to them. Whereas, in all fairness and justice, he was entitled to receive from the legation promises of support and assistance instead of being held at arm's length and assumed to be in the wrong.

We beg to point out that the firman of 1904 on which His Majesty's Government based their assurances as to the perpetuity of the Muin-ut-Tujjar's rights has been in the possession of the legation in Tehran since the end of 1908.

We cannot agree that the interpretation of this firman hangs solely on the meaning of the Persian word translated as "henceforth," and we maintain that, upon a fair reading of the whole document, no reasonable ground can be shown for altering the interpretation originally, and, as we submit rightly, put upon it by His Majesty's Government.

It is for the Persian Government to prove their case, and, in the absence of such proof, we respectfully call upon His Majesty's Government to fulfil their pledges and to grant to the Muin-ut-Tujjar that protection and support which he and we, his agents, had been led to expect he would receive in time of need.

We wish particularly to say that this letter is written by us only as agents of the Muin-ut-Tujjar and in his interests, and is entirely distinct from our communications relating to the rights of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves.

We are, &c.

ELLINGER AND Co.

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No. 202.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

Sir, 28, Oxford Street, Manchester, November 6, 1911.
 WE beg to call your attention to the fact that the whole of the case of the Persian Government disputing the rights of the Muin-ut-Tujjar to the Hormuz concession has now collapsed, and rests, according to Sir G. Barclay's statement, as contained in your letter of the 8th August, 1911, solely upon the interpretation of the firman of 1904.
 His Majesty's Government have interpreted this document as conferring on the Muin-ut-Tujjar rights in perpetuity, and there is no longer any reason for His Majesty's Government to withhold from Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves the protection which was promised us, and on the strength of which the contract with the Muin-ut-Tujjar was entered into.

On the 23rd January, 1911, Mr. Mallet wrote us in a letter that His Majesty's Government would very shortly press the Persian Government in the strongest manner to produce proofs of their assertion, and that, pending the result of this step, Sir E. Grey was unable, after careful consideration of the arguments advanced by us, to modify the view expressed in a letter from your Office of the 15th December as to the prevention of shipments by others than Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co.

On the 15th June, 1911 (that is to say, after a lapse of six months), we addressed a letter in which we again claimed that His Majesty's Government should notify the Persian Government that shipments of oxide by others than Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. would not be permitted. To this Mr. Mallet replied, in a letter dated the 2nd August, 1911, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran had been instructed to present a claim to the Persian Government on our behalf and on that of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and that his attention had been drawn to the points raised in our letter of the 15th June.

We have not since heard what has been done, and must again call upon His Majesty's Government to see that the shipments by others than Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. are discontinued, pending a satisfactory settlement of the question at issue.

The matter is of the utmost urgency, as the stock of oxide which Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. now hold in this country is reduced to exceedingly small dimensions, and there can be no doubt that, unless steps are immediately taken, shipments from Hormuz will be resumed.

We are, &c.
 ELLINGER AND Co.

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No. 203.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 542.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 7, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 327.

Two Parsees referred to were murdered in July. Not British subjects, though one of them had been in bast at consulate and had left consulate to buy provisions for himself and fellow basti.

All consul's efforts to get murderers arrested, seconded by instructions from Tehran, have proved unavailing.

Consul reports agitation against Parsees which led them to take bast at consulate in July has subsided.

I do not think that course you suggest would be useful. There are now no eminent priests in Tehran with any influence in provinces.

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No. 204.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 543.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 7, 1911.

MISS ROSS.

The Governor-General has instructed the deputy governor at Shiraz to send 100 men to escort Miss Ross to Shiraz from Abadeh, where she is now detained. I doubt, however, whether the deputy governor will be able to provide the guard.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz is of opinion that Miss Ross's health will probably suffer from her enforced stay at Abadeh. He also reports that she is most anxious to proceed to Shiraz, and he asks to be allowed to dispatch a suitable detachment of the Indian troops, when available, to escort her to Shiraz, provided of course that the commanding officer concurs. Mr. Knox does not think that the local authorities would raise the slightest objection to this course.

An objection to this, however, is that if we use the consular guard in the case of Miss Ross we shall probably be obliged to do so in other cases. But if a suitable Persian escort is not forthcoming, it would appear to be the only safe way of bringing the lady to Shiraz.

Mr. Knox states that the lawless element is watching the case of Miss Ross with great interest, and doubtless our treatment of the question will have great local significance.

Please see your telegram No. 320 of the 26th ultimo. Miss Ross acquiesced in the proposed manner of settlement, and I have accepted as full settlement of the first robbery the promised and immediate payment by the Persian Government of the value of the property then lost. I shall present them with a claim for the second robbery, and am now considering the amount to be claimed.

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No. 205.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 544.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 7, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident over Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.

Please see my telegram No. 541 of the 6th instant.

There is no truth in a statement, which I understand is appearing in the London press as emanating from Tehran, to the effect that in default of an apology the Russian Government have threatened to occupy the provinces of Ghilan and Mazanderan.

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No. 206.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 545.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 7, 1911.

SELIGMAN loan.

Please see telegram No. 260 from His Majesty's Embassy at St. Petersburg.

Russian Government, I presume, are keeping you informed of the course of the negotiations with M. Seligman.

Russian Government have consulted M. Poklewsky as to the perpetuation of the office of treasurer-general. The latter has advised that a condition be inserted in the contract by which the treasurer-general shall be prevented from acting without the consent of the Persian Government in matters affecting foreign relations. My own opinion is, that it would be wholly desirable to bring about some such restriction.

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No. 207.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 268.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 7, 1911.

PERSIA. British appointments in the North.

I gave M. Nératof to-day the general sense of the instructions sent to Sir G. Barclay in your telegram No. 330 of the 6th November to Tehran. In expressing his thanks for your action, M. Nératof said that he had told M. Poklewski, in instructing him to protest against M. Lecoffre's appointment to Tabreez, that he could count on Sir G. Barclay adopting a sympathetic attitude in the matter.

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No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 331.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 7, 1911.

HORMUZ oxide.

Please inform me at once by telegraph what truth there is in report received from Ellinger, that Muin-ut-Tujjar has got back his concession for a period of ten years.

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No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 674.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 7, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of M. Lecoffre : see your telegram No. 265 of yesterday.

You can make it clear to M. Nératof that we anticipated the wishes of the Russian Government by giving him verbally substance of my telegram to Tehran (No. 330 of yesterday), and by pointing out that we had sent off this telegram before the protest of the Russian Government reached us.

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No. 210.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 546.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 8, 1911.

POSITION of Regent.

In consequence of the dissensions in the Cabinet and of the general demoralisation of the Government, the Regent has informed the Ministers that he will resign unless there is more cohesion in the Ministry before the Medjliss terminates in a few days' time, unless certain vacant posts in the Cabinet are filled, and unless the latter form a constructive programme and receive powers from the Medjliss to carry out such a programme.

My Russian colleague and I are acting to-day on the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 312 of the 18th ultimo.

[44220]

No. 211.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 547.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 8, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident in connection with Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.

Please see telegram No. 265 from St. Petersburg received here to-day and my telegram to you No. 541 of the 6th instant.

The Russian Minister addressed at the time a suitable reply to the Persian Government's note, in which they demanded the recall of the Russian consul-general. The only comment which the Persian Government has made on the return of this note has been an expression of regret that it should have been returned. The matter might therefore be considered closed if the acquiescence of the Persian Government in the return of the note were all that was required. The great difficulty is, however, the demand for an apology and for the withdrawal of the gendarmes from the property in question.

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No. 212.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 548.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 8, 1911

HORMUZ oxide.

In reply to your telegram No. 331 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that the Persian Government have laid a Bill before the Medjliss by which the oxide mine

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No. 212°.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 549.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 8, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 8th November: Hormuz oxide.
Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Bill has finally passed Medjliss.

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is handed over for ten years from 22nd March, 1910, to Muin-ut-Tujjar, on condition that he fulfills the Strick contract. He may recoup himself from the sales to Strick for the oxide already mined by him (see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 23 of 25th January last), after which he is to retain 15 per cent. of the receipts until the Strick contract expires. The Persian Government is to receive 75 per cent., and the Muin 25 per cent. of any sales beyond the 30,000 tons appertaining to Strick.

No mention of Weir or Ellinger's claim is made in the Bill. Notwithstanding the strong opposition of the treasurer-general, the Bill has already passed one reading. There appears to be some doubt whether it has passed the final stage or not. I am to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and will take the opportunity to enquire as to the exact position of the measure.

[44296]

No. 213.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 550.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 8, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of Englishman as treasury agent at Tabreez.

I spoke to Shuster this afternoon, as instructed in your telegram No. 330 of the 6th instant. The latter declared that he was most anxious to conciliate the Russian Legation, and that he had always been desirous of doing so, but he was not prepared to allow all progress in Persian reforms to be nullified. He thought that His Majesty's Government would see convincing proof that this was the aim of the Russian Government in the specific instances of obstruction cited in the open letter which he has written for publication.

He said that Azerbaijan finance was in a deplorable condition, for instead of revenue coming in to the Central Government, the latter had to remit money to the province. Lecoffre was an expert in Azerbaijan finance. His appointment to Tabreez had been decided upon four months ago, and he was quite determined that he should proceed to the post. He had had no idea when making the appointment that Lecoffre was a Russophobe, and he was compelled to select his instruments from the scanty material at his disposal.

I laid strong emphasis on the danger which the Persian Government would incur by defying Russia, and I enquired what he thought the attitude of the Persians would be in the face of the Russian protest. He replied that he presumed they would "wait like a condemned man until he was hanged by someone stronger than him," which was what they were already doing in the case of the demands reported in my telegram No. 541 of the 6th instant.

[44274]

No. 214.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 270.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, November 8, 1911.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that a battalion in full strength is being sent to Tabreez. It is to take the place of the battalion now there, which has been much reduced by departure of time-expired men, and its dispatch does not import any change in situation.

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No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 134.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 8, 1911.

THE Persian Minister asked Sir A. Nicolson to-day if we would not support his Government in the question of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh and the difficulty which had arisen with Russia. Sir A. Nicolson told him that we were aware of the facts, but that it was very difficult for His Majesty's Government to intervene in a difference between the

Persian Government and Russia. Sir G. Barclay, he said, was well acquainted with all the facts and was in intimate relations with the Russian Minister, and it seemed to him that such questions had better be settled locally.

The Persian Minister was a little puzzled with the vagueness of the reply, but Sir A. Nicolson did not wish to give him any ground for thinking we should support Persia, though one feels that she has a certain right on her side.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44079]

No. 216.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 8, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from Sir G. Barclay,* respecting the situation of Miss Ross, who is now at Abadeh, after being robbed for the second time, and unable to proceed.

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it would be difficult to leave an English lady in the position in which Miss Ross now finds herself at this season of the year, or to expect her to trust herself again to the dubious protection of a Persian escort.

He would therefore suggest that, if the Marquess of Crewe sees no objection, a suitable detachment of Indian troops might be allowed to bring Miss Ross from Abadeh to Shiraz. Such action could not be construed by the Persian Government as in any sense using the reinforced consular escorts for the protection of caravans; and, in view of the very special circumstances of this case, Sir E. Grey does not consider that the use to be made of the consular guards on this occasion could be regarded as a precedent for other cases.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[44340]

No. 217.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 551.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 9, 1911.

MY telegram No. 546 of 8th November.

Russian Minister and I were received in private audience yesterday afternoon by Regent.

We assured him of the sympathy of our Governments with him in the difficulties of his task, and of great importance which they attached to his retaining the Regency.

His Highness, after thanking [us] for this message, described the situation as one of complete disorganisation. Three posts, among them Ministry of Finance, were vacant in the Cabinet, and this on the eve of the termination of the Medjliss. So far, all efforts to fill them had failed owing to disagreement with the Medjliss as to who should be appointed. Unless something was done during the winter, disorders in the country would be worse than ever in the spring. In face of the factional opposition and intrigues of the democrats, who, notwithstanding his repeated advice, persisted in their obstruction, and whom he characterised as not a party but a revolutionary society, there was no hope of the present incomplete Cabinet accomplishing anything. He was in a dilemma. Under the constitution, the rôle of the Regent was confined to that of a spectator. He would not make a *coup d'Etat*, nor would he remain a spectator of the ruin of his country. He was therefore quite determined to resign unless a strong Cabinet capable of constructive work were formed without delay, and, moreover, even if such a Cabinet were formed, he had decided to take leave for a month or two.

* No. 201.

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No. 218.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 552.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 9, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 292 of 4th October, first paragraph: Reinforcement of coast escorts.

I am applying to Government of India for similar authorisation for Ispahan.

[44498]

No. 219.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 334.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 9, 1911.

MR. WILSON.

I see no reason why Wilson should not be retained.

Reference is to your telegram No. 524 of the 28th October.

[43455]

No. 220.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 9, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd November respecting the proposed survey of the country between Bushire and Shiraz with a view to the construction of a motor road. With regard to the suggestion that the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury should now be moved to accept half of the amount of the estimated cost, namely, 939*l.*, as a charge on British revenues, I am to say that, if the Secretary of State for India concurs, Sir E. Grey would suggest that the decision as to undertaking this survey should be deferred until better order is re-established on the southern roads in Persia.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[44476]

No. 221.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 553.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, November 10, 1911.*

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, dated 9th November:—

"Last night caravanserai of Chenar Rahdar, 8 miles west of Shiraz, where supplies for troops are stored under guard of three sepoy, was attacked by sorkhis. These were driven off by local tofangchis, with one man wounded and a horse killed. Sepoys, who did not take part, have asked for reinforcement, expecting attack to be renewed. I do not think it desirable to reinforce them with British troops, and I have informed local authorities of the incident, and arranged for a strong Persian guard to be supplied."

I have approved acting consul's action.

[44588]

No. 222.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 554.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 10, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please see my telegram No. 547 of the 8th instant.

The Russian Government have instructed M. Poklewsky to inform the Persian

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Government to-morrow that unless they comply with the Russian demands within forty-eight hours, he will break off relations with the Cabinet, and to warn them that in that case the Russian Government will take such measures to protect their interests as may appear to them to be necessary.

[44586]

No. 223.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 271.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 10, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident.

My telegram No. 265 of 6th November.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that matter stands as follows:—

Russian Minister at Tehran made verbally three demands of the Persian Government—that they should take back their note demanding the recall of the consul-general, that they should express regret for insults offered by gendarmes to consular officials, and that gendarmes should be replaced by Persian Cossacks. The Persian Government declined the last two demands, asking for a joint enquiry into the facts. The Russian Minister has now been instructed to present the same demands in writing, asking for an immediate reply. This he is probably doing to-day. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

In the event of M. Poklewski not receiving a satisfactory reply within two days he is instructed to inform the Persian Government that diplomatic relations are broken off and that his Government will "take measures." It has been decided that these measures will take the form of the dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin. This force is to be of such a strength as will allow of a detachment being summoned to Tehran by M. Poklewski. This detachment will be employed for removing the gendarmes and replacing them by a force of Persian Cossacks, and will return to Kazvin after having accomplished this task.

(R.) As regards the Persian demand for a joint enquiry, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the insult complained of is vouched for by two consular officials and a Russian officer. The only other witnesses who could be questioned are the gendarmes themselves.

[44286]

No. 224.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 335.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 10, 1911.

HORMUZ oxide.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 548 and 549 of 8th November, please let me know what effect, in your opinion, the Bill passed by the Medjliss will have on the claims of Messrs. Weir and Ellinger.

Does Muin-ut-Tujjar become liable, or is Strick still responsible?

[44296]

No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 336.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 10, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of M. Lecoffre.

With reference to your telegram No. 550 of 8th November:

It is probable that, if Shuster were to co-operate with the Russian Legation instead of working against it, he would not find it obstructive.

As regards M. Lecoffre, if the Russian Government request the Persian Government not to ratify his appointment, you may advise the Persian Government to grant their demand. To do so would be in their own interests, as, if they refused, Russia might be induced to take action with a view to protecting her interests in Persia.

[44748]

No. 226*.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received November 11.)

(No. 556.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 11, 1911.

PERSIAN army. Please see your telegram No. 679 to St. Petersburg of the 10th instant.

I have received assurance that Mr. Shuster has had nothing to do with the proposal to engage Swedish officers for the Persian army, and I believe that the suggestion originated with the Regent. Great importance is attached by His Highness to the immediate organisation of a force capable of coping with insurrection, a repetition of which he anticipates for next spring. He has, in conversation with me, referred to the organisation of this force as an all-important part of the constructive programme upon which he has made his retention of office conditional.

I would suggest that the attention of the Russian Government should be drawn to the fact that the strengthening of those branches of the executive which are independent of Shuster, *pro tanto* tends to decrease the latter's authority. Persian Government would not, of course, accept the alternative, viz., appointment of Russian instructors.

[44528]

No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 679.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 10, 1911.

SWEDISH Minister has now informed me that his Government have been privately approached by Persian Government respecting loan of Swedish officers to organise Persian army. Swedish Minister said there would of course be no question of interference with Cossack Brigade. He wished to know opinion of His Majesty's Government respecting this proposal. He was informed that we should like to consult Russian Government before giving a reply.

Above should be communicated to Russian Government.

See your telegram No. 253 of the 20th October. It would be advisable, if they continue to oppose the scheme, to have a clearer statement of their reasons for doing so than that given in your above-mentioned telegram.

[44774]

No. 227.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received November 11.)

(No. 557.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 11, 1911.

SECOND detachment of Indian cavalry has arrived Bushire and is disembarking.

[44786]

No. 228.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received November 11.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Stockholm, November 11, 1911.

MY telegram No. 16 of 10th November. Persian army organisation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has now received, though informally, proposal from Persian Government as to loan of officers for army organisation. Military authorities would like to accept this offer, but Swedish Government wish first to consult London and St. Petersburg, and will take no action contrary to wishes of Governments which are chiefly interested. I pointed out that organisation of army was a different question from gendarmerie, which could only be used for protection of life and property. Many good officers are volunteering for service in Persia, and a solution might be found in extension of gendarmerie in south under Swedish control, leaving aside question as to army organisation, which might cause embarrassment.

[44822]

No. 229.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 341.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 11, 1911.

QUESTION is being asked in Parliament on 14th November whether there are any Russian officers now serving in the corps of Cossacks in Tehran, and whether there exists any restriction on the part of Persia in which these Cossacks can be employed.

Please telegraph reply.

[44775]

No. 230.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received November 12.)

(No. 558.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

CAPTAIN STOKES.

Stokes begs that you will be so kind as to forward the following telegram to the Secretary of State for India:—

"Refusal of my resignation by the Government of India has been communicated to me. It places me in the position of having to choose between disregarding the orders of His Majesty's Government and breaking my faith pledged on conditions officially formulated by His Majesty's Government themselves (see Foreign Office telegram No. 213 of the 21st July). I most respectfully and most earnestly request His Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision and to permit me to resign. I have throughout acted in entire good faith, and the difficulty of my position is not in any sense of my own making."

A telegram reached me from the Government of India on the 5th November to the effect that they were unable to accept Stokes's resignation, as His Majesty's Government could not advise His Majesty to accept the resignation of an officer who handed it in solely in order to take service under a foreign Power in circumstances which, in their judgment, made his action detrimental to British interests. I informed Stokes on the same day of this decision, and added, as requested by the Government of India, that he was to proceed to Simla as soon as possible to join the general staff branch there.

I have urged him repeatedly since then to leave Tehran, but I doubt whether my words will have any effect. In view of the possibility of the forcible removal of Shuster's gendarmes (see St. Petersburg telegram No. 271), if the Persian Government do not yield to the Russian demands the matter may prove very serious, for if Stokes persists in his hesitation to obey our orders, he would probably become involved in any conflict between Russian Cossacks and Treasury gendarmes.

[44776] No. 231.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 559.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

MINISTER of the Interior has resigned. Remnant of Cabinet consists now only of Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[44777] No. 232.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 560.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

REGENT told Medjliss to-day that he was about to take two months' leave.

[44778] No. 233.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 561.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

YESTERDAY Medjliss authorised Shuster to engage ten additional Americans as "financial employés."

[44779] No. 234.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 562.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident.

Please see telegram No. 271 from His Majesty's Embassy at St. Petersburg.

If the Russian demands are not conceded there is the possibility of an eventual conflict between Russian troops and Treasury gendarmes. Some of the Americans—one of them is a gendarmier officer—might easily be involved in such a conflict, and an awkward international question would arise were an American to be wounded.

[44780]

No. 235.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 563.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

PERSIAN Cossack Brigade.

Please see your telegram No. 341 of yesterday.

There are five Russian officers in the brigade. Only two of these are now in Tehran, one is at Tabreez, and the other two are at Kashan, where they have recently taken part in the operations against Naib Hussein.

The brigade can be employed in any part of Persia; there exists no restriction as to district.

(Confidential.)

A proposal was recently put forward to dispatch two of the Russian officers to Shiraz with some Persian Cossacks. The Russian Minister, however, felt that the proposal had been made in order to defy the spheres of influence and embarrass the two Powers. He therefore persuaded the Russian colonel commanding the brigade to veto the dispatch of the officers.

[44781]

No. 236.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 564.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

HORMUZ oxide.

In reply to your telegram No. 335 of yesterday, I beg to state that I do not see how the Weir-Ellinger claims are affected, except in so far as Muin, after working off the Strick contract, may be willing to reinstate Ellinger as his agent for the sale of Hormuz oxide. I presume that Ellinger's claim for loss of agency would in that case be somewhat diminished.

The Muin is precluded from resuming contract with Weir by the part of the new concession dealing with the execution of Strick's contract. Strick does not appear to me to be in any way relieved of responsibility.

As the law of 13th June requires the treasurer-general's consent to concessions, I understand that Shuster contends that the action of the Medjliss has been *ultra vires*, as his consent was not in this case given. He does not regard the concession as yet finally granted to Muin.

[44941]

No. 237.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 326.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a report which appeared in to-day's "Novoe Vremya" of an interview which a representative of that paper had with M. Nératof on the subject of the state of affairs in Persia.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 237.

Extract from the "Novoe Vremya" of October 26 (November 8), 1911.

IN an interview with the representative of the "Novoe Vremya" on Persian affairs, M. A. A. Nératof said, regarding the landing of English cavalry in South Persia, that the trade routes there were not getting any better, and Russia had nothing against the step. With regard to protecting the lives, property, and trade of Russian subjects, Russia would strengthen her force at Tabreez, which had been diminished by natural decrease and by men going to the reserve. Hence, a full battalion is being

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sent to replace the one there, which will be removed. Moreover, some of the consular convoys are being increased.

Asked whether this measure sufficed in view of the existing alarming position, M. Nératof answered, "I don't as yet see any special need for further strengthening our protecting forces in Persia. It is certainly understood that in the event of any danger to the lives or property of Russian subjects suitable measures will be immediately taken."

As regards the dispatch of Swedish officers by the Swedish Government, M. Nératof said that they were performing their duties in a perfectly correct way, and did not interfere in local politics. Anyhow, their activity has not so far given any cause for uneasiness. As to the proposed invitation to Swedish officers to act as instructors to the Persian army, the Persian Government did, in fact, intend to invite twenty Swedish officers, but has not done so yet. M. Nératof thought that the presence of so large a number of foreign officers might only complicate unnecessarily the position.

Asked whether the Persian population showed an inclination towards the ex-Shah Mohammed Ali, M. Nératof said he believed that the Persian masses took no interest in politics, and only wished to save their heads and property. The half-nomadic fighting tribes seemed to be against any Government. Asked how the Russian Government looked on the internal strife, and whether it did not think that it would be opportune to put an end to it by offering support to one of the sides, M. Nératof said, "Russia is united to Persia by the ties of a great many years of good neighbourship and peace. There is no ground or purpose to violate these by interfering in a wholly internal struggle which the neighbour nation will settle itself one way or the other. Russia wants only one thing—that her State interests and the interests of her subjects be respected in Persia. Therefore, we stand aside from Persia's internal struggles, without taking any part. It will be otherwise should the course of events affect our rights."

To the remark that the struggle had already led to the violation of rights of Russian subjects, and that the latest incident with the Russian consular officials in Tehran, moreover, belittled Russia's dignity, M. Nératof answered that the losses suffered by Russian subjects in various parts of Persia amounted to about 3,000,000 roubles, part of which had already been paid. "As to the latest incident," he added, "the Persian Government cannot fail to see that it is in the wrong, and that it will need to give us full satisfaction."

Regarding Mr. Morgan Shuster, he thought that he had started to reform Persia without reckoning with the circumstances. To apply in Persia strictly European measures of financial administration is very incautious. Unless local conditions are kept in mind, Mr. Shuster is bound to be misled by theory. "It is scarcely convenient," added M. Nératof, "that a financial adviser should disregard the rights of third parties, as, for instance, in the case of the Russo-Persian Bank. Altogether, I believe that Mr. Shuster's work can be beneficent only if it conforms with the local and very important interests which Russia and England possess in Persia."

The interviewer remarked that evidently Mr. Shuster's activity was not approved by the Russian Government. To this, M. Nératof answered that the Russian Government was ready to give its support to any conscientious and reasonable effort to bring order into the Persian finances, without which the regeneration of Persia is impossible. But Russia certainly cannot approve of any measures that are calculated not to improve, but to aggravate the situation.

[46132]

No. 238.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 327.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 7, 1911.

THE Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me yesterday that he was constantly receiving reports from Persia of a most unsatisfactory character, that the situation was becoming impossible, and that if matters did not improve it would really be necessary for Russia to do something.

His Excellency referred particularly to two subjects of conflict which had arisen between the Russian and Persian Governments—certain recent appointments made by Mr. Shuster, and an incident between Persian Cossacks and Mr. Shuster's gendarmes in which the Russian consul-general was concerned.

The second of these matters has been referred to in recent press telegrams from Tehran. According to the very brief account of it which M. Nératof gave me, the Persian authorities (for whose action his Excellency thought that Mr. Shuster was responsible) desired to take possession of certain property belonging to adherents of the ex-Shah in which the Russian bank had an interest. The Russian Government did not object to the sequestration of the property, but they were bound to safeguard the interests of their bank. The Russian consul-general had placed Cossacks as guards over the property, and there had been a conflict of some sort between the Cossacks and Mr. Shuster's gendarmes. Thereupon, the Persian Government had gone so far as to demand the recall of the consul-general, and also, I think, of some subordinate officials of the consulate who had been involved in the dispute. The Russian Minister had of course returned the Persian note, and there had been a lively explanation between M. Poklewski and the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Everything now depended on the further action of the Persian Government. If they accepted the return of their note the incident would be closed. If they persisted in the attitude which they had taken up the matter would become excessively serious, and he did not know what action the Russian Government would have to take. The relations between the two Governments were as I could see extremely strained.

As regards the question of appointments, M. Nératof stated that Mr. Shuster had nominated three Treasury agents at Shiraz, Ispahan, and Tabreez respectively, who were, his Excellency said positively (though this I questioned), all Englishmen. The Russian Government did not object to the first two appointments (they had received favourable accounts of the nominee at Ispahan), but the person appointed to Tabreez, a M. Lecoffre, was known to them as being violently antagonistic to Russia. This appointment could not be maintained.

I said that his Excellency could be certain that the appointments in question had been made without the knowledge of Sir G. Barclay, and this assurance M. Nératof readily accepted. As to the tension which had come about in Russo-Persian relations, I said that it would be a pity if the proceedings of an American citizen should lead Russia to take measures in North Persia to which she would otherwise not have resorted. The thing was to prevent Mr. Shuster from doing what was obnoxious to Russia, and it seemed to me personally that the two representatives at Tehran, if instructed in that sense, would find means to make it clear that Mr. Shuster must cease from his present course of action, or must go. M. Nératof discussed the subject for some time, but did not seem to think that any action on the part of the representatives at the present moment would help matters. It was true, he said, that the Persian Government were themselves not very pleased with Mr. Shuster, but he had strong support in the Medjliss. Moreover, there was his contract with the Persian Government, which his Excellency thought would make it difficult to dispense with his services until his term of employment had expired. M. Nératof fell back on the suggestion which, as reported in my despatch No. 314, he had mentioned to me on the 24th ultimo. If the proposed Seligman loan were put through with the participation of the Russian bank he thought that conditions could be attached to it, such as would provide against objectionable action on Mr. Shuster's part in the future; the conditions which he had in mind relating to such matters as control of expenditure, appointments in the financial administration, &c., in which the two Powers should be consulted.

I remarked that the loan negotiations might be protracted, and that it was desirable to keep Mr. Shuster in check in the meantime. Possibly, however, the question of M. Lecoffre's appointment at Tabreez might bring the whole question of that gentleman's position to a point.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[44943]

No. 239.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 329.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of a leading article, published in to-day's "Novoe Vremya," on the subject of the latest Russo-Persian incident.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 239.

Précis of Article in the "Novoe Vremya" of October 28 (November 10), 1911.

THE "Novoe Vremya" in a leading article recalls M. Nératof's words expressing the hope that the recent Russo-Persian difference would soon be settled, and observes that the latest proceedings of the Persians have proved just the contrary. The article summarises the events which led up to the difference, and states them to be as follows: The Persian Government notified the Russian mission in Tehran of its decision to confiscate the property of the partisans of the former Shah. Of this the Russian mission made note.

One of the most active partisans of the ex-Shah is his brother Prince Shoa-es-Saltaneh, who owns a house in Tehran and landed property in the environs. The Persian Government decided to sequester his estate. However, his house in Tehran is mortgaged with the Russo-Persian Bank, and Shoa-es-Saltaneh himself has become a Turkish subject. The Young Turks, as is known, look on the Persian constitutionalists with the greatest sympathy, and gladly give protection to the partisans of the Shah. Such being the case, as soon as the Persian gendarmerie occupied Shoa-es-Saltaneh's house Turkish diplomacy took action. The Ottoman Ambassador protested against the sequestration of a Turkish subject's property, and he demanded that a guard should be placed on the property to resist the intrusion of Morgan Shuster's customs gendarmerie. The Government, in complying, sent Cossacks of the Persians Cossack brigade to help in protecting the house of the rebel Prince. In a subsequent slight conflict the issue was brought off as per pre-arranged programme; the gendarmes got the upper hand, and the Persian Cossacks retired.

Meanwhile the Russian Consul-General, M. Pokhitonoff, received notification from the local management of the Russo-Persian Bank of the seizure of property mortgaged with the bank. He was also informed of the seizure of the Prince's landed estate, which was leased by Russian subjects. The Russian consul-general in order to protect the property of Russian subjects from pillage, sent several men out of his convoy. The customs gendarmes who had previously repulsed the Persian Cossacks, now yielded their positions to the Russians. The Government learning of this gave assurances to the Russian Minister that the property of the Russo-Persian Bank and of the lease-holders of the Prince's land would not suffer. In view of this M. Poklevsky-Kosell withdrew the Russian guards from the house and the land of the Prince. All seemed to promise well; but just here begins the surprising story. The Prince's house happens to be near that of the consul-general. The Persian gendarmes in reoccupying the house regarded themselves as victors over the Russians. On the balcony of the house they posted a shooting party who directed their rifles at the consulate, thereby frightening the inmates by threats to shoot. The gendarmes also pointed their rifles at the consulate dragonnans as they passed. Only a decisive action of a Russian officer who happened to pass put an end to this dangerous and insulting game. The Russian Ambassador insisted from the Government and the Regent that an apology be made for the mocking conduct towards the Russians, and that the culprits be punished. The Persian Government met this just and moderate demand with a point-blank refusal.

It was just at this time that the "Novoe Vremya" correspondent had his conversation with M. Nératof; and the "Times" correspondent had made known Persia's refusal of satisfaction. Unfortunately, official communication of this had not yet reached St. Petersburg. From our to-day's telegrams from Tehran it is plain that events went much further than was indicated. The Russian Minister in Tehran did not accept a verbal refusal from the Persian Government; but now the refusal is given in a formal written note. The Persian Government goes beyond a formal refusal and itself takes the offensive. The Persian Government so far from apologising insists on the removal from Persia of the Russian consul and his dragonnans. It is amazing that this was all they asked, and that they did not insist on having the consul put on a pike and the Minister recalled.

Hitherto the Russian Government has treated Persia as a spoilt but sympathetic child. So it was in the time of Isvolsky and of Sazonoff, and so it continues with Nératof. But where in this is the point of view of the State? Russian diplomacy has spoilt the Persians through its boundless toleration. It is time to put an end to the false and haughty condescension which has till now formed the foundation of Russia's attitude to Persia. After all, Iran is not a nursery, and the acts of the Regent and the Government are not child's play but orders of State.

The Persian Government must at once give full satisfaction for the mocking insult inflicted on the Russian officials by the gendarmes. It must carry out the Russian Minister's demand that the gendarmes on the Prince's landed property be replaced by the Persian Cossacks. It must also apologise for its last note.

Russian diplomacy is softhearted in dealing with the weak and pliable in dealing with its equals. One must put an end to this. In the East counsel and persuasion lead to nothing. Demands must be made on the Regent and Government of Persia, for it is only the logic of such that will affect them. Otherwise the natural course of events will drive us from polite conversations to very impolite actions. Now is the moment for immediate satisfaction without parleying, or otherwise an ultimatum. If not, Russo-Persian relations will be tied in such a knot as can only be cut by the sword. This time, we hope, there will be no place for any half-ultimatum.

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No. 240.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received November 13.)

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, November 13, 1911.

OFFICIAL statement regarding Russo-Persian conflict is published this morning. It observes that Shuster's gendarmes had taken possession of house and property in dispute without due notice to Russian consul-general, and that latter acted quite correctly in sending consular officials to insist on withdrawal of gendarmes until Persian Government had given guarantees of safeguarding interests of Russian Bank. It further complains that while pourparlers with Russian consul-general were still in progress force of 100 gendarmes again took possession of the property, forcibly ejecting Persian Cossacks, and that they pointed their rifles intentionally at consular officials while latter were in uniform. Above proceedings and the demand for recall of consul-general are described as constituting clearly provocative action on the part not only of Shuster's gendarmes, but also of the Persian Government.

Russian note was handed to Persian Government on 11th November.

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No. 241.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received November 13.)

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 13, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 271 of the 10th November.

I saw M. Nératof this evening, and he told me that he had so far not received any news from Poklewski as to the receipt of any reply from the Persian Government to his note. M. Nératof said he believed that Shuster would use his influence with the Persian Government to induce them to offer resistance to the Russian demands.

He went on to say that Shuster had created a fresh difficulty by issuing a circular addressed to Russian subjects resident in Persia, in which he required them to furnish particulars of any leases which they might hold: these particulars were to be furnished direct to him, and the circular stated that the Persian Government would not recognise the rights of leaseholders who did not furnish the required return. This procedure, M. Nératof stated, was entirely contrary to the established usage in Persia. His Excellency said, further, that he feared that Shuster would persist, in spite of Russia's protest, in maintaining the appointment of M. Lecoq to Tabreez, and he remarked that the situation was becoming so difficult that he could see no way out.

To this I replied that, in my own personal opinion, the only solution seemed to be that the Persian Government should be induced to terminate Mr. Shuster's appointment, even if this step involved the payment to him of an indemnity.

M. Nératof said that he feared that, in the teeth of the opposition which such a step would call forth from the Medjliss, the Persian Government would not have sufficient courage to carry it through.

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No. 242.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 688.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 13, 1911.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 556 of 11th November: Swedish officers for organisation of Persian army.

You should put this consideration before the Russian Government.

[45243]

No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 290.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 13, 1911.

M. DE ETTER communicated to-day to Sir A. Nicolson the Russian ultimatum to Persia. We had already received its terms. The only remark Sir A. Nicolson made was that he was sorry such a step had been deemed necessary, and that he hoped that the detachment would remain at Kazvin, and that no troops would proceed to Tehran.

M. de Etter said that no troops would go to Tehran unless the Russian Minister considered their presence "absolutely necessary" for the protection of the legation. The period given to the Persian Government expires to-night.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[45166]

No. 244.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 194.)

Sir,

Stockholm, November 11, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 16 of yesterday's date, relative to the service of Swedish officers in Persia, I have the honour to inform you that the following was published in yesterday's "Stockholm's Dagblad":—

"A Gothenburgh paper's London correspondent informs us that according to a telegram from St. Petersburg the 'Novoe Vremya' of Wednesday last should have published a communication from the Russian Foreign Office stating that 'the Swedish Government has, after representations from the English and Russian Governments, agreed, in order to avoid new complications, not to allow twenty Swedish officers to enter the Persian army.'

"On account of this statement we made enquiries at the Foreign Office here and found out that they know nothing whatsoever about this question. The telegram as to what the Swedish Government has done has even less reason, because there has been no request from the Persian Government's side as to the appointment of Swedish officers for the reorganisation of the army.

"As our readers no doubt realise, the statements in the Russian paper show a strong likeness to a telegram from the 'Times' Tehran correspondent two weeks ago, whose statements as to the appointment of Swedish officers for the Persian army's reorganisation and as to the Russian Government's propositions to the Swedish Government in regard to this matter were denied firstly by the Swedish party and then by the Tehran correspondent himself. This question has naturally nothing to do with the reorganisation of the Persian gendarmerie, in which duty Swedish officers, without objection from any quarter, are already engaged and moreover are waiting for further auxiliaries."

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[45216]

No. 245.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 565.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

MY telegram No. 559 of 12th November: Persian Cabinet.

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs have resigned, but are carrying on.

Situation is more than usually confused, and efforts to reconstruct Cabinet have made no progress.

[45217]

No. 246.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 566.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

MEDJLISS yesterday passed almost unanimously a law prolonging its own existence until more than half the members of the next Medjliss shall have arrived in Tehran.

[45218]

No. 247.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 567.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

I SHOULD be glad if you would inform me whether Smart is proceeding to his post via Bushire. I understand that he left England on the 29th October.

I propose, if he is travelling via Bushire, to retain there the one of the two squadrons which has just landed which is destined for Shiraz to escort him to his post.

[45287]

No. 248.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 568.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

RUSO-PERSIAN incident.

Please see my telegram No. 554 of the 10th instant.

No reply from the Persian Government had been received at the Russian Legation last night when the forty-eight hours expired, but the Russian Minister had not specified the exact time allowed them in his communication to the Persian Government.

I have again urged compliance with the Russian demands, but any disposition to yield as regards the withdrawal of the Treasury gendarmes is likely to be counteracted by the influence of Shuster, while, as regards the other demand, I gather that it will be difficult to find a Minister who will consent to tender an apology.

[45219]

No. 249.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 569.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

FIRST two squadrons of Indian cavalry have arrived at Shiraz without incident.

[45284]

No. 250.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 570.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

RELIEVED sepoy detachment at Shiraz.

Please see my telegram No. 521 of the 25th October.

In view of the state of the road between Kazerun and Bushire, His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire does not consider it advisable for the small detachment of sepoy to travel between Kazerun and Bushire alone. He suggests sending a detachment of cavalry to meet sepoy at Kazerun, and to accompany them to Bushire.

I have authorised him to send as large a detachment of cavalry as he may consider necessary.

[45361]

No. 251.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 571.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

MY telegram No. 567 of 14th November.

I now find that the arrangements made for the departure of the squadron in question are too far advanced for me to detain it until Smart reaches Bushire.

[45345]

No. 252.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 278.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1911.

SWEDISH officers for Persia.

Your telegram No. 679 of the 10th November.

I was informed yesterday by M. Nératof that his Government had given the Swedish Government to understand that it would not be agreeable to Russia that Swedish officers should be lent to the Persian Government for the purpose of reorganising the Persian regular army. The Swedish Government, without asking for any further explanations, had acquiesced in Russia's wishes, and M. Nératof thought that no further explanations would be necessary.

M. Nératof said that the real views of his Government (though these could not very well be laid before the Swedish Government) were that, as the Cossack brigade constituted the only existing nucleus of an organised force in Persia, any future increase of the armed forces of Persia in the north should be based on the development of the brigade. The creation of an independent force would not be welcome to Russia, as such a force would come into rivalry with the Cossack brigade. At present the Persian army, as actually constituted, was quite unworthy of any consideration, but, if it were to be reorganised by foreign officers, a different situation would be created.

On my asking M. Nératof what reasons for his attitude he proposed to give to the Persian Government in the event of their persisting in their proposal, his Excellency replied that he would have to consider that question.

I will speak to M. Nératof at the earliest opportunity, as instructed in your telegram No. 688 of the 13th November, which has just reached me. I fear, however, that this question is one of settled policy with the Russian Government, and that it would be difficult to move them from the attitude which they have taken up on the matter.

[45358]

No. 253.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 279.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 277 of the 13th November.

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof this evening his Excellency said that he was still without news from M. Poklewsky, and intimated that, if by to-morrow morning no satisfactory reply had been received from the Persian Government, Russia would proceed to take measures.

I remarked that I had noticed in the press reports of the resignation of the Persian Regent and Ministers. I pointed out that, though the question now in dispute lay

between Russia and Persia, yet it concerned His Majesty's Government indirectly, and I would therefore suggest whether, under the circumstances, Russia would not be taking the more generous course if she were to indicate a term, say, of one week, for the satisfaction of her demands. M. Nératof remarked that it was clear that resignation was only a device to avoid compliance with the Russian demands, and that, if a week's grace were conceded, the officials holding office would resign in the same way on the expiration of that period.

M. Nératof went on to say that, in the event of the Russian Government having to resort to the measures which had been decided upon, they would give the same assurances to His Majesty's Government as they had given when Russian troops had been sent to Kazvin on a former occasion.

[45359]

No. 254.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 280.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1911.

SWEDISH officers for Persia.

My telegram No. 278 of the 14th November.

I spoke to M. Nératof in the sense of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 556 of the 11th November.

In thanking me for this communication, M. Nératof remarked that the reorganisation of the Persian army was not a question of immediate urgency.

The present moment does not seem very favourable for pursuing this subject, and I accordingly let it drop.

[45218]

No. 255.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 348.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 14, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 567 of 14th November.

I understand that Mr. Smart left England to return to his post viâ Bushire.

I approve your suggestion.

[45113]

No. 256.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 691.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 14, 1911.

RUSSIAN complaints against Shuster's action, as reported in your telegram No. 277 of yesterday, seem to be better founded than dispute about Shoa-es-Sultanch's property, as regards which I am inclined, judging by the version of facts in my possession, to consider that there has been some misunderstanding.

You might tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that I fully realise that the Russian Government cannot abandon the standpoint they have taken up in this matter, but the real and more substantial difficulty seems to be Shuster's anti-Russian policy in Northern Persia, and the Russian Government should, I think, make public their own case against that. Could they not formulate their complaints against Shuster and make a formal demand respecting them?

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is my sincere hope that the Russian Government will not go further than the assurances given me by Count Benckendorff regarding their intentions, that is, to restrict dispatch of detachment to Kazvin and not to send any men to Tehran unless required by Russian Minister for protection of legation. It would be deplorable if a crisis were precipitated which led to a Russian occupation and the fall of Persian Government.

[45442]

No. 257.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received November 15.)

Sir, 28, Oxford Street, Manchester, November 18, 1911.
WE are in receipt of your letter of the 10th November, 1911, from which we note that the oxide mines at Hormuz are to be handed over to the Muin-ut-Tajjar for ten years from the 22nd March, 1910, on the condition that he carries out Messrs. Strick's contract.

We beg most energetically to protest against this arrangement, which is in flagrant contravention of all the assurances we have from time to time received from His Majesty's Government.

We must also protest against the failure on the part of His Majesty's Government to fulfil the pledges given to us, and on the strength of which we entered into this business, and must again ask that the Persian Government be informed, without any further delay, that no shipments of oxide can be permitted from Hormuz in further disregard of our rights and while these remain unsatisfied.

We are, &c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

[45474]

No. 258.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received November 15.)

(Most Confidential.)

Sir, Board of Trade, November 14, 1911.
WITH reference to your letter of the 5th September forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, with a report on German trade and shipping in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by the Board of Trade to forward to you herewith, for the consideration of Sir E. Grey, copy of a Memorandum which they have caused to be prepared dealing with certain questions raised by Colonel Cox's despatch.

I am, &c.

GEO. J. STANLEY.

Enclosure in No. 258.

Memorandum by the Board of Trade respecting the Commercial Position in the Persian Gulf.

(Confidential.)

THE despatch of Consul-General Cox to the Foreign Office, dated the 23rd July, 1911, and the enclosed report, by Mr. Vice-Consul Chick, deal with German commercial activity in the Persian Gulf region during the year ended October 1910; and in particular direct attention to certain points in regard to which it is suggested that action might, and, if possible should, be taken by His Majesty's Government. Further suggestions are contained in recent telegrams from Colonel Cox to the Commercial Intelligence Branch, and in a letter dated the 1st October from Mr. Chick to Mr. Worthington. Copies of these documents are appended. The present memorandum deals solely with these various proposals and the matters to which they relate; and does not attempt to consider in any detail the general problem of German competition in the Gulf region.

1. Shipping.

In the despatch of Colonel Cox mentioned above, attention was drawn to the importance of Antwerp as a port of call for German ships on their way to the Gulf, and to the fact that since 1908 of the British lines trading to the Gulf, only the West Hartlepool line calls at Antwerp. It is stated that this line is believed to be acting under some agreement with the Hamburg-America line in this respect.

The exact position with regard to the Gulf shipping is certainly not clear. Some two or three years ago we were informed by Mr. Strick that the three British lines

trading to the Gulf—his own (the Anglo-Algerian line, Bucknall's, and the West Hartlepool—formed a combine whose policy he controlled. The Bucknall line was weak, and the West Hartlepool line was relatively unimportant. This British combine had an agreement with the Hamburg-America line. Subsequently the Bucknall line was acquired by Sir John Ellerman, but Mr. Strick stated that he was to have charge of the Ellerman interests in the Gulf. In September 1910, Mr. Strick informed the Foreign Office that for reasons with which he was unacquainted, the Hamburg-America line had terminated the agreement or understanding. But it is noteworthy that whereas some time earlier he had declared his inability to engage in a freight war with the German line without Government assistance, he then (September 1910) professed indifference to any action which the German lines might take. Since then the board have heard nothing as to any change in the position, but the facts stated in the papers now under consideration, and other facts gathered by the commercial intelligence branch, are suggestive.

Comparing the two years ended in October 1909 and 1910 respectively, it appears that the sailings of the Hamburg-America line to the Gulf increased from nine to ten (this latter number is smaller than in 1907 or 1908), the sailings of the Anglo-Algerian line from thirteen to eighteen; of the Bucknall line from seven to fifteen; and of the West Hartlepool line from four to ten. (This is the largest number recorded since 1906 for this line. See table on p. 2 of Colonel Cox's despatch.) It appears that of the three last-mentioned lines only the West Hartlepool calls at Antwerp. The paid-up capital of the West Hartlepool line is 410,000*l.*; 16,000 10*l.* shares are held by Mr. Julius Guthe, chairman and managing director, who is a naturalised British subject, and Messrs. T. P. Guthe and Julius Guthe, Junr., are two out of the other three directors. It may therefore be assumed that the elder Mr. Guthe has, directly or indirectly, a controlling interest. The company has paid no dividend since 1907. Its debentures stand at 70. In March last it had a debit balance of 23,000*l.* The sailings are from Middlesbrough, with calls always at Antwerp. From enquiries made by the commercial intelligence branch, it appears that the company has no connection with any other British lines, and is stated to be ignored by them.

It seems obvious that, assuming the above statement correctly represents the facts, the West Hartlepool line cannot be going to Antwerp in competition with the Hamburg-America line, and there would appear to be at least a possibility that the opinion expressed by Colonel Cox and Mr. Chick as to an arrangement between the two lines may be correct. (The statement of the firm in their letter to the Foreign Office, of which copy was sent to the Board of Trade on the 31st October, does not necessarily conflict with this.)

The situation certainly seems unsatisfactory, but it does not appear possible to get at the actual facts, without direct enquiry of Mr. Strick, and it may be doubted if he would be willing to give any definite information. In any event we know that as he had secured contracts in respect of general trade from England and sugar from Marseilles, and has now control of the Hormuz oxide deposits, he is satisfied with his position, and would only be willing to engage in a conflict with the Hamburg-America line, and an attack upon their continental trade, in return for a substantial subsidy, which it has already been decided could be defended only on political grounds.

Light is thrown on Mr. Strick's general attitude by his reply to the communications made to him by the Commercial Intelligence Branch, in consequence of the telegram from Colonel Cox of the 27th September, urging that an attempt should be made to induce Mr. Strick to cancel or suspend the recent increase of homeward freights for grain carried by the lines under his control, which is said to render the competition of British firms with the German firm impossible. The reply is simply to the effect that the increase is perfectly reasonable, and cannot possibly have any harmful effect, and we do not appear to be in a position to controvert this, or to offer Mr. Strick any inducement to modify his policy.

2. The Sugar Trade.

Colonel Cox and Mr. Chick draw attention to the efforts of the Germans to dominate the sugar trade in the Gulf, and to the fact that the exports of sugar to the Gulf form an important part of the cargoes from Antwerp. The possibility of an attempt to capture any part of this trade by sending British ships to Antwerp—other than the West Hartlepool line, which carries a large amount of sugar—has been dealt with above; it is possible also that the Belgian refinery from which the sugar comes has

made long-period contracts in respect of freight, in which case it would not be possible to divert the traffic.

As regards the trade in sugar from Marseilles, as to which it is asserted (p. 6 of Colonel Cox's despatch) that the carriage will soon be in the hands of the Hamburg-America line, it must be pointed out that the only Marseilles refinery shipping to the Gulf is under contract to ship only by the Anglo-Algerian and Bucknall lines, and cannot do otherwise for some time to come without breaking the contract. (Mr. Strick's letter to Foreign Office, of the 10th August, 1911.)

With respect to the sugar trade generally, it may be remarked that the Board of Trade have succeeded in interesting Messrs. Tate in the matter, and understand that they are quite alive to its importance. It is not apparent that anything else can be done. The difficulty lies in the fact that the Persian demand is mainly for loaves, which are not manufactured in any United Kingdom refinery, though they are made by Belgian refineries for both the home and export trades. The manufacture of loaves requires special machinery and special arrangements for drying, and is a considerably longer process than the manufacture of tablets or cubes, and the Persian market alone is so small that there is very little inducement for British firms to take up this branch of the manufacture. Messrs. Tate, however, are hopeful of some success in their venture of pushing the sale of their cubes.

3. Banking Facilities.

In the letter of the 1st October, 1911, from the British consulate-general at Bushire to Mr. Worthington, complaint is made of the difficulties experienced by British firms there in obtaining money from the local branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

The exact nature of the difficulty is not quite clear. When a firm in an Eastern port desire to ship produce, they usually arrange with a London bank for a credit available by drafts in sterling, the documents representing the shipments having to be sent to the bank. When a credit has been received by a firm, if they are not possessed of large means, they apply to the bank's local branch or agent for an advance in local currency against deposit of the produce to be shipped in a warehouse in the bank's name; when shipment is completed, the drafts are drawn under the credit at the rate of exchange previously arranged. If a number of such credits, or a large credit has been granted, it may make currency scarce locally, and the bank may find it necessary to raise the rate of exchange to such a point as will give relief by enabling them to bring in fresh supplies. In such action the bank would doubtless always have in view the interests of all its local clients; they would all have to suffer in the rate of exchange, but, so far as the bank could arrange, they would all have supplies of currency; and a firm that could not obtain their usual supply (or at least a supply fully proportionate to their credits) because some other firm happened to have an unusually large credit on London, would have a legitimate cause for complaint.

It may, however, be that in the present case the German firm made a contract with the bank for a large advance in kranis in Bushire without reference to a sterling credit, such advance being either a specified amount or sufficient to cover the firm's requirements. Though it is unlikely that the bank would make such a contract without taking precautions against possible difficulties arising therefrom, it may be that the contract was for a larger sum than was prudent, and that the bank found themselves unable to furnish the usual facilities to their other customers, who would consequently suffer not from unfair treatment, but from an error of judgment on the part of the bank.

It would probably be possible to make confidential enquiries into the matter on this side, and, if necessary, to convey to the bank in the same manner a warning as to the undesirability of any suspicion as to the preferential treatment of foreign firms in the Persian trade.

4. Other matters.

(a.) *Trading Policy of the German Firm.*—In the letter of the 1st October to Mr. Worthington, reference is made to the practice of the German firm's agents at Bushire of making advances to the tribesmen, probably against growing crops or crops not even planted. This kind of proceeding is probably the main cause of the development of Messrs. Wöneckhaus's trade on the Gulf; it would undoubtedly give them great influence with the natives; but it is highly speculative, and the British firms would doubtless be unwilling to compete in this way with Messrs. Wöneckhaus, nor could they

be expected to do so. The British firms probably make some advances, but they would not be prepared to make them on the extensive scale which appears to be adopted by their German competitors.

(b.) *Financial Resources of the German Firm.*—It is understood that the statements in the paragraphs on p. 9 of Colonel Cox's despatch bearing on this subject are substantially correct, and that in 1910, Mr. Otto Beit, who had some connection with the Hamburg firm of Traun, Sturcken, and Co., did take the place of this firm as a "commanditaire" partner with Messrs. Wöneckhaus. It is doubtful, however, if the Foreign Office or Board of Trade could take any action in this matter which would be likely to meet with any success.

(c.) *Tugs and River Craft.*—There seems to be no information in the possession of the Board of Trade as to the alleged intention of the Germans to take tugs to the Gulf, and we have not heard anything recently of the schemes for dealing with lighterage at Bussorah. Should the Germans be allowed to use their own boats for the conveyance of railway material up the Tigris to Bagdad—which they might quite probably desire to do—it might be difficult to get them off the river when the railway is completed to Bagdad, or even afterwards when it has reached the Gulf; and this, and still more the suggested transference of the Turkish boats to the Germans—which, however, is now perhaps unlikely—would strengthen the German position and prestige there greatly.

5. Conclusions.

So far as the evidence in the papers now under consideration goes, it does little more than strengthen the conclusions reached in previous examinations of this problem, namely, that the efforts to build up German trade and shipping interests on the Gulf are being made, and are likely to continue, without very much regard for the immediate financial results, and are directed probably to the creation of apparent economic interests which can serve as the basis for political claims. It is apparent also that these efforts are meeting with some measure of success, and there is little likelihood that the unsound methods adopted—unsound when regarded from a purely commercial point of view—will, however large the resultant losses, drive German enterprises from the Gulf. It is also certain that the British firms will not compete with the Germans by adopting their methods; there is little evidence (except possibly in the present case of grain-buying) that they are feeling German competition at all keenly; on commercial grounds British ship-owners will not enter into a conflict with the Hamburg-America line, nor is there any reason (from their point of view) why they should do so. Regarding the whole question from the commercial standpoint, however regrettable some of the facts may be, there is no case shown for intervention by His Majesty's Government, even if some useful form of intervention on purely commercial lines could be devised. From the political standpoint there may conceivably be serious reason for action by His Majesty's Government, but the decision as to the need and nature of such action does not rest with the Board of Trade.

P. A.

November 6, 1911.

APPENDIX.

(1.)

British Consul-General at Bushire to Board of Trade.

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, September 27, 1911.

Understand Strick and Co. raised freight wheat 20s. next two months. Stock likely to be heavy, but British firms state rise will make them stop purchasing. Result will be Germans with lower freights would purchase everything. Cannot Strick and Co. delay rise temporarily?—CONSUL-GENERAL.

(2.)

*Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Board of Trade.**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,
October 3, 1911.*

Sir,

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, and to thank you for handing us copy of cable received by you from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, in regard to grain freights from that port.

We beg to suggest that, in your reply to the consul-general, you point out that, at present, there appears to be no reason why freights should be reduced as he indicates. We have recently booked considerable quantities of Gulf grain at 20s., and even at 21s., per scale ton, and no one on this side has made any complaint of the rates of freight. Further, the recent fixtures of steamers by Gulf merchants for full cargoes have been at rates which work out no more than 20s. per scale ton, so that this rate of freight for parcels of cargo cannot be considered anything but very reasonable.

We understand that space by the Hamburg-America Company's steamers is fully booked up to the end of the year, and, consequently, any alteration we might make in our rates of freight would have no effect on the quantities carried or the freights charged by the Hamburg-America line steamers during that period.

We have, &c.

(For Frank C. Strick and Co., Limited),
FRED. G. JONAS.

(3.)

Board of Trade to Consul-General, Bushire.

Sir,

Whitehall, October 5, 1911.

I duly received your telegram of the 27th September (copy enclosed), and at once consulted Messrs. Strick. After some conversation they asked me to send them a copy of the telegram, and they would then consider the matter. I did so, and now enclose a copy of a letter received from them on the 4th October, which confirms the information they gave me verbally. I telegraphed to you the same day that they declined to act as you suggested, and that I was writing to you.

I am, &c.

FREDK. HOOPER.

(4.)

Consul-General, Bushire, to Board of Trade.

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, October 7, 1911.

In reply to your telegram of the 4th October, letter now in post for you will reach you the 21st October. Endeavour effect suspension Strick and Co.'s action till then.—Cox.

(5.)

Consulate-General, Bushire, to Board of Trade.

(Confidential.)

My dear Mr. Worthington,

Bushire, October 1, 1911.

I think we ought to keep you informed of the present state of German competition here, which has lately begun to assail the British position in a way which causes us some anxiety, and, with Colonel Cox's approval, I place the following observations before you:—

During 1909 and 1910 the position as far as Bushire and Mohammerah (Persian ports) were concerned, was that R. Wönekhaus and Co. had no permanent German representative at either port, and were doing practically no other business than land the Hamburg-America cargoes once a month. Robert Wönekhaus has dissolved

partnership with his Hamburg friends, and was looking for support elsewhere; unfortunately he found it in London with Mr. Otto Beit (*vide* your letter dated the 17th August, 1910), and that development seems to have altered the whole aspect of affairs.

As stated in the report on the German lines operations for October 1909-10 (No. 6, Commercial. of the 27th July, 1911), Wönekhaus and Co. opened large credits in the beginning of this year with several German banking firms and with Martin's Bank in London. There were usually favourable opportunities for buying grain here and at Mohammerah this year, and they at once started buying largely.

Aided by the specially low rates of freight which they enjoy from the Hamburg-America line, which I have lately been told on the most reliable authority are always 5s. less than those quoted by the British lines, and with the above-mentioned credits at their disposal they have been able to ride roughshod over all other buyers. It is obvious that with such such a margin as 5s. per ton they can force prices up above the limit of British firms.

At the present there are about five British firms here buying for the London market; it is sufficient that a British firm has named its price for a parcel of wheat for the German agent to cap it immediately by as much as $\frac{1}{2}$ kran per cwt. (approximately) or higher. The German agents (the firm has two men here now) simply pass down the wharf and buy everything. They have always a crowd of tribesmen in the office, to whom they make advances; the German also have a number of agents buying for them at the small district ports.

Apart from the above-mentioned handicap to British firms, scarcity of current coin for purchases was beginning to affect the operations of all European firms; the bank having an insufficient supply, while the German credits came to an end a few weeks ago.

Aided by a British institution, the Imperial Bank of Persia, in London, the German firm, however, freed themselves from the difficulty by getting their London friends to open a new large credit for them in krans at Bushire.

The result is that the branch of the bank here cannot now spare the British firms any money at all, until the German firm have been satisfied. No doubt the Imperial Bank in London were unaware, when they accepted this German business, of the unfortunate position in which it would place the British firms and its office here. We are now trying to get the firms money by other means.

Thirdly, the British steamer companies choose the present moment to raise freights on wheat at Bushire by 2s. 6d., *i.e.*, just sufficient to make purchases too risky for cautious British firms at the present "German" prices.

Colonel Cox has already telegraphed for your assistance in preventing this from taking effect, and I now enclose copy of a letter of the 23rd September, which I wrote to the agents here (at the request of buyers).

If freights are raised to 20s., the Germans are likely to remain in possession of the field alone. The amount of our wheat business may seem small to you, but it is a large item in this part of the world.

I give you the above details for you to judge of the effect of German competition. I doubt whether the British shipping companies quite understand the position.

If the German firm by virtue of the 5s. rebate has the bulk of trade in the wheat export in its hands, it will mean that it will acquire this year a unique position in the eyes of the natives of the town and in the whole district, to the disparagement of British trade.

Some British firms (including Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co.) are now talking of asking the Germans to form a combine to fix prices; the fact of half-a-dozen British firms, some of long standing, asking one German firm to come to terms with them is sufficient to show how British prestige is likely to suffer; and, from what I know of German overtures in that direction at the beginning of the year, the Germans will hardly now be content with less than one-third or one-half of the wheat purchased, and all the barley.

In either case, the British commercial position at Bushire *vis-à-vis* a single German firm is likely to suffer, and at the present juncture, when one does not know what is going to happen in Southern Persia, there seems to be a danger in having the Germans claiming that they have an important commercial interest in the district, as the result of subsidised competition. One of the most influential Persian merchants warned me this week that the German firm was adopting these tactics for the sole end of obtaining influence in the district for political purposes.

I want to ask whether there is no possibility of Government intervening to assist our firms to compete effectively.

Grain being an exceptional article in which a small difference in freight means a great deal, could not the Board of Trade see their way to recommend that the British lines receive a special service grant of money, in compensation for giving shipments to the United Kingdom from Persia a rebate similar to that allowed by the Hamburg-America line?

I suppose there is nothing to be done with Mr. Otto Beit—he is presumably a British subject, but he is distinctly promoting an attack on the position of British trade here. If he is in a position to withdraw, could he not be given a hint to do so?

With apologies for the length of this letter, yours, &c.

(For H. G. Chick),
NEWTON WORRAD.

[45380]

No. 259.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 572.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

NOTHING short of compulsion would, I feel convinced, induce the Medjliss to agree to the extension of the Cossack brigade of the nature referred to in St. Petersburg telegram No. 278 of the 14th instant. Indeed, as the Russian Government would, I presume, not allow Russian officers to assist in the suppression of any recrudescence of the insurrection they would be of little use for the purpose contemplated by the Regent.

[45516]

No. 260.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 573.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident.

Please see your telegram No. 691 to St. Petersburg of the 14th November.

I have always understood that any Russian force sent to Tehran in the event of the Persian Government refusing to withdraw the Treasury gendarmes from the property in dispute would be sent to eject the gendarmes not to protect the legation.

Instructions were received at the Russian Legation last night to break off relations with the Cabinet if one existed; a detachment of Russian troops would then be dispatched to Kazvin.

M. Poklewski has telegraphed to his Government this morning to the effect that no Cabinet has yet been formed, but that if when formed the new one does not immediately satisfy Russian demands he will break off relations. He has also telegraphed his opinion that if compliance with the Russian demands does not result from the dispatch of troops to Kazvin it will be necessary to send 2,000 men to Tehran in order to make certain of attaining the object in view, and that in order to keep open communications 2,000 more will be needed as a reserve at Kazvin. The Treasury gendarmerie could muster 350 men if necessary, but I fear that the force sent in the event of the Persian Government's refusal of satisfaction must be so large as to make resistance hopeless if all possibility of bloodshed is to be avoided.

[45510]

No. 261.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 574.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

MISS ROSS.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz reports that Colonel Douglas proposes to march to Abadeh with about 220 men; 120 of these will then proceed to Isphahan, the rest returning to Shiraz as an escort for Miss Ross.

I have approved Colonel Douglas's proposal.

[45646]

No. 262.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 575.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 336.

Russian Minister has not yet received instructions to protest against appointment of Lecoffre, who is on his way to Tabreez.

[45647]

No. 263.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 576.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

SHOA-ES-SULTANEH'S properties.

I am informed Shuster states that he holds proof that it is untrue that any Russian mortgage exists on these properties.

A Russian subject holds the lease of one property but it is a different one from that out of which this Russo-Persian incident has mainly arisen.

[45518]

No. 264.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 281.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 15, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia. My telegram No. 279 of the 14th November.

I was told by M. Nératof this evening that a telegram had been received from M. Poklewski, reporting the resignation of the Persian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and stating that there was no prospect of the Russian demands being complied with promptly. In these circumstances, M. Nératof's personal opinion was that Russia must at once take active measures. I begged him earnestly to allow a further period of grace to the Persian Government, and pointed out that the resignation of the Persian Ministers would give Russia an excuse for doing so. Russia might declare her intention of landing troops if her demands were not satisfied within three days. M. Nératof would give no definite reply to this suggestion, but held out some hopes that his Government might adopt it. He said that he must consider the matter further, and remarked that, in the event of the period of grace being conceded, he contemplated adding a further demand, and requiring the Persian Government to remove the officials who had been responsible for the gendarmerie incident, including Mr. Shuster.

[45519]

No. 265.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 282.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 15, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I spoke to M. Nératof as instructed in your telegram No. 691 of the 14th November.

His Excellency explained to me that the Russian Government considered it absolutely essential that the house in dispute should be evacuated by the gendarmerie force. In taking possession of the property the gendarmes had disarmed the men of the Cossack brigade, and they had subsequently insulted Russian consular officials. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary for the Russian Government to effect their withdrawal. With this object in view, a detachment would, if necessary, be sent up to Tehran from Kazvin.

With regard to your suggestion that the Russian Government might formulate their complaints against Shuster, M. Nératof pointed out that, from a formal point of view, it would be difficult for them to protest against appointments such as that of M. Lecoffre to Tabreez, since such a protest would constitute an interference in the

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internal affairs of Persia. His Excellency, however, is now considering whether he might not base a demand for the dismissal of Shuster on the ground that the treasurer-general must be held responsible for the action of his own gendarmes (see my telegram No. 281 of the 15th November).

(Confidential.)

It is evident that the Russian Government consider that Russian prestige is gravely involved in the dispute over Shua-es-Sultaneh's sequestered property, inasmuch as it developed into a conflict between Shuster and his gendarmes on the one side and the Russian consul-general and the Cossack brigade on the other.

[46034]

No. 266.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 286.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 15, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

This afternoon I called upon M. Nératof, and spoke to his Excellency in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 694 of the 16th November.

M. Nératof assured me that Russia, in any steps which she might take, would do nothing to strike at Persia's integrity, and that the fundamental principles of the Anglo-Russian understanding would be kept intact, no matter what might happen.

With regard to your suggestion that Russian action might take the form of seizing Persian customs-houses, M. Nératof said that this idea had been rejected by the Russian Government after careful consideration, as it was thought that the effect of such a measure on the Persian Government would not be very serious. He considered that that Government could only be brought to reason by some more decisive action. I pressed his Excellency to allow further time for consideration to the Persian Government before ordering the Russian troops to advance on Tehran. To this his Excellency replied that it would take five days for the troops to reach Kazvin, and that in this interval the Persian Government would have ample time in which to make up its mind. I urged that, on the arrival of the Russian troops at Kazvin, he might address a last warning to the Persian Government, pointing out that a refusal of the Russian demands would entail very serious consequences, but M. Nératof declared that this course was rendered impossible by the fact that M. Poklewski had already broken off relations with the Persian Government, and that, moreover, Russia, now that she had formulated her demands, could not again approach the Persian Government without loss of prestige. A proposal that he might communicate through the Persian Legation here was also negatived. M. Nératof had remarked that the Russian demands would be raised in proportion as it was found necessary to order the advance of the Russian troops, and I accordingly enquired, as a personal suggestion, whether he thought that any useful purpose would be served by Sir G. Barclay informing the Persian Government that we had been told that if they did not immediately satisfy the present Russian demands, not only would Russian troops occupy Tehran, but the Russian Government would also insist upon fresh demands. M. Nératof said that he would have no objection to Sir G. Barclay making such a communication, no matter whether it were successful or not.

Turning to the general situation, I told M. Nératof how ardently you desired to maintain a close understanding with the Russian Government, and I reminded his Excellency of how you had always striven to the best of your power to meet the wishes of Russia. I instanced the Stokes and Lecoffre cases, and pointed out how often you had defended Russian action in Parliament when it had been attacked. I begged him to recollect that you had to take British public opinion into account. The Russian account of the present incident differed in some respects from the reports which we had received, and the task of justifying armed Russian intervention would be a very difficult one for you. Russia might have received great provocation, but the fact remained that an attempt had been made by the Persian Cossacks to prevent the property of one of the leaders in the late rebellion being confiscated. To this M. Nératof replied by repeating the explanations which he had previously given to Mr. O'Beirne. He laid special stress on the fact that no notification of the name of the person whose property was to be sequestered had been made to the Russian Legation, while implements which were the property of the Shua-es-Sultaneh's Russian tenants

had been seized. He referred to the conciliatory attitude which the Russian Government had adopted in the matter of the appointments of Mr. New and of another British subject at Ispahan, and remarked that Russia had at last been forced to take action by the accumulation of one provocation after another.

I then spoke in the sense of the two paragraphs, marked "Very Confidential," at the end of your telegram. M. Nératof assured me that there was no reason to suspect M. Pokhitonof of any intention of creating incidents, nor was there any danger of subordinate Russian officials in Persia compromising the Anglo-Russian agreement. His Excellency admitted that M. Pokhitonof might perhaps have proceeded more judiciously, but he had been placed in a position in which circumstances had forced him to act.

M. Nératof then said that he would tell me in strict confidence that orders would shortly be sent for the recall of the subordinate official who had been sent to Shua-es-Sultaneh's house, on the plea that he had exceeded the instructions which the consul-general had given him. His Excellency added that Major Stokes was also a subordinate official, and that at the present moment he was still living in Mr. Shuster's house.

M. Nératof gave me to understand in the course of our conversation that the real desire of the Russian Government is to effect the removal of Mr. Shuster. I pointed out how difficult this would now be, in view of the fact that the Medjliss had decided to remain in session permanently, but his Excellency observed that perhaps the date now fixed for the elections might be anticipated, and suggested the possibility of the new Assembly proving more amenable. M. Nératof appeared to believe that in any circumstances the Regent would remain, and as we then proceeded to discuss what would happen in the event of his resigning, I took the opportunity of warning his Excellency that His Majesty's Government could not, in any circumstances, consent to the ex-Shah's return.

When I was on the point of leaving, I asked M. Nératof to tell me frankly whether his Government had any intention of occupying Kazvin or Tehran for any length of time. I observed that a lengthy occupation would be regarded generally as a preliminary to a protectorate, and that the establishment of a protectorate would constitute a direct infringement of the Anglo-Russian agreement. He replied that the sole object of the present measures, which were of a purely provisional character, was to obtain redress for the grievances of which Russia complained. On my enquiring what satisfaction Russia would consider sufficient to induce her to withdraw her troops, M. Nératof said that the troops would be recalled as soon as the Russian Government was notified that Mr. Shuster had been dismissed. If the Persian Government conceded this satisfaction, Russia would even withdraw her demand that the gendarmes now in possession of the sequestered property should be replaced by Persian Cossacks.

[45507]

No. 267.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Stockholm, November 15, 1911.

SWEDISH officers for the Persian army.

My telegram No. 17 of the 11th November.

I am told that a warning has been addressed to the Swedish Government by the Russian Government, pointing out in a friendly and unofficial manner, that if Swedish officers were to undertake the work of organising the Persian army there might be complications, especially if they were employed in north Persia.

[46133]

No. 268.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 330.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 11, 1911.

I CALLED yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to ascertain how matters stood with regard to the latest Russo-Persian incident. At our conversation of the 6th instant, which is reported in my despatch No. 327 of the 7th instant, M. Nératof had referred only to the return by M. Poklewski of the Persian note demanding the recall of the Russian consul-general. He had said nothing about

a demand on the part of the Russian Minister for an apology for insults offered to Russian consular officials, and I was yesterday not yet aware of the contents of Sir G. Barclay's recent telegrams on the subject. I had, however, seen some press telegrams, which seemed to show that the difference between the two Governments had reached a critical point.

M. Nératof now made to me the communication which I had the honour to report to you by my telegram No. 271 of yesterday's date. He said that M. Poklewski had made the following three demands verbally of the Persian Government: That they should acquiesce in the return of their note asking for the recall of the consul-general; that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should express his regrets for insulting conduct of which the Persian gendarmes had been guilty towards certain Russian consular officials; and, lastly, that the gendarmes should be withdrawn from the house of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, which had been the scene of the dispute, and should be replaced by Persian Cossacks. The Persian Government had apparently acquiesced in the return of their note, though they stated that they regretted M. Poklewski's action in returning it. They had declined the other two demands, asking that in the first place a joint enquiry should be held into the facts.

On this point M. Nératof explained to me that the insults which the Russian Government complained of consisted in the gendarmes having pointed their rifles at two officials of the Russian consulate, who, as I understood, were passing Shoa-es-Sultaneh's house. The facts were vouched for, his Excellency said, by the two officials, and also by a Russian officer who was present. The only other witnesses who could be questioned were the gendarmes themselves, and the statements of the consular officials must be accepted.

Proceeding, M. Nératof said that M. Poklewski had reported to the Imperial Government the attitude taken by the Persian Government in regard to his demands, and that he had thereupon been instructed to present the same demands to the Persian Government in writing, and to ask for an immediate reply. He was probably carrying out these instructions on the day of our conversation (yesterday). He was further instructed that if he did not receive a satisfactory reply within two days he was to inform the Persian Government that relations were broken off, and that the Russian Government would take the measures which it thought necessary. M. Nératof added that he would tell me in confidence that the measure which the Russian Government had determined upon was the dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin as on a previous occasion. It should be of sufficient strength to permit of a detachment being summoned by M. Poklewski to Tehran which would remove the gendarmes from Shoa-es-Sultaneh's house and instal Persian Cossacks in their place, after which it would return to Kazvin.

I made no comment on what his Excellency told me beyond saying that I supposed the Persian Government would give way.

I have, &c.
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[45536] No. 269.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 12, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the increase of the Russian consular escort at Astrabad, and also respecting the presentation of a note to the Persian Government by the Russian Minister on the subject of the recent incident at Tehran.

I have, &c.
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 269.

M. Nératof to Mr. O'Beirne.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 30 octobre
(12 novembre), 1911.*

Mon cher Mr. O'Beirne,

JE crois devoir vous prévenir que, vu les pillages auxquels se livrent les Turcomans dans les environs d'Astrabad depuis la victoire remportée par Mohammed Ali Schah

sur le détachement des troupes du Gouvernement persan, et en présence du fait que la vie et les biens des sujets russes sur les lieux, ainsi que la ville même, sont sérieusement menacés par ces hordes de nomades, nous renforçons l'escorte de notre consul à Astrabad de 200 cosaques, avec deux mitrailleuses.

Je viens de recevoir un télégramme de Poklewsky m'informant que la note officielle relative à la liquidation de l'incident du conflit que vous connaissez a été remise au Gouvernement persan hier le 29 octobre (11 novembre).

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
A. NÉRATOF.

[45609] No. 270.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 16.)

Sir,

India Office, November 15, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, and in reply to say that he sees no objection to postponing the proposed survey of the country between Bushire and Shiraz until better order prevails.

I am, however, to remark that the decision to undertake the survey appears to have been given in your letter of the 26th August, and my letter of 2nd instant dealt only with the incidence of the cost, half of which the Secretary of State in Council is prepared to accept as a charge on Indian revenues, provided the Imperial Government is willing to bear the other half.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[45618] No. 271.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 577.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 16, 1911.

I AM informed that before resigning office the Prime Minister sent instructions to Shuster to withdraw his gendarmes from the property in dispute, and that Shuster replied that, as the order on which he had acted when taking possession of the property was signed by all the Ministers, he must decline to withdraw his men until the order to do so was signed in a similar way.

[45672] No. 272.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 578.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 16, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please see my immediately preceding telegram of this morning.

I learn that the Prime Minister has repeated his order to Shuster to withdraw the Treasury gendarmes. He has taken this step on the advice of the Regent. The order is given under the fiction that the Prime Minister is still in office and on the ground that, in default of a Cabinet, his sole instructions should be sufficient.

[45527] No. 273.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 16, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 281 of the 15th November.

If the Russian Government adds to its other demands a fresh one for Shuster's

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dismissal, I fear that the chances of Persia refusing to comply and of the consequent dispatch of Russian troops may be greatly increased. I have therefore written to M. Nératof to say that, in my personal opinion, it would be better, at the present stage, not to put forward such a demand.

[44775]

No. 274.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 353.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 558 of the 13th November.

You should tell Stokes that, as his appointment will clearly precipitate a conflict between Russia and Persia, and as we cannot consistently with the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention promote the employment of British subjects in the north of Persia, we cannot facilitate his appointment by accepting his resignation now.

[45516]

No. 275.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 693.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please communicate to Russian Government our hope that, in view of the Tehran telegram No. 573 of the 16th November, Russian Government will see its way to exhausting every other alternative before deciding on the dispatch of troops to Tebran.

[45519]

No. 276.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 694.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

See your telegram No. 282 of yesterday.

Following paragraph is to be treated as very confidential:—

His Majesty's Government are perfectly satisfied as to loyalty of M. Poklewski to Anglo-Russian agreement. Attitude of Russian consul-general at Tehran to the agreement causes them anxiety. They fear that he may intend to force the hand of his Government by arranging incidents. When Sir G. Buchanan returns he might urge on Russian Government that it would be most deplorable if the agreement were upset by the action of the Russian consul-general or other subordinates in Persia; the whole general policy of ourselves and Russia might thereby be embarrassed, or even diverted.

Please speak in following sense to M. Nératof:—

Although His Majesty's Government quite agree that the decision and formulation of her own demands must rest with Russia, we feel considerable anxiety as to the ulterior consequences which her action may have, especially as regards the basis of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1908. We consider that Mahomedan feeling in India might be adversely affected if Russia sent 2,000 men and occupied Tehran by force, and we think, further, that the general effect in India, especially as it coincides with the King's visit, would be prejudicial if we were to appear to consent to this action on the part of Russia. In my opinion, it would have been possible for Russia to wait until the detachment had reached Kuzvin and then formulate her demands, and, before taking any further action, to allow more time to elapse.

We ourselves, if we had had to secure redress of a grievance, would probably in the first instance seize a custom-house. I see no reason why Russia should not, if necessary, do this, and await the effect of her action before bringing further pressure to bear.

[46043]

No. 277.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 293.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

IN conversation to-day the Councillor of the Russian Embassy referred to some remarks that I had made to Count Benckendorff about the conversation which the Russian Ambassador in Vienna was reported in Mr. Shuster's letters to the "Times" to have had with the ex-Shah. The Councillor informed me that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna stated positively that he had never seen the ex-Shah or made to him any declaration whatever.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46042]

No. 278.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 294.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

I TOLD the Councillor of the Russian Embassy to-day that I was seriously concerned about Persia.

If the Russian Government were satisfied that they had grievances which demanded redress, they must, of course, formulate their own demands for redress. That was no concern of mine. If they thought that no satisfactory settlement could be reached without the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, I could urge no objection. I did not wish to suggest the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, but I mentioned it lest there should be an impression in St. Petersburg that I was prepossessed in his favour. As a matter of fact, he had given me endless trouble by his inconvenient appointments of British subjects in spite of all I could say to him.

We were, however, deeply concerned as to the possible consequences of the action which the Russian Government might take, not so much the direct consequences as the ulterior consequences. The Russian Government intended to send troops to Kazvin. They contemplated sending on from there some force to Tehran. I heard from Sir George Barclay that M. Poklevsky said that, if a force were sent to Tehran it must be a large one—some 2,000 men. This would mean an occupation of the capital of Persia. It was sure to have an effect upon the Mahomedan world, and it was a most serious thing. I would therefore suggest that, when the Russian Government had sent the troops to Kazvin, they should pause, and formulate their demands upon the Persian Government. If further pressure became necessary, why should the Russian Government not seize some of the customs, or even impound the revenues of Tabreez? This was the sort of pressure that was relevant to Mr. Shuster's action. An occupation of the capital was bound to excite Mahomedan feeling, and might react most unfavourably in India, especially if it were thought that we were in any way a consenting party to it.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[45696]

No. 279.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 332.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of an official communiqué issued to the press yesterday in regard to the recent Russo-Persian incident at Tehran and the steps taken in the matter by the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 279.

Official Communiqué communicated to Russian Press.

(Translation.)

October 31 (November 13), 1911.

WITH regard to the conflict with the Persian Government, the official information bureau makes the following communication:—

This conflict arose from the measures taken by the Persian Government for the confiscation of the property of certain partisans of the former Shah Mohammed Ali and especially of his brother, Prince Shoa-es-Sultaneh. The Persian Government informed the Russian Legation of its intention to confiscate the property of certain persons who had taken part in the struggle of the ex-Shah against the Government, whereupon the legation on its side, without protesting in any way against this principle, held it necessary to remark that the interests of Russian subjects, which might be connected in one way or another with the property owner's name, must be safeguarded in a proper manner.

Some days afterwards, on the order of the Financial Adviser, Morgan Shuster, a party of the gendarmerie just organised by him occupied the house of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, which was guarded by some Cossacks of the Persian Cossack brigade, who were posted there at the wish of the Turkish Ambassador in Tehran. This last circumstance is explained by Shoa-es-Sultaneh being a Turkish subject. Several officials entered with the gendarmes to make an inventory in the house of the Prince's possessions. The Government had not held it necessary to inform in due time our consul-general in Tehran, whose direct duty it is to protect the interests of Russian subjects. The consul-general learned by chance of the conduct of the Persian gendarmerie. He knew that the Prince had obligations to the Russian Discount Bank, which are secured on the real estate of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, and saw himself compelled to send his officials to the house and to the country estate of the Prince to protect the interests of Russian subjects and of the bank, and to charge them to insist on the removal of the gendarmes until the receipt of the required guarantees from the Persian Government. At the instance of the consular officials, who were accompanied to the spot by a small convoy of Russian Cossacks, Shuster's gendarmes were removed from the house and the country estate, whereupon the former was occupied again by Cossacks of the Persian brigade.

Shuster, who saw that he had been guilty of an incorrectness in this matter in his relations to the Russian Minister, sent his assistant to the consul-general, and only then presented to him the confiscation order, on which occasion this official, according to the opinion of the consul-general, behaved very arrogantly.

Yet before the end of his conversation with Shuster's representative, State Councillor Pokhitonoff learnt that over a hundred Persian gendarmes had again occupied the house and the garden of the Prince, having got there over a fence and forcibly disarmed and sent off the Cossacks of the Persian brigade. When afterwards the officials of the consulate-general, Petroff and Hildebrandt, returned to their quarters, which are opposite the house of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, they saw in a room over the entrance gate a number of Persian gendarmes, who dared to point their rifles with the evident intention of firing at both officials, but thanks to the accidental presence and intervention of a native officer of the Persian Cossack brigade this was prevented. (The officials heard clearly the order: "ready!" and the clacking of the charging of the rifle magazines.) The assumption that the gendarmes did not know on whom they aimed is unpermissible as both officials wore uniform and are well known at the place.

Hereupon the Persian Government, departing from all traditions, made a claim on the Imperial Legation to recall Consul-General Pokhitonoff and the two above-named officials of the consulate-general from Tehran, and indeed this claim was made in writing in two notes following one another.

On examining the incident the Russian Government confirmed the correct behaviour, suitable to the circumstances, of the consul-general in Tehran and his officials. On the other hand, it marked the openly provocative behaviour, contrary to the traditional friendly relations of both Powers, not only of the Persian gendarmerie under Shuster's orders, but of the Persian Government itself. It suffices in this connection to point to the sending of a hundred gendarmes to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's house before the conclusion of the negotiations with the consul-general (as if foreseeing a collision with the convoy of our consul), the forcible removal of the Cossacks of the Persian brigade from the said house, which had been entrusted by officials of our

consulate to them to guard, but especially the fact that the gendarmes aimed their rifles at our officials, and the sending of the two above-named notes by the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Russian Government regarded this behaviour of the Persian authorities and their Government as wholly unpermissible from the standpoint of Russia's dignity, and instructed the Imperial Minister to take up the matter verbally in a friendly way with the Persian Foreign Minister, to give him back both notes and to require:—

1. The replacing of the gendarmes in the house and on the estate of Shoa-es-Sultaneh by Cossacks of the brigade until the interests of our bank and of Russian subjects connected with the property of the Prince are fully secured; and
2. An apology for the insulting conduct of the Persians towards the officials of the consulate-general.

The Persian Government, however, rejected the explanations of the Minister and put forward a plan for a mutual enquiry into the behaviour of the officials of the consulate-general, which was naturally absolutely unacceptable, as the Imperial Government alone can judge of the correctness or incorrectness of the orders or proceedings of its officials.

In view of this the Russian Minister received instructions to make again the same demand for satisfaction on the Persian Government, and this time in writing and with the warning, that, in case the Persians do not yield forthwith, the Ambassador will break off relations with the Tehran Cabinet and the Russian Government will prepare to resort to the measures which seem needful for the protection of its interests.

According to a telegram received from State Councillor Poklewski-Kozell a note in this sense was handed on the 29th October to the Persian Foreign Minister together with a warning in the sense indicated.

[46280]

No. 280.

Note communicated by M. de Elter, November 17, 1911.

(Confidentielle.)

LE Gouvernement britannique n'ignore pas que le Gouvernement persan avait revêtu ces derniers temps, dans ses rapports avec la Russie, un caractère notoirement inamical et que la responsabilité de cette attitude doit retomber principalement sur le conseiller financier, Mr. Morgan Shuster, qui, depuis son arrivée en Perse, s'est plu systématiquement à ignorer les intérêts de la Russie.

Le Gouvernement persan a perdu du terrain et s'est trouvé, en grande partie, impuissant vis-à-vis de Mr. Shuster par suite de l'appui dont il s'est assuré auprès du Medjliss et du parti nationaliste.

Un incident regrettable a surgi dernièrement à Téhéran, provoqué par l'intention du Gouvernement persan de confisquer les propriétés des partisans de l'ancien Chah Mohamed Ali, et, entre autres, celles du Prince Shao-es-Saltaneh, dans lesquelles des intérêts russes se trouvent engagés.

Mr. Shuster, chargé d'exécuter cette mesure, y a encore procédé d'une façon provocante vis-à-vis de nous. Les gendarmes placés sous ses ordres ne se sont pas seulement permis d'occuper de force l'immeuble du Prince avant que les pourparlers à ce propos entre les représentants de Mr. Shuster et le consul général de Russie aient pris fin, et de déloger les Cosaques persans auxquels était confiée la garde de la maison, ils ont de plus visé les représentants du consulat général avec l'intention évidente de décharger contre eux leurs fusils.

De son côté, le Gouvernement persan—contrairement à toutes les traditions—s'est cru autorisé à nous adresser deux notes exigeant le rappel du consul général et du personnel du consulat général de Russie.

Jugeant ces actes inadmissibles tant au point de vue du prestige que des intérêts de la Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial a chargé le Ministre à Téhéran, premièrement, de renvoyer au Gouvernement persan les deux notes précitées et de lui notifier verbalement l'exigence de remplacer les gendarmes financiers par les Cosaques persans jusqu'à ce qu'il soit établi dans quelle mesure les intérêts des sujets russes se trouvent engagés dans les propriétés de Shao-es-Saltaneh; et, secondement, d'exiger que le Gouvernement persan fasse des excuses, par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, pour le façon de procéder des gendarmes persans.

[1524]

2 N

Contrairement à notre attente, ces exigences modérées ont été rejetées par le Gouvernement persan, et, par suite, le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé de charger M. Poklewski de renouveler ses représentations par écrit, en ajoutant que nous nous attendons à ce que nos demandes soient exécutées sans le moindre retard, et que dans le cas contraire il cesserait tous rapports avec le Gouvernement persan, et que la Russie se réserverait de prendre telles mesures qu'elle jugera nécessaires.

Aucune réponse n'ayant été reçue jusqu'ici du Gouvernement persan, notre Ministre a reçu l'ordre de cesser tous rapports avec ce dernier. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial, considérant que ses intérêts ont été sérieusement lésés et que, par suite, une pression de sa part sur le Gouvernement persan s'imposait, a décidé d'envoyer dès maintenant à Kazvin un détachement se composant de différentes armes, en laissant au Ministre la faculté d'appeler à Téhéran une force suffisante pour éloigner les gendarmes persans occupant actuellement la maison et la propriété de Shao-es-Saltaneh.

Ces mesures, nécessitées par les circonstances susindiquées, revêtent certainement un caractère purement provisoire. Aussitôt que l'incident sera clos et que des garanties quant à l'attitude correcte ultérieure vis-à-vis de nous du Gouvernement persan seront assurées, notre détachement sera rappelé en Russie.

Le compte rendu télégraphique sur la réponse, faite par Sir E. Grey à l'interpellation au Parlement à cet effet, a été très favorablement accueilli par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Nous considérons, de notre côté, que les mesures prises par nous ne sont nullement en contradiction avec le principe de notre entente avec l'Angleterre pour les affaires de Perse, et nous sommes décidés à ne pas dévier de la ligne de conduite poursuivie jusqu'ici basée sur l'esprit de solidarité complète et de coopération avec l'Angleterre.

*Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 4 (17) novembre, 1911.*

[45811] No. 281.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 579.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 17, 1911.

CAPTAIN STOKES.

Please refer to my telegram No. 558 of the 12th instant.

I note that your message to Stokes contains no repetition of the order to join his post at Simla, and before addressing him, as instructed in your telegram No. 579 of yesterday's date, I venture to point out that this omission may be interpreted by him as an encouragement to stay on here.

It is doubtful, I admit, whether Stokes would obey the order, but the message, in the mild form in which it now stands, does not seem to me to be consistent with the attitude we have observed in this matter *vis-à-vis* to Russia.

I would propose to omit the word "now," the bearing of which is somewhat ambiguous, and to add the words "he had therefore better comply with the orders of the Government of India without delay." Do you concur?

[45812] No. 282.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 580.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 17, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please see telegram No. 282 from St. Petersburg of the 15th November.

Unless Russia took over the administration here and dismissed Shuster herself, it is difficult to see how his removal could be effected.

Outside pressure is hardly likely to bring about his resignation, nor do I see any likelihood of the Medjliss allowing the Persian Government to dismiss him.

In any case, the collapse which would doubtless ensue on the disappearance (were the Russian Government to succeed in obtaining it) of this one prop of the administration would equally afford ground for intervention by Russia.

[45818]

No. 283.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 581.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 17, 1911.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative at Kermanshah:—

"The situation critical. Serious disorder probable. All communications with the interior stopped."

[45873]

No. 284.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 582.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 17, 1911.

INSTRUCTIONS have to-day reached the Russian Minister to break off relations with the Cabinet. M. Poklewsky informs me that his Government have also instructed the military authorities in the Caucasus to dispatch a detachment of troops to Kazvin immediately, this detachment to be reinforced ultimately up to 4,000 strong.

No Cabinet has yet been formed.

[45803]

No. 285.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 284.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, November 17, 1911.

MY telegram No. [?] 281 of 15th November.

Letter received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states that after careful reflection he has come to the conclusion that Russian Government cannot wait further for an answer from the Persian Government. They have sufficiently shown their spirit of conciliation by waiting so long. They must take into account Russian public opinion, which is much excited against Persia.

Orders have therefore been given for immediate departure of troops for Kazvin. Some days must elapse before they arrive there, which will give Persians further time to consider the necessity of submitting to Russian demand.

[46042]

No. 286.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 698.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 17, 1911.

SHUSTER.

We have no desire to favour Shuster, and, although I do not suggest it, it is possible that the Russian Government have formed a mistaken view of our attitude towards him. You can, therefore, make it quite clear to M. Nératof that any demand on Russia's part for Shuster's dismissal will be met with no objections by His Majesty's Government.

Reference is to my telegram No. 694 of the 16th November to Mr. O'Beirne.

[45803]

No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 699.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 17, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 279 of the 14th November.

I suppose it may be stated here that we have received assurances from the Russian Government that the troops sent to Kazvin are proceeding there subject to the same conditions as before.

[46321]

No. 288.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, November 18, 1911.

LE 29 octobre (11 novembre), année courante, le Ministre de Russie à Téhéran a remis au Gouvernement persan une note demandant satisfaction pour l'attitude des autorités persanes envers des fonctionnaires du consulat général à Téhéran et leurs procédés provocants dans l'affaire de la confiscation dans cette ville des propriétés du Prince Shoa-us-Saltaneh—affaire dont les détails se trouvent exposés dans la communication officielle publiée à ce sujet.

La note en question est restée sans réponse de la part du Gouvernement persan, ce qui témoigne de son intention manifeste de se soustraire à l'exécution de notre demande.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a, en conséquence, prescrit au Ministre de Russie d'interrompre ses relations avec le Cabinet de Téhéran et a pris des mesures pour l'envoi en Perse d'un détachement de troupes, qui doit se concentrer à Kazvine, sur la route de Téhéran.

Les mesures ci-dessus ont un caractère absolument provisoire et le détachement sera rappelé sans retard aussitôt que l'incident en question aura été réglé et les rapports avec la Perse dûment rétablis.

*Ambassade Impériale de Russie,
Londres, le 18 novembre, 1911.*

[46048]

No. 289.

Memorandum by Mr. Mallin.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 18, 1911.)

Hormuz Oxide.

THE persons concerned are—

- (a.) The Muin.
- (b.) Strick.
- (c.) Ellinger.
- (d.) Weir.

Their respective positions now seem to be as follows:—

(a.) The Muin has got the Hormuz concession for ten years from the 22nd March, 1910. We have not got the details of the bill, but it appears that the Muin has to carry out Strick's contract, which presumably means that he takes the place of the Persian Government under Strick's contract, and becomes the seller of the oxide to Strick. He is entitled to recoup himself for the oxide mined by him up to the 21st March, 1910, out of the sales to Strick, after which he is to keep 15 per cent. of receipts until the expiration of Strick's contract on the 20th March, 1915. If oxide is sold beyond the 30,000 tons going to Strick, the Persian Government is to receive 75 per cent. and the Muin 25 per cent. This presumably refers to the period between the 20th March, 1915, and the 21st March, 1920. Apparently no rent is to be paid.

It is clear that the Muin has done very well for himself. He has got an advantageous concession, and compensation for the losses occasioned by the cancellation of the concession in March 1910. It is equally clear that he has entirely disregarded the interests of Ellinger and Weir, and has, in fact, "let them (or, any rate, Weir) in" very badly.

(b.) Strick is also in an advantageous position. He has got a very favourable contract, which has just been confirmed, and we may assume that the Persian Government, in order to prevent any claim against them by Strick, will see that the Muin carries out the contract properly. Strick has undertaken full responsibility for any lawful claim which Weir or Ellinger may have against the Persian Government or the Muin, but (apart from the question whether any such claim exists) that is a matter between Strick and the Persian Government, with which we need not concern ourselves. As far as the equities of the case are concerned, there is no doubt that Strick ought to pay some compensation to Weir and Ellinger; he got 1,000 tons of oxide free from the Persian Government on condition that he took over their liabilities to Weir and

Ellinger; his agent advised him that the contract was very favourable to him, even if he had to discharge such liabilities, and now he is trying to wriggle out of his obligation by means of a technicality.

(c) and (d.) The position of Ellinger and Weir is more complicated. It is clear that they cannot now hope to get anything more under their contract with the Muin, and we are entitled to point out to them that the responsibility for that is finally due not to our iniquities, but to the action of the Muin in agreeing to carry out the Strick contract.

Under their contract with the Muin he was to sell Weir about 18,000 tons of oxide, and was not during the duration of the contract to sell other oxide to Europe or America. It appears that of this amount—

6,199 tons have been delivered and disposed of;

6,583 tons have been delivered, but not sold, owing to Strick flooding the market with the oxide which he got under his contract with the Persian Government.

5,218 tons have not been delivered, owing to the cancellation of the Muin's concession.

The claims for damages may thus (avoiding figures) be put as follows:—

Weir.—Difference between the price ultimately obtained for the 6,583 tons not yet disposed of, and the price which would have been obtained at the time when they would under normal circumstances have been sold.

Loss on profit on the 5,218 tons not delivered.

Interest, storage charges, &c.

Ellinger.—Loss of commission on the 5,218 tons not delivered.

Loss of commission on future sales, after the expiry of Weir's contract, which they were reasonably entitled to expect to receive for, say, five years.

Interest.

The question then arises from whom (if at all) are these claims recoverable.

It has always been considered, since we became aware of the terms of the contract between the Muin, Weir, and Ellinger, that an action against the first, based solely on his failure to carry out the contract during the time when he had ceased to hold the concession, would probably fail, because he would be entitled to rely on the provision contained in article 1 of the second supplemental contract, dated the 4th December, 1908, to the effect that "in the event of hindrance being raised by the Persian Government or their officials as to the shipment of oxide . . . or should the Persian Government in any way prevent the shipping of oxide, the seller and the agents for the seller shall be in no way responsible, and the buyers shall have no right to claim any damage or demand delivery of oxide, and the seller has every right to cancel the contract . . ." (This article would not bar an action by Ellinger for commission, because it is not under this contract that commission is payable to them; but such an action would fail, on the ground that no money had been received by or on behalf of the Muin on which commission was due.)

It has, however, always been assumed by us that one of the following alternatives must cover the facts:—

(1.) At the time when the Muin entered into the contract his concession had come to an end, and he had no right to make the contract and no power to carry it out. In that case an action against him would not be barred by article 1 of the second supplemental agreement, and Weir (if not Ellinger) could recover damages from him.

(2.) The Muin's title to the concession was, when he contracted with Weir and Ellinger, good, and the Persian Government had no right to dispossess him. In that case it was considered that Weir and Ellinger would have their remedy against the Persian Government.

As a result of information received from Tehran we have been strongly disposed to consider that (1) correctly represented the facts of the case, and comparatively little attention has been paid to (2), in fact we so far committed ourselves to (1) that (2) is described in a minute written on the 12th December, 1910, as an "appalling contingency" which we need not contemplate till it arose. It must, however, now be admitted that (1) fails; the Persian Government have now shown that the concession had come to an end (in fact it is becoming clear that it had not) and, therefore, it will be impossible to prove that the Muin had no right to contract with Weir and Ellinger

when he did. The Persian Government have practically admitted that they were wrong by restoring his concession to the Muin, and allowing him to compensate himself at their expense for the losses caused by its cancellation.

It now appears probable that a third alternative represents the actual facts.

(3.) The Muin's concession had not come to an end when he entered into the contract, but it was not a perpetual one, but could be cancelled at any time by the Persian Government. So long as the Muin was in undisputed possession he was entitled to enter into contracts for a reasonable time ahead. This view is supported by the fact that in a somewhat similar case of Abu Musa Colonel Cox collected a considerable body of evidence to show that a lease which did not specify the period for which it was granted was strictly, by Mahommedan law, bad, and could be cancelled by the lesser at any time.

Under these circumstances, Sir G. Barclay suggests that a claim should be put forward against the Persian Government on the ground that, not having given the Muin reasonable notice, they were bound to respect his current engagements, and that they were warned at the time that they would be held liable in damages for any losses caused to British subjects by the cancellation of his concession.

But whether (2) or (3) represents the facts there is a considerable objection to putting forward Weir's and Ellinger's claims against the Persian Government. In the case of Abu Musa we have taken a line, as against the German Government, which is directly opposed to such a contention as is proposed. We contend, in that case, that State A is not entitled to put forward a claim against State B, based on the cancellation by State B of a concession granted by it to one of its (B's), nationals, who, on the faith of such a concession, has entered into a contract with a national of State A, which contract he is unable, by reason of the cancellation of the concession, to carry out. There are two points which distinguish the case of Abu Musa from the present:—

1. That in the Abu Musa case there was no clause in the contract barring an action against the concessionaires in such circumstances.
2. That we hold in the Abu Musa case that the contract was entered into by one of the concessionaires without the consent of his partners, without which the contract was not binding on the firm; so that the German claimants had a right of action, either against the firm or against the concessionaire who entered into the contract without the consent of his partners.

It might be possible to distinguish the case on these grounds, and argue that it is only the existence of a legal remedy against the concessionaires in the Abu Musa case which debars the German claimants from any remedy against the State. I am not quite clear that this distinction is not sound; but it is a point which would require very careful consideration, as it would be very awkward if the German Government heard of the contention which we should be putting forward against Persia. I do not think it would be inequitable on our part to resist the German claim and support the English; in one case there is a legal remedy, in the other there is (so far) no remedy at all, unless we support the claim against the Persian Government. But, assuming that we could not present the claims, it appears that neither of the remedies, which we have assumed to be open to Weir and Ellinger, is applicable.

It would be extremely unpleasant to have to tell them so, and they would have some reason to be aggrieved. If any way out can be found, it would be most desirable.

As regards Ellinger, it seems that the recapture of the concession by the Muin has somewhat improved his position. The Muin must have an agent in England, and as Ellinger is still acting for him in other matters, there seems no reason why he should not get the oxide business. It appears that the Muin did approach Strick some time ago, but he declined, and as Strick is now the buyer of the Muin's oxide he obviously could not act as his agent. If Ellinger does get the business, it would at once eliminate his claim for 3,847l. 10s. future commission after the termination of the Weir contract, and would only leave his claim for 554l. 8s. and interest being commission on the undelivered 5,218 tons. As the Muin is allowed to recoup himself from the sales to Strick for the sums which he lost on this quantity, he ought to raise no objection to paying Ellinger commission on what he gets, and Ellinger's claim would thus be disposed of. The difficulty is that Ellinger is apparently very loyal to Weir, and might decline to consent to any arrangement which did not provide for settling Weir's claim.

It seems to me that Weir has a good cause of action against the Muin, not based

on the latter's failure to carry out the contract while he was deprived of the concession, but on his action in assuming the Persian Government's contract with Strick. He had contracted to sell 18,000 tons to Weir by the 1st April, 1912, and not to sell to anyone else (for Europe or America) during that period. Although he could not be sued if he lost the concession, it was his duty to carry out the contract when he regained it. He had power to cancel the contract under article 1 of the second supplemental agreement, but apparently he has never done so, and now it is too late. Thus Weir is entitled to damages for every ton of oxide sold by the Muin to anyone else before the 1st April, 1912.

There are two objections to this course:—

1. Weir would not be entitled to damages in respect of the oxide sold by the Persian Government to Strick, unless the court held that as the Muin was entitled to recoup himself for these sales at the expense of the Persian Government, he thereby placed himself in the position of having become the seller to Strick. The measure of Weir's damages would in any case be rather difficult to ascertain.

2. An attempt to sue the Muin in the Persian courts would probably result in a denial of justice, and though judgment might be recovered in England he probably has no property here on which execution could be levied. It might, however, be possible to get the Persian Government to put pressure on the Muin to induce him to discharge the English judgment; there is not much fear of driving him into the arms of the Germans, as he is bound to Strick till 1915.

Ellinger is now calling on us to stop further shipments from Hormuz *vi et armis*. It is obviously advisable, if possible, to get out of having to tell him the reason why we cannot present the claims to the Persian Government. We might tell him that the whole situation has been changed by the recapture of the concession by the Muin, and that we are not responsible for the unfortunate position in which they are placed by his betrayal of their interests. We could then make the suggestion outlined above, that Ellinger should come to terms with the Muin, and Weir sue him.

The only alternative I can see is to distinguish the Abu Musa case on the grounds suggested above, and press the claims on the Persian Government. This would, no doubt, be more satisfactory to Weir and Ellinger, and would destroy any cause of complaint against us on their part; but it would be a somewhat dangerous course.

[46055]

No. 290.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 18, 1911.

THE "chef de cabinet" of the late Minister for Foreign Affairs (who is still discharging the duties of his ministry) has visited me, and I gather from him that a favourable reply will probably be returned to the Russian note, the Persian Cabinet having no alternative but to yield to *force majeure*.

He brought me a message from the late Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Cabinet crisis, which he assured me would soon be over, was entirely responsible for the failure of the Persian Government to reply to the Russian note for so long.

As soon as a new Cabinet was formed, it would at once proceed to draw up a reply to the Russian note. If this reply were unsatisfactory to Russia the measures she contemplated would have to take their course. But if a favourable reply were to be given, there would no longer be any justification for Russia to take such action.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs would therefore be grateful if I would appeal to His Majesty's Government, on behalf of the Persian Government, to approach the Russian Government with the object of securing the suspension of the contemplated Russian action, to which, he pointed out, no term was specified in the Russian note.

Diplomatic relations between M. Poklewski and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were broken off this afternoon.

[46035]

No. 291.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 287.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 18, 1911.

NIZAM-ES-SULTANEH incident.

The press here in general treat the rumour of M. Poklewski's retirement as being well-founded. The "Novoe Vremya" recently published a violent attack on him, and in the "Retch" it is stated that the charge against him is that he has not acted energetically both in the matter of certain claims of the Russian Government against Persia and also in the matter of Russian interests in North Persia, where he has allowed concessions, refused to Russians, to be granted to foreigners.

The action of the Russian Government in sending troops is warmly applauded by the "Novoe Vremya" and the "Bourse Gazette."

[45811]

No. 292.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 356.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 18, 1911.

COMMUNICATION to Stokes.

You may make the alterations suggested in your telegram No. 579 of the 17th November.

[46112]

No. 293.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 584.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 19, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram No. 472 of 7th October.

Salar-ed-Dowleh is reported to have been again defeated by Government troops in the neighbourhood of Burnjird.

[46056]

No. 294.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 585.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 19, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

I am afraid that unless the Russian Government gave an assurance that in the event of their demands being immediately complied with the threat of the dispatch of troops to Tehran would not be used as a leverage for other demands, any action on my part in the sense indicated by Sir G. Buchanan in his telegram No. 286 of the 18th instant would be out of place.

[46054]

No. 295.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 19, 1911.

I CONVEYED to M. Kokovtsoff (this afternoon the flattering messages with which the King and you had entrusted me. It was evident that these messages greatly

pleased his Excellency, who reminded me that in his capacity of Minister of Finance he had worked with M. Iavolsky to establish the understanding between Great Britain and Russia, and assured me that he would now devote all his efforts, as President of the Council, to maintaining it. He added that he would at once communicate what I had said to the Emperor, who also warmly desired the maintenance of our understanding. I remarked that in order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding our best course was to agree to be perfectly frank with one another. To this his Excellency heartily agreed, and I then spoke to him on the subject of the situation in Persia, making use of much the same language as I had already employed in my conversation with M. Nératof (see my telegram No. 286 of the 17th November). At the same time, I asked M. Kokovtsoff what I might say in answer to the enquiry made in your telegram No. 699 of the 17th November. He replied that I might give you an assurance that the Russian Government harboured no designs of an aggressive character whatsoever against Persia. Russia's dignity, however, had been outraged by a whole series of acts of provocation, and she was bound to vindicate it. These provocations had culminated in the seizure of a property belonging to Shoa-es-Sultaneh, which had been mortgaged by that prince to the Russian Bank as security for a debt. The excited state of Russian public opinion had made it impossible for the Russian Government to act otherwise than they had done. Russia would withdraw her troops as soon as Persia had complied with her two demands, i.e., as soon as the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made a formal apology to the Russian Minister, and Persian cossacks had been installed in the seized property instead of the gendarmes. M. Kokovtsoff said that he would have no objection to your making a statement in this sense, but he pointed out that the present case differed from that of 1909, and that the precedent of the occupation of Kazvin in that year hardly applied.

I pressed M. Kokovtsoff to allow time for the occupation of Kazvin to produce its effect, and not to order the Russian troops on to Tehran immediately on their arrival at the former place. I communicated to him the substance of Tehran telegram No. 583 of the 18th November, without, however, mentioning that any request for our mediation had been made. M. Kokovtsoff eventually promised that he would delay the advance from Kazvin as suggested.

As authorised in your telegram No. 698 of the 17th November, I told his Excellency that His Majesty's Government would have no objection to Russia presenting a demand for the dismissal of Mr. Shuster. To this he replied that he had not yet spoken to M. Nératof on the question of whether, in the event of the Persian answer being unduly delayed, or of its being of an unsatisfactory nature, Russia should formulate fresh demands in addition to those mentioned above.

The language used by M. Kokovtsoff could not have been more explicit. He said that the integrity of Persia formed the basis of our agreement, and gave me his word of honour that Russia would neither violate it nor annex a single Persian province. He assured me, moreover, that Russia was having no dealings with the ex-Shah, nor had she any idea of affording him support.

[46085]

No. 296.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 198.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 20, 1911.

THE question of again lending the services of Mr. George New, a servant of the Government of India, employed in the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Tehran, to the Persian Government, had been under contemplation for some time by Mr. Shuster, who had had several conversations on the subject with Mr. King Wood, the Director of the Telegraph Department. But when Mr. Shuster put the matter before the Medjliss last month, the proposal was rejected by the committee entrusted with its examination.

I am told that the ultra-Nationalists in the Medjliss decided not to allow the engagement by the Persian Government of any more British, Belgian, or Russian subjects, and their rejection of this proposal was especially influenced by the difficulties encountered over the proposed engagement of Major Stokes.

[1524]

2 P

Mr. Shuster, however, returned to the charge with characteristic energy, and eventually on the 3rd October the Medjliss passed a Bill empowering the Minister of Finance to engage Mr. New for three years, on the same conditions as the American employes, "for the Accounts Department of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs," at a yearly salary of 4,000 tomans (say, 800*l.*).

I have the honour to enclose a copy of Mr. Shuster's letter of the 11th instant to Mr. King Wood, informing him of the decision of the Medjliss, and asking for the loan of Mr. New's services as "financial aide to the treasurer-general, to be assigned to the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs."

The Russian Government having finally agreed—though apparently with some reluctance—to the arrangement, Mr. New will probably be allowed to take up his new duties without further delay.

Mr. New's long residence in Persia and special qualifications will, I feel sure, enable him to render useful service to the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 296.

Mr. Shuster to Mr. King Wood.

Sir, October 11, 1911.
I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Medjliss has approved of my proposal to appoint Mr. G. E. New as financial aide to the treasurer-general, to be assigned to the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

Following the unofficial conversation which we had on this subject some time ago, I trust you can arrange with your director-in-chief to second him for the service above mentioned for a period of three years.

I enclose the terms of his proposed contract, and I shall be much obliged if your director-in-chief will help me in this matter, and allow Mr. New to accept the appointment offered to him as soon as possible.

With kind regards, I remain, yours very sincerely,

W. MORGAN SHUSTER,
Treasurer-General.

[46087]

No. 297.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 200.)
Sir,

Tehran, October 21, 1911.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch received from His Majesty's consul at Seistan, enclosing copies of correspondence with the local authorities respecting the alleged violation on the part of the British Indian authorities of the Baluch-Persian frontier near Piran. A paraphrase of a telegram from the Government of India to Major O'Connor is also enclosed.

I have now received a note from the Persian Government, translation of which is enclosed, requesting that the proper steps should be taken to respect the frontier line at the points in question.

In view of the instructions sent by the Government of India to Major O'Connor to the effect that they do not wish the boundary question to be reopened, I do not propose to reply to this note unless I receive instructions to the contrary.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 297.

Consul O'Connor to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 17.)
Sir,

Birjand, September 14, 1911.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 73, dated the 14th September, 1911, to your address, I have the honour to submit herewith, for your information, a copy and translation of the Seistan karguzar's letter, dated the 28th August, to the address of Mr. E. A. McManus, officiating vice-consul at Seistan, and a copy of my reply thereto.

I have, &c.
W. F. O'CONNOR, Major.

Enclosure 2 in No. 297.

Karguzar of Seistan to Mr. McManus.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

August 28, 1911.

ACCORDING to a letter which has been received in the karguzari from the Seistan Hakumat office, they (Hakumat) had sent some time ago a party of Jambaz sowars (camel sowars) under the leadership of Reza Kuli Khan and Said Khan to the Sarhad, Baluchistan, as an advance guard. The said sowars met some of the robbers and pursued them. The robbers fled to Lar and Piran hills, which is admittedly Persian territory. It is a matter of regret that the British troops at Robat, who for some time have transgressed the Kacha and Piran districts and have used them for pitching their tents, prevented the Hakumat sowars from pursuing and arresting the robbers. And as the Hakumat writes he has spoken to you personally about this; you have not assisted, and have said that, as Piran and Kacha are British territory, it was well that the Jambazes did not go there and did not interfere with those persons, and that, if he wants again to send troops to those parts, it should be with the information of the consulate. At this occasion I considered it necessary to refer you to the letter, dated the 18th Ramazan, 1324, written by the consulate to the karguzari, and to ask that you may order that the sowars may not be prevented from pursuing the rascals and robbers and from arresting them. And you may take an action that the Robat troops should not trespass in the said district, which is clearly territory of Persia.

(Usual ending.)

ASADULLAH, *Karguzar of Seistan and Kain.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 297.

Consul O'Connor to the Karguzar of Seistan.

(After compliments.)

Birjand, September 9, 1911.

I HAVE received your letter, dated the 3rd Ramazan, 1329 (28th August, 1911), addressed to Mr. McManus, and, in reply, I beg to inform you that the localities to which you refer lie outside my consular jurisdiction, and that I am therefore unable to take any action whatever in the matter.

(Usual ending.)

W. F. O'CONNOR, Major.

Enclosure 4 in No. 297.

Consul O'Connor to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) P.

FOLLOWING telegram from Foreign Office to consul, Seistan:—

[Undated.]

"No. 524 S. Lar and Piran. Your telegram No. 77 K. of the 25th August.

"As the Government of India have objections to the reopening of the boundary question, you should reply to the karguzar (in accordance with the telegraphic instructions from Foreign Office No. 69 S. of the 8th February, 1907, by which you will be guided) that the locality is beyond your jurisdiction.

"Please inform Tehran."

Enclosure 5 in No. 297.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

October 14, 1911.

ACCORDING to the official information received by the Persian Government from Khorassan, the authorities in Seistan had sent mamurs in pursuit of the Baluch brigands and for the restoration of the property plundered from the inhabitants of Nowbandan. When the mamurs reached Piran, in Persian territory, the Baluch chiefs took refuge in the Piran mountains, and the British forces there, under the plea that the place is in British territory, stopped the mamurs of the Persian Government.

Under these circumstances I have the honour to refer your Excellency to the notes addressed by your predecessors to the Persian Government, and especially to that of Sir C. Spring-Rice, dated the 8th April, 1907, in which he states: "Allow me to assure your Excellency that the Persian Government may rest assured that there is not, and cannot be, any intention whatever on the part of the Indian Government to trespass on Persian territory." Your Excellency's predecessors have often given assurances as to the non-transgression of Persian territory, and more especially it is stated in various notes that the frontier line must be fully regarded as defined in the agreement of 1896.

There is no doubt that His Britannic Majesty's Government have never had any intention of transgression on Persian territory, but regard the frontier line as defined in the agreement of 1896, and consider all claims null and void. It is, therefore, a matter of surprise that the frontier officials should have acted contrary to the good intentions of their Government by stopping the Persian mamurs from pursuing the brigands on the undisputable soil of the Persian Government.

The frontier line, as defined in the agreement of 1896, runs as follows:—

"From pillar 2 northwards the Talab River becomes the boundary to its junction with the Mirjawa River. From the point of junction it is carried by a straight line to the nearest point on the watershed of the Mirjawa range, which limits the drainage into the Mirjawa River on the north. Thence it follows the main watershed northwards to the highest point of the Kacha Kuh. From the highest point of the Kacha Kuh the line is carried straight to the highest point of the Malik Siah Kuh."

In these circumstances all the points on the eastern slopes . . . of Siah Kacha Kuh belong to the Persian Government. Kacha and Piran are two places which are undoubtedly on the eastern slope of the Kacha Kuh and in Persian territory, occupied by mistake by the British officials in charge of the British Baluchistan frontier, who have now prevented the Persian mamurs from carrying out their duty.

I have, therefore, the honour to request your Excellency to remove this misconception on the part of the officials in charge of the frontier of British Baluchistan, and to move the proper authorities to remove the English forces from the two places in Persian territory and to inform me of the result.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

[46088]

No. 298.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 201.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 21, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 178 of the 25th September, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of Diaries Nos. 5 and 6 from the British and Russian delegates lately touring on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 298.

Diary No. 5 of the Itinerary of the British and Russian Delegates from Bané through Serdesht to Soujboulak, August 3 to 14, 1911.

FROM Bané, the most southerly point reached by us, the direct road to Serdesht would be by Namashir. As, however, this, the beaten track, offered no particular point of interest, and as we considered it necessary to visit the remote but important district of Alan and to keep as near as possible on our return journey to the old frontier, we decided to travel via Alot.

August 3.—We left Bané at 10.30 A.M., being seen off by all the officials, the khans, and the population. At 1.15 P.M. we reached the village of Zerwaw, situated in the district of Deshtetal (twenty-one villages, with some 600 houses), which, though belonging administratively to Bané, is outside the neutral zone as marked on the identic map. The land-owners of Deshtetal form a separate tribe not connected with the Begzades of Bané. Leaving Zerwaw at 4 P.M., we reached the village of Siawma, our halting place for the night, at 5.40 P.M. Here we found that the commission of 1849-52 was well remembered by several of the older inhabitants, many of whom imparted to us their conviction that Deshtetal belonged to Persia. A certain Mamed Emin, of the Ikhtiar-ed-Din family, which ruled until thirty years ago in Bané (see Itinerary No. 4), further informed us that the inhabitants of Siawma were formerly Shiaks, and had only become Mussulmans, i.e., Sunnis, for fear of persecution. We understood, however, that this conversion had taken place previously to the Turkish occupation. The Mamed Emin in question also stated that many villages belonging to the Ikhtiar-ed-Dinis had been illegally seized by the present Mamed Khan of Bané, whose father, he alleged, was a simple servant of the former rulers of the place. The Turkish gendarmes accompanying us volunteered to Mamed Emin in our presence to make representations to the new kaimakam with a view of obtaining the restitution of his rights. We gathered, indeed, from our conversation with Suleiman Bey, when in Bané, that the Turks were dissatisfied with Mamed Khan—the former honorary kaimakam—whose present Persian proclivities can hardly be unknown to them, and it is not impossible therefore that a fresh repartition of landed property in that district may be in contemplation.

August 4.—We started at 9.15 A.M., and, having passed through the villages of Hamzelan and Oghal, entered again the "neutral zone" at a spot not far from the great Baloo range, of which the summit was reached at 1 P.M. From this point we could see the ravine of the lower course of the Bané River, which until the recent events formed the frontier: the right bank with the village of Kiveroo belonging to Persia, the left bank being in Turkish possession. After a most difficult descent from the offshoots of the Baloo range which form the watershed between the last-mentioned stream and the Lesser Zab just above their confluence, we reached the large and picturesque village of Alot, which belonged formerly to Rustem Khan, a relative of Mamed Khan, of Bané. The villagers explained that, though they did not actually recognise anyone as having rights of proprietorship over them, and though they now saw Turkish troops for the first time, they considered themselves under Turkish rule, as a "dakhalet" had been given on their behalf from Bané.

[1524]

2 Q

August 5.—Shortly after our morning start (7.50) we had to cross the Lesser Zab (Zey or Kialoo) by a bridge formed of willow witha. The passage of this bridge, which occupied two hours, was the most difficult of all the experiences we met with during our journey, the crossing of so large a party (our caravan at that time comprising seventy men with 110 horses and pack animals) causing it to oscillate dangerously, while the descent to it on both sides was almost precipitous. Shortly after passing the village of Guirvez we made a halt at a spring called Nawalan with the intention of passing the night at Doolkan, the residence of the local agha, but were obliged to change our plan, owing to the pressing invitation given to us by some Kurds of Bezhwa, who had come to meet us, and who gave us to understand that the agha in question was expected in their village situated at only about a quarter of an hour's distance. We accordingly proceeded to Bezhwa, where at first much kindness was shown to us, which, however, soon gave place to an attitude of much greater reserve, a change we can only attribute to the proceedings of the two Turkish officers of our escort, by whom all intercourse between our camp and the village was restricted as much as possible. It should be mentioned that shortly after our arrival a dispute arose between one of our men (a Christian) and a Turkish chaoosh, who refused to allow our tents to be pitched on the spot, which, it appears, he wanted for himself. The chaoosh even went so far as to endeavour to unsheathe his sword, but was stopped by some of the men of our escort who were standing near. As no desire was evinced by Ibrahim Effendi (the senior lieutenant in charge of the Turkish escort) for an enquiry, and as such enquiry could in any case have served no useful purpose, we on our side allowed the matter to drop. We had further great difficulty in finding fodder for our horses, and had in fact to procure a supply secretly, the villagers, we were given to understand, being unwilling to furnish provisions to the Turks, and unable therefore to sell to us openly.

August 6.—Spent in Bezhwa. We had a visit from Ibrahim Agha, the chief of the Alan Kurds, an old man remembering well the stay in Alan of the first mixed commission. He told us that his clan, with the two others living between the Lesser Zab and the frontier range, viz., the Melkari and Beradji, formed one large tribe called Süesni, affiliated to the Mukris and speaking the same dialect. Ibrahim Agha willingly gave us the information we asked for, but, speaking as he did always in the presence of Turkish officers, was rather reticent as to his own affairs, though, from the fact of our invitation by his men, as well as from his complaints about the suspension of the salary which he used to draw from the Persian Government, &c., we could understand that he was far from being reconciled with the change of régime. We learned from the villagers that the Turks first came to Alan five years ago in the autumn, and that some 100 men had been stationed at Beytoosh, with some sixty at Doolkan, but had since been recalled. Mohammed Fazil Pasha had himself visited Alan, coming from Serdesht. We ascertained, further, that the Lesser Zab formed, until the Turkish occupation, the frontier of Alan, this latter district numbering some twenty villages, also that a Persian custom-house existed until 1906 (of which the chiefs were successively Mirza Abdullah, Mirza Ibrahim, and Mirza Ma'arof) in the village of Beytoosh, and that the Teyet bridge was considered to be the extreme point of Persian territory. It is noteworthy that the villagers whom we met on the road seemed to know very little about the localities situated beyond the rivers of Kiveroo and the Lesser Zab, always pointing out to us that it was Turkey.

August 7.—We started from Bezhwa at 8.15 A.M., beginning our ascent of the range of Bendi-Roo immediately after leaving the village. At 9.55 A.M. we reached the top of the pass of Howmyl, from which point an extensive panorama opens out: to the south, the amphitheatre of mountains dominating the Lesser Zab, with the gardens of Doolkan and Beytoosh on the right bank; to the north, the unbroken mountain chain, called in Persian "Zendjiré," of the old frontier with the snowy Kandil. The villagers whom we met at the summit of the pass pointed out to us the old frontier without hesitation. After a very difficult descent of one and a-quarter hours we halted at the village of Aspénéza, where we were told that Mohammed Fazil Pasha had collected some 100 toman each from the aghas for the construction of barracks in Serdesht, the aghas themselves subsequently exacting double the said amounts from their "cayet" (subject) Kurds. The villagers in Aspénéza, as in many other places in the Serdesht district, were, on the whole, of the opinion that it was better for them before the Turkish occupation; the reason, as far as we could discover, being that the Persians, in their dealings with the natives, were much more courteous and less arbitrary than the Turks. Continuing our journey at 1.5 P.M. we passed through the village of Süéroo, forded the Kazan River, and arrived at Serdesht at 3.50 P.M., being met by the kazi, acting for the

kaimakam, the officers of the garrison, and a crowd shouting "Long live the Sultan," and flying Ottoman flags. We were begged to pitch our camp outside the town, our tents during the period of our stay being closely watched by the patrols, and, although we ourselves were hospitably entertained to dinner by the kazi, those of our escort who endeavoured to go to the market were invariably brought back by the Turkish soldiers; the authorities insisting, as in Sulduz, on taking upon themselves the charge of all intercourse with the population.

The head-quarters of the 107th Regiment had been transferred to Sulduz just previously to our arrival in Serdesht, one "taboor" only of that regiment, under command of Mahmoud Faiz Effendi, Kol-Aghassi, and a Kurd by birth, remaining in the town. There are large barracks, built by Mohammed Fazil Pasha, and occupying a central position, with the Turkish flag flying over the entrance. One of the gendarmes who had accompanied us from Bané accepted a gratuity on taking leave of us in Serdesht. The money was shortly afterwards returned to us by an officer, with the explanation that the gendarme in question had gone to the kazi and stated that he had received a sum of money from us for some purpose unknown to him; the real facts of the case, as we pointed out to the officer, being that a gratuity had been given to him by us, not only in Serdesht, but also in Bezhwa, where he informed us that he was unable to accompany us further, as he was without means to defray his expenses.

While at Serdesht we were informed that a duly-qualified kaimakam was expected there before long, and learned later on that he had already left Mossul.

August 8.—Before leaving Serdesht we visited a spot overlooking the right bank of the Lesser Zab, and took note of the villages situated on the slopes of the Kurtek mountain on the other side of the river, now under Turkish occupation. A villager whom we met on the road informed us in the course of conversation that the Persians were much less rough in their dealings with the people than the Turks, but it was significant that, on perceiving the approach of some Turkish soldiers, he immediately broke out into the customary phrases of the benefits bestowed on the population by the Ottoman rule. We left Serdesht at 5.15 P.M., making almost due west for Kani-resht, on the old frontier. Some indication of the feeling of the population in this part of the country may possibly be found in the statements made to us on the road by a Melkari Kurd from Béuran, who said that he was strongly in favour of the former patriarchal rule of the hereditary aghas, his clansmen, whose power the Turks were trying to break. "There are no more aghas left," he constantly repeated to us. After a ride of some three hours, during which darkness had set in, we found that we had lost our way, and it was with much difficulty that we succeeded in reaching a Kurdish summer encampment. The reception accorded to the officers of our Turkish escort by the occupants of the "yaila" was far from friendly, and neither words nor blows on the part of the former could induce them to furnish a guide. Our own intervention, however, proved more successful, and we arrived at Kani-resht at about 11 P.M., only to find that our caravan had remained at Béura, thus entailing on us the necessity of a further ride in the night of some three-quarters of an hour.

August 9.—We ascertained at Béura that the village lay exactly on the road between Serdesht and Turkey. As this road is extensively used for the passage of Ottoman troops, it may possibly account for the fact that the inhabitants (Kurds of the Melkari clan), though very civil and obliging towards ourselves, showed no signs of welcome to our Ottoman escort. Here we had occasion to witness the somewhat summary methods adopted by the Turkish officers, this time towards their own troopers. Starting at 9.20 A.M., we reached, after thirty minutes ride, Kani-resht (our proposed halting-place the previous night), and undertook an ascent of the mountain of Abul-Fath, situated on the frontier itself. The Turkish officers had at first objected to our taking men of our escort with us, pointing out that the mountain had at all times been Turkish territory. Having explained, however, that the boundary could pass only by the line of the watershed, we succeeded in overruling this objection. From the top of Abul-Fath, which we reached after one hour and a-half's climb, we had a fine view of the perfectly level plain of the Turkish district of Pishder to the west, of the continuous range of frontier mountains with the mighty Kandil to the north. We could further see quite distinctly the easy pass of Kani-resht beneath us to the south, occupied at that time by Turkish soldiers living in tents, and the Turkish fort of Kala-Dizé (otherwise called Hamidiéh) at a curve of the Lesser Zab.

Having descended the mountain we continued our journey at 1 P.M., passing on our left at 1.45 P.M. the village of Kohne-Mashk, where a Persian custom-post existed until 1906. At 3.30 P.M. we arrived at Mala Sheikh, the residence of Hamzé-Kasim, chief of the Malkari clan, who happened to be absent from home. Here again we were

on the slopes of the heights overlooking the right bank of the Lesser Zab. Having started at 5.5 P.M. from Mala Sheikh by the Tirkesh road, we crossed again at 6.30 P.M., near the village of Zeiva, the watershed between the Kialoo (Lesser Zab) and Vazné rivers, and passing through Divalan (7.30 P.M.) reached at 8.25 P.M. the village of Aghalan, inhabited by the Melkari Kurds. Soon after our arrival three Turkish sowaris with their arms appeared on the hill where our tents stood, and began to stroll about among our men. We immediately sent our ghulams to the village to request Ibrahim Effendi (the senior of the two second lieutenants accompanying us) to come and see us. On Mirza Effendi appearing instead, we explained to him that, having received permission to travel with our own escort, there was no need to set a Turkish guard over us. We added that we were the more astonished at this proceeding as the soldiers had come without any previous intimation, and as nothing of the kind had yet taken place during our journey. Mirza Effendi, admitting that he could not always understand the orders given by his colleague, dismissed the men, having explained to them that their sole duty was to patrol the neighbourhood of the camp and not to allow strangers to enter it. It may perhaps be conjectured that the reasons of the special precautions taken by the Turks on this occasion at Aghalan was to prevent us from obtaining information as to the gold mines situated in the vicinity. These mines, as far as we could ascertain, were not being worked just now, though we were told that in the summer of 1907, when a Turkish detachment from Lahidjan was at Aghalan, digging for gold was done by the soldiers. We had occasion while in camp to speak to some villagers of Nowchoovan (situated on the Vazné River), who seemed to be pleased with the decrease of the aghas' power, and who said that they had very little contact with the Turks, their village being situated out of the line of the latter's communications. We learned afterwards in Vazné that Aghalan, as well as Serdesht itself, was in 1907 occupied for some time by Karani Agha, chief of the Nureddini tribe (Bilbass), his own residence being in Turkish Pishder.

August 10.—We started from Aghalan at 10.10 A.M., and after some twenty minutes' ride forded the Vazné River, and then, by the easy passes of Kodalan and Séharé, entered at 1.35 P.M. the high green plateau of Vazné, surrounded by ranges of mountains and consisting of two converging valleys situated at right angles to each other. At 3.10 P.M. we reached the end of a second valley, and put up our tents close to a large encampment of the Ka-Khydran clan of the Bilbass tribe, of which the chief is Agha Baiz, who readily gave us information concerning the nomads near Kandil. He is a grandson of Ka-Osman, who lived in the time of the first commission, and professed to have always been a Turkish subject. Besides the Ka-Khydran, Vazné, in its lower part, is occupied by the Mamash-ibné clan of the Bilbass tribe, who also have their winter quarters in Turkish Pishder.

There is no pass called "Vazné," the gorge leading to Pishder bearing the name of Bunin. This road seems to be very little frequented, the Turks always preferring the Kani-resht pass (see above) for their communications between Serdesht and the vilayet of Mossul, while Lahidjan is connected with Revanduz by the Zinvé-Sheikh pass (*vide infra*).

August 11.—We left our encampment at Vazné at 9.50 A.M., and passed the village of Alwatan at 11.25 A.M. After a most picturesque descent by slopes thickly covered with oak with the snowy Kandil before us we reached the valley of Gor-Omar, lying on the right bank of the Lesser Zab (12.25 P.M.). We then followed the streams of Khydrava and Prdanan, western tributaries of the Zab, and halted (2.20 to 4.20 P.M.) at the rather poor hamlet of Prdanan, of which the inhabitants belonging to the Mangur clan of the Bilbasses expressed themselves as dissatisfied with the Turks, "with whom there was always too much giving orders." At 5.30 P.M. we arrived at the encampment of Baiz Pasha, near the village of Tirkesh. Baiz Pasha, to whom the latter village belongs, is the chief of the Mangurs. At some distance from the encampment we came into sight of certain horsemen who had evidently been sent to meet us, but Mirza Effendi, riding on ahead, did not allow them to approach, and took them forward with himself. We were received in a kind manner by Baiz Pasha at the entrance of his tent, our host being one of the first Persian aghas who went over to Turkey, and the services rendered by him to his new masters have been highly appreciated by the Ottoman Government, which has conferred on him the title of "Pasha," and has raised him to the rank of the chief of the powerful clan of Mangurs (some 3,000 families) in place of Bapir Agha, representative of the elder branch, who, having remained faithful to Persia, has now been obliged to take refuge in the eastern part of the Soujboulak provinces. Baiz Pasha was loud in his expressions of loyalty and gratitude to the Turks, and on the

morning of the following day put on his decorations and inspected the sowaris of our Turkish escort drawn up in his honour, all ranks presenting arms. Many of Baiz Pasha's relatives came to meet us at Tirkesh, and, according to his own assurances, he could, at any moment, get together some 4,000 horsemen, of whom about 250 would belong to his own family. A Turkish secretary, son of a Turkish officer, is staying with the pasha, who is illiterate and speaks only Kurdish.

The wants of the Turkish soldiers were well attended to in Tirkesh, but we ourselves had the greatest difficulty in getting fodder and provisions for our caravan, the villagers refusing to sell us anything without their agha's permission, nor, for some reason or other, did even the orders of the latter prove effective.

The pasha told us that Tirkesh, with its district called Mergan, was his property, and that he never left his home. We ascertained, however, that he used to visit Soujboulak, where he was on good terms with certain of the governors (*e.g.*, Ijlal-ul-Mulk, now Governor of Urmi), and had subsequently made a long stay in Turkey, having been obliged to fly from Persia owing to conflicts with the Government. It was the advance of the Turks only which enabled him to return to Mergan. The relations entertained by the Turks with Baiz Agha (now pasha) are of long date, and among the services rendered by him to them, and alluded to above, may be mentioned the very important one of the reduction to submission—some twenty years ago—of the rebellious chiefs in Pishder, in Turkish territory.

It is worth while to note that since the time of the first commission the Mangurs seemed to have considerably pushed on to eastwards, and now even have their winter quarters on the Persian side of the frontier range.

August 12.—We started at 9.30, and, after a ride of an hour, forded the Lesser Zab, containing, even at this part of its course, a considerable volume of water. Following a narrow valley lying to the north of the larger valley called Naaleini-Mangur (also situated on the left bank of the river), and then the stream of Guéda, we reached at 1.55 P.M. the village of Kara-Khydyr, where Lahidjan begins. At 2.50 we made a halt at the pleasant enclosure of Dai-Shaikh-Balakan, surrounding the tomb of one Molla Séman and his sister. Here we had a visit from three brothers, proprietors of the adjoining Mamash villages, who, we saw, would evidently prefer to return to Persian rule.

Continuing our journey at 5 P.M. we reached at 6.10 the village of Keli-Sipan, at the opening to the extensive plain of New Lahidjan, watered by the stream of Avazburn. This stream, after its confluence with that of the Laven (watering Old Lahidjan) forms the big Kialoo (Lesser Zab) River. After a visit to an ancient stone monument standing near Keli-Sipan, we crossed the plain and reached at 8.20 P.M. the large but poor Mamash village of Pasvé, which has acquired such considerable notoriety since the time of the Turkish invasion. Pasvé itself seems to be in great decay owing to the fact that, the Turkish occupation having extended much further to the east, its centre has now been transferred to Sulduz. Instead of the eighteen battalions with artillery stationed there at the time of Mohammed Fazil Pasha we found one or two companies of the 107th Regiment, under command of two lieutenants, Abdullah and Sheikh Salih Effendis, the former of whom we had met in Sulduz. These officers informed us that Pasvé was a very unhealthy place, and that, at the time of Mohammed Fazil Pasha, no less than 2,500 soldiers had died there of typhus. We may perhaps be excused for feeling a certain satisfaction on learning while at Pasvé that Reshid Effendi, commander of the taboor stationed at Rahdane, who showed us such incivility during our visit to the latter place, had been recalled, the said recall being attributed by the population generally to our representations. But, however this may be, we find on this occasion certainly no reason to complain of any lack of kindness or assistance on the part of the officers of the Pasvé garrison.

There is in Pasvé a Persian brick fort, standing on a hill, but which has evidently no importance whatever from a military point of view. The soldiers are housed in most inferior quarters, and even those of the officers are dirty and wretched beyond description.

A Turkish Government telegraph is working in Pasvé, and we ourselves sent two telegrams to Constantinople, being given official receipts. The line goes over the Zinvé Sheikh pass to the Turkish township of Rayat, from which place, as we were informed, the telegraph office has been lately transferred to Galalé.

August 13.—In the morning we had a visit from Aziz Agha, son of Karani Agha, chief of the Mamash Kurds. The young man invited us to visit his father in Shavala, but we were obliged to decline the invitation, partly on account of want of time and partly to avoid casting suspicion on Karani Agha. The latter's father, Mamed Agha

Mamash, was one of the Turkish partisans, but Karani Agha himself was against them from the beginning, and even tried to stop by force in the village of Ushnuzeng the first Turkish detachment under command of Abdurrahman Effendi. He, Karani Agha, secretly dispatched to Pasvé a mirza of his to inform us that he was the writer of the anonymous letter which was handed to us in Soujboulak, containing a historical résumé of Persia's rights on Lahidjan. Though recognised by the Turks as chief of the Mamashes, Karani Agha seems to be no favourite of theirs. We learned subsequently that the latter were supporting Karani Agha's rival, named Hamzé, son of Séman, belonging to a junior line, as is the case with Baiz Pasha, of the Mangurs. We saw afterwards a village on the Lavan River, called Gaphasan, the property of Karani, which had been completely destroyed by Baiz Pasha and Hamsé Séman about a year ago. Later on we heard that Hamzé, who had gone to Turkey to establish his claim on certain villages, had returned to Lahidjan, bringing with him the Kaïmakam of Erbil, who was instructed by his Government to act as mediator between the two rivals, the Kaïmakam of Sulduz declining to intervene, being desirous we understood of showing an attitude of impartiality.

In view of the hardship and severe work entailed upon our men during the journey through Kurdistan, we decided to give them a rest in Soujboulak before continuing our itinerary, and took the road to that place over Sulduz, this being a little longer, but enabling us to pass once more and by another direction through the latter important district. We should, moreover, this time be accompanied by our own escort, which, it will be remembered, was on the first occasion prevented from travelling with us.

We left Pasvé accordingly at 11 A.M., going due north, and passing by a grave in which twenty-five soldiers of one taboor, who had died in one day during the typhus epidemic, were buried. At 12.27 we reached the watershed between the Kialoo, flowing into the Tigris, and the head-waters of the Gadir Chai, running into the Lake Urmî. Following the course of the Baizova River, and passing the villages of Gylvan (2 P.M.) and Balykchi (2.55 P.M.) we debouched into the large Sulduz valley, reaching Néhadé at 3.30 P.M.

We again missed meeting the kaïmakam (civil), who, in company of the Turkish consul in Soujboulak, had gone to Urmî, for the purpose, we had reason to believe, of inspecting certain matters in connection with the Ottoman consulate in that town. At Néhadé we were received by the commander of the 107th Regiment, Mamed Sabri Bey, with rank of kaïmakam. The head-quarters of the regiment had been transferred from Serdesht to Sulduz shortly before our arrival, a fact which shows the increasing importance given by the Ottomans to that district. The military forces in Néhadé consisted of one "kadro-holuk" of infantry and a mountain battery (five guns), under command of Yuz-bashi Roshid Effendi, an Arab by birth.

Néhadé is a big village of some 900 houses, of which 120 are Jews and 80 Nestorians, and belongs to the Karapapakli Kahn Roshid-es-Saltané. We met this gentleman in the presence of the Turks, and had occasion to see that he was treated rather contemptuously. We declined R. S.'s offer to visit him in his house, fearing to excite suspicions on the part of the Turks.

Some Mussulman villagers with whom we spoke in Sulduz were rather in favour of the Turks, on the ground apparently that the latter were curtailing the power of the aghas. A story was told us of the arrest of Nejef Kuli Khan (the chief of all the Karapapaklis) by the kaïmakam for having beaten one of his servants. The Christians, on the contrary, disliked the authoritative methods of the Turks with the predominance of the military, and appear to incline towards the Persians. The khans, on their side, bitterly complained of their degradation, and accused their new masters of inciting their rivals against them.

August 14.—We left Néhadé for Soujboulak at 8.15 A.M., taking the upper road which passes along the skirts of the range (Ferenghi Daghi) bounding the Sulduz plain to the north. We passed at 10 A.M. between the villages of Djirtava to our right and Begun-Kulé to our left, reaching at 11.45 the large village of Mamed Shah, situated in a transverse gorge on a south-eastern tributary of the Gadir Chai. Here we were guests of the local khan called Mamed Ali Djan Ahmadli, who did not conceal his dislike and fear of the Turks, and who, producing some old firmans given to his grandfather by the Russian authorities for bravery and services rendered during the conquest of the Caucasus, professed to consider himself entitled to Russian protection.

Continuing our journey at 3 P.M. we reached, after forty minutes, the village of Kazi Gol, being met on the outskirts by Abdul Rahman Gazi, its proprietor, belonging to the family of the well-known Kazi-Pettah of Soujboulak. The old man was full of indignation against Hamzé Séman (*vide supra*), who, taking advantage of the

troubles consequent upon the Turkish advance, had seized his village and had held it during four years, and it was only a few months ago that he had been reinstated in his rights by the Kaïmakam of Sulduz, though no compensation had been exacted for the damages caused by the usurper. Shortly after Kazi Gol (near the stone called Berdé Andgir), Mirza Effendi with his men took leave of us. We asked two shepherds, who we met near this spot, where the frontier was, their answer being a gesture extremely expressive of their inability to give the information required.

At 6 P.M. we passed the village of Kahrizé, and, after a somewhat long descent, reached Soujboulak at 7 P.M.; the Government of that place being, we found, in the hands of a personal servant of Sardar Mukri, the governor, who was himself collecting troops in Bookan to march against the Khan of Sakkiz, the latter having thrown in his lot with Salar-ed-Dowleh.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

Tabreez, October 5, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 298.

Diary No. 6 of the Itinerary of the British and Russian Delegates from Soujboulak through Old Lahidjan, Ushnu, Deshtebil, Mergover, Desht, Tergever, and Inchkésu to Urmî, August 18 to 30, 1911.

WE stayed at Soujboulak three days completing our information as to the districts through which we had been travelling. Before our departure we had a visit from one of our Sulduz acquaintances, who gave us some details as to the process by which that district had been brought under Turkish occupation. According to our informant (Mamed Ali Khan), dissensions having arisen among the Karapapakli khans themselves, the chiefs of the tribes of Shemseddin, Saral, Djan-Ahmedli, Chakhirli, and Terkavun went to Ferman Ferma, at that time Governor-General of Soujboulak, with whom they lodged a complaint against Nejef Kuli Khan Amir Tuman, the then Governor of Sulduz. The latter, fearing the consequences of this step on the part of the khans, gave an invitation to the Turks to come to his village, Chiyané. This was responded to by the latter, who sent some fifteen men under Ahmed Effendi, this being the beginning of the Turkish advance in Sulduz, which has ended in the occupation of the whole of the valley of the Gadir Chai.

August 18.—We left Soujboulak at 9 A.M., and after half-an-hour's ride passed the confluence of the two tributaries forming the Soujboulak River. The right tributary, called the Chomi-Hamzéava, derives its name from the village of Hamzéava, situated in the gorge at some thirty minutes' distance from the point of junction. The latter village is now in the hands of Baiz Pasha's son, Suleiman Agha, and, as it is considered to be under Turkish occupation, we had previously arranged with Mirza Effendi that he should join us there with the Turkish escort. As, however, we saw no signs of the latter's presence, we decided to continue our journey, which led us by the left tributary of the Soujboulak River, called the Chomi-Delibokr. At 10.50 A.M. we came into sight of the half-ruined village of Beyram-Shah, which nominally still belongs to Persia; then re-entering the zone of Turkish occupation, we reached at noon the village of Dehbokr, situated somewhat to the left of the main road going over the Meidan pass. We met with a friendly greeting on the part of the inhabitants, who informed us that the proprietor of the village, Mamed Agha, an uncle of Baiz Pasha, was very much dissatisfied with the Turks, and that he was sending some men to support Sardar Mukri against Salar-ed-Dowleh. The approach, however, of our Turkish escort, which at this time came up with us, at once put a stop to all further confidences on their part.

Continuing our journey at 3.35 P.M. we made for the pass of Meidan above referred to, this being the shortest road between Lahidjan and Soujboulak. As we proceeded up the gorge we had on our right the ranges of Spilka and Shivehzi, and on our left those of Mergé and Shilonova, ending in the solitary and conspicuous peak of Choghantoo.

This latter summit deserves special notice, as the watershed formed by it had at one time been proposed by the Turks (during the joint commission of Zeki Pashu and Ihtisham-es-Saltané) as the new frontier. The importance given to Choghantoo by the Ottomans is still remembered by the Dehbokri kurds camping in the gorge, who informed us that coal was buried on its summit by Dervish Pashu, though this

may have been confused by them with the marking of the astronomical point. These Kurds further informed us that their village of Shīnava originally belonged to Hamad Agha Shashan, nephew of Shudja-ul-Mulk Dehbokri, but had now been seized by Hamadé Bapir Mangur.

We reached the summit of the pass at 5:30 p.m., and then began the descent into Lahidjan, following the stream flowing from the eastern slopes of the Choghantoo, which stream lower down takes the name of Avazhurn, and then, together with the Laven, flowing from the Kandil range forms the river of Kialoo (Lesser Zab). We had on the left the ranges of Kala Koka, Djumeilan, and Halawna, and on our right that of Ramand. At 6:45 p.m. we passed by an encampment of Mamash Kurds, whose chief, Rasul Agha, sent us a guide, who informed us that his master preferred Persian rule to that of the Turks. We also saw on the road the present occupier of a village called Awshin, who told us that his brother, supported by the Turks, had expelled him from the village of Legbin. Passing by this latter village at 7:45 p.m., we discerned on our right (8:55) the village of Khurwindj, of which the proprietor, we were told, was a Persian partisan. It may be noted as bearing on this latter point that Mirza Effendi, who stayed there over night, was full of the difficulties he had met with in obtaining fodder and provisions. The night was spent by us at Keli-Sipan, the village through which we had passed when on our way to Pasvê, and belonging to Séman, the father of the well-known Turcophil chief, Hamzé Mamash (see Itinerary No. 5).

August 19.—We started at 9:20 a.m., and, leaving on our right the Zeva-kew mountain, descended over a range of hills into the extensive Lahidjan plain, stretching westwards towards the Kandil range (the old frontier). At 11:55 we forded the Avazhurn (otherwise Avazhêrn, Avazhê-zhurn), and reached at 12:30 p.m. the village of Gaplasan, where only six houses of a former sixty-six are left, the remainder having been completely destroyed (see Itinerary No. 5).

The Laven, on the left bank of which Gaplasan is situated, forms a boundary between New and Old Lahidjan, the former being inhabited by the Mamash and the latter by the Piran Kurds. We crossed the river, and forty-five minutes later reached the village of Shīnava, the principal summer encampment of the Piran tribe being close by. Here we were shortly afterwards visited by Mamed Emin Agha, the chief of the Piran tribe, who came for that purpose from Scidava, another village of his situated immediately under the frontier range. He is a man of some fifty years of age, of very pleasant manners, and well read in the Persian classics. We made the acquaintance of three of his sons, of whom two wore Turkish decorations given them by Vedjid Pasha, the first Turkish commissioner, who having committed suicide owing, it appears, to certain Palace intrigues, was subsequently replaced by Zeki Pasha. Our host endeavoured to prove to us that Lahidjan was originally a Turkish possession, and expressed his complete contentment with Ottoman rule. He spoke with great bitterness of the Persians, the reasons of this antipathy of his being, as far as we were able to ascertain from other sources, as follows:—

Owing to certain conflicts with the Governor of Soujboulak the Piran tribe some twenty years ago, when Amir Nizam was Pishkar of Azerbaijan, had crossed over to Turkey, with the result that the villages of Old Lahidjan were immediately handed over by the Persians to the Mamashes. On the return of the Pirans to their homes after the settlement of their dispute with the Persians they found that they were unable to regain possession of the villages, occupied as above stated by the Mamashes. Hoping to effect this object with the help of the Ottomans, Mamed Emin Agha declared himself their partisan from the very beginning of their advance. There is no doubt that together with Baiz Pasha and Hamzé Séman he is one of the principal supporters of Turkish pretensions, but it should, nevertheless, be mentioned that he greatly complained in our presence of not having yet recovered his villages, as also of a lack of attention on the part of his protectors, from whom he had not even received a decoration.

Shīnava is a very important place, being situated on the road to Revanduz. The entrance to the pass of Zinvé-Sheikh, through which all the Turkish troops have entered Lahidjan, lies close to the village, which itself is situated within three hours' distance of Rayat, the nearest Turkish town. The telegraph line with its terminus in Pasvê passes by Shīnava. A Turkish battalion was further stationed for a considerable time in the place. There is a ruined Persian fort on the hill of Shīnava, and the traces of a second one are still to be seen on the hill of Mootava-tépé, barring the entrance to the pass. The Persian view of the Lahidjan question will be found in Karani Agha's letter anonymously sent to us when in Soujboulak, translation of which is herewith annexed (see Itinerary No. 5).

August 20.—Our original intention was to proceed by Zinvé Sheikh to Rayat and then along the Turkish side of the frontier to the pass of Kela-shin, making our way to Ushnu through the latter. As the tenour of our instructions, as communicated to us in the telegram of the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople of the 7th July last, enabled us to travel on purely Turkish territory as well as in the contested zone on condition of not being in that case accompanied by our own escort, we intimated to Mirza Effendi our intention to take the above-mentioned route. The latter in reply stated that, before giving his assent, he would first of all have to consult his own instructions, and these, on being produced, proved to be a copy of an order signed by Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, simply confirming our right to travel in the *status quo* zone with both our own and the Turkish escort. Mirza Effendi, insisting on the fact that nothing was said in the paper concerning our travelling in Turkish territory, informed us that he was, in consequence, unable to comply with our wish. It was to no purpose that we pointed out that the order was to be understood as merely supplementary to the original permission accorded to us to visit both sides of the frontier, that it bore only on the escort question, and that the Turkish officers themselves had on several occasions spoken of our right to travel wherever we chose. Being unable to induce Mirza Effendi to depart from his original decision, and seeing the uselessness of further discussion, we sent a telegram via Pasvê to the British Embassy in Constantinople, requesting that additional instructions might be furnished to our Turkish escort. The telegram, though written in Turkish at our dictation by Mirza Effendi himself, proved afterwards to have been imperfectly transmitted, and, as in any case a reply could only have been received after considerable delay, we sent a special messenger to Urmī, begging the Turkish consul in the latter town to help us in our difficulty. As it was inadvisable to delay our journey any longer than it was possible we decided to push on, and on the arrival of the permission required to avail ourselves of it at some other point.

Previously to continuing our journey northwards we decided to visit the village of Khané, situated at some 25 minutes ride from Shīnava, at the entrance of the gorge leading to the Zinvé Sheikh pass. Khané has acquired some notoriety, owing to the fact that a Persian custom-house existed there formerly, and that M. Leleux's attempt to transfer it to Tamarchian, a little further to the west, was the ostensible motive of the first appearance of the Turks in Lahidjan (September 1905). The custom-house in question was worked for a period of four years, the names of its chiefs, as ascertained by us in Soujboulak, being as follows: (1) Hadgi Ali Kōr; (2) Mirza Abdullah, son of Kaka Agha; (3) Mirza Khydyr, father of M. Maaruf; (4) Mirza Abdul-ali-Khan; (5) Mirza Rafaat. It was the latter, now living in Urmī and since said to have acquired a Turkish passport, who was in charge of the construction of a new building, and we enclose herewith a copy in translation of his report to the director of the customs in Urmī, dated 23rd Djowza, 1323, together with a copy of a letter bearing the seal of our host in Shīnava, Mamed Emin Agha, which, it will be seen, furnishes an incontestable proof of the recognition by him of the supremacy of Persia in that district at the time of the Turkish advance, the news of which was immediately reported by him to Urmī (see Annex No. 4).

Notwithstanding the repugnance evinced by Mirza Effendi on our announcing to him our intention of visiting Khané we adhered to our decision, but, to avoid the possibility of complications, did not proceed further up the pass. Khané, which has an excellent spring close by and belongs to Mamed Emin Agha, is now in ruins. Hard by were some Piran Kurds grazing their cattle, who told us that the inhabitants were obliged to desert their homes owing to the lawless ("na-haqq") proceedings of the Turkish soldiers shortly after the latter began to use the Zinvé Sheikh pass as a military road. The names of the head officials in charge of the local Persian custom-house were still familiar to the villagers. Starting from Khané at 10:30 a.m. we crossed the telegraph line, which is in good order, and then, proceeding northwards by the offshoots of the Kandil range (here called Dadawan), subsequently passed the villages of Selkava (11:15) and Kalakin (11:35). At 11:55 a.m. we crossed the Laven River close to where it issues from the gorge, and re-entered at this point the territory of the Mamashes. At 12:40 p.m. we passed on our right the village of Khaldar belonging to Sheikh Kemal-ed-Din, a person highly respected by the Kurds. This sheikh is said to have lived formerly on his property situated on the Turkish side of the frontier. As, however, the Persian authorities required that devotees who went to see him should be in the possession of Persian passports, he was obliged to transfer his residence to the village of Tamarchian, near to the Zinvé Sheikh pass, at that time considered to be in Persian territory. It was in the house of this sheikh that Abdurrahman Bey's

party stayed on their first arrival in Lahidjan. At 1.30 P.M., after an ascent of 20 minutes, we reached the summit of the Kubbé-boozan pass, then, following the Maravi valley, ascended another range of low hills, and, leaving on our left the village of Koolivh (2.40 P.M.), arrived at Dja Djaldian or Djildian at 3.15 P.M.

Owing to some misunderstanding, the stream passing through the latter village is, both on M. de Morgan's map of Kurdistan (Paris 1895) and on the map annexed to the memorandum on the Turco-Persian boundary question drawn up in the British Foreign Office, called Leuven, while the only name known to the local Kurds is Berdê-Meshê, as rightly given in the identic map. Leuven, it may be conjectured, is a simple misreading for "Laven" (identic map, Lavène), but even in this case, the application of the name to the Berdê-Meshê would still be incorrect, as the latter stream flows into the Avazhuru, the eastern tributary of the Kialoo (*vide supra*, under heading 18th August). The error in question has already given rise to considerable confusion, as stated in the memorandum above referred to (p. 21). It should further be mentioned in this connection that the river actually alluded to by the Turks in 1906 was the Laven, as we have been informed in Tabreez by Nazim-ul-Mulk, one of the members who took part in the Commission of Ihtisami-és-Sultane and Zeki Pasha, "Lahan" being simply another rendering of "Lavan" (Laven).

We learned from the inhabitants of Djaldian that the village belonged to a relative of Karani Agha, who, however, happened to be absent on the day of our visit, having gone to meet the Kaimakam of Erbil (Mohammed Ali Bey, brother of Mahmud Pasha Djaf), who, as already stated in our Itinerary No. 5, had undertaken to act as mediator between Karani Agha and Hamzé Séman. We were also told that a taboor had been formerly stationed at Djaldian.

August 21.—We started at 8.35 A.M., and, immediately after leaving Djaldian, crossed some rising ground forming the almost imperceptible watershed between the Berdê-Meshê stream belonging to the system of the Kialoo (Lesser Zab), and a little rivulet running from the Kani-Kanitara spring to the Gadir Chai, which, in its turn, empties itself into the Lake of Urmi. At 9.25 A.M. we passed on the left the village of Séfian, and reached at 10.35 a pleasantly shaded spot called Kani-resb. Some forty minutes later we entered the Ushnu plain, and made a short halt on the hill overlooking the large village of Nalos, which, with some others on the right bank of the Gadir Chai, belongs to the Mumashas, while those on the left bank and the upper part of the right one are held by the Zerza Khans of Ushnu. From the place where we stood a good view was afforded us of the villages scattered about the plain, and, further to the east, of the gap in the hills giving an easy access to the Suldaz plain. There are no bridges over the Gadir at this part of its course. Having forded it, however, without any difficulty, for, though broad, it contains little water at this time of the year, we halted for mid-day at the village of Narziva. Here certain of the soldiers of our Turkish escort having helped themselves to some hay from the roof of one of the villagers, the proprietor, Piroz Agha Zerza, came to Mirza Effendi and asked him to forbid his men to lay their hands on other people's property. Mirza Effendi, on investigating the matter and on discovering that the soldiers had in reality taken some small quantity of clover, forthwith proceeded to administer to the latter a number of very effective cuts with his whip, including in this castigation the proprietor also, whom he evidently suspected of the desire to use our presence as a means of making a sort of demonstration on the matter. Piroz Khan appealed to us, declaring that he had never yet undergone such treatment in his life. We endeavoured to calm him as best we could, and eventually succeeded in smoothing matters over somewhat.

After half-an-hour's ride, we reached the town of Ushnu at 2.30 P.M. A crowd, not very numerous, and composed of people belonging to the lower classes, met us on the outskirts drawn up in two rows. Our arrival was greeted with the usual shouts of "Long live the Sultan," with the addition in this particular case of loud clapping of hands. As, however, our horses exhibited signs of considerable restiveness under all this tumult, we were obliged to pass behind instead of between the ranks, a course which brought the clamour to a summary close. We were further received by the school boys of the town singing patriotic songs, and by a detachment of the 98th Regiment (15th Army Corps), of which one company under command of Ibrahim Effendi, Yuzbashi, is stationed in Ushnu. The latter officer proved to be the acting kaimakam, as the former occupant of that post had, for some reason or other, been dismissed, while Behdjet Bey, the Frontier Commissioner (see our Itinerary Nos. 1 and 4), who had himself for a time been performing the duties of that post, was on leave in Van.

While taking tea in Ibrahim Effendi's tent we met several representatives of the Ushnu population. The schoolmaster, wearing on his shoulder a yellow badge with

tricolour ribbons, explained to us that his school depended on the "Union and Progress Committee," and that a new school-house was in process of construction in the town. We afterwards saw the work of building going on, and learned that the funds were mostly being provided by Suleiman Khan, the chief of the Zerza clan. Previous to our arrival at Ushnu we had heard from a European, well qualified to judge and who had himself visited the place, that Suleiman's prestige had greatly suffered from the presence of the Turks, the latter, as was the case with Mamed Khan in Bane (*vide No. 4*), having superseded him by a kaimakam of their own. During our stay in Ushnu it so happened that, from whatever cause arising, we neither saw nor received a message from Suleiman Khan himself, though some time previously he had conveyed an intimation to us of his desire to meet us, the only representatives of the Zerza family seen by us being the two brothers, Riza Khan and Mustapha Khan, his cousins. Although it was admitted fully by the latter that Suleiman Khan was their senior, it was none the less evident that it was they and not he who, under the Turkish occupation, were enjoying the position rightfully due to the chief of the clan. We learned afterwards that it was these two who sent in 1907 to Mosul, and, having given "dakhlalet," brought back with them a Turkish detachment, which, in the October of that year, seized the Persian custom-house at Ushnu, causing its chief (Mirza Rifaat), who had been warned of the danger by Suleiman Khan, to make a hurried departure to Urmi. Riza Khan, who, as reward for his services, had received permission to appropriate the Deshtebil district, was loud in his praises of the Turks, thanks to whom, he said, he had only now begun to understand what progress and civilisation meant, adding that he intended to make a trip to Europe. He further assured us that Ushnu was Turkish property, and that the Turks ruled the place some 120 to 140 years ago, the proof of this being, according to him, a tomb near the village of Shivé-Somak, bearing on it the inscription that a brother of Kerim Bey, the kaimakam, sent from Mosul at the period in question, lay buried there.

August 22.—We made an excursion in the afternoon to the sanctuary of Sheikh Pradiin, lying higher up in the gorge of the Gadir Chai, at some hour and a-half's distance, from whence a good view was to be obtained of the very conspicuous range of the frontier mountains and their offshoots. To avoid futile discussions with the Turkish officers we decided not to visit the Keli-Shin pass, which, in addition to the fact of its being well marked on the identic map, would present no special features of interest unless traversed in its whole length, the possibility of which was precluded pending the reception of a reply from Constantinople or Urmi, authorising us to cross the frontier (see above under heading the 20th August). We learned, however, that the pass was very difficult, and that travellers therefore, although the journey through Sidakan to Revanduz by this route occupies only two days, always preferred the easier road over the Zinvé Sheikh pass in Old Lahidjan, though taking one day longer.

At Ushnu we again had difficulties, owing to the vigilant watch which the Turks seemed to think necessary to maintain over our proceedings. It was only after persistent remonstrance on our part that we succeeded in obtaining the removal of the gendarmes, who, with their rifles, had been placed by the kaimakam as sentinels over our encampment, with orders, it was explained to Mirza Effendi in our presence, not to allow any civilians to approach our tents. Even at night the streets leading to the garden were occupied by gendarmes and patrols. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that neither Suleiman Khan nor any other of the townspeople ventured to visit us. Before leaving Ushnu we took an opportunity of intimating to the kaimakam our surprise at the treatment to which we had been subjected, with the result that the latter felt constrained to offer us his excuses. The measures taken by him on this occasion may have been to some extent due to the influence of the senior lieutenant of our escort (Ibrahim Effendi), whose presence at any of our encampments, we found by experience, invariably gave rise to difficulty of one kind or another.

August 23.—Instead of proceeding direct to Mergaver over the Guilas pass, we decided to travel through Deshtebil, watered by a southern tributary of the Baranduz River, and not without interest as affording us an opportunity of obtaining information as to the changes in the ownership of landed property, which, we were given to understand, had recently taken place in that district. We left Ushnu at 8.45 A.M., going eastwards, and then, having passed the villages of Nalivan (9.30 A.M.) and Guirde Kashan (10.5 A.M.), turned northwards and gained the summit of the Khurisew pass, leading into Deshtebil. Both at the village of Ainaroom (12.45 P.M.) and at Sékani (1.30 P.M.), where we made a halt, we asked the villagers who their agha was.

All gave the answer that the proprietor of the villages was Agha Khan Mir Pendj, living in Urmī, but that their present agha was Riza Khan Zerza, who, since the Turkish occupation, had made himself master of the whole of the district, comprising some twenty-two villages.

We passed the night in the village of Kasinli (7.30 p.m.), which, belonging originally to Agha Khan, has now been seized by Mamed, son of Hassan Agha, and his brother Izzet, of the Delbokr tribe. The villagers here told us that they preferred the new régime, as being milder to the rayat.

August 24.—We started at 9.10 a.m., and after half-an-hour arrived at Kukié, where we were very hospitably received by Mulazim Muhiyyeddin Effendi, commanding temporarily two companies of the 98th Regiment. We learned that since the date of our previous passage through Babarood (see Itinerary No. 3), a military post had been placed at the bridge leading to the latter village. We were further informed by the Kedkhuda of Kukié that Mohammed Effendi, whom we saw on our first journey through Baranduz, was no gendarmerie officer, as he had represented himself to us to be, but a Turkish custom-house official, and that he had left for Shemdinan, as the proposed custom-house in Baranduz had, for some reason or other, not been established. Kukié, we were also given to understand, was still held by its former proprietor, Hassan Ali Khan, of Urmī, the latter sending his agent to collect his dues, which, however, now consisted of one-tenth only of the produce, instead of a former fifth.

Continuing our journey at 11.20 a.m., we proceeded up the fertile valley of Baranduz, along the right bank, which is under Turkish occupation. At 12.40 p.m. we reached the village of Shuaban, where a yuz-bashi resides with some soldiers, the detachment itself being stationed in the village of Dizé, situated a little further on across the stream under the mountain of Sir. Having passed by the rickety wooden bridge built by the Turkish soldiers, we were received with the usual honours by a small detachment under the command of an officer. It is here that the Baranduz River, leaving the narrow gorge, enters the Urmī plain, the posts occupied by the Turks on both banks having thus an obvious strategical importance. From Dizé upwards the left bank of the river is under Turkish occupation, while the villages lying lower down (Baranduz, Ahava, Saadli, Dizé-teke, &c.) are still in Persian possession. (N.B.—To this extent, therefore, our statement in Itinerary No. 3 must be modified.)

Near Shuaban we were met by Mr. Neesan, of the English mission in Urmī, who wished to join our party, having some business in Mergever. Though Mr. Neesan, it appears, was well known to the officer in command at Shuaban, and though he alleged that he made frequent trips to those regions, he was, notwithstanding the production of his American passport, not allowed to travel with us, Ibrahim Effendi informing him in a not very courteous manner that no stranger could be permitted to join our party. At 4.55 p.m., after a halt of one hour and a-half on the road, we reached Mergui, the first village in the Mergever plain, where we found a small Turkish post which had been sent there a few days previously in consequence of an outbreak of hostilities between its proprietor, Kerim Khan Harki, now holding the rank of honorary Turkish midir of the Baranduz district, and Seyyid Taha, of Shemdinan. As Kerim Khan himself was absent from the village, and as fuller information could be obtained by penetrating further into the plain, we decided to push on, and at 7.10 p.m. reached the village of Zeiva (Kala-Zeiva), the site of which afforded us a most favourable opportunity of taking observations on the surrounding country. During the evening we had a visit from Mulazim Sheref-ed-Din Effendi, who, with some soldiers of the 98th Regiment, had shortly before our arrival been stationed at the neighbouring village of Hoolistan, equally for the purpose of keeping the peace between the two khans above referred to. Zeiva, we were informed, was held by Seyyid Taha, who further pretended to be the proprietor of all the southern part of the plain, thus bringing him into direct opposition not only with the above-mentioned chief of the Harki clan, but also with his own uncle, the well-known Sheikh Abdul Kadir.

August 25.—In the morning our caravan, which the previous night had remained at Nerguy, rejoined us, and with it our courier from Urmī. Among the correspondence brought by the latter was an official letter from the Turkish consul in Urmī to Mirza Effendi (under open envelope), requesting the latter to allow us to cross the old frontier at whatever point we might choose. As the point was of some importance in principle, we decided to avail ourselves of the right thus conceded to us, and to make an excursion from Zeiva to the territory of Shemdinan (Naw-Chin). Mirza Effendi, though raising some objections at first, eventually agreed. His colleague, Ibrahim Effendi, who

seemed to avoid us, had not made his appearance since the interview with Mr. Neesan, above reported.

August 26.—We started from Zeiva on our excursion at 8 a.m., and, passing Hoolistan and Berasp, entered (8.55 a.m.) the gorge of Benar, reaching at 10 a.m. the village of the same name, which we found in ruins. Above it was a strong stone fort, the construction of which was only half finished, while the beams and stones lying scattered around showed the work had had to be hurriedly abandoned. We learned subsequently that the fort in question was being erected by Seyyid Taha, who had bought Benar from its proprietors, a separate clan called Benar-Begzadés, his intention being to protect his Naw-Chin villages from the incursions of the Harki Kurds of Mergever. The chief of the latter, Kerim Khan, viewing Taha's proceedings as an attempt to obtain the preponderating influence in Mergever, sent his men to stop the construction. This led to a fight, which took place, in fact, only a few days previous to our arrival, and resulted in the retirement of both parties from Benar.

Leaving our Cossacks and sowars behind in charge of Captain Kissly, and accompanied only by our two ghulams and the Turkish escort, we started from the last-mentioned village at 10.50 a.m., and, crossing the mountains by a very steep pass dividing Benar from the usual caravan road, followed the latter, reaching at 12.20 p.m. the ruins of a caravanserai called Zini Khan, situated below the high range of Mawi-Halané. It is this latter place, which, until the recent events, was held to be the Turkish frontier. At 1.35 p.m. we arrived at the very picturesquely situated village of Halané, the property of Seyyid Taha. The inhabitants, who are all Nestorians, appeared to be greatly impoverished. Our return journey by the ordinary road (over Zini-Khan and Chia-Resh) lasted three hours and three-quarters, and we found the pass fairly easy.

August 27.—We started from Zeiva at 8.30 a.m., and, following the road which skirts the frontier range to the west of the plain, reached at 11 a.m. the village of Dazguir, situated on slightly rising ground which forms the watershed, and the only boundary between Mergever and Desht, into which latter district we were then entering. At 11.50 a.m. we arrived at the small village of Razhan, noteworthy only as being the residence of Sheikh Abdul Kadir, son of Sheikh Obeidullah, who in 1881 invaded and laid waste the western part of Azerbaijan. Sheikh Abdul Kadir, who, as is well known, was the chief in command of his father's forces, was subsequently deported by the Ottoman Government to Mecca, where he resided until the Turkish revolution, when he was allowed to return to Constantinople, and was made a senator. Last year, for the first time since his exile, he revisited his native town of Nehri, in Shemdinan. On this occasion he was visiting the villages in his possession in the territory now occupied by the Turks, having taken the route via Russia. Sheikh Abdul Kadir is at present engaged in a dispute as to his rights on Mergever with his nephew, Seyyid Taha, the son of Sheikh Siddik, who died some five years ago. The Kerim Khan Harki above alluded to is reputed to have taken the side of Abdul Kadir.

We met with a very kind reception at Razhan at the hands of the sheikh and his son, Mohammed Effendi. Among the questions we ventured to put to the sheikh was one as to the origin of his rights in those parts. After a moment of hesitation the answer was that the villages in Mergever were, with the exception of four (Berasp, Hoolistan, Dizé, and Guirdivan, as we learned later on), originally purchased from the Prince Melik Mansoor Mirza, former Governor of Urmī. A "tuyool" or "taviil," i.e., the right to levy and appropriate the Government taxes due from these villages, had been granted by Mohammed Shah to his (Abdul Kadir's) grandfather, Sheikh Taha, for the upkeep of a sanctuary in Nehri (Shemdinan). It is perhaps noteworthy that in the course of conversation Sheikh Abdul Kadir, by a curious slip of the tongue, spoke of being "here in Persia." We had occasion to note on our journey that a great number of Kurdish chiefs had been to see the sheikh, who, enjoying a great influence throughout the whole of Kurdistan, is undoubtedly taking an active part in the furtherance of the Turkish propaganda in those districts.

We left Razhan at 3.50 p.m., forded the Berdesoor River near Miroyn at 4.45, and, notwithstanding Mirza Effendi's efforts to dissuade us, spent the night in Kyai, a village half Kurdish and half Nestorian, belonging to Beder Khan Beg, of the Desht Begzadés, who openly professes his attachment to Persia. Although since the Turkish advance he has appropriated the village of Bedkar at the source of the Rowze-Chai, where a Persian customs previously existed, even this has not reconciled him to the presence of the former, and both on his part and on that of the Ottomans we heard expressions of mutual discontent.

August 28.—Having left Kyai at 8.15 a.m., and having forded the Rowze-Chai

near Derhend at 9.10, we saw on our right the group of villages in the vicinity of which the memorable fight between the detachments commanded respectively by Madjd-es-Saltané and Yaver Pasha took place on the 1st August, 1907. The remains of the Persian entrenchments are still visible on the hill near Tulli. At 10.15 we arrived at Ambi, a mixed Kurdish and Christian village, where we saw Kurdo Beg, Peder Khan Beg's nephew, and the acknowledged chief of the Desht Begzadés. By the references he made to the unsatisfactory nature of his present position and to the cessation of the pay he had formerly drawn from the Persians, he conveyed, in the way customary with certain other Kurdish chieftains whom we had met, the impression that he was not contented with the Turks.

At Ambi we were already in the Tergever district, and after an hour and a-half's ride reached Mavana, being received at Kurana (close by) by the kaïmakam, whom we had met on passing through the previous June (21st). It appeared, from what we learned on this occasion in Kurana, that our first visit to the place coincided with the laying of the foundation stone of a school, for which the funds were obtained by subscription. The ceremony began as soon as we ourselves had left the place, patriotic speeches being delivered by the frontier commissioner and the Turkish consul at Urmi. The work itself, we found, was being proceeded with on the hill overlooking Kurana and Mavana, and we were assured by the Christians that the school would in winter serve the soldiers for barracks, no other suitable quarters being obtainable.

Mavana belonged formerly to the late Salar-Afkham, owner of all Mergover and many other villages. Since the time, however, of the Turkish advance and Salar's death, the village has been without an agha, but we were informed that every now and then some Kurdish chief would put forward his claims, and we were even shown an elderly Kurd who had come from Turkey, and who was at that moment endeavouring to settle down in the place. A Christian (a Turkish subject, but with property in Kurana) stated to us that he thought it better for his co-religionists to live under the rule of the Turks, as the latter had, at all events, the force necessary to put a stop to Kurdish raids and depredations. He admitted, however, that the Turks were more fanatical, and that the petty officials, in whose hands all power in the occupied districts was practically concentrated, were as venal as the Persians, a fact which introduced no little uncertainty into business operations. Some indication of the feeling entertained by the Christian population may be obtained from the utterance to our men, by those of the inhabitants acquainted with Russian or who spoke Armenian, of their numerous grievances, and from a petition subsequently handed to us in Urmi, signed by the Nestorians of Mavana, Babulan, and other Tergever villages.

During our second visit to Kurana we met no officers (possibly on account of its being the month of Ramazan), nor did Ibrahim Effendi, the senior officer of our escort, apparently consider it necessary to pay us a farewell visit, notwithstanding the fact that we had travelled in company more than two months, and that we were about to separate finally from our Turkish escort.

We left Mavana at 3.35 p.m., and, varying slightly the road we had taken when coming from Baradost to Tergever, took the one which necessitated the fording of the Arziu stream, and reached Neyehalan on the Nazlu River at 6.35 p.m. Neyehalan belongs to local proprietors, the heirs of Sheikh Djemal-ed-Din. It appears, however, from the statements made to us by the representatives of the latter that two Kurds, viz., Ami, son of Mamel Sherif Dahan, and Ismail Agha Kardar, are disputing between themselves the proprietorship of the village in question, which belongs to neither. Our informants added that it mattered nothing to them whether they were under Turks or Persians. It was their neighbours, the Shekkak Kurds only, of whom they complained.

August 29.—We started from Neyehalan at 8.15 a.m., and, having forded the Nazlu Chai, took a north-easterly direction, making for Inehké-su, a place which we had been unable to visit on our first journey through Baradost. We arrived at Inehké-su at 10 a.m., being met by Lieutenant Ismail Effendi ("malili," i.e., promoted from the ranks) and Hassan Agha, son of Amer Henare, the present occupier of the village as well as of Khalian and Kanispi, situated in the neighbourhood. One company of the 98th Regiment is stationed here, while new barracks are being built both in Inehké-su itself and in Kanispi. Close to the village on the road to Urmi there is a new well-built caravanserai belonging to Hassan Agha, which, furnished as it is with turrets, is evidently intended to serve in case of need as a blockhouse.

Inehké-su occupies a position of great importance, being situated at the meeting of the roads to Baradost (the latter one leading further to Chahrik and Van through the occupied districts), Anzal, Urmi, and Tergever.

After a short halt we reached in forty minutes the summit of the Khan-Guédigui pass, guarded, as being the frontier line, by two sentries from Inehké-su. Here we separated from Mirza Effendi and his men. Military honours were given by the Turkish soldiers and returned by our own escort, the whole ceremony of leave-taking being characterised by great friendliness on both sides. As regards Mirza Effendi, we think it only right to say that, from the time that he was left in sole charge of the escort, we found him much more ready to fall in with our wishes, and, indeed, both he and the men of the Turkish escort were always willing personally to render what assistance they could.

Mirza Effendi, after some hesitation, consented to accept from us a pair of field glasses as a souvenir of our journey together. We further asked and obtained his permission to present his men with a small sum of money, sufficient to purchase a sheep or two, to enable them to celebrate the occasion according to the usual Oriental custom. Our presents, however, were subsequently returned to us by Mirza Effendi from Chahrik, through the medium of the Turkish consul in Urmi, a course which, in the absence of any explanation, must, we presume, have been dictated to him by his superiors.

Beginning our descent at mid-day we shortly afterwards passed Kani-resch, re-entering Persian territory, on which we had not set foot since our departure from Soujboulak on the 19th August. After a stay of one hour and three-quarters at Orta Sindji, we continued our march by the large and well-to-do village of Hissar, situated at the opening of the gorge into the Urmi plain, and having forded the Nazlu Chai River, the current of which is here very rapid, reached the village of Kalé-i-Ismaïl Agha, our halting place for the night, at 4.30 p.m. This village was built only six years ago by Madjd-es-Saltané, who had leased the land from Ikbal-un-Nizam. The inhabitants are all Nestorian Catholics, while the village itself, with its houses arranged in symmetrical order, forms one large compound, the whole being surrounded by a high mud wall. Perhaps the most curious feature in connection with this place is that the villagers, who, under the guidance of their present priest and Kedkhuda Kasha Oner, had emigrated to Persia from the Turkish district of Gaver during the Armenian massacres, though still retaining their Ottoman nationality, are now engaged in defending this outlying corner of Persian territory against the incursions of the Kurds living in the districts occupied by the Turks. The old fort of Kalé-i-Ismaïl Agha, now in ruins, stands on a hill overlooking the village immediately at the entrance to the gorge, through which the Nazlu River issues forth from Baradost into the Urmi plain. The village of Kyr-neisa, situated a little higher up the stream, is in Turkish occupation. We were informed by Kasha Oner that the Turks considered as their present frontier the range of the higher mountains overlooking the Urmi plain to the north, and ending in a promontory with white rocks over Askerabad. The villagers, though complaining to us of the raids of Hassan Agha Henare, and of the general state of insecurity now prevailing, stated that they themselves had enjoyed comparative tranquillity since the expulsion of Tamir Agha Shekkak (whom we saw at Mastakan, see Diary No. 2) from their village by Idjlal-ul-Mulk, the present Governor of Urmi.

August 30.—Starting at 9.40 a.m., and passing at 11 a.m. the village of Guedjin, which, in 1909, gave a "dakhalet" to the notorious Peter Ellow, we arrived at Urmi at 1 p.m.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

Tabreez, October 12, 1911.

Annex to Diary No. 6.

(Translation.)

To the Russian and English Representatives:

I AM a trustworthy informant, a patriot, and a man conversant with the rights of the matter. I am well acquainted with the state of this frontier and with the tribes of these parts. According to what I have heard from my father and have myself seen all these parts tribes, inhabitants and residents, for the whole period of the 130 years since the beginning of the Kajar reign, have been in true Persian territory and have been true Persian subjects. Every year they have paid the taxes due and obtained formal receipts for them. They have never failed to perform their duty, and have always shown their allegiance to the Persian Government. In return the Persians

have been accustomed to bestow offices on them, titles, and fixed salaries; have issued decrees in their favour, and kept them in comfort and security. There are valid reasons in proof of the justice of what I am stating. Sixty-six years ago Mohammed Khan Amir Nizam Zangana, by order of the Persian Government, came with artillery and soldiers to Old Lahidjan, and built forts at Shinava. Sixty years ago, moreover, Mehdi Khan Karapapakhi, under the instructions of the Persian Government, constructed the forts of Laven in Lahidjan. Forty-five years ago Shuja-ed-Dowleh of Urm, by the order of the Persian Government, came with great pomp to Lahidjan and repaired the Mutava fort and edifice, the traces of which can still be seen. Pirot Khan Mamash and Sheikh Ali Khan Mukri built, by the authorisation of the Persian Government, the fort of Pasv. If the Turkish Government had any claim on these parts, why did they not prevent the Persians from constructing these edifices and forts? Besides this, Persian officials, in pursuit of criminals and seditious persons, came on several occasions with guns and soldiers to Vazne and Serdesht, which are on the Perso-Turkish boundary line. Why did the Turks keep silence, and not stop them?

Five years ago the Turkish Government began to intrigue by sending soldiers and forces to the frontier. Even then some of the tribes did not abandon their nationality and allegiance to the Persian Government. They yielded no obedience to the Turks, and preferred to emigrate. During this same period the Persians, having internal dissensions, retired from the frontier districts, and the Turks seeing this took advantage of that circumstance to subjugate the Ashirets by fraud, and took possession of all the frontier lands. Everywhere they left behind them guns and soldiers. There was nothing for it for the tribes but to acquiesce and keep silence.

This time the frontier question has become probably a matter of discussion among the Great Powers. The Turkish authorities everywhere assemble the inhabitants by force, and, after threatening and warning them, obtained a paper saying that they gave up their nationality at their own pleasure, and willingly accepted that of the Turks. The inhabitants and tribes accept Turkish nationality because they are helpless, and are afraid of losing their lives, property, and honour. Otherwise, excepting two or three wretches, whose wickedness was well known to the Persians, absolutely no one of the inhabitants and tribes of these parts would give up Persian nationality and accept that of the Turks.

If the Russian and English representatives assure the chiefs of the tribes of these districts of receiving protection against Turkish molestation, of removing from them every cause of fear, and hold a meeting at which Persian representatives shall be present, the chiefs of these tribes will then of course appear at that meeting and produce the decrees and other documents issued by the Persian Government on their behalf, proving their allegiance to the latter. In doing this, all of them will demand indemnity for the loss incurred by them through the Turks during the last five or six years, seeing that none of these tribes neither had any connection with the Turks nor did the lands belong to Turkey. The Turks have no right of possession and interference in these parts. According to law and justice, they must pay an indemnity.

I also am a well-known man here, but, being afraid of the Turkish authorities, cannot disclose my identity. Should I be assured, however, of protection for the present and future against Turkish molestation, I will appear at the meeting and state that the Turks possess no document showing any right to these parts. People have been compelled to apply for "dakhaleh," and have no courage to refuse, because they are surrounded everywhere by Turks who have soldiers and guns. If the Turks have any rightful claim on these parts, there must be *rukans*, *firmans*, and other official documents in the hands of the inhabitants. Why do they not produce them? In short, whatever the Turks have done in these parts has been done by political intrigue. I have put these facts, which are all true, before certain of the chiefs of the tribes in order that they may look to the matter. Please make the necessary investigation and enquiries, and, if you find the circumstances contrary to what I have stated, I shall deserve any kind of punishment.

(Signed) A true Informant.

[46089]

No. 299.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 202.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 19, 1911.

I REGRET to see from the telegram of Sir A. Nicolson of yesterday that the telegrams you have received from me recently have failed to make my view sufficiently clear as to whether the dispatch of reinforcements of the consular escorts should be suspended or not.

From the moment that Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Soulet-ed-Dowleh with the Kashgais left Shiraz I have never wavered in my view that no reinforcement was needed if the situation actually in the town was alone to be considered. Even when things had looked blackest at Shiraz (see my telegram No. 460 of the 2nd October), when I felt compelled to deliver my warning to Soulet-ed-Dowleh that unless he left the neighbourhood of Shiraz forthwith I should recommend His Majesty's Government to take the necessary steps to protect British interests, it was only under the impression that His Majesty's Government were considering favourably the scheme for increasing the consular guards for the purpose of escorting caravans, and that quite independently of the actual situation in Shiraz the escort at that consulate was shortly to be increased, that I recommended in my telegram No. 462 of the 3rd October, that the dispatch of troops destined, if the Government of India concurred in our scheme for escorting caravans for Ispahan and Shiraz, should be accelerated.

I was still under the same impression when in my telegram No. 474 of the 7th October I deprecated delaying the departure of the troops merely because the situation in the town of Shiraz had improved, and suggested a form of announcement to the Persian Government, basing our action on the general disorder in the south and showing that it was our intention to use the troops for the protection of caravans.

My remarks, reported in my telegram No. 479 of the 9th instant, to a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who came to enquire as to the truth of reports in the London press in regard to reinforcements of the consular escorts at Ispahan, Shiraz, Bushire, Bander Abbas, and Kerman, were based entirely on the same supposition.

Your telegram No. 299 of the 8th instant, directing me when announcing the dispatch of the troops to the Persian Government to make no mention of their being intended to escort caravans, seemed to imply that the troops were intended exclusively for the situation in Shiraz. When, therefore, in your telegram No. 304 of the 12th instant, you consulted me as to whether any satisfactory and immediate improvement was likely as the result of certain developments which the Persian Minister in London had brought to your notice, I pointed out in my telegram No. 490 of the 14th instant, that while no great importance was to be attached to the considerations urged by the Persian Minister there had been a real improvement in the situation in the town of Shiraz, sufficient, indeed, if the dispatch of troops depended solely on that situation and not on the desperate state of the roads, to warrant a suspension of their departure.

Subsequently I learned from your telegram No. 307 of the 14th instant, that four squadrons of cavalry were about to be dispatched.

The impending dispatch of over 400 men seemed to make it clear that they were intended for more than the protection of British lives and property at Shiraz, and indeed that they were intended to give effect to our scheme for escorting caravans at least on the Bushire-Shiraz-Ispahan road. I therefore ventured to suggest in my telegram No. 500 of yesterday, in which I reported one of the many appeals I have received from the Persian Government in regard to the dispatch of troops, that we should make it clear to the Persian Government that the protection of British caravans was the objective of the reinforcements. The Persian Government had announced to us certain measures which they were taking amongst which was the dispatch of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars. The situation at Shiraz is not at this moment such as to warrant in itself the reinforcing of the escort, and it may fairly be expected that if Ala-ed-Dowleh proceeds the situation in the town itself will still further improve. Improvement on the roads is, however, more remote, and their condition affords, in my opinion, a much better warrant for the dispatch of troops than any need that there is at this moment for special measures of protection for British lives and property in the town of Shiraz.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[46091]

No. 300.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 201.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 27, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 180 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that on receipt of your telegram No. 284 in which you asked for my view on the suggestion of the Russian Government that Major Stokes might be employed to organise a gendarmerie at or near Ispahan, I enquired of Mr. Shuster as to what he thought of the idea. I enclose a copy of his reply the substance of which I reported in my telegram No. 467.

I acquainted my Russian colleague with Mr. Shuster's answer, and on the 15th instant he informed Mr. Shuster, under instructions from his Government, that as it was unfortunately found impossible to restrict Major Stokes's services to the south, the Russian Government must adhere to their protest against his engagement to organise a Treasury gendarmerie.

As reported in my despatch No. 162 of the 4th September, Mr. Shuster had threatened to publish a statement of his case against the two Governments in the event of his being prevented from securing Major Stokes's services, and on receipt of M. Poklewski's communication of the 15th instant, he lost no time in communicating to Renter's correspondent a brief statement, which I understand duly appeared in the London press. He has since, I am told, posted a more detailed indictment, which will presumably appear in the London press in a few days, meanwhile Major Stokes stays on in Tehran, though I have urged him in a friendly manner to leave. He has been granted leave by the Government of India, pending a decision on the question of his resignation from the army which he had tendered on the 30th July. This grant of leave was conveyed to him by me on the 9th instant, and I have since been requested by the Government of India to inform him that he has been granted leave for twelve months. This message however, I have not yet conveyed to him, as I thought that when once he had been formally granted leave for a definite period, it would be more difficult to recall him to his regimental duties, which as far as I can see would be the most likely way of inducing him to leave Tehran. His continued presence here may prove very inconvenient as he is staying with Mr. Shuster, and it can hardly be doubted that he is assisting him in the organisation of the Treasury gendarmerie. As I have already reported I should not be surprised if at any moment you were approached by the Russian Government with the request that he may be recalled.

I must confess to feeling some anxiety as to how, if this request is complied with, he will respond to his orders of recall.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 300

Mr. Shuster to Sir G. Barclay.

Dear Sir George,

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

REGARDING your note of the 3rd, to which I was about to reply, let me say that the suggestion as to localising Stokes at Ispahan, is, of course, out of the question, both on principle and as a matter of practicability.

I hope some day the British and Russian Foreign Offices will come to believe that when I said I wanted Stokes here in Tehran to assist me by his advice and peculiar knowledge in the formation of a Treasury gendarmerie, I meant just that and nothing more; no *arrière-pensée*, no military expeditions, no intrigues, nothing but what I said.

It seems impossible at times for one to gain any credence for a frank open statement of facts or intentions, but it is equally true that it was neither within the letter nor the spirit of my statement to go through the truly absurd performance of marooning him at Ispahan or anywhere else in order that he might advise and assist me here.

Is it not about time, dear Sir George, that two big Governments stop playing at

this matter, and state plainly whether they intend to continue to oppose the employment of Stokes along the lines which I have mentioned, or not?

With, &c.

W. MORGAN SHUSTER,
Treasurer-General of Persia.

[46094]

No. 301.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 207.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report the Persian Government recently issued a decree confiscating the properties of the rebellious Princes Shoa-es-Sultaneh and Salar-ed-Dowleh.

In execution of the decree, Mr. Shuster, the treasurer-general, on the 9th October, sent five of his gendarmerie to each of the six properties in Tehran and the suburbs affected by the decree. The gendarmes were instructed to take possession of the properties, and to draw special attention, if necessary, to an undertaking of the Persian Government that all rights of foreigners arising from contracts in connection with these properties would be wholly respected.

One of the properties of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh is situated in the vicinity of the Russian consulate-general in the town. There the gendarmes found some Persian Cossacks in occupation. These had apparently been posted there by the Turkish Embassy (though this is not quite clear)—Shoa-es-Sultaneh being claimed by the Turkish Embassy as a Turkish subject. The Persian Cossacks objected to the entry of the gendarmes, who, however, proceeded into the house and commenced an inventory of its contents. Soon after, two officials of the Russian consulate-general, sent by M. Pokhitonow, the Russian consul-general, arrived and told the gendarmes they had no business to enter the property. The latter explained their mission, but the officials began to threaten them and to tell them that if they did not leave immediately, the officials would have them beaten by Russian Cossacks, about a dozen of whom then appeared, and were given the order to attack. The gendarmes, not having instructions to meet such an eventuality, withdrew from the premises, chased up the street by the Russian Cossacks.

Mr. Shuster at once wrote a letter to the Russian Minister, who was still at Zerguendeh, protesting against the action of the Russian consulate-general in regard to this incident, and in regard to others of a similar nature mentioned below which occurred on the same day in connection with the seizure of other properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh. M. Poklewski replied making out the best case he could for the action of M. Pokhitonow basing it on the fact that Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property in town was leased to Russian subjects. M. Poklewski, however, while making proper reserves as to Russian rights, declared that, provided these were respected, there would be no opposition on the part of the Russian Legation. At the same time M. Poklewski instructed M. Pokhitonow to raise no further obstacles to the seizure of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties.

On the following morning, the 10th October, Mr. Shuster sent his assistant, Mr. Cairns, accompanied by a force of fifty fiscal gendarmes with five officers and fifty mounted national gendarmes with three officers, under the command of Mr. Merrell, of the fiscal gendarmerie, with stringent instructions to take possession of the property in town by peaceful methods, if possible. If, however, violence were offered, the gendarmes were to wait for their opponents to fire the first shot, but in any case they were to accomplish their mission and take possession of the garden and the house.

When the expedition arrived at the gate of the property, Messrs. Cairns and Merrell went round to the Russian consulate, and were received by M. Pokhitonow, the Russian consul-general. They read to him the order of confiscation, explained the instructions they had received, and while assuring him that the rights of foreign subjects would be respected, begged him to withdraw the force he had placed in the garden. According to the report of Mr. Merrell, M. Pokhitonow refused, but as far as I can ascertain it was the Turkish Embassy, and not M. Pokhitonow, which was responsible for the presence of the force in question, which consisted of Persian Cossacks only.

Mr. Merrell went back to the gate, the six Persian Cossacks on guard refused him entrance. Mr. Merrell, however, found a way in by a side door, and his men disarmed

the Cossacks, and the gendarmes remained quietly in possession. An attempt was made by the Cossacks to summon reinforcements from the brigade to their assistance, but Prince Vadbolski, the Russian commanding officer, refused to comply without the consent of the Minister of War or the Russian Minister.

In the afternoon of the 10th, two Russian officials in the uniform of the consulate came to the gate of the property and demanded entrance. On being refused they abused the officers and gendarmes, saying they would be shot. After a time the officials passed on. This at least is the account of the officer left in charge of the gendarmes, and it is to a large extent borne out by other evidence, though it should be stated that the Russian consular officials declare that they were merely passing the gate of the property, and that the gendarmes gratuitously levelled their rifles at them.

In regard to the other properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh similar occurrences took place on the 9th, the gendarmes being roughly handled by Russian Cossacks at the instigation of consulate officials, but in consequence of the restraint exercised by the Russian Minister on M. Pokhitonow the gendarmes were enabled during the following days to take peaceful possession of all the properties in question.

The truculent conduct of the Russian consul-general presents a most unsavoury contrast to the moderate though firm attitude of the Russian Minister who, though most careful to preserve all legitimate Russian interests, was also careful not to endorse the high-handed action of his subordinate. I believe it is true that Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties are mortgaged to the Russian Bank, and that one at least is leased to a Russian subject, but M. Pokhitonow had no reason to assume that these rights would not be respected, and his violent and provocative action was directly contrary to the standing orders which the Minister has given to Russian consular officers to confine themselves in defending Russian interests to the use of their tongue and their pen unless they have special authority from the legation for active measures.

At the same time Mr. Shuster's action in sending so large a force of gendarmes on the morning of the 10th to take possession of the property, and the orders he gave them to persevere in their mission whatever might be the opposition they encountered was most imprudent, and might have, but for the restraint exercised by M. Poklewski on his truculent consul-general, led to a serious conflict.

The Persian Government have addressed a note to the Russian Legation demanding the withdrawal of the consul-general and his violent subordinates, at the same time undertaking that all Russian interests connected with Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties will be respected. To this note M. Poklewski has replied rejecting the demand of the Persian Government, and pointing out numerous cases in which injuries to Russian interests remained unredressed.

M. Poklewski, and M. Pokhitonow I understand also, are in correspondence with their Government as to the further treatment of this incident.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[46095]

No. 302.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received November 20.)

(No. 208.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

SINCE my last despatch No. 185 of the 4th instant respecting the insurrection, there has been little definite to report.

The whereabouts of the ex-Shah have been the subject of many rumours. At one time it was confidently believed by the Persian Government that he was in Russian territory at Askaniabad, where he was believed to be staying with the governor. There appears to have been no more truth in this story than in the rumour telegraphed by His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed that the ex-Shah had gone to Tashkent. I do not know that he has, since his flight to Gumeshtepa, ever left the district of Astrabad. At any rate, he is there now, and some of his followers are reported to have gained a success quite recently over some Government troops near Bender Gez.

Salar-ed-Dowleh, after the rout of his forces on the 27th ultimo, fled to the neighbourhood of Hamadan, and thence, on the approach of the Government troops, to Burujird. The tribesmen who composed his army have dispersed to their homes. Azad-es-Saltan, another brother of Mohammed Ali, whom Salar-ed-Dowleh had appointed governor of Kermanshah, took last at the Turkish consulate in that town on learning the defeat of his brother, and has since left Kermanshah on his way, it is

believed, to Kerbela. Yeprim and his Armenians have returned to Tehran; the Bakhtiari who were with him and who formed the bulk of the victorious army are now in Hamadan and its neighbourhood with the object of dealing with the aftermath of the insurrection, or, as is confidently asserted by those not friendly to them, for the purpose of unrestrained looting.

There is talk of sending Yeprim against Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabreez. That chieftain still threatens the town, and though no fighting has been reported for some time Tabreez is still almost completely invested, a state of things which is producing a serious situation, and prices of provisions are reported to be rising to a famine level.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[46098]

No. 303.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received November 20.)

(No. 212.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 184 of the 2nd October respecting the state of insecurity on the southern roads, I have had the honour to keep you informed in my recent telegrams respecting the reinforcement of the consular escorts of the desperate state in which the channels of communication between the Persian Gulf and Central Persia continue to remain.

Besides the concrete instances of robberies of British goods reported in my telegrams No. 490 of the 14th October and No. 515 of the 22nd October, I still continue to receive the same reports from His Majesty's consuls in the places affected of caravans held up or compelled to follow devious routes at ruinous rates for transport fodder and protection, while the telegraph gholauns are being constantly stripped and beaten, and the telegraph *matériel* destroyed or stolen. Villages in all directions are pillaged by first one tribe and then by another set of bandits, until the inhabitants of the country in their turn have nothing left to them to live on except the pillaging of passing trade or travellers.

Now that His Majesty's Government have shown their sense of the seriousness of the prevalent disorder by the significant increase in the consular guards, it may be hoped that a temporary moral effect will be produced on at least those marauders who are under more or less responsible leaders, such as the Kashgais, the Kuhgelouis, and the Bakhtiari, and that a diminution of disorder on the roads may have to be noted while the Persian Government are devising the effective scheme on which they have been told the inaction of our troops as regards the policing of the roads will depend.

His Majesty's consul at Kerman, however, expresses the fear that effective measures on the Bushire-Ispahan road will lead to the robbers transferring their activity to the already unsafe Kerman-Bunder Abbas route.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[46099]

No. 304.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received November 20.)

(No. 213.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 494 and 496 of the 15th October, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the Bill passed by the Medjliss on the 10th October, empowering the Government to engage three staff, fourteen regimental, and three non-commissioned officers from the Swedish army. The three staff officers are to be employed as administrative staff officers, one at head-quarters, one in charge of the infantry administrative department, and one in charge of the administrative departments of the cavalry and artillery.

Five of the regimental officers are to be employed as general staff officers, three at army head-quarters, and one at the higher military college and one at the subalterns' military college.

[1524]

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I understand that the remaining nine officers are, in the first instance, to be employed as commandants and adjutants of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery units. The scheme includes both organisation and command.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 304.

Bill passed by the Medjliss on October 10, 1911, empowering the Government to engage Twenty Swedish Officers.

THE National Assembly approves the following Bill, and his Highness the Regent commands its execution:—

Article 1. The Persian Government's Ministry of War is empowered to engage twenty Swedish officers, in accordance with the following seven articles, for administrative organisation, military instruction, and scientific tuition.

Art. 2. The number of Swedish officers, who will be engaged for three years, will be fourteen regimental officers and three staff officers.

Art. 3. Three other non-commissioned Swedish officers will be engaged for three years to assist the officers mentioned in the foregoing article (to form an army cadre and to instruct subalterns and individual privates).

Art. 4. The fourteen regimental officers will be divided in the army as follows:—

The Ministry of War	3 officers
" infantry	6 "
" cavalry	2 "
" artillery	1 officer
" military college	2 officers

Art. 5. The three staff officers will be divided as follows:—

The Ministry of War	1 officer
" infantry	1 "
" cavalry and artillery	1 "

Art. 6. The three non-commissioned officers will be divided as follows:—

The cavalry	1 officer
" artillery	1 "
" military college of subalterns	1 "

Art. 7. For the employment of the fourteen regimental officers, the three staff officers, and the three non-commissioned officers the Ministry of War is given a credit of 583,730 kran.

Art. 8. The division of the high and subordinate officers will be in accordance with the following table:—

The Ministry of War—	
The chief of the army employes, with the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel	1
Captain for the infantry	1
Captain for the artillery	1
Captain for the army administrative department	1
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The infantry—	
Captains for the infantry	3
First lieutenants	3
Captain for the infantry administrative department	1
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The cavalry—	
Captain for the cavalry	1
First lieutenant	1
Non-commissioned officer	1
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The artillery—	
First lieutenant for the artillery	1
Non-commissioned officer	1
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For the administrative departments of the artillery and cavalry—						
First lieutenant	1					
Officers' military college—						
Captain for the infantry	1					
Subalterns' military college—						
Infantry lieutenant	1					
Non-commissioned officer	1					
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Total	20					

[46100]

No. 305.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 214.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a statement showing the numbers of Russian troops at present in Persia.

I obtained this statement through the courtesy of my Russian colleague.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 305.

Statement respecting Russian Troops in Persia, October 30, 1911.

Ardebil	2,000
Tahreez	1,000
Gombad-i-Kabus	400
Mashad	200
Resht	150
Kazvin	52
Tehran	32
Isfahan	17*
Kermanshah	11
Kerman	4
Bushire	10
Urmia	12
Asirabad	12
Seistan	10
Turbat-i-Haidari	12
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Total	3,922

[46101]

No. 306.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 215.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 1, 1911.

THE course of the Cabinet has been by no means smooth during the past few weeks owing to the severe tension between the Ministers and the treasurer-general. It was this which was really the cause of the crisis reported in my telegram No. 498, when three of the Ministers resigned, their resignation so affecting the Regent and the Prime Minister that they too made up their minds to resign. It appears that the trouble arose from a sharp letter addressed by Mr. Shuster to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he complained of Vossuk-ed-Dowleh's action in settling two trifling Russian claims without his consent. Vossuk-ed-Dowleh considered the letter so offensive that he immediately tendered his resignation, which was followed by that of two of his colleagues. Realising, however, that his action was likely to lead to the upset of the whole Ministry, and that he was thus playing into the hands of Mr. Shuster's extremist supporters, he resumed office, and his example was followed by his two colleagues.

* At Isfahan the escort is to be increased to 200.

Since then there have been further resignations; amongst them that of Hakim-ul-Mulk, Minister of Finance, who it appears was compelled to take this course by the difficulties of his position between the clamours of his colleagues for money on the one side and Mr. Shuster's tight hold of the purse-strings on the other. Hakim-ul-Mulk's place has not yet been filled, and, indeed, the post of a Minister of Finance, controlled by Mr. Shuster in a Ministry which cannot reconcile itself to the wholesome restrictions placed by Mr. Shuster on expenditure, is a very difficult one, and it may well not be easy to find anyone willing to undertake it. The Prime Minister is said to be seeking someone who can stand up to Mr. Shuster. Such a one will be hard to find. There has been much talk of curtailing by a vote of the Medjliss, the Powers conferred upon Mr. Shuster by the law of the 13th June. There is no doubt that the law was passed without its full bearings being realised by those in power, but Moavined-Dowleh, the then Minister of Finance, who gave his imprimatur to the measure, even had he possessed the intelligence to realise its true nature, would have been too weak to fight it. He is naturally now much blamed by those who now find the fetters riveted, but they know that they would not have the bulk of even the moderates with them if they proposed any measure which might provoke Mr. Shuster's resignation. They did, indeed, decide on a discussion in the Medjliss as to the means of diminishing his powers, but the discussion never took place, for when at the sitting of the 23rd instant the Ministers proposed that the Medjliss should go into secret session to discuss matters of importance, the democrats, seeing what was coming, left the House in a body, so that there was no quorum. Since then as a result of several meetings between Mr. Shuster and the Cabinet, at one of which the Regent was himself present, the idea of curtailing the treasurer-general's powers has been abandoned, and a *modus vivendi* seems to have been arrived at, though it is idle to hope that the tension between Mr. Shuster and the present Cabinet will disappear. It must, indeed, I fear, be chronic except in the unpleasant and even dangerous contingency of the advent to power of a Cabinet of ultra-Nationalists, who, however, troublesome and dangerous they may be, are the only section of public men in Persia imbued with any real spirit of reform.

The Regent, whom Mr. Young saw yesterday, appeared disgusted with the demoralisation of the Cabinet and again talked of resigning. He evidently fears the responsibility which will fall on him when the Medjliss terminates on the 13th instant, and the question of prolonging its life in some form or other until the new elections take place is engaging the attention of the Ministers. In the absence of any code of laws, the presence of the Medjliss is the only check on unrestrained autocracy, and the rôle of autocrat is most repellent to Nasr-ul-Mulk. The responsibility would be less were there a complete and strong Cabinet, and this the Regent said was a primary desideratum. The vacant posts in the Cabinet can doubtless be filled, but I fear that a strong Ministry is an impossibility unless it has the backing of Mr. Shuster, and unfortunately to find a Cabinet which could really work in harmony with him recourse would have to be had to the extremists, and such a Cabinet would probably not only drive the Regent to resign, but soon provoke Russia beyond endurance.

My Russian colleague has received authorisation from his Government to join with me in making the communication to the Regent indicated in your telegram No. 312, but we have decided to defer taking this formal step for the moment. I lose, however, no opportunity of urging upon his Highness privately that I should view his resignation with dismay.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[46103]

No. 307.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 217.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 307.

*Summary of Events in Persia for October.**Tehran.*

Military Operations.—The defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh on the 27th September forms the subject of a separate despatch. Amir Mufakham, Sardar Jang and Moin Humayun have since returned to Tehran, while Sardar Mohtashem, Sardar Zafar, and Sardar Bahadur remained in the vicinity of Hamadan. Yeprem, who has received the title of "Sardar," returned to Tehran on the 22nd October.

The Medjliss.—The electoral law has at last been passed by the Medjliss. It provides for direct elections and 136 deputies instead of 120.

On the 5th October a motion, signed by forty-one deputies asking the Government to lay before the House all documents in their possession relating to reactionary intrigues and plots, was read, but so far the demand has not been responded to by the Ministers.

On the 10th October the Minister of War presented a project for the engagement of twenty Swedish officers for the reorganisation of the army. The proposal was agreed to unanimously, and a credit of some 11,000*l.* was voted for the pay of the officers for one year.

At the sitting of the 12th October the House approved of the renewal for three years, at 2,400 tomans a-year, of the contract of Mr. Bottin, who is employed in the arsenal.

On the 15th October a telegram was read which had been addressed by Mullah Mohammed Kazim Khorassani, the chief of the "Ulema" of Nejed, to the Regent and the Medjliss, protesting against the alleged disregard at Tehran of religious interdictions. The telegram has apparently not received much attention.

At the sitting of the 19th October the Under-Secretary for Education and Public Works was questioned concerning certain new buildings erected by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the south. He replied that in view of certain misrepresentations in this connection the Government had issued orders for the inspection of the buildings by a representative of the Persian commissioner.

At the sitting of the 21st October, the Cabinet presented a project for the lease of the Island of Hormuz to Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar. The project was opposed by the Democratic party on the ground that it had not been examined and sanctioned by the treasurer-general. The Government and their supporters contended that Mr. Shuster's imprimatur was not essential, and the project was read a first time.

On the 23rd October a licence for the establishment of a leather factory was approved, and on the 28th a concession applied for by a Persian subject to establish a sugar factory and for transport to and from certain coal mines received the approval of the House.

The Cabinet.—There has been considerable friction between the Cabinet and the treasurer-general. A Cabinet crisis was averted with difficulty on the 18th October, when several of the Ministers resigned. The Minister of Finance definitely resigned on the 23rd, and has not yet been replaced. The Minister of Justice resigned earlier in the month for reasons connected with the internal administration of his department, and has not yet been replaced.

Mr. Shuster and the Russian Consul-General.—On the 9th and 10th October, in consequence of the interference by the Russian consul-general in measures taken by the treasurer-general to confiscate the property of Shma-es-Sultaneh (the ex-Shah's brother), some unpleasant incidents took place. This matter forms the subject of a separate despatch.

Foreign Representatives.—Spain, which has so far been unrepresented at Tehran (Spanish interests having been in charge of the French Legation), has now started a legation, and M. José de Romero Dusmet has arrived in the capacity of Spanish chargé d'affaires.

Count Quadt Wykradt Isny, the German Minister, has left, and Herr von Schmidthal is in charge of the legation.

Miscellaneous.—The Countess Clermont Tonnerre, a somewhat eccentric French globe-trotter, has arrived at Tehran via Bagdad and Hamadan. She denies the stories current as to her connection with Salar-ed-Dowleh's march on Tehran, and now talks of travelling to the Gulf via Kerman, and of an alternative journey to Afghanistan.

[1524]

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Some feeble attempts have been made to organise demonstrations of sympathy with Turkey in her struggle with Italy, but the public is decidedly apathetic.

Tabreez.

At the end of September two English employés of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, who, at the request of the Russian consul-general, were a short distance from Tabreez repairing the line, were fired upon by some rebels. No one was injured, and the incident is now closed.

The investment of the town by Shuja-ed-Dowleh continues, and in the middle of October some serious fighting occurred, when the Nationalists attacked the Karamalik suburb, which was held by the rebels, and lost twenty-five killed and thirty wounded.

It is reported by His Majesty's consul that, according to trustworthy information, Rabin Khan, the notorious Royalist outlaw, has been secretly executed in prison at Tabreez.

Mujallid-es-Sultan, the ex-Shah's chamberlain, who landed in Persia at the same time as the late Arshad-ed-Dowleh, has been sent to Maragha as a prisoner by Shuja-ed-Dowleh in consequence of dissensions in camp.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

On the 20th October a telegram was received from the British consular agent at Astrabad, reporting that the ex-Shah was at Khoja Nafas, which is a few miles south of Gumesb Tepe. On the 30th October he telegraphed the news of the defeat of a Government force consisting of 200 men (reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 525 of 29th October as a force of 1,500 men, based on Russian telegram) under Sardar Mohy, by the ex-Shah's Turcomans. Sardar Mohy is said to have fled, and Astrabad is reported to be in danger of an attack by the Turcomans.

Zahir-ed-Dowleh, the new governor for Ghilan, has left Tehran for his post.

At the end of October a little over 100 Russian Cossacks were landed at Enzeli to increase the consular guard.

Meshed.

Prince Rukn-ed-Dowleh has been definitely appointed Governor-General of Khorassan, and proposes to leave Tehran for Meshed shortly.

The state of the province has continued quiet, the town of Meshed has not been disturbed, but the roads are, as usual, infested with robbers.

Nishapur has been placed under Khorassan, but Prince Nayer-ed-Dowleh, who is the principal landed proprietor of the district, is endeavouring to separate it again and to obtain the governorship as before.

Ispahan.

Some caravans have actually attempted to do the journey between Ispahan and Shiraz and *vice versa*. One caravan of about 400 animals reached Ispahan in the middle of September, having taken the Sarhad route and was not molested anywhere. There are constant reports of robberies on the road between Ispahan and Kumbukh attributed to Kuhgelouis. A large camel caravan arrived safely on the 2nd October with piece-goods from Hamadan. Traffic has been suspended for some time on the Ispahan-Ahwaz (Bakhtiari) road, and on the 7th October there were 2,174 packages awaiting downward dispatch from Ispahan. A caravan of over 800 camels carrying pipe tobacco actually left Ispahan, but hearing reports of robbers on the road, the camelmen dropped their loads and returned to Ispahan.

The governor, Sardar Ashja Bakhtiari, is said to leave most of the cares of State to his subordinates, who are greedy and unprincipled. The local anjuman ceased to sit after the arrival of the present governor in May last.

Hayder Khan, the Caucasian terrorist, returned from Shiraz on his way to Tehran at the end of September with a band of armed followers. He and his companions were disarmed at Ispahan.

Miss Ross, a lady doctor, was attacked by robbers while travelling from Ispahan to Shiraz, robbed of all her effects, and subjected to personal violence.

On the 20th October it was reported that the post from Shiraz to Ispahan accompanied by 300 soldiers of the Hamadan regiment encountered 200 Kuhgelouis, near Yezdikhost, and were routed by them after a severe conflict.

Various robberies of British merchandise are reported, and the usual claims have been presented to the local authorities.

The Bovair Ahmadis attacked a village in the vicinity of Abadeh in the middle of October, and completely looted it.

The detachments of Persian Cossacks under two Russian officers, which was sent from Tehran against Naib Hussein at Kashan, arrived at its destination on the 13th October, and after bombarding the town entered it the following day to find that Naib Hussein had again managed to get away. Ten days later Naib Hussein was reported to be in the vicinity of Kum plundering the villages as usual.

The Bakhtiari who are returning to their homes from Tehran are reported to be robbing travellers and posts on the road.

Yezd.

Prince Amir Azam, the Governor of Kerman, succeeded in entering Yezd at the beginning of October, in spite of the resistance of the mob. Some executions followed, and the British acting vice-consul reported that the town was quiet.

Sultanabad.

The British vice-consul reported on the 11th October that the state of the district was unsettled, and that in some parts taxes were still being collected for the Salar-ed-Dowleh, who was then on his way to Laristan via Malair and Nehavend with from 5,000 to 6,000 followers. Haji Seif-ed-Dowleh, a brother of Ain-ed-Dowleh, who had been nominated Governor of Sultanabad by Salar-ed-Dowleh, took refuge at the British vice-consulate after the defeat of the Prince, but subsequently left for Tehran.

Shiraz.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Soulet-ed-Dowleh left Shiraz on their way south on the 5th October, and Kavam-ul-Mulk left His Majesty's consulate the following day. It was generally thought that Nizam and Soulet left the town in consequence of the warning conveyed to them by His Majesty's Minister. The situation in the town of Shiraz was at once relieved, and Kavam-ul-Mulk took over the administration of the province on behalf of Ala-ed-Dowleh, whose appointment as Governor-General of Persia and the Gulf ports was publicly announced at Shiraz on the 10th October. Soulet-ed-Dowleh, before leaving Shiraz, openly declared his intention of disturbing the Bushire road, and this threat he carried out. The accounts of the depredations of his followers are too numerous to report. The telegraph lines have been much damaged by the Kashgais and other tribesmen both to the north and to the south of Shiraz, and men sent out to repair them have been robbed and ill-treated. The robberies of British goods on the southern roads are too numerous to catalogue. Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Soulet-ed-Dowleh parted company after leaving Shiraz. The former went as far as Daliki, and then returned to Komartakhteh, while the latter remained in the vicinity of Jerreh. The Persian Government have issued a proclamation proscribing Nizam-es-Sultaneh and forfeiting his estates. It is their intention to capture him if possible. Soulet-ed-Dowleh has been dismissed from the post of "Ilkhani" of the Kashgais, and his brother, Zaigham-ed-Dowleh, has been appointed to succeed him. He left Tehran on the 26th October for Shiraz. Ala-ed-Dowleh has not yet left Tehran, but says he will go as soon as the treasurer-general transfers a sum of money to Shiraz which is required for the payment of the Arab forces there. This Mr. Shuster has, so far, refused to do, fearing that the money will be squandered. The treasurer-general has engaged Mr. Alexander Schindler, formerly of the staff of the Imperial Bank, and proposes to send him as his representative to Shiraz to supervise the expenditure of money transferred in this way. It is announced by the Persian Government that a large force will accompany Ala-ed-Dowleh to Shiraz, and that they will include the Cossack detachment now at Kashan. The garrison of 5,000 troops stationed there last March have melted away unpaid, with the exception of some 300, who clamour fitfully for nine months arrears of pay and have now taken "bast" outside the British consulate.

Seistan.

The roads which continue to be unsafe all round Seistan are now also reported unsafe in southern and western Kainat.

Baluchi raiders have been active on the western borders of the Kainat, but the new Government delegate, Nassir-es-Sultaneh, is taking steps to deal with them.

Kerman.

His Majesty's consul writes on the 7th September that the condition of the province of Kerman is worse than at any time since his arrival in May 1910. The local government has hardly any power in the town and practically none in the province. The prices of bread and meat are rising, and the people are growing uneasy. The new governor is still at Yezil. Three robberies occurred in September on the Bunder Abbas road and the property of some Hindu merchants was robbed. The post is constantly being robbed on the Yezil, Bunder Abbas, and other roads.

Kermanshah and Hamadan.

On the 8th October a telegram arrived from Hamadan, addressed by the Bakhtiari khans, Sardar Zafar and Sardar Jang, to the clergy and merchants of Kermanshah, announcing their arrival there, and instructing them to detain Azad-es-Sultan, the governor nominated by Salar-ed-Dowleh. The Prince having been warned fled to the Turkish consulate. On the telegram becoming known, the populace robbed any Kallurs whom they found in the streets. Azad-es-Sultan eventually left the town and proceeded in the direction of Bagdad. Salar-ed-Dowleh left Hamadan by the Tusirkan road on the 3rd October with a small following, which looted the villages on the way. On the 4th the Government forces arrived at Showarin, near Hamadan, and looted the houses of Amir Afkham and his sons, Ehtesham-ed-Dowleh and Hissam-ul-Mulk. Sardar Zafar assumed the post of Governor of Hamadan. On the 15th Sardar Mozaffar (Daoud Khan, chief of the Kallurs) left the vicinity of Kermanshah for his tribal quarters. Letters were received from Salar-ed-Dowleh on the 13th October, written from Laristan, directing that forces should be collected and sent to join him. In answer he was invited to come himself to Kermanshah.

Bushire.

The Indian cavalry for Shiraz arrived on the 27th October, and the disembarkation was completed by the 30th without casualty. An attempt was made by some of the clergy of Bushire to cause a boycott by intimidating the boatmen and others, but this was eventually overcome.

The governor of the Gulf ports, Muvakkar-ed-Dowleh, has telegraphed to Ala-ed-Dowleh that the inclusion of his governorship in the Fars appointment is very detrimental to his prestige and usefulness. He has declared that he will resign if the arrangement is not reversed. If Ala-ed-Dowleh actually goes to Shiraz he will probably reappoint Darya Beggi to the Gulf ports.

Mohammerah.

Sheikh Farhan now appears to be on the best of terms with the Sheikh of Mohammerah. He has been appointed Governor of Shavur, and has received a robe of honour.

The cholera epidemic has been somewhat severe, and several Europeans have died of it.

Bunder Abbas.

The road to Kerman has been closed to caravans owing to the appearance of robbers on it.

G. P. CHURCHILL,
Oriental Secretary.

[46105]

No. 308.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 219.)
Sir,

Tehran, November 3, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two notes which I addressed to the Persian Government on the receipt of your telegram No. 314 of the

23rd ultimo and of subsequent correspondence on the subject of the increase of the consular escorts at Bushire, Ispahan, and Shiraz.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 308.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

REFERRING to my note of the 10th October and to your Excellency's notes of the 11th and 18th October, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the reinforcements for the consular escorts have now started from India, and are now due to arrive shortly at Bushire. I shall have the honour to inform your Excellency in due course how these reinforcements will be distributed, and, in the meantime, I am to assure your Excellency that if the Persian Government will devise an effective scheme to restore security and protect the roads the British consular escorts will be used solely as consular guards to protect the consulates and British lives and property in the towns where they are located, and will not patrol the roads or make expeditions during the putting into execution of the Persian scheme.

When such scheme is in operation and is effective the reinforcements of the escorts will be withdrawn.

I avail, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 308.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

WITH reference to my note of to-day, announcing the impending arrival at Bushire of reinforcements of the British consular escorts, I have the honour to request that the necessary orders may be given for the usual customs facilities for these troops.

I also request your Excellency to be so good as to cause the necessary instructions to be sent to the governor of the Gulf ports to afford his full co-operation to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in connection with the landing of these troops and for the dispatch northwards of such of them as are intended for Shiraz and Ispahan.

I avail, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 308.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my two notes of the 24th instant respecting the arrival at Bushire of reinforcements of the consular escorts at the consulate-general at that port and at the British consulates at Shiraz and Ispahan, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the governor of the Gulf ports has informed His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire that, though he has asked for instructions, he has not received them, and that he is therefore unable to co-operate with the consul-general in connection with the landing of reinforcements.

I learn, too, that boatmen and others have been intimidated, and that endeavours are being made to provoke an agitation against the landing of British troops.

I need not point out to your Excellency the serious consequences of any opposition to the landing of the British troops, but I must request your Excellency to be good enough to send immediate instructions to the governor of the Gulf ports to afford his full co-operation to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire and to do his utmost to prevent any agitation against the troops.

I avail, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[1524]

2 Z

Enclosure 4 in No. 308.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

I HAVE taken note of the contents of your Excellency's communication of the 24th October respecting the arrival of reinforcements for the consular guard, and I have the honour to say that the Persian Government maintain their protest against this measure, as made to your Excellency in my notes of the 11th and 18th instant. The Persian Government continue to consider the presence of these reinforcements as the greatest obstacle to the execution of the scheme which they had elaborated for the maintenance of order in Fars. Therefore, I have the honour to point out that, in spite of the disorder caused by the conflict between the inhabitants, the continuance of which was only due to the fact that the Government were occupied in dealing with unusual events in the north and west, the Persian Government do not see any justification for the dispatch of a military force by His Britannic Majesty's Government for the protection of their consulates. As I have already often stated to your Excellency, the Persian Government consider that the scheme they have formulated for the maintenance of order and for the protection of the lives and property of British subjects in those parts is sufficient, and they consider their former protest to be in full force.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 308.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

I HAVE received your Excellency's note of the 22nd instant respecting the arrival at Bushire of reinforcements for the consular guards, and I have the honour to inform you that the necessary telegrams on the subject have been sent to the Governor of Bushire.

With regard, however, to the agitation amongst the inhabitants which your Excellency had asked me to prevent, I may point out that no Government can stop public feelings, and it is impossible for the Government to do so in the present case. When it was pointed out in my notes of the 11th and 18th instant that the arrival of the consular guards would interfere with the execution of the proposed organisation, it was not only considered that it would weaken the Government's scheme, but public excitement, which might lead to new difficulties, had also been foreseen. Now that indications of public excitement have become evident the Persian Government will do their utmost to prevent public opposition, but your Excellency will surely admit that public disgust and similar feelings cannot be prevented, as they are the manifestation of personal sentiment.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

[46136]

No. 309.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. (Received November 20.)

(No. 336.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1911.

AT a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday his Excellency, after dwelling on the most recent misdeeds of Mr. Shuster, said that he could see no issue from the difficulties of the situation in Persia.

The latest proceedings on Mr. Shuster's part, to which his Excellency referred, were his refusal, notwithstanding Sir G. Barclay's remonstrances, to rescind the nomination of Mr. Lavoff as Treasury agent at Tabreez and the course which he had taken in regard to Russian lease-holders in Persia. So far as I gathered from M. Nératof, the Treasurer-general had quite recently addressed a circular direct to Russian holders of property under lease, whether from the Persian Government or from private individuals, calling upon them to notify their claims to him, failing which

they would not be recognised by the Persian Government. In thus ignoring the Russian consulate-general Mr. Shuster had, M. Nératof said, acted contrary to all established usage in Persia.

On previous occasions, when M. Nératof had complained to me of Mr. Shuster's doings, I had unsuccessfully endeavoured, as I have had the honour to report to you, to induce his Excellency to indicate some course of action which he would propose that the two Governments should take in order to put a stop to occurrences which were obnoxious to Russia, and so to prevent the necessity arising for Russia taking strong measures in the protection of her interests. M. Nératof had always expressed doubts as to the utility of any suggestions which I made to him. He did not think that any steps which the two representatives could take would induce Mr. Shuster either to change his attitude or to resign, or would cause the Persian Government to intervene with sufficient energy in the question. The only idea which his Excellency had put forward was that conditions might eventually be attached to the Seligman loan which would establish an effective kind of control over Mr. Shuster's actions. When M. Nératof now declared that he could see no way out of the present difficulties I expressed the opinion (of course as a personal one merely) that, at the point which things had reached, the only issue consisted in bringing pressure on the Persian Government to terminate Mr. Shuster's appointment, even if this should involve the payment to him of an indemnity. It was plain, I said, that so long as Mr. Shuster retained his post, the dangerous conflict between him and the Russian Government would continue. M. Nératof, in reply, said that he feared that the Persian Government would not have the courage to break Mr. Shuster's contract in the face of the opposition which such a step would arouse in the Medjliss.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[46137]

No. 310.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. (Received November 20.)

(No. 337.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report in continuation of my despatch No. 330 of the 11th instant that I called on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening, the 14th, to enquire whether any answer had been received to the note handed by M. Poklewski to the Persian Government on the 11th instant. M. Nératof said that he had heard nothing as yet from M. Poklewski, and that if he did not receive a satisfactory communication next morning the Russian Government would act.

I had seen a telegram in that day's papers reporting that the Regent and the Persian Ministers had resigned in consequence of the Russian note. I referred to this report, and I said to M. Nératof that, while I fully realised that the present question was the concern of Russia, it was one which indirectly interested His Majesty's Government (to which his Excellency cordially assented), and therefore I felt justified in suggesting to him that, if owing to the resignation of the Persian Government, it was materially impossible for Persia to comply immediately with the Russian demands, it might be more generous for the Russian Government, instead of taking measures forthwith, to name a definite time—a week for instance—within which the demands must be fulfilled.

M. Nératof replied, that he was perfectly convinced that nothing would be gained by this delay; it was evident that the resignation of the Persian Ministers was merely a device to avoid compliance with Russia's demands, and whatever Ministers held office at the expiry of the week's grace would resign for the same purpose.

He went on to say that, if Russia should take the measures contemplated, she maintained (as things now stood) the undertakings which she had given to His Majesty's Government with regard to Persia, and she would give you through the Russian Ambassador assurances similar to those which she gave on the former occasion when Russian troops went to Kazvin.

To-day, the 15th instant, I had another interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. He informed me that M. Poklewski had reported that the Persian Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had resigned, and that there was no present likelihood of a compliance with the Russian demands. Under these circumstances M. Nératof said it was his personal opinion that Russia must take action forthwith. I then made a strong appeal to his Excellency in favour of allowing

Persia a short further period of grace. I suggested that the Russian Government might declare that, in view of the resignation of the Persian Ministry, they would not take the immediate action on which they had determined, but they would allow, say, three days, in which Persia could give the required satisfaction. I urged, that if the Russian Government acted in this way they would be in a better position to defend subsequent strong measures, should these be forced upon them. Otherwise, they would be accused of taking advantage of the temporary absence of a Persian Government to intervene by force in that country.

M. Nératof on this occasion did not altogether decline to entertain my plea for a further delay. Without giving me a definite answer he held out some hopes that he might take the course suggested, but he said very positively that five days having already elapsed since the presentation of the Russian note, it would be necessary if Russia accorded a further delay that she should also increase her demands. It occurred to him that he might put forward a demand for the dismissal of the officials responsible for the action of the gendarmerie, including Mr. Shuster, under whose orders that body stood. This was an idea which, he said, he must consider further.

I felt, of course, strongly, that if the present crisis in Russo-Persian relations could be utilised to procure the departure of Mr. Shuster, a very desirable object would have been attained. I feared, however, that if to the demands already made by Russia there was now added a demand for Mr. Shuster's dismissal, it might greatly increase the difficulty of Persia complying, and therefore also the chances of Russia sending her troops to Kazvin, and perhaps to Tehran. It would thus lead precisely to that result which His Majesty's Government were anxious to avoid. I accordingly addressed a letter to M. Nératof this evening, of which a copy is enclosed, expressing my personal opinion that it would be better not to put forward a demand of this kind at the present stage of the question. When I left his Excellency he had not made up his mind how to proceed, but promised to inform me as soon as a decision was reached.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 310.

Mr. O'Beirne to M. Nératof.

Mon cher M. Nératof,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 2 (15) novembre, 1911.

VOUS me permettez, j'en suis sûr, de vous exprimer une idée personnelle au sujet dont nous parlions tout à l'heure.

C'est que si aux demandes déjà formulées vous ajoutez une demande pour le renvoi de Mr. Shuster, cela pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les chances que vous fussiez obligés d'envoyer des troupes; car il se pourrait que le Gouvernement persan fût prêt à céder sur les autres points, mais ne fût pas capable de renvoyer Mr. Shuster.

Donc il serait mieux à mon avis, de ne pas, *at the present stage of the question*, demander le renvoi du trésorier général. Vous savez que je conserve toujours l'espoir que les Persans finiront par vous donner la satisfaction que vous avez demandée.

Votre, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[46169]

No. 311.

Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 88.)

Sir,

Copenhagen, November 15, 1911.

ON the receipt of your despatch No. 13 of the 11th July last I did not fail to inform the Danish Government that His Majesty's Government could not afford facilities for a Danish geographical expedition to explore the lands bordering on the Persian Gulf. This decision was not, of course, very agreeable to the Royal Danish Geographical Society, who had collected a fund for the object in question, and had, moreover, published a programme of the proposed expedition. There has been some discussion in the newspapers in consequence, which blame the society for having declared their intentions before they had made sure that they could be carried out,

and for having thereby interfered with the prospects of Lieutenant Davidsen and M. Raunkiaer, who were to have led the expedition. The upshot of the whole affair now is that it is announced that Lieutenant Davidsen has retired from the army on dis- about to proceed to Egypt on his own account, whence he proposes, after a couple of years' preparation and study of the Arabic language, to penetrate across the desert and explore Arabia. M. Raunkiaer, on the other hand, started on the 12th instant for Bussorah, via Constantinople, Aleppo, and the Euphrates Valley, where he proposes to carry out meteorological, ethnographical, topographical, and botanical researches in the neighbourhood. It is announced that the Ottoman Government have given their consent to the dispatch of the latter expedition, which will be absent about six months.

I have the honour to enclose translation of extracts from the "Riget" and "Politiken" recording interviews with Lieutenant Davidsen and Admiral de Richelieu, president of the Royal Geographical Society, and giving details as to the objects and scope of the two expeditions.*

I have, &c.

CONYNTHAM GREENE.

[46138]

No. 312.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 338.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 16, 1911.

THE "Retch," a newspaper which is frequently well informed in matters connected with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, publishes in its issue of the 14th November a paragraph to the effect that "it is informed that the official announcement of M. Poklewski-Koziell's retirement from the post of Minister at Tehran will be made within the next few days." The paragraph goes on to state that M. Poklewski's retirement is to be attributed to a report addressed by M. Pokhiltonof, Russian consul-general at Tehran, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which the Minister's policy is sharply criticised, and in which he is accused of having neglected Russian interests, and thereby contributed to the growth of English influence at Tehran. It is stated that M. Pokhiltonof forwarded a copy of this report to M. Poklewski, and that both M. Kokowtsof and M. Nératof find that the accusations brought against the Minister are worthy of consideration. Finally, the paragraph states that M. Klemm, who is at present head of the Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which deals with Persia and the Middle East, will be appointed to succeed M. Poklewski at Tehran.

It will be remembered that M. Klemm was formerly Russian consul-general at Meshed.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[46140]

No. 313.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 340.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 17, 1911.

WITH reference to previous correspondence concerning the latest Russo-Persian incident, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which I received late last night from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that he had reached the conclusion that the Russian Government could not wait longer for a reply from the Persian Government to the demands put forward by Russia, and that orders had been given for the dispatch of troops to Kazvin.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[1524]

* Not printed.

3 A

Enclosure in No. 313.

M. Nératof to Mr. O'Beirne.

Cher Mr. O'Beirne,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 3 (16) novembre, 1911.

J'ai bien réfléchi sur notre conversation d'hier et j'ai conclu qu'il nous serait impossible d'attendre plus longtemps la réponse du Gouvernement persan, ainsi que vous l'aviez suggéré. Je pense que nous avons donné une preuve suffisante de notre esprit de conciliation en attendant jusqu'ici. Il ne faut pas oublier que nous sommes obligés de compter avec notre opinion publique, qui, comme vous avez dû le remarquer, est excessivement montée contre la Perse.

En conséquence, le lieutenant de Sa Majesté au Caucase a reçu l'ordre de faire partir immédiatement les troupes destinées pour Kazvine. Il se passera sans doute plusieurs jours entre le départ du détachement de Bakou et son arrivée à Kazvine, ce qui donnera aux Persans encore un certain temps pour réfléchir afin de se soumettre à nos exigences.

Je viens de télégraphier au Comte Benckendorff de donner à Sir Edward Grey connaissance de la décision prise par nous.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

A. NERATOF.

[46322]

No. 314.

Mirza Meluli Khan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

THE Persian Minister presents his compliments to Sir Edward Grey, and, with reference to his calls at the Foreign Office regarding the recent policy of Russia towards Persia, has the honour to enclose the translation of a telegram, which he has just received from his Government, regarding the decision of the Russian Government to dispatch troops to Persia. The Persian Minister begs most earnestly to recommend this matter to Sir Edward Grey's immediate attention. The hope of the Persian Government and of the entire Persian nation rests on the ancient and traditional friendship of Great Britain, to whom they appeal to prevent the violation of the integrity of their country without the least justification.

The Persian Minister will call at the Foreign Office to-morrow (Monday) morning. In order that there should be no loss of time he has at once sent to Sir Edward Grey the telegram from his Government.

Persian Legation, London, November 19, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 314.

Persian Government to Mirza Meluli Khan.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

November 19, 1911.

THE interpreter of the Russian Legation called yesterday at 5 o'clock at the Foreign Office, and announced the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the legation and this Foreign Office and the dispatch of troops to Persia. I have informed Sir George Barclay that the reply to the Russian Minister has not been put off; the delay in replying was due solely to the crisis in the Cabinet. The new Cabinet will be formed to-night, or, at the latest, to-morrow morning, when the reply to the note will be sent. The Russian Government should therefore refrain from taking any measures until the reply of the note is sent. When the Cabinet is formed and the demands of the Russian Government are accepted, under *force majeure*, there can no longer be any cause for the breaking off of diplomatic relations and for dispatch of troops. We depend strongly on His Britannic Majesty's Government to prove at this hour their ancient and traditional friendship.

[46215]

No. 315.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 586.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, November 19, 1911.

MY telegram No. 574 of 15th November: Escort for Miss Ross. Force left Shiraz yesterday.

[46130]

No. 316.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 587.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 19, 1911.

MY telegram No. 583.

Hope of Minister for Foreign Affairs as to speedy solution of crisis has not been fulfilled, Medjliss objecting in a session late last night to proposed new Cabinet.

Medjliss does not at present appear disposed to ratify any Ministry prepared to yield to Russian demands.

(Sent to embassy.)

[46216]

No. 317.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 588.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, November 19, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 292 of 4th October.

Colonel Douglas telegraphs from Shiraz that, owing to very limited accommodation here and urgent necessity for providing cover for men and horses before the severe winter, they are placing contracts for building temporary quarters and stables.

I have asked for estimate, but meanwhile, in view of urgency of case, I have sanctioned necessary expenditure.

(Repeated to India.)

[46300]

No. 318.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 589.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 20, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 325.

Sepoy guard left Shiraz on the 18th November. Acting consul reports that two Japanese subjects who had been informed that sepoys could not be responsible for their safety, and who were travelling ahead of the guard, were completely stripped yesterday by a large party of Boir Ahmadas near Dastarjin. Acting consul has ordered sepoys not to advance until a local Persian force, dispatch of which he is endeavouring to arrange for, has occupied neighbouring hills, and to return to Zanjan if there is any doubt as to their getting through safely.

I have approved.

[46365]

No. 319.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 290.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 20, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 288 of the 19th November.

In a conversation which I had this afternoon with M. Nératof I told his Excellency of what passed at my interview yesterday with M. Kokovtsoff, and I made to him the communication about Mr. Shuster, as instructed in your telegram No. 698 of the 17th November.

M. Nératof expressed great satisfaction at this communication, and told me in confidence that the United States Government, whom he had sounded on the subject, had assured him that they did not intend to intervene in any way on Mr. Shuster's behalf.

In discussing the question when the Russian troops would eventually be withdrawn, M. Nératof gave me to understand that they would be withdrawn without Russia presenting any further demands if the demands already formulated were complied with by the time that the Russian force reached Persian territory. If, on the other hand, the troops had to proceed beyond the frontier, then it might be necessary for Russia to increase her demands, and she would then probably insist on Shuster being dismissed. M. Nératof feared, however, that it would be far from easy to secure compliance with such a demand.

In our conversation yesterday M. Kokovtsoff attached no such condition to the withdrawal of the troops.

[46054]

No. 320.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 363.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 20, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see St. Petersburg telegram No. 288 of yesterday.

We have every reason to believe, that if Persian Government apologise and replace gendarmerie by Persian Cossacks, Russian troops will be withdrawn.

You should let Persian Government know of this and point out that no time should be lost in complying with Russian demands.

[46054]

No. 321.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 702.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 20, 1911.

I APPROVE your language as reported in your telegram No. 288 of the 19th November.

You should inform Russian Government that I appreciate M. Kokovtsoff's friendly sentiments and his frank expression of Russian policy. I am glad to hear that a delay will be accorded before an advance to Tehran takes place, and that troops will be withdrawn as soon as Persian Government comply with Russian Government's demands.

[46471]

No. 322.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 701.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 20, 1911.

THE Persian Minister came to see me to-day and spoke at length regarding the advance of Russian troops.

With regard to the merits of the case, I told him that I could not discuss the subject since the interest in the property involved was Russian and not British; Shuster's attitude, however, has generally been so regardless of Russia, I might even say, so provocative, that one could hardly expect Russia to regard the incident leniently.

The Persian Minister then asked me for my advice. I told him that Persian Government had no choice but to comply with two Russian demands for a formal apology and substitution of Persian cossacks for Treasury gendarmes. I added that such compliance should be made at once, as time was lost by making conditions. He answered that the Persian Government would instantly comply with these two demands, and that he was in a position to promise that compliance would be carried out if they received an assurance that Russian troops would not advance further, and if we would intervene for the purpose. He pointed out that his Government's position would be untenable if they complied and troops were not withdrawn.

I said that I could not give any assurance on Russia's behalf regarding Russian troops, and that I did not suppose she would admit official intervention on a point in which, as I understood, she considered her honour to be involved; all I could do was to make known at St. Petersburg what the Persian Minister had said.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I was left with the impression that a settlement can be effected, and that, if Russian Government desire it, I am ready to communicate their views formally. You may use your discretion as to suggesting to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, having heard through me that Persian Government are ready to comply with two demands stipulated, he should allow M. Poklewski to arrange the matter either informally at Tehran or formally by a renewal of diplomatic relations.

[46396]

No. 323.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 199.)

Sir,

Stockholm, November 18, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 194 of the 11th November, I have the honour to state that the press publishes to-day the names of the seven officers who have been designated by the War Office to proceed to Persia in order to reorganise the gendarmerie. It is added that no further nominations will take place, and it is understood that, in consequence of complications which are likely to occur in Persia in the immediate future, it is not proposed to send any officers to organise the Persian army. It may therefore be concluded that the proposal to that effect has fallen through.

The names of the officers are as follows:—

Captain Glimstedt, Gota Life Guards. Born 1871, entered the army 1893, entered the service of the Congo Free State 1894, returned 1898, captain 1898.

Captain Folke, Varmlands regiment. Born 1879, captain this year; he is married, and his wife will accompany him.

Rittmeister Siefert, Scania Dragoons. Born 1875.

Lieutenant Count Lewenhaupt, Scania Hussars. Born 1877, lieutenant 1904; a member of the well-known family of that name, one of whom was Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Lieutenant Borell, Gothland infantry regiment. Born 1882, lieutenant 1907.

Intendent Nicolin, Army Service Corps. Born 1878.

Lieutenant Noren Brandel, Tonkoping regiment. Born 1860, lieutenant 1906.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[46382]

No. 324.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 539.)

Sir,

Paris, November 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to my despatch No. 435 of the 7th ultimo, that the Russian Ambassador told me last night that Sardar Khan, the Bakhtiari chief, had paid him a visit, and had informed him that he was about to return to Persia, as he believed that his presence there might be of use in bringing about some return to order. Formerly he had been opposed to Russian influence in Persia. He now realised that the proper policy for his country was to lean on Russia and England, and he would follow it in any circumstances in which he might have to act.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1524]

[46378]

No. 325.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 590.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ex clair.**Tehran, November 21, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 589 of 20th November.

Sepoys have continued journey unmolested.

[46531]

No. 326.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 591.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

CAPTAIN STOKES.

I have communicated your message to Stokes, as instructed in your telegrams Nos. 353 and 356 of the 16th and 18th instant respectively. I fear, however, that I cannot persuade him to decide on departure.

He declares that he pledged himself to Shuster to accept the appointment at the moment when we notified Shuster that before taking up the appointment Stokes must resign his commission. He therefore asks that the "question" which he requested me to convey through you to the Secretary of State for India (see my telegram No. 558 of the 12th instant) may receive a direct answer, which would, at least, show that it was only *force majeure* which had forced him to break his pledge.

[46540]

No. 327.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 592.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

I RECEIVED a visit yesterday from two of the Bakhtiari khans, who called on behalf of their tribes to lay their view of the situation before me and to ask my advice.

They said that democrats and Shuster between them not only made Government impossible, but had gravely endangered Persia by provoking Russia. Democrats were now obstructing in Medjliss the formation of a Cabinet, which Samsam-es-Sultaneh had designed to curtail power of Shuster and give satisfaction to Russia. Bakhtiari could not remain spectators of the ruin of their country, and they were hesitating whether to use their position to effect a *coup d'Etat* and take power into their own hands, which they could easily do, or to return to their own home, leaving Persia a defenceless prey to ex-Shah or Salar-ed-Dowleh. They would gladly return to their home if they had guarantee of two Powers that whoever is in power at Tehran would not molest them in their territory, limits of which ought to be defined.

They then asked whether *coup d'Etat* would lead to intervention of the two Powers. They declared that Government they established could easily dismiss Shuster and would work in harmony with the two Powers.

I declined to give any advice, and told them that all responsibility must rest with them, but, after consulting with Russian Minister, who visited me immediately after my interview with khans, and was himself expecting a visit from them, we thought that abstention from any advice might be regarded as an encouragement to act at once, and we therefore agreed to speak to them on the following lines in both our names: General friendly attitude of the British Government to Bakhtiari as to special assurances given them last summer by Russian Government ensured for the Bakhtiari, should they decide to hold aloof, fair treatment whoever was in power. Question of a *coup d'Etat* was a new one, on which we could not advise them without consulting our Governments. They said that they wanted a clear pronouncement as to the attitude of the two Powers towards their ambitions, and as to guarantees that could be given in the event of their holding aloof, and meanwhile would suspend action for a few days.

The idea of the Bakhtiari, as explained to Russian Minister, is that they should form a Cabinet of their own choice capable of keeping Medjliss in order, and of

dismissing it if this is found impossible; in latter case they foresee Regent would resign, and they look to replacing him by a Bakhtiari.
(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[46541]

No. 328.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 593.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Russian assurances to the Bakhtiari referred to in my immediately preceding telegram were given when Samsam-es-Sultaneh paid his official visit on assuming office to the Russian Minister last summer—at the beginning of the insurrection. Samsam said that if the Medjliss made it impossible for him to carry out his desire to work in a manner friendly to the two Powers he would resign rather than lose the friendship of the latter. He begged the Russian Minister to give guarantees that whatever Government might come to power here his tribe would not be molested in any way.

M. Poklewski gave him the reply, which was subsequently approved by the Russian Government, to the effect that it was the duty of the British Government, in view of the traditional British friendship for the Bakhtiari and of the position of the two Powers in Persia, to see that whatever Government might be in power, established a *modus vivendi* with the Bakhtiari.

[46542]

No. 329.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 594.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 363 of 20th November.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh has formed a Cabinet, and was only prevented by indisposition from presenting it to Medjliss to-day. I am assured that it will be presented to-morrow.

Orders signed by all the Ministers have been sent to Shuster to withdraw gendarmes and hand over properties to delegates of Persian Government, and Cossack Brigade has been ordered to furnish guards.

Sounded as to whether an apology from Persian chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg would satisfy Russia, I have replied that I had no assurance that it would, and that to enquire would waste valuable time. I am now assured that Minister for Foreign Affairs will apologise as soon as Cabinet has been presented to Medjliss. Minister for Foreign Affairs begs me to express his gratitude for your good offices.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[46539]

No. 330.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 291.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 21, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I have acted in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 702 and 704 of the 20th November.

The communication, M. Neratof said, was a most important one and he begged me to thank you for it as also for your offer to act as intermediary with the Persian Government. He must, however, consult M. Kokovtsoff before he could give me a definite answer. His personal opinion was that it might be possible to give the Persian Government the assurance for which they asked if a settlement had been reached before the Russian troops were disembarked. They were expected to arrive at Enzeli by Thursday.

On my suggesting that orders might be sent by telegraph to delay the disembarkation of the troops, he replied that they would have to be landed at once if the weather were bad.

He then observed that it seemed a pity not to take advantage of the present incident in order to set affairs at Tehran on a normal footing. The attainment of this object was to the interest of both Governments. The constitution at present was working in a one-sided manner. No executive powers belonged of right to the Medjliss, but that body had arrogated such powers to itself, and it would be well to restrict it to a purely legislative rôle to allow more power to the Regent and to constitute a Senate. Then there was the question of Mr. Shuster. As long as that gentleman remained friction was bound to arise constantly and there would be no hope of settling outstanding questions such as that of the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre to Tabreez.

I objected, that if the withdrawal of the Russian troops were to be made conditional on the carrying through of this programme it would be months before they were withdrawn. I pointed out that the only condition which M. Kokovtsoff had attached to their withdrawal was that Persia should comply with the two demands already presented by Russia, nor had he qualified his assurance by any condition as to compliance being made before the Russian troops landed on Persian soil. It was evident, moreover, that he had had Kasvin in his mind when he gave me his assurance about their withdrawal, for he had promised to accord a delay on their arrival at that place. I said that I knew that you attached great importance to this matter and I would therefore suggest that the assurances given to me by M. Kokovtsoff should be strictly adhered to, and that M. Poklewski should tell the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when the latter came to make his apologies, that Russia had recalled her troops in the confident hope that now the Persian Government would negotiate with him for placing the relations between their two Governments on a stable and friendly basis, and for settling all outstanding questions. I said that I felt sure that if the Russian Government adopted this course you would do everything in your power to assist them in obtaining a settlement of their outstanding questions.

M. Nératof observed that it was not known to the Persian Government that M. Kokovtsoff had given me assurances. I accordingly informed him of the instructions that you had sent to Sir G. Barclay to the effect that he should tell the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government had every reason to believe that if they complied with the two Russian demands the troops would be withdrawn. I explained that you had taken this action in the hope that a settlement would thereby be accelerated.

M. Nératof said that he was no less anxious than yourself to obtain the recall of the troops, but that the Russian Government, when once this was effected, would be powerless to prevent the occurrence of fresh incidents which might again necessitate the despatch of troops or to obtain any guarantees for the future. He would discuss the matter with M. Kokovtsoff and speak to me again to-morrow.

[46677] No. 331.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 299.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1911.

THE councillor of the Russian Embassy read to Sir A. Nicolson to-day a telegram from the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs saying that the United States Ambassador had been to see him, and had, by order of his Government, informed him that they took no interest in Mr. Shuster, that they disapproved of the whole line of conduct of that gentleman, and that they did not intend in any way to interfere in the dispute raised by his recent action in Persia. The United States Government expressed the hope that the Russian Government were satisfied with the attitude of the United States representative at Tehran.

M. Nératof thanked Mr. Rockhill for the above communication, and said that the Russian Government were quite satisfied with the attitude of the United States representative at Tehran—and that whatever occurred the Russian Government would always recollect that Mr. Shuster was a United States citizen.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46543]

No. 332.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 595.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

MY telegram No. 588 of 19th November.

Estimated cost of building quarters and stables is 4,500l.

In view of heavy cost I have instructed acting consul to suspend action until sanction is given by Government, but work on stables began some days ago, and contract for these, amounting to 6,500 tomans, has been signed by builders and will have to stand.

[46605]

No. 333.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 596.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please see telegram No. 290 from St. Petersburg of the 20th November.

Your telegram No. 363 of the 20th reached me yesterday, and I at once acted on the instructions it conveyed, and left a *pro-memoria* at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the morning.

The announcement made to me last night by the Persian Government (see my telegram No. 594) was doubtless due to my message, which I know was discussed by the members of the new Cabinet and by prominent deputies of the Medjliss.

If the Persian Government comply with the Russian demand with the promptitude foreshadowed in my telegram, it will place us in an exceedingly awkward position if the Russian Government now use the presence of Russian troops on Persian territory as a leverage for further demands. I understand some troops have already landed.

[46682]

No. 334.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 294.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 22, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 291 of the 21st November.

In communicating the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 594 of the 21st November to M. Nératof this afternoon, I said that I trusted that no difficulties would be made about the withdrawal of the Russian troops now that the Persian Government had signified their willingness to comply with Russia's two demands.

To this M. Nératof replied that the situation had now been somewhat altered by the fact that part of the Russian force had already been landed this morning, while the rest of it was due to arrive in a day or two. A settlement would of course be facilitated by Persia's compliance with the two demands, but it would not now be possible for Russia to withdraw the troops until she had secured some guarantee that her relations with the Persian Government would be placed on a normal basis and that satisfaction would be given in pending questions, e.g., in that of the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre to Tabreez. If such a guarantee were not obtained there would be nothing to prevent a new incident arising at any moment.

I pointed out that this attitude was not in harmony with the assurances which M. Kokovtsoff had given me, and that His Majesty's Government would be placed in the invidious position of being reproached by the Persian Government with having induced them by false pretences to comply with Russia's two demands. M. Nératof asked whether I was sure that it was solely owing to our advice that the Persian Government had yielded, and whether it was not a fact that you had told the Persian representative in London that Russia would probably decline intervention in this matter. I said that the conciliatory attitude now shown by the Persian Government was, I thought, chiefly due to the influence which you had brought to bear upon them.

[1524]

M. Nératof then said that he had spoken last night to M. Kokovtsoff at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. M. Kokovtsoff had told him that he held to the assurance which he had given to me as to Russia's policy and to his promise that a delay would be accorded when the troops reached Kazvin; but that he had not intended, in giving me his specific assurance as to the troops being recalled, to intimate that all discussion with the Persian Government for a general settlement of outstanding questions was excluded. The dispatch of troops had not only been very inconvenient to the Russian Government but had involved great expense, and they would have to raise the question of the cost of the expedition. On my asking whether this meant that Russia would demand an indemnity from Persia, M. Nératof replied that this question had not yet been decided. His Excellency observed that my account of what had taken place at my conversation with M. Kokovtsoff's had caused him great surprise. I replied that, on my side also, M. Kokovtsoff's assurances had gone beyond what I had ventured to hope for and I had, therefore, in the course of our conversation, induced him to repeat them twice over. He had, moreover, given me to understand, when I sounded him about Mr. Shuster, that the question of Russia presenting fresh demands had not yet been discussed. The retention of the Russian troops in Persia would thus be very difficult to explain.

It was apparently useless to attempt to shake the decision arrived at by the Council of Ministers, and I accordingly urged upon M. Nératof that the Russian Government might, at any rate, stop the further advance of the troops. To this he replied that the general in command had entire control of the conduct of the military operations, but that the troops would probably be encamped somewhere between Enzeli and Resht for at least a few days. I said that the general must be told that an advance had been rendered unnecessary by Persia's compliance with the Russian demands. M. Nératof said that he thought it possible that the force might for the present be detained at Resht if Persia gave satisfaction.

At a later stage of our conversation, however, M. Nératof reverted to the plea that it was necessary that the Persian Government should be reformed on the lines to which reference was made in my telegram No. 291 of the 21st November, and said that Mr. Shuster must be got rid of, suggesting that Great Britain should give Russia a free hand to procure his dismissal. I pointed out that His Majesty's Government, as I had already told him, had intimated that they would offer no opposition to a demand for Mr. Shuster's dismissal, but I added that this must be effected by diplomatic methods. He replied that the only way to effect it was by occupying Tehran, and he was at a loss to understand why the idea of such an occupation perturbed us so greatly. I remarked that an assurance from Russia that she had no ulterior designs might be accepted by us, but would hardly be accepted by the general public, and that the result would be that our understanding might be prejudiced.

I pressed M. Nératof repeatedly to reconcile the decision taken by the Council of Ministers yesterday with the assurances given me on Sunday by M. Kokovtsoff, but he entirely failed to do so. The only explanation that I can offer is that M. Kokovtsoff, in his anxiety to give evidence of his good intentions, may have spoken without reflecting on the full bearing of what he was saying, and without having informed himself sufficiently beforehand of the views of his colleagues in the Council of Ministers. I fear that a request for a personal explanation would serve no good purpose.

[46539]

No. 335.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 708.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

YOU should without delay communicate substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegrams No. 596 of to-day and No. 549 of yesterday to Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of Council, so as to endeavour to render unnecessary the disembarkation of troops, since the Persian Government have apparently agreed to one of Russian demands and are about to act similarly in respect of the other. It is, as you will observe from Sir G. Barclay's No. 596, of the utmost importance that if Russian demands are complied with troops will not be landed, or if disembarked should at once be re-shipped. I am quite ready to discuss with Russian Government any proposals they may have to make in regard to promoting a more stable condition of affairs in Persia, and for the avoidance of any further acute differences.

Language as reported in your telegram No. 291 is approved.

[46322]

No. 336.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 139.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 19th instant, and communicated the accompanying documents respecting the Shoa-es-Sultaneh incident and the consequent action of Russia.*

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46553]

No. 337.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 142.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 18th instant, and asked for confirmation of the reported advance on Kazvin.

Mr. Mallet told him the facts, and said that the only hope of averting the occupation of Tehran and further demands was prompt acceptance of the Russian conditions; he added that it appeared that Mr. Shuster's removal was one of the principal objects of the move. The Persian Minister did not attempt to defend that gentleman's conduct.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46280]

No. 338.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 298.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

THE Russian chargé d'affaires called on the 17th instant, and communicated an *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy is enclosed,† respecting the proposed action to be taken by the Russian Government in consequence of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh incident.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. de Etter that he had understood from him that the Russian Minister at Tehran was only to call for troops to Tehran in case of absolute necessity for the protection of the Russian Legation; whereas now it appeared that if troops were called up it was to turn out the gendarmes and to occupy the house and property of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh.

M. de Etter replied that Sir A. Nicolson had correctly understood what he had at first said, but that the telegram he had received from the Russian Government was not very clear, and he had concluded that the troops, if sent to Tehran, were for the protection of the legation.

The Turkish Ambassador stated on the 17th instant that Shoa-es-Sultaneh was a Turkish subject.

On the 18th instant the Russian Ambassador communicated the accompanying further paper.‡

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46531]

No. 339.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram No. 591, dated the 21st November, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, respecting the departure of Major Stokes.§

* No. 314.

† No. 280.

‡ No. 288.

§ No. 326.

I am to suggest that, subject to the approval of the Marquess of Crewe, the telegram, of which a copy is enclosed, should be sent in reply; and I am to enquire whether, in his Lordship's opinion, the telegram had better be sent from the Viceroy or from this department.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[46683]

No. 340.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 597.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

His Majesty's consul at Resht reports 500 Russian infantry arrived 21st November.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[46774]

No. 341.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 598.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 23, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 594 of yesterday.

At yesterday's session of the Medjliss a letter was read from the Prime Minister introducing an incomplete Cabinet: the late Minister for Foreign Affairs resumes his portfolio. He was too unwell to be present at the sitting; I am, however, assured that as soon as he is well enough, which he hopes will be to-day, he will tender an apology to the Russian Legation.

Persian Government inform me that the formalities for checking the inventory of movables will take four days, or possibly longer: the gendarmes cannot therefore be withdrawn from the property at once.

I have on repeated occasions impressed on the Persian Government that the chance of a withdrawal of the Russian troops becomes smaller with every moment's delay.

[46793]

No. 342.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 595.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, November 23, 1911.

I COMMUNICATED yesterday to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 594 of 21st November, and have now written him a private letter sending paraphrases of that telegram as well as of No. 596 of 22nd November, together with a summary of your telegram No. 708 of 22nd November. I have requested him to communicate your views at once to the President of the Council.

[46819]

No. 343.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 596.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 23, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I was sent for this afternoon by M. Nératof, who told me that he had received a telegram from M. Poklewski, stating that the Government that had now been constituted at Tehran was only of a provisional character; that only two of its members had presented themselves before the Medjliss; that he could not receive the Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit of apology until the Treasury gendarmes had been removed from Shams-Sultaneh's property and replaced by the Persian Cossacks, and that this operation, on the pretext that various preliminary arrangements must first be made,

would not be effected for four or five days. M. Poklewski also reported that a pamphlet in Persian, containing all the letters that had appeared in the "Times" and other details concerning the recent incident, had been published by Mr. Shuster and circulated broadcast, in order to foment anti-Russian agitation.

A meeting of the council of Ministers was to be held, M. Nératof informed me, at 7 o'clock to-morrow evening, at which it would be resolved to demand formally the dismissal of Shuster, such demand being based on the proceedings referred to above and on the previous acts of provocation of which he had been guilty. The Persian Government would also be required to make a declaration to the effect that in future they would appoint no subject of a Great Power to any post of importance in the Persian service or employ any foreigner in such a post without first consulting the Russian and British Legations. At the same time, they would demand that M. Lecoiffre's appointment should be cancelled. M. Nératof added that his Government had reason to know that Stokes was only prevented from leaving Tehran by Shuster's influence.

I repeated my assurance that His Majesty's Government would raise no objection to a formal demand for Shuster's dismissal, but pointed out that it was quite a different matter to march Russian troops into Tehran in order to accomplish that object. I begged that he would not present this demand until I had heard your views, and I added that you might perhaps be disposed, in order to prevent recourse to forcible measures, to use your influence with the Persian Government in an attempt to persuade them to dismiss Shuster. M. Nératof said that he would be very grateful if you would act as suggested, but added that he must send Poklewski his instructions to-morrow night, adding that once Russia had presented the demand she must see that it was complied with, even if this entailed the occupation of Tehran.

M. Nératof then turned to the question of the Bakhtiari Khan's appeal, reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 592 of the 21st November. He remarked that the Bakhtiari were as strongly opposed as Russia herself both to Mr. Shuster and to the Medjliss, and that Russia would be relieved of a disagreeable task if they were able, by means of a *coup d'État*, to get rid of Mr. Shuster. He was therefore inclined to encourage them. I asked whether by that he meant that Russia would be willing to give them material support, but he replied that he had not yet considered the question from that point of view. He thought that we might at any rate give the Bakhtiaris the guarantee for which they asked in the event of their returning to their homes. He would only move in this matter, however, in concert with His Majesty's Government, and he would therefore be glad to have your views.

At the close of our conversation, I recapitulated all the assurances which M. Kokovtsoff gave me on Sunday. I told his Excellency that you intended to make a statement in Parliament next Monday, and suggested whether it would not be well that he should consult with M. Kokovtsoff and let me know what you were authorised to say as to the assurances given by the Russian Government with regard to the presence in Persia of Russian troops. I pointed out that this was rendered more desirable by the fact that the events of the last two days had somewhat changed the situation.

[46543]

No. 344.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 373.)

(Telegraphic.) Code.

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 595 of 21st November.

Is it impossible to hire buildings?

If not, how is it proposed to utilise buildings to be erected after departure of troops?

[46540]

No. 345.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 711.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegrams Nos. 592 and 593 of 21st November.

Ascertain views of Russian Government, and say that in our opinion the two Powers should abstain from intervention either by encouraging or thwarting Bakhtiari.

[1524]

[46682]

No. 346.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 712.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

See your telegram No. 294 of yesterday.

Question has been asked in Parliament concerning advance of Russian troops into Persia, and, in view of fact that two Russian demands have not yet been complied with, and of information in your telegram, I have only given a general assurance that the advance was a temporary measure.

You should urge on Russian Government that the troops which are already in Persia should at all events not be allowed to advance when once Persian Government has agreed to two Russian demands, that diplomatic relations at Tehran should be resumed, and that no further troops should be dispatched. It is most deplorable that Council of Ministers should have disregarded M. Kokovtsoff's specific assurances to you.

If the above requests were agreed to, a discussion might take place between ourselves and Russia as to what changes are required at Tehran in order to give better security to Russian interests.

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

[47960]

No. 347.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce.

(No. 472.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

HAVING heard of the communication which the United States Government had made in St. Petersburg as to Mr. Shuster's action in Persia, I informed Mr. Whitelaw Reid of it to-day, and said that I would like to give him our view.

Mr. Shuster was evidently an able man. He had set about his work in Persia with great zeal, and had, I believed, been quite single-minded. But he had left certain considerations out of account. In the past, England and Russia had worked against each other in Persia; but a few years ago they came to an agreement that Russia would not push her influence in the part of Persia near the Indian frontier, while England would not push hers in the north of Persia. Mr. Shuster insisted on appointing British subjects to posts in the north of Persia: a notable case being that of Major Stokes, about whom I had discovered, since the question of his appointment was first mooted, that he was notorious for his anti-Russian views. No doubt Mr. Shuster maintained that these were the best men for his purpose, and it was not for me to say that they were not. But if this plan was to be accepted these appointments might cause British influence to displace Russian influence in the north of Persia. Under the Anglo-Russian Agreement it was impossible for us to assist any such tendency.

Originally I had joined Russia in advocating the employment of Americans in Persia, because I was sure that they would have no political axe to grind. But it had turned out that Mr. Shuster went to such an extreme of political innocence that he disregarded the peculiar situation in Persia, and by not taking any political considerations into account he had become like a bull in a china shop.

Mr. Whitelaw Reid asked whether he should tell Mr. Knox confidentially what I had said.

I replied that I would send a record of it to you, with instructions to tell Mr. Knox our view if he asked for it, but I thought it better to say nothing to Mr. Knox unless he asked. It was not our object to make any complaint to the United States Government about Mr. Shuster, and if we sent a communication to them on the subject the impression might be given that we desired to drag them into the matter in some way. My only desire was that, if they did take any interest in the subject and asked what our view and our version was, Mr. Whitelaw Reid or you should be in a position to give information, for the United States Government would then be satisfied that we had not been treating Mr. Shuster unfairly, and they would understand the difficulty.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46216]

No. 348.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the provision of accommodation for the Indian cavalry which has been dispatched to Shiraz to reinforce the escort of His Majesty's consulate there.*

I am to state that, in view of the circumstances of the case, Sir E. Grey is disposed, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, to approve Sir G. Barclay's action in sanctioning the expenditure required for the provision of this accommodation pending the preparation of a detailed estimate of the cost.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[46840]

No. 349.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 222. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

BEFORE continuing the narrative of the events arising out of the action of the Russian consul-general in actively opposing the seizure of the estates of the Rebel Prince, Shoa-es-Sultaneh, I should wish to correct an error in my despatch No. 207 of the 27th ultimo. In that despatch I stated that the Russian Minister while instructing M. Pokhitonow to desist from further opposition to the confiscation of the estates, had in reply to a complaint from the Treasurer-General sought to make out as good a case as possible for M. Pokhitonow, and had based the latter's action on the fact that the property in the town, which is the one to which most prominence has attached in this incident, was leased to a Russian subject. I find now that this is not so, and that the property to which M. Poklewski referred as leased to a Russian subject is not in Tehran but in the country, and that the pretext for M. Pokhitonow's violence at the town property where the main incident—the one which has provoked Russia's humiliating demands—occurred, was that the Russian Bank holds some kind of general mortgage on Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties. M. Poklewski, desiring to let M. Pokhitonow down as easily as possible, referred in his communication to Mr. Shuster only to the property for interference with which the Russian consul-general had the best *locus standi*.

As reported in my telegram No. 533, the Russian Minister, under instructions from his Government, demanded on the 2nd instant from the Persian Government that the Treasury gendarmes should be withdrawn from the town property and replaced by Persian Cossacks, and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should formally apologise for an incident which had occurred after the gendarmes had taken possession. The Russian Minister also returned the note in which the Persian Government had demanded the recall of Pokhitonow, as well as a rejoinder which the Persian Government had made to M. Poklewski's reply to the note in question.

On the 5th instant, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent his "chef de cabinet" entreat me to intervene with my colleague to soften these demands, but as I knew that the latter had already strongly deprecated them, and that it was in conflict with his advice that he had received the most peremptory orders to present the demands forthwith, it was evident that my intervention must be unavailing and I, therefore, urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to yield. A Cabinet Council was held on the same afternoon to consider the reply to the Russian demands and it was decided, practically unanimously as I understand, to reject them. The demands had been made verbally and the reply which was given on the 6th instant, was also verbal. I enclose a copy of it as taken down at the Russian Legation. You will observe that it is implied in the Persian Government's reply that the Russian Legation had had due notice of the seizures, and it is stated that they had been assured that Russian rights would be respected. I believe this is so far accurate that the Persian Government had

informally intimated to the Russian Minister that the estates of certain reactionaries were to be confiscated, and assurances were given that any proper Russian claim would be met, but Shoa-es-Sultaneh's name was not specifically mentioned by the Persian Government and it would, no doubt, have been more regular, had the Persian Government known that there were any Russian rights involved, that they should have given notice of the date and hour at which the seizure was to be effected, and should have invited the co-operation of the Russian consulate-general. Nothing, however, in my opinion can justify the truculent and provocative action of the consul-general in sending Russian Cossacks, entirely on his own initiative, to turn the gendarmes out. Moreover, the incident for which the apology is demanded is differently described by the two sides. It is the incident reported in my despatch No. 207 of the 27th ultimo, as having occurred on the 10th ultimo, and of the two versions I am strongly inclined to believe the story of the gendarmes. *A priori* it is most unlikely that Persians would dare wantonly to point their rifles at a Russian consular official, but apart from this one of the two consular officials involved in the incident is nothing short of an *agent provocateur*, and has given the Russian Minister much trouble in the past.

Yesterday the Russian Minister, under orders from St. Petersburg, demanded, in writing, satisfaction of the Russian demands, and intimated to the Persian Government, verbally, that unless this were given without delay he would break off relations with the present Cabinet, and Russia would take such measures as might be necessary to protect her own interests.

Russia's action is doubtless directed against Mr. Shuster, but one could wish that she had chosen a better pretext, and the fact that she has ignored her Minister's advice and practically endorsed the action of the most truculent of all her consular officers in Persia must tend to render the position of any Russian Minister, anxious to make the Anglo-Russian agreement work smoothly in Persia, extremely difficult. I understand that a subordinate official has been directing Persian affairs at the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs during the absence of M. Klemm. This may, perhaps, account for the support given to M. Pokhitonow.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 349.

Reply of Persian Government to Russian Demands made verbally on November 2.

THE Imperial Government of Persia, desirous as ever of maintaining the most friendly relations with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor, after a most careful consideration of the proposals made by your Excellency, in effect that the Government's agents now occupying certain properties recently confiscated from the rebellious Persian subject Shoa-es-Sultaneh, should be removed and should be replaced by the former guard of Persian Cossacks, and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should, in person, present himself at the Russian Legation, and tender an apology for an offence alleged to have been given to officers of the Russian consulate-general in Tehran, make, in reply thereto, the following observations: Whereas, the Persian authorities had taken care to notify beforehand the Russian Legation that the interests of Russian subjects would be safeguarded, and, moreover, on the second day of the incident, they reiterated the Government's decree to the Russian consul-general, requesting, as they had a right to do, that no hindrance or intervention on the part of any member of the consulate-general should be tolerated, and further, seeing that the policy of this Government is one of friendship and conciliation towards Russia, in which sense they are endeavouring to direct the course of public opinion; and whereas, on the other hand, compliance with your Excellency's verbal proposition, in spite of the innocence of the Imperial Government's agents, would not only violate the dignity and honour of the country, but would also be incompatible with the said policy of friendship and co-operation, the Imperial Government of Persia find it impossible to acquiesce in the above proposals.

Apprehending, however, that a misunderstanding as to the real facts of the case still clings to the mind of the Imperial Government of Russia, and with a view to completely demonstrating their good will, the Persian Government court a full and impartial investigation of the facts in order that all possible ground for misapprehension might be removed.

I am to state, in conclusion, that the Imperial Government of Persia cannot fail to

express regret at the action taken by your Excellency's Government in returning the protest heretofore lodged by the Persian Government with your Excellency.

November 6, 1911.

[46940]

No. 350.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 342.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 20, 1911.

THE St. Petersburg newspapers continue to publish articles on the situation in Persia, and for the most part applaud the decision of the Russian Government to send troops to Kazvin.

The "Sviet," the organ of the extreme Nationalists, goes so far as to recommend that Persia be divided without more ado into two protectorates, under Russia in the north and Great Britain in the south, and expresses the opinion that "the chief condition for a correct and peaceful solution of the Persian question is that there should be complete harmony between England and Russia."

The expression of such sentiments in this newspaper is noteworthy, as in the past it has been consistently hostile to England and to everything English.

The semi-official "Rossia," in a contributed article published in its issue of the 19th November, notes the absence of any executive authority in Persia, and goes on to say:—

"Russia and England, who of all European Powers are the most interested in the maintenance of peace, tranquillity, and of a certain order in Persia, have endeavoured hard to avoid the necessity of interfering in her internal affairs, giving her full time to extricate herself as best she could from the chaos brought on by the revolution. Russia has been patient and full of good-will to her weak neighbour, so long as there was any hope left that she would understand the necessity of bringing order and prudence into at least her external policy. However, Russia cannot close her eyes to the fact that even the last shadow of a legal executive authority with whom to communicate in the event of any difference arising between the two Powers has finally disappeared. Under these conditions it would not be fair to attribute the occupation of Kazvin by Russian troops to any desire on Russia's part to use for her own benefit the pitiful internal situation of her neighbour. The Russian Government has had recourse to this extraordinary measure only after it was convinced of the fruitlessness of carrying on any further negotiations with a country who refuses to recognise the justice and moderateness of demands presented to her. This should be borne in mind when estimating the events likely to occur in the subsequent development of the Russo-Persian conflict."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[46916]

No. 351.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 21st November, 1911, relative to consular escorts in Southern Persia.

India Office, November 23, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 351.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, November 21, 1911.

INCREASE of consular guards in Southern Persia (see your telegram dated the 30th September and subsequent correspondence).

[1524]

3 E

The Treasury see no reason why principle of equal division of cost of protecting British subjects in Persia should be departed from in present instance; they have agreed to bear provisionally half cost of measures sanctioned. I agree, having regard to decision that action should be limited to protection of life and property at consular posts, not of roads. Particulars as to cost of transport and maintenance of troops should be furnished in due course.

[46913]

No. 352.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 21st November, 1911, relative to Russia and Persia.

India Office, November 23, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 352.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, November 21, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of Council have given categorical assurances in conversation with Sir G. Buchanan on the 18th and 19th November respectively that principle of Anglo-Russian convention will be kept intact whatever happens, that no idea of supporting ex-Shah is entertained by Russian Government, and that Russia has no aggressive designs on Persia whatever. Promise was made by President that Russia would wait to see effect of occupation of Kazvin, and that troops would not advance immediately on arrival there. Sir G. Buchanan was given to understand by Minister for Foreign Affairs that Shuster's dismissal is what Russia really wants, and that she would withdraw troops if this were effected. President, however, said that troops would be withdrawn as soon as formal apology was tendered by Persian Government and Persian Cossacks were substituted for gendarmerie on seized property.

[46836]

No. 353.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 599.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegrams Nos. 596 and 598 of the 22nd and 23rd instant respectively.

The "chef de Cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent me a private letter yesterday afternoon to the effect that the Persian Government had lost no time in acting on the advice given them by His Majesty's Government as regards compliance with the Russian demands, on the express understanding that the Russian troops would then be withdrawn. He stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared to tender a formal apology to the Russian Legation, and that Persian Cossacks would replace the Treasury gendarmes this evening in the property in question.

I pointed out to him at once that there was no express understanding. I reminded him of the wording of your telegram No. 363 of the 20th instant, and added that when I used your words on the morning of the 22nd November, they correctly expressed the state of the case as it then stood.

[46963]

No. 354.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 600.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

The Russian Minister received the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Russian Legation this afternoon, when his Excellency tendered the formal apology demanded by the Russian Government.

Persian Cossacks have replaced the Treasury gendarmes on the principal property, and they will also replace Treasury gendarmes on the other properties this evening.

As soon as the Minister for Foreign Affairs had apologised, M. Poklewski informed his Excellency that his Government had authorised him to resume diplomatic relations, but he added his personal opinion that his Government would not be entirely satisfied with the compliance with their two original demands. He reminded his Excellency of the great delay shown by the Persian Government in giving satisfaction, in consequence of which Russian troops had already been landed; and he added that, since the original demands had been presented, Shuster had had translations of his recent letter to the press made, and had distributed them broadcast among the people. He thought the Russian Government would formulate some further demands and present them to the Persian Government.

[47028]

No. 355.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 601.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Reference to last paragraph of your telegram No. 712 of the 23rd November to Sir G. Buchanan.

M. Poklewski informs me that his Government having enquired his views as to means of procuring the dismissal of the treasurer-general, he replied on the 21st November that he did not think that diplomatic pressure would be likely to effect this object. Russian Minister added that if Russian Government decided to formulate fresh demands and to employ troops to enforce their acceptance, he believed that the course most likely to put relations between Russia and Persian Government on a more stable basis, whatever might be the decision of the Russian Government with regard to Shuster, would be to utilise the presence of the troops to force Persian Government to recognise Anglo-Russian Convention in a formula previously agreed upon by Great Britain and Russia.

The comprehensive demand suggested by my Russian colleague is, I think, preferable, if troops are to be employed to support Russian demands, to the pressing of the many particular demands, which, I understand from the Russian Minister, is contemplated at St. Petersburg.

[46962]

No. 356.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 297.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 24, 1911.

PERSIA and Russia.

My telegram No. 296 of the 23rd November.

I have to-day written privately to M. Nératof pointing out that the Russian proposal that the Persian Government should be required to make a declaration with regard to the employment of foreigners might be held to engage His Majesty's Government. I have accordingly begged him to postpone presenting such a demand until I have ascertained your views on the subject and communicated them to him.

[47066]

No. 357.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 298.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 24, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Your telegram No. 712 of the 23rd November.

M. Nératof tells me that in the Council of Ministers he is insisting that, at all events for the present, the troops should not be advanced beyond Resht. He says, however, that he can give no assurance that they will not eventually be sent further than that point, as if he did so the satisfaction demanded by Russia would never be given. He will instruct M. Poklewski to warn the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, when the latter announces his intention of paying his visit of apology, that he has been instructed by his Government to present further demands. If the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on learning of this intention, still pays his visit, M. Nératof presumes that this will mean the resumption of diplomatic relations.

I am to see M. Nératof again before the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, which has now been put off till to-morrow afternoon.

I urged upon M. Nératof strongly that the new demands should be limited strictly to the minimum. He replied that the Council of Ministers must decide this, and that he could not speak with authority until they had decided; he thought, however, that the demands would be limited to the following:—

The dismissal of Shuster; a demand respecting the employment of foreigners by the Persian Government in important posts; and a demand for an assurance that the Persian Government will undertake to settle all pending questions in a conciliatory spirit.

With regard to the demand as to the employment of foreigners, I pointed out that this was a question of an ultimatum, and that in these circumstances you might object to any reference being made to our legation, as such reference might be held to imply that His Majesty's Government approved the presentation of the ultimatum. M. Nératof suggested that in that case some other formula might be found, such as that Persia should be required to state that she would act in conformity with the representations made by Russia to the Persian Government in the autumn of 1910 (see pp. 9 and 10 of the annual report for Persia of 1910 for the representation to which M. Nératof presumably refers).

With regard to the third demand, M. Nératof assured me that there would be no question of insisting on all the outstanding questions being settled immediately, nor would Russia keep her troops in Persia until a settlement was effected, if the required assurance were given by the Persian Government.

On M. Nératof suggesting that it might be possible to require the Persian Government to recognise the Anglo-Russian agreement, I objected that this step too would involve His Majesty's Government.

His Excellency also said that the Russian Government would express a desire for the establishment of a Senate, but that this would not take the form of a demand, but would merely be the expression of a wish.

[46819]

No. 358.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 378.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 24, 1911.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 592 and 593 of 21st November.

We certainly cannot encourage *coup d'État*, but have no more intention of interfering with a Bakhtiari *coup d'État* than with previous *coups d'État* in Persia. Attitude of both Powers should be one of neutrality to these internal movements so long as their interests are respected. As to guarantees to Bakhtiari, assurances of general friendly attitude towards them, as described in your telegram No. 592 of 21st November, should suffice.

You may, with your Russian colleague, if he is so instructed, speak in above sense to Bakhtiari.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 744.)

[46819]

No. 359.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 713.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 24, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia. See your telegram No. 296 of yesterday.

In view of fact that Shuster has made a fresh attack on Russian Government, His Majesty's Government consider it impossible for them to object to formulation of Russian demands as proposed. We nevertheless consider it essential that as soon as Persian Government has complied with Russia's two original demands the movements of Russian troops should be stopped, and that, as regards the new Russian demands, time should be given to allow diplomatic pressure to be brought to bear at Tehran to ensure their acceptance. Of course presentation of further Russian demands at Tehran must take place before His Majesty's Government can do anything there.

I take it for granted that M. Poklawski will be instructed to resume diplomatic relations as soon as Persian Government has agreed to the two original demands of his Government, and when that has been done, concerted action between His Majesty's representative and M. Poklewski will be possible.

[46819]

No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 715.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 24, 1911.

INTERVIEW of Bakhtiari khans with British and Russian Ministers.

Please inform M. Nératof of attitude of His Majesty's Government towards suggested Bakhtiari *coup d'État*. See my telegram to Tehran No. 378 of to-day.

[46962]

No. 361.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 717.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 24, 1911.

EMPLOYMENT of foreigners.

I see no objection to our supporting Russian demand (see your telegram No. 297 of to-day), which does not seem to differ much from what has hitherto been the practice.

I consider, however, in the first instance, that Russian Government should act on their own responsibility in putting forward demands.

[47010]

No. 362.

Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 263. Confidential.)

Sir,

Washington, November 13, 1911.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 401 of the 4th October last, regarding the intention of the American Presbyterian Mission in Persia to extend its activities to Afghanistan, I addressed a letter (copy of which I enclose) privately to the Secretary of State on the subject.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a reply, marked "Personal and Confidential," which I have received from the Acting Secretary of State, enclosing a letter from Mr. Robert E. Speer on behalf of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, from which it would appear that it is not the intention of the society to actually enter Afghanistan at this time.

I have, &c.

JAMES BRYCE.

[1524]

B F

Enclosure 1 in No. 362.

Mr. Bryce to Mr. Knox.

(Confidential.)

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Washington, October 19, 1911.

INFORMATION has reached His Majesty's Government that Mr. Esselstyn, of the American Presbyterian Mission, has been ordered to Khorassan to start a branch mission in that province with the further idea of eventually extending the work of the mission into Afghanistan.

His Majesty's Minister in Persia warned Dr. Esselstyn that difficulties might perhaps be found to exist with regard to his entering Afghanistan, and was further instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to inform him that no responsibility could be accepted for what might befall him should he enter Afghanistan without the permission of the Ameer.

It has occurred to Sir Edward Grey that it would be well that I should bring this matter to your notice, in order that you should understand the attitude taken by His Majesty's Government in the matter and the reasons underlying it.

These reasons are based on the fact that—as has been pointed out by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India—the Ameer strongly objects to the presence of European travellers in his country, and that his objections on this score have always been recognised and respected by His Majesty's Government.

As an illustration of this attitude on the part of the British authorities, it may be pointed out that the Government of India would not allow a European traveller to cross the Indian frontier into Afghanistan, except on the production of a written permit from the Ameer to enter his dominions.

Very sincerely yours,
JAMES BRYCE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 362.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Bryce.

(Personal and Confidential.)

Dear Mr. Bryce,

Washington, November 11, 1911.

IN further reply to your letter of the 19th October, on the subject of the reported intention of an American Mission Board to extend its work into Afghanistan, I enclose herewith, for your personal information, a copy of a letter received from Mr. Robert E. Spear, of New York City, on behalf of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, of whom enquiry was made by the department in a purely informal manner, from which it will be seen the apparent position and intention of this mission regarding its work in Eastern Persia and Afghanistan.

Faithfully yours,
ALVEY A. ADEE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 362.

Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America to Mr. Adee.

Dear Sir,

156, Fifth Avenue, New York, November 2, 1911.

I BEG leave to express our board's appreciation of the spirit and interest of your enquiry as to the purpose of our mission in Persia in assigning Dr. Esselstyn, one of our missionaries to Tehran, to work in the province of Khorassan. It is true that he has been so assigned, and that it is our hope and the hope of the mission that the day may come when missionary work can be undertaken in Afghanistan, and this development of our work into Eastern Persia is in anticipation of that day. Our mission in Persia understands quite well, and our board has so informed it, that the way is not open at present for the establishment of mission work in Afghanistan, but we have felt that a friendly mission in Eastern Persia, especially a medical mission, would touch in a sympathetic way people from Afghanistan travelling into Eastern Persia, just as the mission of the Church of England in Peshawur is exerting a large influence on the Afghan peoples crossing the north-west frontier in India. We have

long carried on missionary work in this part of Persia by itinerating journeys, and plan at present only to locate Dr. Esselstyn, who has lived a long time in Persia and knows the people and the language well, in the city of Meshed, and to place there with him as soon as possible a capable and judicious medical missionary.

Last year two young ministers from McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago applied to be sent as missionaries to Afghanistan, and were informed by our board that no such mission was practicable at the present time, but that they would be sent—as they have been—to Persia, where one is located now at Resht, and the other in Tehran studying Persian and under assignment to mission work in Persia.

In reporting their desires to the board, our missionaries in Persia have termed the development which they contemplate in Khorassan "The Persia and Afghan Mission." This may have given the impression that they were looking forward to actually entering Afghanistan at this time. They know that this is impracticable, however, and have doubtless merely chosen this name—which we shall suggest their not using at present—after the precedent of the Church Missionary Society of the Church of England, which calls its mission at Peshawur "The Afghan Mission."

Trusting that this will make clear to your satisfaction the purposes of our mission and board in the matter, I am, &c.

ROBERT E. SPEERS.

[46980]

No. 363.

Anglo-Jewish Association to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

Blomfield House, 85, London Wall, London

November 24, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed to communicate to you the contents of a letter received from our sister institution in Paris, the Alliance israélite universelle, which has a number of schools in Persia.

The president and council of this association will be grateful if the Foreign Office, from the information which it may have in its possession, can give the assurance sought for by the Alliance.

I have, &c.

M. DUPARC, Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 363.

Alliance israélite universelle to the Anglo-Jewish Association.

Cher Monsieur,

Paris, le 22 novembre, 1911.

LES directeurs de nos écoles de Chiraz ont quitté cette ville dès le mois de juin ; nous avons dû attendre jusqu'à ce jour pour leur trouver des successeurs. Ils sont désignés maintenant. Mais au moment de les faire partir, nous avons quelques hésitations. La route de Bouchir à Chiraz est-elle sûre ? Ne courront-ils pas le danger d'être attaqués par les brigands ? Nous vous serions très reconnaissants de demander au Foreign Office, qui a pris le Sud de la Perse sous sa protection, s'il pense que nos professeurs, qui ont des enfants, peuvent se rendre en sécurité de Bouchir à Chiraz.

Agréez, &c.

[47130]

No. 364.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, November 25, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 715 of 24th November.

Russian Minister at Tehran will be instructed to consult and act with Sir G. Barclay.

[47132]

No. 365.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 301.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1911.

PERSIA and Russia.

I received a visit yesterday from the Persian chargé d'affaires, who asked me what was the nature of the further demands which the Russian Government proposed to present. He added that after the communication which Sir G. Barclay had made to his Government, the latter had hoped that when they had complied with the two original Russian demands the troops would be withdrawn.

To this I replied that the order for withdrawal would have been given if the Persian Government had at once given the satisfaction demanded and had not waited till the troops had landed on Persian soil. I informed him that the council of Ministers was to meet this evening and would then formulate the further demands, and I said that Mr. Shuster's action in publishing his pamphlet had greatly incensed the Russian Government.

He asked whether Russia would demand the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, and I said that I thought such a demand was most probable, adding that, in my opinion, it was of far greater moment to Persia to re-establish good relations with Russia than to keep Mr. Shuster in her service, and that the responsibility for the estrangement between the two countries lay chiefly at his door.

[47133]

No. 366.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I spoke to M. Nératof yesterday evening as instructed in your telegrams Nos. 713 and 717. I urged upon him how important it was that the troops should not advance beyond Resht now that Persia had complied with the two original demands and that the two countries had resumed diplomatic relations. I said that you had no objection to the presentation of the demand with regard to the employment of foreigners in the Persian service, but that the Russian Government must present it in the first instance on their own responsibility. With regard to the suggestion that the Persian Government should be required to recognise the Anglo-Russian agreement, I said that I did not know what your views were on this subject, but if such a demand were presented the same condition as to Russia taking sole responsibility must also attach to it. I endeavoured to persuade M. Nératof to drop a proposed demand for an indemnity of some 15,000L, begging him not to forget the difficulties which lay before you in Parliament and to do nothing which might add to them.

M. Nératof said that he would do what he could in the Council of Ministers to ensure that a reasonable time should be given to the Persian Government in which to answer the new demands. I said that if a reasonable delay were granted Sir G. Barclay would then be able to consult with M. Poklewski and arrange as to what measure of support he could give him.

In repeating his assurance that no annexation of Persian territory was contemplated, M. Nératof handed me a memorandum which, he said, might furnish you with material for the statement which you were about to make in Parliament.

The following is a summary of this document, the text of which is too long to be telegraphed verbatim:—

(1.) The present conflict is the outcome of a series of incidents offensive to Russia, brought about chiefly by the irreconcilable attitude of the Persian Radical party and the arbitrary proceedings of Shuster in disregarding Russian interests.

Russia having now been forced to take rigorous measures, her object is to establish normal and stable relations with Persia and to remove elements of discord. With this object she will formulate certain further demands. In her present action Russia seeks only to defend her legitimate interests in zone reserved to her by 1907 agreement. Her object is not in conflict with that of agreement, since it does not pursue any aim that could impair independence or integrity of Persia. Russian Government affirm categorically that their military measures are of a purely provisional character, and

that they have no intention of infringing the principles governing the Anglo-Russian understanding.

Memorandum then recapitulates the reasons leading to Russia's first two demands on much the same lines as *aide-mémoire* communicated by Russian chargé d'affaires to Foreign Office on 17th November. It further résumés the reasons for presentation of present demands as follows:—

Absence of a Persian reply to first demands in reasonable time.

Cabinet crisis no excuse for this delay, as resignation of Persian Ministers showed intention to evade demands.

Shuster's letters translated into Persian.

Necessity of obtaining guarantee that elements of future discord will be removed.

[47134]

No. 367.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 303.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 302 of to-day.

I have just received a private letter from M. Nératof, informing me that it was decided at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held yesterday that the following demands should be presented at Tehran:—

1. Both Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre to be dismissed, and the engagement to be given by the Persian Government in accordance with demand No. 2 to apply to all other foreign officials already appointed by Mr. Shuster.

2. The Persian Government must give an engagement that they will obtain the consent of the Russian and British Legations before offering any post in the Persian service to persons of foreign nationality.

3. Expenses incurred by the present military expedition to be reimbursed by the Persian Government.

In order not to add to your difficulties in the debate in the House of Commons to-morrow, the Council resolved that the presentation of these demands should be deferred till Tuesday. The above information is accordingly intended for you personally, and not for use in the House of Commons.

The demands will be presented at Tehran in the form of an ultimatum, granting a delay of only forty-eight hours for their acceptance. During that delay the Russian troops will not be moved beyond Resht.

M. Nératof told me yesterday that he would suggest that a delay of five or six days should be granted, and I am accordingly much disappointed that the Persian Government are to be allowed only forty-eight hours in which to consider the demands. I fancy that M. Nératof must have been over-ruled in the Council of Ministers, the majority of the members of which are determined that Russia's differences with Persia must be settled once and for all; I fear, too, that the majority have the ear of the Emperor.

On the previous occasion when troops were sent to Kazvin in 1909, M. Iswolsky took up the position that it was impossible for Russia to keep sending troops backwards and forwards to Persia and so rendering herself ridiculous, and the same feeling is strongly held here on the present occasion.

The original objective of the expedition was Kazvin, and M. Kokovtsoff promised, when it was a question of the Persian Government complying with the two original demands, that a further delay would be granted on the arrival of the troops at that place. I will now urge that the delay at Kazvin be granted in connection with the demands now to be presented.

[47174]

No. 368.

Sir G. Lanthier to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 811.)

Sir,

Persia, November 20, 1911.

It is somewhat remarkable that neither the publication in the "Times" of Mr. Morgan Shuster's indictment of the policy of Great Britain and Russia in Persia nor

[1524]

3 G

the recent ultimatum of the latter Power has raised any excitement or indignation in the local press, but has, as a matter of fact, passed almost unnoticed. The "Liberté" a few days ago gave a short statement of the events which led up to the latter occurrence, but the account was written in a distinctly friendly and exculpatory spirit towards Russia; while of the vernacular journals the "Tanin" alone has even alluded to it. The article in question was written by Ismail Hakki Bey Babandzadeh, the Bagdad deputy, who is not usually remarkable for sweet reasonableness in his views of foreign questions, and says briefly, after a sarcastic complaint, that, while Turkey must of course feel regret, she cannot, with Italy's recent action in mind, be surprised that the resignation of the Persian Regent and Cabinet can be of no advantage, and recommends the Ministers to sacrifice their personal dignity in the interests of their country.

I can hardly think that this silence is due solely to preoccupation with Turkish affairs, and I am inclined to believe that it arises also from a disinclination to offend the susceptibilities of the Great Power whose influence in the Balkans may at this moment be of value to the Porte.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[47223]

No. 369.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 207.)

Sir,

Stockholm, November 22, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 199 of the 18th instant relative to the dispatch of Swedish officers to Persia, I have the honour to inform you that Count Ehrensvärd spoke to me on the subject in a private and unofficial manner. He said that his Government desired to send the officers partly in order to promote Sweden's commercial interests and partly because promotion in the army was slow, and that the military authorities thought that such active employment as was contemplated would be an excellent thing for the officers employed. It is undoubtedly true that a very good class of officer has volunteered, that it has been very difficult for the army authorities to make the selection as the competition was so keen, and that the strongest interest was used on behalf of the applicants. Count Ehrensvärd added that it was a great sacrifice to give up the idea of a reorganisation of the Persian army by Swedish officers, but that it was evident that it was distasteful to the Russian Government. The latter had expressed in a delicate and unofficial manner the complications which might arise in case the Swedish officers were employed in a foreign war or even in civil strife. The Swedish Government was most anxious to avoid giving offence to Russia or England, and they had therefore taken pains to consult them even before they had received the official notification of the offer of the Persian Government. I said I was sure you would be very grateful for the manner in which the Swedish Government had approached the question, and speaking as a private person acquainted with Persia, I explained the reasons why, under present circumstances, it was not advisable to accept the offer of the Persian Government should such be officially made. With regard to the gendarmerie, I stated the reasons why the British Government and British merchants would welcome its formation as soon as possible, and bearing in mind your despatch No. 13 of the 15th June last, I pointed out that the Indian troops now being dispatched to South Persia were being sent for the protection of our consulates and not as a police force to occupy and patrol the trade routes.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[47372]

No. 370.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 27.)

Sir,

India Office, November 24, 1911.

IN continuation of previous correspondence ending with your letter dated the 9th August, 1911, regarding the payment to the Persian Government of the sum due for the rental of the Central Persia telegraph line, I am directed by the Secretary of

State for India in Council to state that a ninth instalment of this rental becomes due on the 1st January, 1912.

In accordance with the account of the cost of the line presented to the Persian Minister at Tehran on the 18th March, 1911, the half-yearly payment of rental should, as explained in my previous letter of the 9th June last, amount to 15,635 fr. Pending the acceptance of that account by the Persian Government, the previous payments of rental have, however, been at the minimum rate shown in the convention, viz., 12,500 fr. per half-year, and there is therefore a balance due to the Persian Government of 25,080 fr. (15,636 fr. — 12,500 fr. × 2), which will be placed at their disposal as soon as the account is accepted.

The Secretary of State for India in Council will be glad if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will cause the necessary instructions to be communicated to the British Minister at Tehran to make a payment to the Persian Government on the 1st January next of either 12,500 fr. as before, or of 40,715 fr. (15,635 fr. + arrears, 25,080 fr.) in the event of the Persian Government intimating their acceptance of the account on or before that date.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[47458]

No. 371.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 602.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

FOLLOWING from British vice-consul, Resht, 26th November:—

"Exact figures of Russian troops at Resht: 200 Cossacks, 780 infantry, and 7 guns. On 25th November 240 artillery and commissariat arrived, bringing the total to 1,120 [sic]. By yesterday's mail-boat [?] some infantry and, by special steamer, cavalry arrived at Enzeli, numbers unknown, rumoured 1,100, but this is probably exaggerated."

[47461]

No. 372.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 603.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 373 of 23rd November.

Both acting consul and officer commanding report that no suitable buildings outside town are available, and that it would be extremely undesirable to quarter men inside town, where they would necessarily be split up into small parties at a considerable distance from consulate and European colony. They see no alternative but building, and for that purpose have a large piece of walled ground near consulate. They add that men are even now suffering considerably from cold, and urge necessity for rapid completion of building. Failing arrangement with owner, who is in Europe, to take over building at a valuation, they presume that buildings will have to be demolished on evacuation and materials sold. They suggest that it would be far preferable to buy outright piece of ground in question, which is eminently suitable, but examination on this point should not, I think, defer sanction for commencement of building.

(Repeated to India.)

[47459]

No. 373.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 604.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

MY telegram No. 603.

Value of land required at current rate is, roughly, 3,200*l.*

[47627]

No. 374.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 605.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair**Tehran, November 27, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 569 of 14th November: Indian escorts.

Second detachment reached Shiraz to-day without incident.

[47628]

No. 375.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 606.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

RUSSIAN troops in Persia.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports that 700 infantry and artillery and 100 Cossacks arrived at Enzeli on Friday and Saturday, and not 1,100, as reported by him previously (see my telegram No. 602 of this morning).

[47464]

No. 376.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 305.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 27, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 303 of the 26th November. I told M. Nératof that I was sorry to see that the Persian Government were only to be allowed forty-eight hours in which to reply to the Russian ultimatum, and I urged that on the arrival of the troops at Kazvin a further delay should be accorded. M. Nératof replied that it had been decided in the Council of Ministers that the terms of this second ultimatum must be more severe than those of the first. As a matter of fact, the Persian Government would really have some five days in which to consider the matter, for the ultimatum would only be presented to-morrow, and meanwhile they must be perfectly aware, from the language held by M. Poklewski, that the dismissal of Mr. Shuster would be included in the demands. In M. Nératof's opinion, these demands were very moderate in character, and he pointed out that their scope had been limited to matters directly connected with the recent incident. The object of the second portion of demand No. 1 was to include the ten American citizens whose appointment the Medjliss had recently sanctioned; but it was to be left to the discretion of M. Poklewski to decide whether any action was called for with regard to foreign officials already holding appointments under the Persian Government.

I said that I hoped that, even in the event of the Russian troops having to advance to Tehran, no fresh demands would be made on the Persian Government. M. Nératof gave me to understand that in such an event the only fresh demand would be for an increase in the indemnity.

[47465]

No. 377.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 306.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 27, 1911.

IN conversation with M. Nératof this afternoon, his Excellency spoke to me of yet another incident which had occurred in Persia. While engaged in conveying a caravan from Khoi to Urmia a Russian officer had been warned by the commandant of some Turkish troops who were in occupation of the district that he was trespassing on Turkish territory. He had accordingly been forced to make a détour and take a longer road, and on his return journey he had been attacked and wounded seriously.

Instructions had been sent to M. Teharykow to call the attention of the Turkish Government to the matter. Meanwhile, in view of the necessity of protecting the

caravan routes and of the fact that the incident had occurred close to the Russian frontier, a force of from 400 to 500 men would be sent to reinforce the consular escort at Khoi.

[46808]

No. 378.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 144.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 22nd instant to announce that orders have been given for the withdrawal of the Treasury gendarmes from the Shoab-es-Sultaneh's property, and that, after the presentation of the Cabinet to the Medjliss on the 22nd, the desired apology would be tendered to the Russian Minister.

He expressed the strong hope that His Majesty's Government would inform the Russian Government, and obtain the recall of the Russian forces, 250 of whom had landed on the 21st instant at Enzeli.

He said that he felt that his personal position was at stake, as he had led the Persian Government to believe, after his interview with me, that all would end well if they apologised.

Mr. Mallet reminded him that I had made no engagements, and could not have done so, and he agreed to this.

The Persian Minister asked whether the Russian Government had replied to my telegram (No. 704), and Mr. Mallet replied that we had as yet not had any final answer. The Persian Minister urged that we should make a further representation and appeal to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[47121]

No. 379.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 146.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 23rd instant and asked Mr. Mallet whether His Majesty's Government had heard if the Russian troops had been recalled.

Mr. Mallet replied in the negative, and said that His Majesty's Government had no definite information yet as to what the Russian Government would do. His Majesty's Government had also not yet heard that the Persian Government had complied with the Russian demands.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[47668]

No. 380.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 147.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 27th ultimo and asked Sir A. Nicolson whether His Majesty's Government were aware if Russia intended to present further demands now that the Persian Government had conceded the two original ones. As Sir A. Nicolson thought it undesirable to anticipate what Russia would ask, he was exceedingly reserved, and said that he believed that the Russian Council of Ministers was discussing the situation, and that no doubt we should hear very shortly what line they proposed to adopt. He added that, speaking quite confidentially, he thought it most unfortunate that at this moment Mr. Shuster had thought fit to circulate in Persia translations of his indictment against Russia. Mr. Shuster, Sir A. Nicolson remarked, was a high Persian official, and his recent act could not but be displeasing to Russia, and would perhaps be interpreted by her as provocative.

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Mehdi Khan agreed, and said that the Persian Government were anxious to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government. Sir A. Nicolson remarked to him that, as I had told him, it was difficult for His Majesty's Government to intervene between Russia and Persia. Mehdi Khan replied that perhaps I would consent to instruct you to confer with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir A. Nicolson promised to consult me on this point.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47519]

No. 381.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 343.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 25, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 280 of the 7th November last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter, with enclosure, from M. Pagenkopf, representative of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, on the subject of the maintenance and working of telegraph lines in Northern Persia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 381.

M. Pagenkopf to Mr. O'Beirne.

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 23, 1911.

WITH regard to the interview kindly granted me yesterday, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a letter addressed to M. de Klemm, of the Imperial Russian Foreign Office, communicating to him the modifications pointed out by the British Foreign Office as being desirable to be made in the proposals of the Indo-European Company for the maintenance and working of the telegraph lines in Northern Persia within the Russian sphere of influence in that country.

At the same time I beg leave to state that my company has no objections to British signallers working the terminal stations at Tehran-Meshed and Meshed-Khaf, at intervals daily after the control of these lines has been handed over to the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

PAGENKOPF.

Enclosure 2 in No. 381.

M. Pagenkopf to M. de Klemm.

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 10 (23), 1911.

REFERRING to my letter of the 23rd March (5th April), 1911, addressed to your Excellency, with regard to the proposals of the Indo-European Company for the reconstruction, maintenance, and working of the main telegraph lines in Persia within the Russian sphere of influence in that country, I am instructed by my directors to submit to your Excellency the following observations respecting these proposals.

It would appear from the arrangements already concluded between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia that the latter Government takes eventually over the control of the Tehran-Meshed line and of the line from Meshed to Khaf, while the line from Khaf to Seistan comes under the British control. This terminates the company's activity at Khaf, and not at Birjand, and the proposed agreement (article 3) between the Imperial Russian and Persian Governments and my company should be modified accordingly.

I further beg to point out, for your Excellency's information, that the possible continuation of the Meshed line to Herat was only referred to in my above-mentioned letter to make the scheme thoroughly comprehensive, but on reconsideration it has been decided to omit this extension from the company's proposals.

In conclusion, I am instructed to add that my company is prepared to accept any other modifications the Imperial Russian Government may deem necessary to bring the proposed agreements into line with arrangements already made with the British Government.

I have, &c.

PAGENKOPF.

[48017]

No. 382.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, November 28, 1911.

LA Turquie ne cesse de s'emparer graduellement de différents points du territoire de la région d'Ourmiah, en se rapprochant opiniâtrément de la frontière russe.

Ce fait n'ayant, comme de raison, pas pu échapper à l'attention des autorités militaires, le Gouvernement Impérial se voit obligé de prendre des mesures en vue du renforcement de la garde du consulat nouvellement installé à Khoï.

Un régiment de tirailleurs avec fusils à tir rapide, quatre canons, et une compagnie du génie ont par conséquent reçu l'ordre de se rendre à Khoï pour s'y joindre aux deux sotnias (escadrons) de cosaques chargés de la sauvegarde de la route de caravanes reliant Khoï à Ourmiah.

Cette mesure a été jugée nécessaire à la suite de l'attaque récente de Kurdes, vraisemblablement assistés de soldats turcs, dirigée tout près de Khoï contre le Sotnik (Capitaine) Bitcherakoff et son escorte, affaire en laquelle fut grièvement blessé un officier russe.

Le Gouvernement Impérial considère qu'il est de son droit d'assurer la tranquillité et l'ordre dans les régions susindiquées, où la Russie possède d'importants intérêts politiques et commerciaux, attendu que le Gouvernement persan est absolument incapable d'entreprendre quelques mesures que ce soit à cet effet.

*Ambassade de Russie, Londres,
le 15 (28) novembre, 1911.*

[47676]

No. 383.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 607.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 28, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 378 of 24th November.

Russian Minister and I made yesterday joint communication to Bakhtiari Khans as follows:—

"Two Powers do not see their way to advise Bakhtiari in this matter of a purely internal nature, but they can tell them that they do not contemplate any interference so long as the interests of the two Powers are respected. Two Ministers again assure khans of the friendly sympathy of their Governments so long as the Bakhtiari act in a manner friendly to the two Powers. This friendly sympathy of their Governments should ensure fair treatment for Bakhtiari." (End of R.)

Russian Minister could not be induced to adopt the wording suggested by you. It seemed to him to approach to discouragement more closely than would be wished by his Government.

[47518]

No. 384.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 307.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 28, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

My telegram No. 305 of 28th November.

I should have mentioned that in our conversation yesterday M. Nératof said that he expected that the Russian troops, on arriving at Kazvin, would be retained there for a few days before any advance on Tehran was made.

[47464]

No. 385.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 728.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 28, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 305 of 27th November.

Persian Minister here has asked our advice, and requested that British Minister at Tehran should be instructed to confer with Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am ready to use what influence I can to induce Persian Government to comply with Russian demands, if they are as stated in your telegram No. 303 of 26th November, but it is essential that more time should be given. I have in reply to criticism here of Russian action as being harsh and unfair to Persia stated the Russian case, but there is a strong and natural feeling that failure to prevent return of ex-Shah and inherent weakness of Persian Government afford a valid plea for some consideration. (End of R.)

The Russian Government gave reasonable expectation that they would withdraw troops when once the two demands as originally formulated had been complied with. The Persian Government have now carried out the Russian wishes in these two points, and I fail to see that late events in any way justify an advance to Tehran, or, indeed, an advance beyond Resht, nor is the situation of sufficient urgency for the Russian Government to disappoint the expectation of withdrawal of troops and then to deliver an ultimatum with so short a time limit.

(R.) You should urge strongly that Russian demands should be put forward without time limit simply as condition of withdrawal of troops; that Russia should then, if there is delay in complying, come to an agreement with us as to what changes are required at Tehran to secure her interests. My public statements here have shown how clearly we feel that those interests must not be prejudiced.

You should represent all this in strongest manner both to President of Council and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 388.)

[47911]

No. 386.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 313.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1911.

I SPOKE to the Russian Ambassador to-day very seriously about the prospect in Persia.

I explained that the dispute between Russia and Persia did not concern us directly; but that the consequences of the Russian action might be very serious. I said that, whether the things in Mr. Shuster's pamphlet were right or wrong, the situation certainly became intolerable when the official of one Government distributed attacks upon another Government; but this would hardly justify a precipitate occupation of Tehran. I then used all the arguments contained in my telegram No. 737 to you of to-day, and added what I have already told you of my apprehensions as to the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

The Russian Ambassador said that Russian opinion was very much stirred, and felt that there must be an outright settlement with Persia; but he did not deprecate any of the suggestions which I made.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[46087]

No. 387.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the alleged violation by the British Indian authorities of the Baluch-Persian frontier near Piran.*

* No. 297.

In view of the wish expressed by the Government of India that the question of this frontier should not be opened, Sir E. Grey is disposed to approve Sir G. Barclay's proposal to abstain from replying to the note addressed to him by the Persian Government on the subject. I am, however, to suggest that, if the Marquess of Crewe sees no objection, the Government of India should be moved to cause an enquiry to be made into the circumstances of the case, and, if it is shown that a violation of the frontier has in fact taken place, to take measures to prevent any recurrence of the incident, which might afford to the Persian Government a plausible pretext for raising the question of the frontier in spite of the desire of the Government of India that it should be allowed to rest.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[47322]

No. 388.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 608.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

MY telegrams Nos. 596 and 599.

In reply to my *aide-mémoire* I have now received memorandum thanking His Majesty's Government for their good offices.

Memorandum states that on His Majesty's Government's friendly advice and on the strength of the understanding that Russian troops would be withdrawn, Persian Government have lost no time in fully complying with Russian demands.

Troops landed before the receipt of my *aide-mémoire* have hitherto not been withdrawn and disembarkations are occurring daily at Enzeli, and the force at Resht is now nearly 2,000.

Aide-mémoire concludes expressing confidence that His Majesty's Government will continue to lend their good offices for fulfilment of the terms of my *aide-mémoire*, "which was the determining factor in attitude adopted by Persian Government towards Russian desiderata."

Sent to Constantinople and St. Petersburg.

[47827]

No. 389.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 609.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

MY telegram No. 589 of 20th November.

Japanese have arrived Bushire and ask resident's advice as to proper channel for all complaints and claims against the Persian Government. They have letters of introduction from their consular authorities asking our good offices.

Pending reference to you, I am authorising resident to attest their statement of losses.

[47828]

No. 390.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 610.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

RUSSIAN ultimatum was presented at noon to-day on exact lines of Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 303 of 26th November.

Compliance is demanded within forty-eight hours.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

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[47834]

No. 391.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 611.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

MY telegram No. 610 of 29th November.

Ultimatum contains no promise to withdraw troops on compliance with demands.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent his "chef de cabinet" again to appeal to our good offices to obtain some mitigation of demands, or at any rate an extension of the period of grace. Demands came to Persian Government as a complete surprise, and term allowed gives them no time to deliberate.

He asked me for advice. I replied that I had no instructions, but that I personally thought that the Persian Government had better yield without delay.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[47893]

No. 392.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 312.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 29, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

At visits which I paid to-day to M. Kokovtsoff and M. Nératof I read to both of them your telegrams Nos. 728 of the 28th November and 736 of the 29th November, as this method seemed to me best calculated to impress them. I made use of every argument possible: I pointed out that if our influence was to be used at Tehran we must have time in which to use it; that public opinion in England might be estranged by the action which Russia was now taking, and that, without the support of public opinion, no understanding was worth anything.

My first visit was paid to M. Nératof, who told me that he was not yet in possession of the actual text of the ultimatum, which was only to be delivered this morning, but that the instructions sent to M. Poklewski by the Russian Government were correctly given in my telegram to you No. 303 of the 26th November, the only modification in the three points mentioned being an addition to the effect that particulars as to the exact amount of indemnity required and as to the manner of its payment would be settled when Russia had established how much the expedition had actually cost.

All that I could induce M. Nératof to concede in the matter of an extension of the time limit was that no orders for an advance from Resht would be telegraphed to the troops before next Saturday. He said, however, that if the Russian Government received from Persia a definite written assurance that all three demands would be complied with, he would then grant a delay of fifteen days in which the Persian Government might make all arrangements necessary in connection with the departure of Mr. Shuster.

He said that he believed that on Persia complying with the demands the Russian force would be withdrawn and that the Russian Government would not insist on the indemnity being paid immediately.

In my subsequent conversation with M. Kokovtsoff I said that M. Nératof's assurances did not go far enough. I pressed his Excellency to allow sufficient time for our two Ministers at Tehran to co-operate and effect a settlement which would prevent the necessity of resorting to force.

M. Kokovtsoff said that we must not lose sight of the fact that Russia had been offended in her dignity, a point which carried great weight with the Emperor; that the presentation of an ultimatum in a form which could leave no hope for compromise was the only way of bringing home to the Persians that Russia was really in earnest; that at the last meeting of the council of Ministers he had reduced to their minimum the demands which had been originally suggested; that Russia had no desire to send her troops to Tehran, and that he would be most grateful if you would assist in inducing the Persians to give way; that he gathered that it was the manner of presenting the demands and not the demands themselves to which you objected, and that, if I would furnish him with copies of the telegrams which I had read to him he would lay them before a meeting of the Council of Ministers to be held to-morrow, explaining to the council that they constituted a matter of grave importance.

M. Kokovtsoff assured me positively that if Persia complied with the three demands

the Russian troops would be withdrawn, even if they had already been advanced as far as Tehran, and that Russia would present no fresh demands, though the increased cost of the expedition would have to be added to the amount of the indemnity to be required. He would not play the Shylock in the matter of the indemnity, but would give the Persians reasonable time in which to pay it, and the troops would not be kept in Persia till it was paid.

He would see what could be done with regard to increasing the time limit or ordering a halt at Kesvin for a week or ten days, as I had suggested, but before giving me any definite assurance on these points he must first consult his colleagues.

In accordance with his request I am furnishing him with paraphrases of your two telegrams, and I hope that the decision of the Council of Ministers will be communicated to me by to-morrow evening. Until the council has pronounced its decision I cannot guarantee that any of the assurances given me by M. Kokovtsoff will be upheld.

In my conversation with M. Nératof we spoke of the steps that the Persian Government should take in order to secure the establishment of friendly relations with Russia. The only suggestion that M. Nératof could offer was that Persia should give expression to her desire to establish such friendly relations with her Russian neighbours.

[47769]

No. 393.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 736.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 29, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister has again asked advice, and I have told him that I can say nothing definite till I know exactly how Russian demands are formulated and can say for certain that compliance will secure withdrawal of Russian troops. I have, however, told him definitely that Shuster makes things impossible.

It is obvious that Persia cannot pay an indemnity, and I assume Russian troops will not remain till actual payment has been made if everything else is settled. To exact indemnity before Persia has obtained a loan would be fatal to any prospect of improvement of southern roads, and would thereby further intensify damage to British trade.

It is important that I should know text of Russian demands, and whether it can be said definitely that compliance will secure withdrawal of troops.

Persian Minister represents to me that he desires advice as to how new Persian Cabinet must act generally to secure friendly relations with Russia, and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs may be able to say something on this point also. Impression made on me by Persian Minister is that Persian Government realise how serious situation is. He admits unwisdom of Shuster in distributing pamphlet.

[47770]

No. 394.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 737.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 29, 1911.

PERSIA.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Count Benckendorff came to see me to-day, and I gave him the substance of my telegram to you. I told his Excellency that if Russian treatment of the Persian Government became too exacting, it might become necessary for me to make some public statement to the effect that we found ourselves obliged to discuss with the Russian Government how far the consequences of Russian action in Persia had impaired the principle of the Anglo-Russian agreement. This would give the appearance that the Anglo-Russian agreement was less solid than formerly, and would thereby have a most unfortunate effect on foreign policy generally.

It would be better perhaps if you were to let the Russian Government hear this from Count Benckendorff himself, and were not to go so far in your own conversations.

[46980]

No. 395.

Foreign Office to Anglo-Jewish Association.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 29, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant relative to an enquiry addressed to your association by the Alliance israélite universelle, of Paris, as to whether the masters whom they have appointed to their schools at Shiraz can safely proceed to their posts from Bushire.

I am to inform you, in reply, that the latest intelligence in Sir E. Grey's possession shows no improvement in the state of the Bushire-Shiraz road, and that he cannot take the responsibility of expressing an opinion that persons travelling along it would be safe from attack.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[47946]

No. 396.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 612.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

BRITISH vice-consul at Resht reports that there are now at Resht about 1,900 Russian troops. He understands that 700 more left Enzeli yesterday, and that two further transports have since arrived.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[47947]

No. 397.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 613.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 736 of 29th November to St. Petersburg received last night.

Following is full substance of demands:—

1. Dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre; other persons engaged by Shuster will come under condition 2.
2. Persian Government must undertake not to engage foreigners without previous consent of Russian and British Legations.
3. Payment by Persian Government of the expenses of present Russian military expedition to Persia. Manner of payment and exact sum will be settled after Persian Government's reply has been received.

After stating these demands, note gives following reasons for making them:—

Absolute necessity of obtaining compensation for Russians having been forced to send troops to Persia and for Shuster's recent offensive actions towards Russia, and also the sincere desire of Russia now to remove principal source of conflict which has arisen, and for future to lay foundations upon which the two Governments can build up friendly and stable relations, and to give a prompt and satisfactory solution to all Russian matters and pending questions.

Note concludes by stating that Russian Minister cannot wait more than forty-eight hours for fulfilment of these conditions, during which troops will remain at Resht. If before expiration of this term no answer is received, or answer is unsatisfactory, troops will advance, and of course indemnity will increase.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[47948]

No. 398.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 614.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

A message has just reached me from the Persian Government to the effect that they attach less importance to the far-reaching demands in the ultimatum than to the explanations (see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 613), as they fear that these latter leave the door open for any further claims that Russia may desire to formulate, and even for a demand that Persia adopt any particular form of Government that it may suit Russia to see established here.

[47956]

No. 399.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 615.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

SHOA-ES-SULTANEH.

The Russian Government have taken the mother of Shoa-es-Sultaneh and her property under Russian protection. This action has been taken in response to a telegram addressed by the lady to the Emperor and Empress of Russia.

It is to be feared that she may utilise this protection to claim that the property, the confiscation of which provoked the recent troublesome action of the Russian consul-general here, be restored to her.

[47949]

No. 400.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 616.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 613 of this morning.

Russian Government have now authorised their Minister to announce to the Persian Government that they will withdraw their troops as soon as (1) the first part of the first condition has been *de facto* fulfilled; and (2) the Persian Government have undertaken to fulfil the second part of the first condition and also condition two, and have promised to pay an indemnity. The mode of settlement and the actual amount of the indemnity may be left over for discussion at a later date.

[47965]

No. 401.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 617.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Russian Minister has just informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the three conditions are satisfied, as indicated in my immediately preceding telegram of this afternoon.

Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently visited me, and spoke of the explanations contained in the Russian note (see my telegram No. 613, penultimate paragraph), which had caused the Persian Government such anxiety. He said that he had received assurances from the Russian Minister; in view of these he appeared no longer anxious on that point. He laid, however, great stress on the fact that it was impossible to comply with the demands in the time allowed. The opinion in the Medjlis was strongly against compliance, and it was a physical impossibility for him to win over by

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to-morrow a majority to his way of thinking. He added that he had always been most sincerely anxious to smooth relations with Russia.

He hopes that the Russian Government will not utilise this delay as a pretext for putting forward other demands than those already presented.

[47990]

No. 402.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

M. Nératof is still at the meeting of the Council of Ministers (which is still sitting at 7 p.m.), but M. Klemm has just sent me the following message:—

(R.) "Russian Minister at Tehran has been informed that Persian reply will be considered satisfactory if within forty-eight hours Persian Government state in writing that the three demands are formally accepted and that dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre is an accomplished fact. Since, however, formalities connected with Shuster's dismissal may require some time, Russian Minister is authorised to allow Persian Government delay which he judges necessary for complete regulation of position of that official. As to cost of expedition, it will be sufficient that Persian Government should now agree to settle that matter when amount shall have been fixed.

"If a satisfactory answer is received, detachment will not advance beyond Resht, but its recall to Russia can only take place when Shuster affair is completely settled."

[47991]

No. 403.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 314.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

As Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs could not receive me, I wrote privately, pointing out that letter sent to me made no mention of further delay at Kazvin or of President of the Council's assurance respecting recall of troops.

Following is his answer:—

"As regards halt of troops at Kazvin, it was decided that it would be necessary to order troops to rest there for a few days, without fixing exactly length of their stay.

"We have, I think, time enough before us to discuss this question, should it arise.

"As regards question of recall of our troops, it is difficult for me to give you categorical answer, as all will depend on circumstances under which march into the interior will take place. At present moment it is not our intention to formulate other demands beyond those already known, but if we are obliged to employ force in order to carry business, our demands may be increased." (End of R.)

From M. Nératof's letter it appears that M. Kokovtsoff has again gone farther in his assurances to me than his colleagues on the council are prepared to go. In these circumstances, I think it would be better that I should deal in future exclusively with M. Nératof, who is much more careful in his language. M. Kokovtsoff is not only insufficiently posted in Persian affairs, but I am informed that two reactionary members of the Council of Ministers oppose him in that body, and are working to bring about his downfall in co-operation with a party at court.

I am to see M. Nératof to-morrow, and will make enquiry about the "explanations" in the Russian note to which Sir G. Barclay refers in his telegram No. 613 of to-day.

From M. Nératof's assurances, however, and from the terms of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 616 of to-day the troops will presumably be withdrawn when the dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre has been actually carried out, and when the Persian Government has given an engagement to comply with the other demands put forward in the ultimatum.

I very much fear that, unless a satisfactory answer is given at once, the Persian Government will be called upon later on to pay for it.

[47949]

No. 404.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 392.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 30, 1911.

I HAVE told Persian Minister that we are discussing situation with Russian Government, but there can be no question of Russia withdrawing the three demands; that if these are complied with at once details may be arranged favourably afterwards, but that delay in complying will inevitably mean advance of Russian troops.

You may inform your Russian colleague and Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 744.)

[47893]

No. 405.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 745.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 30, 1911.

YOU may inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram No. 392 of the 29th November to Sir G. Barclay.

I have made a statement to-day in Parliament admitting that situation is serious, and must be discussed with the Russian Government. After Persian Government submit to three demands, it will be essential that Russian Government should co-operate in facilitating appointment of such foreign advisers as are necessary, and in enabling Persian Government to obtain a loan.

(Confidential.)

Although it is at present premature to raise the question, Persia will never be in a position to pay an indemnity, and it might be a good thing if later on the Russian Government withdrew that condition, and obtained in its place some other concession, e.g., the satisfactory settlement of some outstanding question with Russia, if not the recognition of the Anglo-Russian agreement.

[47461]

No. 406.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my letter of the 23rd instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copies of telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran respecting the provision of temporary quarters for the Indian troops now at Shiraz.*

Sir E. Grey does not think that the expenditure required for the purchase of a site for this purpose would be justified; but, if the Government of India will accept half the cost involved in the erection of the necessary buildings, the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury will be approached with a view to the remainder being charged against Imperial funds.

I am to add that a further communication will be addressed to you as soon as an estimate is received.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MAILET.

[48041]

No. 407.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received December 1.)

28, Oxford Street, Manchester,

November 29, 1911.

Sir,

THE Muin now writes us particulars of the decision of the Persian Government, which has been confirmed by the Medjliss, confining to him for a period of ten years the Hormuz mines.

* Nos. 392, 344, 372, and 373.

We understand, however, from the Muin that he has been obliged to accept this decision in the meantime to recover his money, but in doing so he has reserved all his rights to pursue his claims to his concession, which was granted him in perpetuity, and his rights in which have been usurped.

Under these circumstances it appears to us that it would be unfair to the Muin to any longer delay sending him our replies to his two letters of the 7th October, copies of which we sent you on the 30th ultimo for your approval, and, unless you see reason to object to this course, we now propose to post to him the two letters in question.

We have repeatedly pointed out to you the urgent need of immediate action on the part of His Majesty's Government in fulfilment of the pledges which have been made to us, and we much regret that we are still without any response to our letters of the 30th ultimo and the 4th and 13th instant.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[48063]

No. 408.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 618.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

ALA-ED-DOWLEH was assassinated this morning. There appears to be some excitement in the town on account of this occurrence, and also in connection with Russian ultimatum.

[48064]

No. 409.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 619.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

MEDJLISS this morning voted rejection of Russian [?] demands practically unanimously.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48125]

No. 410.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 620.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

CAPTAIN STOKES.

It is very desirable to get rid of Stokes as soon as possible, in view of the excitement prevailing here. The Russian Minister hears on reliable authority that he is taking part in meetings held at Shuster's house; at these meetings the situation and the possibility of offering resistance to the Russian troops are discussed. It is impossible, of course, for me to say positively that he has done anything yet to provoke a breach of the peace.

My Russian colleague comments on the very delicate situation which might arise where a British officer appears to be mixed up with the enemies of Russia, and he asks whether there is no way of getting rid of Stokes and thus avoiding the difficulty.

Would it not be possible to send him a telegram to the effect that he will be considered a deserter unless he leaves Tehran immediately? If he ignored the order and continued to stay here, have I the power to deport him?

[48126]

No. 411.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 621.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

THERE has been much excitement throughout day, and several anti-Russian demonstrations.

There seems no doubt that Ala-ed-Dowleh was assassinated owing to his Russian sympathies.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[48127]

No. 412.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 622.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

MY telegram No. 619 of 1st December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs resigned after rejection by the Medjliss of the Russian demands.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48129]

No. 413.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 316.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 1, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I spoke to M. Nératof to-day in the sense of your telegram No. 745 of the 30th November. His Excellency said that the Russian Government intended to do all in their power to assist Persia to appoint new foreign advisers and to negotiate a loan. He also explained to me in a satisfactory manner the points in the Russian note which had roused the apprehensions of the Persian Government (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 614 of the 30th November).

M. Nératof then said that an official communication had to-day been made to M. Poklewski announcing that the Medjliss refused to comply with the demands presented by Russia.

He had expected that the Persian Government would not accept the demands, but he had thought that they would content themselves with leaving the Russian note unanswered, and he regretted that they had sent a written refusal. If they had sent no reply the door would have been left open for further conversation. In accordance with his promise to me, the troops would not be ordered to advance till to-morrow afternoon, and a halt of a few days would be made at Kazvin on their arrival at that place. The Persian Government, it was evident after the categorical refusal which they had just given, would never yield so long as the present Medjliss remained in session. The only hope now was that the Medjliss might be sent about its business. The Regent was hardly the sort of man to dissolve the Medjliss, even if the terms of the constitution gave him the power to do so, a point on which, M. Nératof said, he was not very clear. There was the possibility, however, of a *coup d'État* by the Bakhtiari. Sardar Assad was now at Baku, and would be allowed to pass freely through the Russian lines on his arrival in Persia.

I again impressed on his Excellency the complications which might result from a Russian advance on Tehran, pointing out the likelihood of its giving rise to fresh incidents which would in turn occasion fresh demands. Russia would have no regular Persian Government with which to deal, and there was always the possibility of the ex-Shah profiting by the confusion and endeavouring to seize the throne once more, a contingency to which His Majesty's Government would never consent in any circumstances.

M. Nératof assured me that no support whatever would be given to the ex-Shah by Russia. I then remarked that we would probably have to find someone to replace Nasr-al-Mulk in the regency, and M. Nératof suggested that Sardar Assad might have the post. I said that I had no knowledge as to how you would regard his candidature.

At the close of our conversation I begged his Excellency to take into consideration the difficulties of the position in which His Majesty's Government would now find themselves placed. To this he replied that the press in this country was attacking the Russian Government for lack of firmness in dealing with the Persian situation, and that Russian prestige must be upheld. He promised, however, that any further demands which they might have to put forward would be restricted to what was

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absolutely necessary for the purpose of upholding Russian prestige and satisfying Russian public opinion.

Occupation of Tehran is, I fear, inevitable unless something unexpected happens in the capital by the time the Russian troops reach Kazvin.

[47965]

No. 414.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 394.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

It seems possible that situation created by Russian ultimatum may produce complete chaos at Tehran. You should co-operate with your Russian colleague to secure that under any circumstances the full influence of Russia, as well as of British Legation, will be used if necessary to give protection to the person of the Regent, whose attitude towards both England and Russia has been friendly throughout.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 746.)

[47827]

No. 415.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 400.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 609 of 29th November.

I have no objection to your lending good offices in favour of Japanese if you think that a claim can properly be presented on their behalf.

(Repeated to Tokyo, No. 53.)

[48125]

No. 416.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 401.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

MAJOR STOKES' appointment.

You should inform Stokes that, in view of his position as an officer in the service of His Majesty's Government, he must, under no circumstances, allow himself to become involved in any way in the present complicated situation.

In the meanwhile I am telegraphing to the Indian Government, requesting them to renew their orders given to Stokes to leave Persia and return to India.

Please see your telegram No. 620.

[47965]

No. 417.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 747.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 1st December, repeating No. 394 to Tehran.

Ask Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to send instructions in this sense to Russian Minister at Tehran.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 395.)

[47990]

No. 418.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 748.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

RUSSIAN demands.

Reference to your telegram No. 313 of 1st December.

I much regret that the Persian Government has not been allowed a longer delay

by Russia. With this reservation, M. Poklewski's instructions seem to me satisfactory. They will presumably be communicated to the Persian Government. In view of the importance of my being able to make a definite statement in Parliament on Russian action and on the conditions on which the Russian Government will withdraw their troops, you should ask whether I may state generally what these instructions are.

You should also ask for very definite assurances in writing, stating the purpose with which Russian Government are acting, and the limits of their action, as such assurances are needed to allay the great anxiety concerning the Anglo-Russian Agreement. It is feared very naturally here that Russian action may result in the agreement breaking down.

[47827]

No. 419.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. MacDonald.

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegrams Nos. 589 of 20th November and 609 of 29th November.

Enquire whether Japanese Government wish us to represent them in this matter.

I think anything we do should be limited to good offices.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 399.)

[47133]

No. 420.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 311.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram No. 302 of the 26th ultimo, reporting a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the Russian demands on Persia and the dispatch of troops to enforce them.

I approve the language used by your Excellency to M. Nératof on this occasion, and take note with satisfaction of the assurance which he conveyed to you that Russia contemplates no annexation of Persian territory.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[48250]

No. 421.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 623.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

THE assassination of Ala-ed-Dowleh is said to have been due to the suspicion that the Russian Minister made use of him as a go-between with the Bakhtiari to bring about the restoration to the throne of Mohamed Ali.

The return of the ex-Shah would, there is no doubt, not be distasteful to one branch of the Bakhtiari, but the other branch of the tribe is in the ascendant for the moment. The khans who visited the two legations on the 21st November (see my telegram No. 592 of the same day) were representing both branches of the tribe.

Ala-ed-Dowleh had doubtless, too, shown considerable activity in fostering an understanding of some kind between the Bakhtiari khans and the Russian Minister.

[48264]

No. 422.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 624.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

SITUATION at Tehran.

Please see my telegram No. 618 of yesterday.

Two further attempts on the lives of reactionaries were made yesterday; one only

resulted in the death of the coachman of the intended victim, but the other proved successful.

The leading baker, who was suspected of cornering grain, was also killed yesterday. Prices are rising, and fears are expressed of an outbreak of bread riots. Shuster's energetic action in collecting malat in kind for the needs of the capital has hitherto averted these.

[48237]

No. 423.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 625.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

PLEASE see last sentence of your telegram No. 401 of yesterday.

I conveyed your message to Stokes in an official letter, which has, however, elicited nothing more than a mere acknowledgment.

[48251]

No. 424.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 626.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

BRITISH consul at Resht reports that the total number of Russian troops in that town is now 3,500, and that houses at Resht and Enzeli are being leased for troops and officers for one year and over.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48262]

No. 425.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 627.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

REJECTION by Medjliss of Russian demand was communicated verbally by Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Minister yesterday, but I understand that the Persian Government are preparing a note.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48263]

No. 426.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 628.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

RUSSIAN ultimatum.

Please see my telegram No. 617 of the 30th ultimo.

Russian Minister does not exclude possibility of further demands. He tells me that the assurances to the Minister for Foreign Affairs only held provided that the Persian Government complied with the demands within forty-eight hours. The instructions telegraphed to him by the Russian Government, on which he presented the ultimatum, ran—as regards the last sentence of my telegram No. 613 of the 30th ultimo—"inter alia indemnity will increase."

The version of the ultimatum given in my telegram No. 613 was taken from the Persian text presented to the Persian Government, and the words "inter alia" appear to be omitted from it.

[48269]

No. 427.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 629.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

FOLLOWING received from His Majesty's consul at Resht to-day:—

"About 100 men reached here last night from Enzeli; 800 men left last night for Kazvin."

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48270]

No. 428.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 630.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

SARDAR ASSAD arrived at Enzeli from Europe last night.

[48271]

No. 429.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 631.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

IN a letter addressed by Shuster to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which I saw to-day, the former declares that the pamphlet containing his letter to the "Times" was neither published nor circulated in Tehran by him.

Copies, in English, of the letter were shown to a number of his friends (I myself asked him to let me have a copy), and a dozen or more copies, in Persian, were sent to certain Persian friends. He replied to some of the latter, who enquired if he would object to its being published in Persian, that he certainly had no objection to the public knowing the contents of an open letter to the "Times."

[48267]

No. 430.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 317.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 2, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Your telegram No. 748 of the 1st December.

I laid before M. Nératof to-day his own private letters and the *aide-mémoire* which he had sent me, and asked what portions of these documents you might use for the statement which you propose to make in Parliament.

His Excellency said that there would be no objection to your quoting the second and third paragraphs of the *aide-mémoire* (summarised in my telegram No. 302 of the 26th November) beginning from "Russia having now" down to "governing Anglo-Russian understanding." The full text of the *aide-mémoire* has been sent by bag, and should reach you on Monday.

He has also no objection to your making use of the private letters (see my telegrams Nos. 313 and 314 of the 30th November), but the first of these has now lost interest through Persia's refusal to comply with the Russian demands. With regard to the contents of the second letter, M. Nératof said that it was no longer possible for him to give a definite assurance that a halt would be made at Kazvin, though instructions had been sent to the officer in command of the troops that he must not advance beyond that place until he had received orders to do so either from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or from M. Poklewski. It was possible, however, that in view of the disturbed state of Tehran, M. Poklewski might ask that troops should be sent at once to protect the Russian Legation.

On my enquiring whether there was anything that he could add to the assurances

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given above, M. Nératof approved the following, after I had submitted it to him in writing:—

"Should circumstances arise to render necessary presentation of further demands, those demands will not go beyond questions having a peculiar interest for Russia, such as settlement of outstanding matters in dispute or other matters having an exclusive interest for Russia in zone that has been reserved to her, and will not touch questions of a general political interest."

Having already in my possession M. Nératof's two private letters and the *aide-mémoire* referred to above, I hardly liked to ask his Excellency to give me yet further assurances in writing.

I gather from my conversation with M. Nératof that new demands, should such be presented, may include one to the effect that Russia should be given a first option for the construction of all railways in the Russian sphere, or one for the formation, under Russian control, of a force of police, the *quid pro quo* being the withdrawal from Tabreez of the Russian force now stationed there.

[48268]

No. 431.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, December 2, 1911.

MY telegram No. 394 of 1st December to Tehran.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs will send instructions in the sense desired, but thinks that our two Ministers should consult together and agree on the names of the persons to whom protection or bast should be given. He mentioned young Shah and persons of his entourage. Of course, if military force has to be employed, Russia would act independently. He hopes that Sir G. Barclay may be instructed accordingly.

[47388]

No. 432.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 403.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

MAJOR STOKES'S appointment.

The following telegram has been sent to the Indian Government, dated the 22nd ultimo:—

"An appeal has been made by Stokes to His Majesty's Government begging them to reconsider their decision. His Majesty's Government would therefore be glad if you could inform Stokes as follows, stating that 'His Majesty's Government consider that his first duty as an officer in His Majesty's service is to obey the orders given him, and thus to withdraw his acceptance of the post in the service of the Persian Government. His Majesty's Government consider that it is necessary for him to withdraw, and take upon themselves the full responsibility for such action. The reasons which determined them to refuse his resignation have already been explained to him at length.'"

Reference to your telegram No. 591 of 21st November.

[48250]

No. 433.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 404.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

CONSIDERING the way in which the ex-Shah has behaved in the past His Majesty's Government could in no circumstances recognise him again. Whatever the Bakhtiaris do, His Majesty's Government must not incur any responsibility, and you must of course avoid taking part in any intrigues with them.

Reference is to your telegram No. 623.

[48129]

No. 434.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 756.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

THE language you held about the ex-Shah (see your telegram No. 316) has my approval. I am glad to note that the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed to it.

Tehran should not be occupied by the Russians except in the last resort, and new and more extensive demands should not be put forward by them. This is very important, and I hope that if they find it necessary to formulate fresh demands they will first consult His Majesty's Government. The danger which I anticipate is that they may make new demands which, being neither inevitable nor consistent with the Anglo-Russian Agreement, I should be unable to defend. In fact, I am inclined to think that the Russian Government does not understand how easily the whole question of the foreign policy of both Russia and England might be raised by the Persian question, which has already become so acute. If the Russian Government, failing to realise the danger of their action, were to force the question of foreign policy upon us, by making it impossible for us to co-operate with them in Persia, it would be a most deplorable state of affairs.

[48522]

No. 435.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 315.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

I SPOKE very seriously to Count Benckendorff to-day as to my anxiety about Persia.

I said it was unfortunate, in the first instance, that the Russian ultimatum had been based upon the question of the property of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh; for the question was of comparatively slight importance, and the Russian case with regard to it did not seem to be very strong. It was still more unfortunate that, after we had been given to understand—and, indeed, had once received a most positive assurance from M. Kokovtsoff—that the Russian troops would be withdrawn when the two demands in connection with the property were complied with, and Sir George Barclay had urged the Persian Government to comply, in this expectation, the troops had not been withdrawn, and further demands had been put forward. It was true that there had been a delay of a few days in complying with the demands, but nevertheless the circumstances in which the Russian action was taken were not fortunate.

Three demands had now been put forward. With regard to the first two, as to Mr. Shuster and the future appointment of foreign advisers, I could not object. Mr. Shuster had rejected the advice which we had given him through our Minister in Tehran; he had placed us in a most embarrassing position; and some arrangement with the Persian Government respecting foreign advisers was necessary even from the British point of view, to prevent our being placed in such a position again. It would have been better, I thought, if the Persian Government had been asked to promise not to appoint foreign advisers without consultation with the Russian and British Legations instead of being bound to obtain consent; but this was rather a matter of form.

I regretted that an indemnity had been asked for. British trade had suffered much more than Russian trade: in fact, Russian trade in the north might even have gained by the stoppage of British trade in the south. Money was essential for the restoration of order in the south, and the Russian demand for an indemnity would be felt here as injurious to the prospect of the restoration of order in the south that was necessary for British trade. As the demand had been put forward, the Persian Government must say "Yes" to it; but I trusted that payment would either not be pressed for, or in some way be commuted for some other advantage later on.

I then urged strongly upon the Ambassador that the Russian troops should not go to Tehran, except in the very last resort; and that no further demands of a more far-reaching nature should be put forward by the Russian Government without consultation with us. I was afraid that the Government in St. Petersburg did not realise how suddenly the Persian question, if it was mismanaged, might raise the whole question of foreign policy. If further demands were to be put forward, with regard to which we might be obliged to say that they were not justified, or inconsistent with the

Anglo-Russian agreement, the Persian question would disappear, and the much more serious question of foreign policy, both for us and for Russia, would take its place. This would be most deplorable, and I was very anxious.

On the other hand, if the Russian Government would restrict themselves to their existing demands, and would not go to Tehran except in the last resort, I thought that we might get through the present difficulties. We might secure a Persian Government who would realise that they must govern with a good disposition towards Russian interests, instead of in opposition to them. We should be able to assist such a Government with foreign advisers, and facilitate such a loan as Messrs. Seligmann's or another on favourable terms. Things in Persia might then become better than they had yet been.

But, at present, we were passing through a very delicate and difficult time; and I was afraid that the Government in St. Petersburg did not realise what great issues were at stake, and what great care was needed to prevent our drifting apart.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[48272]

No. 436.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 632.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 394 of 1st December.

My Russian colleague and I have more than once assured Regent that he might count on all possible protection from the two legations.

Your telegram was read to him yesterday, and my Russian colleague authorised me to say that he would gladly associate himself with renewed offer of protection.

Regent asked me to express to you sense of his deepest gratitude and also thanked us both, but said that for the moment he did not consider himself in danger.

[48273]

No. 437.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 633.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

ANTI-RUSSIAN demonstrations continued yesterday. Attempts are being made to establish boycott of Russian enterprises and goods.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48274]

No. 438.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 634.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

MY telegram No. 622 of 1st December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has withdrawn resignation, being assured that rejection of Russian demands by Medjliss did not imply any want of confidence in him.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48275]

No. 439.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 635.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 403 of 2nd December.

I received telegram in the sense indicated from Government of India yesterday, and communicated it to Stokes.

I fear, however, that he will need something more peremptory.

[48276]

No. 440.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 636.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

MY telegrams Nos. 613 of 30th November and 619 of 1st December.

Persian Government have now replied to Russian ultimatum in a note.

Note urges that compliance with two original demands was as prompt as compatible with Cabinet, and complains that, though no term had been stated for compliance with these demands, troops were suddenly landed; and, furthermore, Russian Government presented additional demands incompatible with independence of Persia, allowing too brief a period for deliberation, thus closing door to further discussion.

Note continues:—

"There can be no cause for complaint until real necessity [group undecypherable] is shown, and until Persian Government have refused satisfaction for insult referred to (presumably alleged publication by Shuster of the pamphlet complained of), as to which there has been no discussion by the two Governments as to whether it actually occurred or not, and until there has been preliminary enquiry.

"Removal of differences, together with the establishment of basis of an understanding and harmony, are naturally more compatible with peaceful methods.

"While inviting Russian Government to consider true state of case, the good relations existing between the two Governments and importance of maintaining them, I beg that Persian Government may be excused from fulfilling demands. I have, however, the honour to inform your Excellency of the readiness of the Persian Government to discuss alterations in above-mentioned proposals, and to accept any just proposals which may be made to Persian Government."

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48277]

No. 441.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 637.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

CAPTAIN STOKES.

Reference to my telegram No. 635 of to-day's date.

I am informed by Captain Stokes that he has informed treasurer-general of His Majesty's Government's decision refusing his resignation. Mr. Shuster, although deeply regretting that His Majesty's Government have decided to revoke the permission at first given to Captain Stokes to take up the appointment offered to him, now considers himself obliged to release Captain Stokes from the promise which he had contracted with the treasurer-general in consequence of that permission received from His Majesty's Government.

Captain Stokes tells me that he intends to leave for India "as soon as ever he can terminate some purely personal affairs."

In spite of this assurance, I venture to suggest that he may be peremptorily instructed to start immediately. Such orders could perhaps be conveniently embodied in the reply to a telegram to Government of India from Captain Stokes which I am sending to-day.

On the 20th October Stokes informed me that in any case certain private business and purely personal reasons would prevent him from leaving Tehran for at least a month. I consider, however, that recent developments make it politic for him to leave the country without delay. The private business to which reference is made consists chiefly, I believe, in the disposal of Dr. Lindley's furniture, which could no doubt be deputed to someone else.

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[48278]

No. 442.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 638.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 16 S.C.

Following is message from Stokes:—

"I propose starting for India, in accordance with orders of commander-in-chief, as soon as my private affairs here are settled. I request instructions as to route I am to travel by, and the authority from whom I am to draw money for travelling expenses. With regard to route, via London would be quicker than Suez Canal and Bushire. If ordered to travel via London, will Foreign Office pay for my journey to London as it would have done had I left Tehran at termination of my appointment as military attaché?"

(Addressed to India, No. 638.)

[48279]

No. 443.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 639.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

RUSSIA and ex-Shah.

Please see last paragraph but three and ante-penultimate paragraph of telegram No. 316 from St. Petersburg.

I am constantly receiving reports from our agent at Astrabad of alleged acts by the Russian consul there, and by the Russian Turcoman Commissioner at Gombad Kabus, on behalf of the ex-Shah.

My despatch No. 225 of the 22nd ultimo (which left by bag on the 1st December) transmitted a selection of these allegations.

Our agent at Astrabad is, of course, a Persian. I presume it would be difficult to use these stories, the accuracy of which it is impossible to verify, at St. Petersburg without substantiation.

I have informed my Russian colleague of the more plausible stories, such, for instance, as the dispatch of 4,000 tomans, collected for the ex-Shah by Turcomans in Astrabad, to His Majesty by gholam of the Russian consulate. But the Russian Minister can hardly be expected to have proper authority over his consuls after the manner in which his insubordinate consul-general in Tehran has recently been upheld.

Among other stories now reported by our agent in Astrabad is one respecting an interview between the Russian consul and the ex-Shah on the 6th November.

[48280]

No. 444.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 640.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

It would be desirable from the Tehran standpoint that a public statement should be made in the sense of the first sentence of your telegram No. 404 of yesterday's date. Public excitement here might be allayed, and it would tend to stop further assassinations of reactionaries.

It seems probable that Russia may before long be faced by a dilemma of state mate, or of having to make a *coup d'Etat* at Tehran, which latter must, it would seem, inevitably lead to something in the nature of a protectorate. While my Russian colleague would certainly welcome any means of saving his Government from such a dilemma by a Bakhtiari *coup d'Etat* here, I have no reason to think that he is acting contrary to the spirit of the joint action as regards the Bakhtiaris, reported in my telegram No. 607 of the 28th ultimo.

The views expressed in my telegram No. 580 of the 17th November remain unchanged, and I see no reason to alter them.

[48281]

No. 445.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 641.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, December 3, 1911.*

SQUADRON of Indian cavalry on its way to reinforce Ispahan consular escort came into conflict with armed tribesmen, 30th November, near Yezdikesh. One native officer, Major Gholam Mohammad, was wounded in thigh, but is doing well and quite out of danger.

Incident reported to Bushire, whence it will be doubtless reported to India.

[48282]

No. 446.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 642.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Russian Minister tells me he has sent for 25 cossacks from the Kazvin guard as an increase for the legation escort. The legation and consulate-general have now about 50 cossacks between them. In view of present conditions this is certainly not excessive.

[48362]

No. 447.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 223.)

Sir.

Tehran, November 20, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 566 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith, a report compiled by Mr. Churchill, of the debate held in the Medjliss on the 13th instant, at which the Medjliss voted a prolongation of its session by forty-six votes to six.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 447.

Report by Mr. Churchill respecting Debate in the Medjliss.

(Prolongation of the Session, voted by the Medjliss, November 13, 1911.)

I ATTENDED at the first part of the sitting and heard the arguments for and against the proposal to prolong the session until just over half the deputies of the new Medjliss arrive in Tehran.

It was quite clear from the outset that the general feeling of the House was strongly in favour of prolonging the session, but nevertheless several members (notably Haji Imam Jamah, of Khoi), though admitting the desirability of the prolongation, pointed out the illegality of such a measure.

Against the proposal it was urged that the Medjliss could not legally pass an Act contrary to the constitution without a referendum, and in support of this contention the case of the Electoral Law of July, 1909 was cited. On that occasion it was found necessary to modify four articles of the constitution of December 1906 (namely articles 4, 5, 6, and 49), and for this purpose the matter was referred to the provincial Anjumanis, which eventually empowered the committee charged with the framing of the Electoral Law to modify those articles of the constitution (see preamble to the Electoral Law of 1909, Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 141 of the 19th July, 1909). Telegrams having been received from certain provinces urging the Medjliss to continue its sittings, and these telegrams having been quoted as justification for the contemplated measure, those opposing it pointed out that they did not in themselves

constitute a referendum, or show that the constituencies were really in favour of the prolongation. It was further stated that the course now contemplated had scarcely ever had a precedent in European countries, and *Matin-es-Sultaneh*, after referring to the precedent of the Long Parliament in England, and its ultimate dissolution by Cromwell, quoted the words of a great British statesman to the effect that nothing could be more disgraceful than that a Parliament should prolong its own life.

These arguments however, had very little effect, and those supporting the proposed measure, dwelt on the danger with which the country is at this moment confronted, and the paramount necessity for the representatives of the people to supervise the Government at this critical juncture. It was pointed out that if all the provinces had not expressed their wishes, it was because some of them were prevented from doing so by reactionary forces, and that if the *Medjliss* were to dissolve and wait for fresh elections, the enemies of the constitution would find means to prevent elections from taking place, and thereby to put off the reassembling of Parliament indefinitely.

Eventually the committee's report was put to the vote and agreed to by forty-six votes to six. The law, as passed, was briefly as follows:—

That the *Medjliss* will continue to sit until one more than half of the members of the new *Medjliss* shall have arrived in Tehran, and that the Government will take measures to bring about elections as soon as possible.

G. P. C.

[48347]

No. 448.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 349.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 29, 1911.

IN the conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately after my return to my post, on which I reported in my telegram No. 286, Confidential, of the 15th instant, I spoke to his Excellency very seriously of the consequences which might result from a Russian occupation of Tehran. The Anglo-Russian understanding, which was based on the principle of Persian integrity and independence, might receive a severe shock, while Moslem sentiment in India would be prejudicially affected. I urged him, therefore, not to issue orders for an advance from Kazvin till all other means of exercising pressure on the Persian Government, such as the seizure of customs-houses, had been exhausted, and until sufficient time had elapsed to allow the occupation of Kazvin to produce its effect. I further reminded him how, in your desire to maintain the Anglo-Russian understanding intact, you had always tried to meet Russia's wishes, and how you had repeatedly defended her action when it was criticised in Parliament. There was, however, an English public opinion of which you had to take account; and as, in spite of the provocation which Russia might have received, the fact remained that the Persian Cossacks had endeavoured to prevent the seizure of a property belonging to one of the leaders of the late insurrection, it would not be easy for you to justify an armed occupation of the capital on account of this incident.

In the course of his reply, M. Nératof gave me the positive assurance that the principle on which the Anglo-Russian understanding was founded would be maintained intact, and that nothing which the Russian Government might do would strike at the integrity of Persia. He dismissed, however, the idea of exercising pressure by the seizure of customs-houses as being quite inadequate, and declined to grant the Persian Government any further delay after the arrival of the troops at Kazvin. He based this refusal on the grounds that the Russian Minister at Tehran had broken off diplomatic relations with the Persian Government, and that Russia could not without loss of prestige address any further communication to that Government. He rejected a proposal which I had made, that he should send a last warning message through the Persian *chargé d'affaires* here, but raised no objection when I put forward the personal suggestion that Sir George Barclay might, perhaps, warn the Persian Government that we had been told that unless satisfaction was at once given to Russia, not only would Tehran be occupied, but that Russia's demands would, as his Excellency had already informed me, be increased the further she advanced into the country.

In referring to the incident to which the seizure of *Shoa-es-Sultaneh's* property had given rise, M. Nératof said that the Russian Government had never disputed the right

of the Persian Government to confiscate the property of persons who had taken part in the late rebellion. They had acquiesced in principle in such a procedure, but in this particular case the Persian Government had failed to notify the Russian Legation that it was *Shoa-es-Sultaneh's* property that was about to be seized, while the gendarmerie sent to take possession of it had carried off various implements belonging to the Russian farmers who had leased the property. This incident, however, was but one of a series of provocative measures that had been inspired by Mr. Shuster; and it was the cumulative effect of these acts that had forced the Russian Government to take action. His Excellency's language clearly showed that Russia is bent on bringing about the fall of Mr. Shuster, and that if the *Medjliss* refuses to consent to his dismissal, she will endeavour to get rid of the present Chamber by having the date of the new elections anticipated. I told him that if the occupation of Tehran by Russian troops were to lead to the departure of the Regent and the overturn of the present régime, there was one thing to which His Majesty's Government would never agree, namely, the return of the ex-Shah. His Excellency replied that he did not believe that the Regent would go, and that his Highness could count on Russia's support. The measures that she was taking were of a purely provisional character, and their sole object was to secure the redress of her grievances; and on my enquiring what satisfaction the Persian Government could give to induce her to withdraw her troops, M. Nératof replied that she would recall them as soon as she was notified of Mr. Shuster's dismissal, and that were he to go, she would even abandon her demand with regard to the replacing of the Treasury gendarmes by Persian Cossacks on *Shoa-es-Sultaneh's* property.

In the course of our conversation, I observed that the loyal manner in which M. Poklewski had always worked in concert with Sir G. Barclay had afforded His Majesty's Government great satisfaction, but that it would be deplorable were the action of subaltern officials like M. Pokhitonoff, who might not be so friendly disposed towards us, to compromise the existence of the Anglo-Russian understanding by the creation of incidents with a view to forcing the hand of their Government. M. Nératof replied that there was no danger of this, and that M. Pokhitonoff had found himself placed in a position in which he was bound to act. His Excellency admitted, however, that he might have proceeded in a more judicious manner, and told me in confidence that the subaltern official whom he had sent to *Shoa-es-Sultaneh's* house would shortly be recalled for having exceeded his instructions. M. Nératof added with a smile that Major Stokes, who was still living with Mr. Shuster, was also a subordinate official.

Two days after my interview with Mr. Shuster, was also a subordinate official. Council, and delivered to him the messages with which the King and you had charged me.

I told M. Kokovtsoff that the King had sent for me on the eve of his departure for India, and had commanded me to say that there was nothing which he had so much at heart as the maintenance of a close understanding with Russia, and that His Majesty was confident that his Excellency would prove as true a friend to England as was the late M. Stolypin, whose death His Majesty so greatly deplored. His Majesty, I said, counted on his Excellency to do all that was possible to maintain an understanding which, while offering a present guarantee for the preservation of peace, could not fail to promote the best interests of the two countries. His Majesty was aware that between two great Empires, whose interests extended over the whole world, it was inevitable that differences should from time to time arise, but he cherished the hope that, when that happened, the two Governments would always approach the questions at issue in a conciliatory spirit, and thus avoid any possible misunderstanding. I also conveyed to M. Kokovtsoff friendly messages from yourself, assuring him that you associated yourself in all that the King had commanded me to say; that you had learnt with much pleasure of his appointment to the Presidency of the Council, knowing the great services that he had already rendered this country; and that his Excellency could always count on you as a sincere friend of Russia to collaborate with him for the cultivation of the best possible relations between the two countries.

M. Kokovtsoff expressed his grateful thanks for these messages, which he would at once communicate to the Emperor, who warmly desired a good understanding with England. His Excellency then proceeded to take a retrospective survey of Anglo-Russian relations. The foundation of our present understanding had, he said, been laid by Lord Hardinge, when he was Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and the work of bringing about a serious rapprochement between the two countries had been taken up by Sir A. Nicolson. He was himself at that time Minister of Finance, and as such had

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co-operated with M. Isvolsky for the establishment of the Anglo-Russian understanding. Now that he had been entrusted by the Emperor with the onerous duties of President of the Council, he would devote all his efforts to maintain it. He deeply felt the responsibility that rested on him of having to steer the ship of State in these troublous times; but if the future should prove that his strength was not equal to the task, he could at any rate assure me that he was inspired by the very best intentions.

I said that, in my opinion, the surest way of avoiding any possible misunderstandings was for us always to be perfectly frank with each other, and, on his Excellency cordially assenting, I proceeded to speak of the present situation in Persia, using much the same language as that which I had employed in my conversation with M. Nératof. I explained to his Excellency the serious preoccupation which it was causing you, pointing out that it would not be easy for you to justify in Parliament an occupation of Tehran by Russian troops on account of the incident connected with the seizure of Shou-es-Sultaneh's property.

M. Kokovtsoff replied that the apprehensions entertained in England were greatly exaggerated. He had, he said, studied the Persian question for some time past, and he was entirely opposed to the idea of adding to the already vast territories comprised in the Russian Empire. He would give me his word of honour that the Imperial Government did not contemplate the annexation of a single Persian province, and that they would not violate the principle of Persian integrity, which formed the basis of our understanding. They were not, he said, going to follow the example set by Italy in Tripoli. They were not, moreover, having any dealings with the ex-Shah; and his Excellency cited cases to show how they had on more than one occasion during the past few months turned a deaf ear to the appeals which had been made to them on His Majesty's behalf. The dispatch of Russian troops to Persia covered no aggressive design. They had been sent there to vindicate Russia's honour and dignity, which had been outraged by a series of provocative acts, culminating in the seizure of a property that had been mortgaged to the Banque d'Escompte as security for a debt contracted by Shou-es-Sultaneh. The Russian Government had had no choice but to act as they had done, more especially as public opinion in Russia had been greatly roused by these various incidents. Russia would recall her troops as soon as the Persian Government had complied with her two demands; namely, a formal apology to be made by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister and the Treasury gendarmes to be replaced by Persian Cossacks on Shou-es-Sultaneh's property. The above explanation with regard to the dispatch of Russian troops was given by his Excellency on my enquiry what statement you might make on the subject in the House of Commons. In order that I might correctly report what he had said, I induced his Excellency later on in our conversation to repeat the last sentence a second time; and on neither occasion did he attempt to qualify in any way his categorical assurance respecting the conditions on which the troops would be recalled. When I pressed him to grant a further delay to the Persian Government after the troops had reached Kazvin his Excellency finally consented, and did not hint that the Russian demands would be increased if a satisfactory answer had not been received from the Persian Government before the troops had arrived at that place. On the contrary, when I told him that we had no intention of taking Mr. Shuster's part, and that we should not oppose any demand which Russia might formulate for his dismissal, as the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand was possible, M. Kokovtsoff merely said that he had not yet discussed with M. Nératof the question of any ulterior demands.

On my informing M. Nératof next day of the assurances which M. Kokovtsoff had given me his Excellency did not seem quite pleased, and said that he personally thought that unless the Russian demands were conceded by the time that the Russian troops had reached Persian territory something more would have to be asked for; and this something he trusted would be a demand for Mr. Shuster's dismissal.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 704 of the 20th instant I again called on M. Nératof, and communicated to him what you had said to the Persian Minister, adding that the latter had given you the impression that a settlement could be effected, and that you were ready, if the Imperial Government desired it, to communicate their views formally to the Persian Government.

M. Nératof said that the Persian Minister's communication was very important, as showing the disposition of his Government, and desired me to thank you for your offer to act as intermediary. If the Russian troops had not disembarked before satisfaction had been given to Russia's two demands it might be possible, he thought, to give the Persian Government the assurance which they had asked for; but this was a question on which he would have to consult the President of the Council. It would nevertheless

be to the interests of both our Governments were the present incident to be used for the purpose of establishing a normal state of affairs at Tehran. The constitution was at present being worked in a one-sided manner, and the Medjliss had arrogated to itself executive powers to which it had no right. It was necessary, in his opinion, to restrict the rôle of that Chamber to that of a purely legislative assembly, to constitute a Senate, and to increase the powers of the Regent. It would, moreover, be most desirable to procure the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, as, so long as he remained at Tehran, pending questions like that of the appointment of M. Lecomte would never be settled, while even were that appointment now to be cancelled there was no guarantee that similar ones would not be made in the future.

I replied that if the Russian troops were to be retained in Persia till this programme had been carried through, they would have to remain there for months; that the President of the Council had attached no conditions to the assurances which he had given me with regard to their recall beyond compliance with the two demands already presented, and that his Excellency had not qualified those assurances by stating that the two demands must be complied with before the troops touched Persian territory. As this was a matter to which you attached great importance, I trusted that the Russian Government would adhere strictly to what M. Kokovtsoff had said. I further suggested that when M. Poklewski received the visit of apology from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, he might state that the troops had been recalled in the hope that the Persian Government would now come to an arrangement with them for the settlement of all outstanding questions and for placing relations on a friendly and stable basis. I added that in such a case I was sure that you would give him all the support you could.

M. Nératof replied that he was as anxious as you were for the recall of the troops, but that when once this step was taken there would be no guarantee against the recurrence of other incidents entailing the dispatch of further troops.

On the following day, M. Nératof informed me that he had communicated to the President of the Council all that I had told him, but that, as a portion of the troops had already arrived at Enzeli, it had been decided at a Cabinet Council held on the preceding evening that it was impossible to recall them till some guarantee had been obtained with regard to the future. I said that this decision was in direct contradiction to what the President of the Council had told me; that it would place His Majesty's Government in a very invidious position; that the Persian Government would reproach them with having induced them to comply with the two Russian demands under false pretences; and that, under these circumstances, it would be very difficult for you to justify the retention of the troops. M. Nératof then tried to explain that M. Kokovtsoff, in giving me the specific assurance respecting the recall of the troops, had not intended to exclude a discussion with the Persian Government for the purpose of arriving at a settlement of all outstanding questions. His Excellency, however, entirely failed to reconcile the language held to me by M. Kokovtsoff on Sunday with the decision arrived at at yesterday's Cabinet Council; and I can only explain it by the supposition that, in his desire to show his good intentions, M. Kokovtsoff spoke without taking sufficient account of the views held by the majority of his colleagues (who might, if not listened to, have laid the matter before the Emperor), and without sufficiently reflecting on the full bearing of his words. I subsequently pressed M. Nératof at any rate to prevent the troops advancing beyond Resht; but though he gave me a vague and conditional assurance on the subject, it was clear from his subsequent language that the Russian Government are determined not to withdraw their troops till they have got rid of Mr. Shuster, even if they must send their troops to Tehran to expel him.

On the evening of the next day, the 23rd instant, M. Nératof sent for me and told me that, according to a telegram which he had received from M. Poklewski, the new Persian Government consisted of only three Ministers, and had only a provisional mandate; that the Persian Cossacks were not to replace the Treasury gendarmes for another four or five days, and that until this change had been effected, M. Poklewski could not receive the visit of apology that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was to pay him. Finally, Mr. Shuster had, his Excellency said, caused a Persian pamphlet dealing with the recent incident to be circulated broadcast for the purpose of stirring up an anti-Russian agitation. This was a proceeding which the Russian Government could not tolerate, and instructions would be sent to M. Poklewski, after a Council of Ministers to be held the next evening, to demand his dismissal. Such a demand, when once presented, must, his Excellency added, be enforced at all costs. M. Poklewski would also be instructed to demand the cancelling of M. Lecomte's appointment, as

well as a declaration to the effect that in future no subject of any of the Great Powers would be appointed to any important post in the Persian service, and that no foreigner of any nationality would be employed in such a capacity without previous consultation with the two legations.

I endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to induce his Excellency to delay the dispatch of these instructions till I was in receipt of your views with regard to them.

M. Nérotof subsequently said that he would be grateful if you would let him know what you thought of the appeal which had been addressed to the two Governments by the Bakhtiari khans, as this was a matter in which he could not move save in concert with His Majesty's Government. We could, he thought, at any rate give them the guarantee they asked for should they return to their homes; and he, personally, was inclined to encourage them to carry out the proposed *coup d'État*. It would relieve the Russian Government of the necessity of taking measures to oust Mr. Shuster, as the Bakhtiari were as strongly opposed to Mr. Shuster and to the Medjliss as was the Imperial Government. On my enquiring whether in saying this his Excellency contemplated giving the Bakhtiari any material support, M. Nérotof said that he had not yet considered this side of the question.

After receiving your telegram No. 712 of the 23rd instant I again pressed M. Nérotof to stop the further advance of the troops, explaining at the same time the nature of the statement which you had made on the preceding evening in Parliament, and giving him to understand that you had been greatly disappointed to hear that the troops were not to be withdrawn immediately on the Persian Government complying with the two demands. I further expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would do nothing to add to the difficulties with which you would be confronted when foreign affairs came up for discussion in the House of Commons next Monday.

M. Nérotof said that he was insisting in the Council of Ministers that for the present at any rate the troops should be retained at Resht; but that he could not give me an assurance that they would not advance beyond it, as were he to do so, the Persian Government would never yield. As regarded the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations, M. Poklewski would be instructed to warn the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he announced his intention of paying a visit of apology, that further demands were about to be presented, and that if, in spite of this warning, the apologies were presented, his Excellency supposed that diplomatic relations would be resumed.

M. Nérotof then said that as the meeting of the Council of Ministers had been postponed for twenty-four hours he could not give me an authoritative statement with regard to the new demands, of which he had spoken to me yesterday. They would, however, he thought, deal with the question of Mr. Shuster's dismissal, the employment of foreigners in important posts in the Persian administration, and the settlement of all outstanding litigious matters in a conciliatory spirit. The question of M. Lecoffre's appointment was a matter of secondary importance; but it might be well to take this opportunity of obtaining the recognition of the Anglo-Russian agreement; while a proposal which would be more in the nature of a wish than of a demand would be put forward for the constitution of a Senate.

I pressed his Excellency strongly to limit the number of these demands to the strictest minimum, and remarked that I did not know how far you would approve of the mention of our legation in the matter of the employment of foreigners, when the demand about to be presented was virtually an ultimatum that might have to be imposed by force. I added that in my opinion the same objection held good with regard to a demand for the recognition of the Anglo-Russian understanding. His Excellency admitted that this might be awkward for us, and said that he would try to find a formula that would show that Russia was acting entirely on her own responsibility. In reply to some objections which I had raised, his Excellency gave me the assurance that he would not insist on the immediate settlement of all pending questions; that the troops would not remain in Persia till such a settlement had been effected; and that the Russian Government would be content with a declaration in the sense that those questions would be settled in a conciliatory spirit.

On the receipt of your telegrams Nos. 713 and 717 of the 24th instant I again pressed on M. Nérotof the importance of retaining the troops at Resht, now that the two original demands had been complied with, and that the resumption of diplomatic relations would enable our two representatives to act together. I did not conceal from him the disappointment which the decision taken by the Russian Government not to withdraw their troops had caused you, and urged him to drop the demand for an indemnity of 150,000 roubles, of which he had just spoken to me. I also told him that

any demand that the Russian Government might present respecting foreign employés must be made in the first instance on their own responsibility.

M. Nérotof said that he proposed suggesting that a delay of five or six days should be accorded the Persian Government; but that, as regarded the question of an indemnity, he considered that its payment would exercise a salutary effect, and render the Persians less disposed to provoke armed intervention in the future.

On the next day (Sunday), M. Nérotof informed me of the decision arrived at by the Council of Ministers respecting the new demands to be presented at Tehran, in a private letter, of which the following is an extract:—

"Elles sont au nombre de trois:—

"1. La démission de Mr. Morgan Shuster et Mr. Lecoffre; quant aux autres fonctionnaires étrangers, nommés par Mr. Shuster, leur situation doit être réglée d'après le point ci-après, sub No. 2;

"2. Engagement du Gouvernement persan de n'inviter à l'avance des étrangers à son service qu'avec le consentement préalable des Légations de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne à Téhéran;

"3. Remboursement par le Gouvernement persan des frais de l'expédition militaire qui vient d'être envoyée en Perse.

"Pour ne pas rendre inutilement difficile la position de Sir Edward Grey au Parlement, nous avons résolu de ne pas rendre cette décision publique avant mardi, et ce n'est qu'à la date de ce jour que M. Poklewski fera connaître nos exigences au Gouvernement persan. La communication de notre Ministre aura le caractère d'un ultimatum, dont les conditions seront exécutables dans un terme de quarante-huit heures, jusqu'à l'expiration duquel nos troupes seront retenues à Recht."

In a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day, I told his Excellency that I was much disappointed at the shortness of the time allowed the Persian Government for returning an answer to this ultimatum, and urged that, in accordance with the assurance given me by the President of the Council, a further delay would be accorded on the arrival of the troops at Kazvin.

His Excellency replied that the Council of Ministers had decided that, in order to satisfy public opinion in Russia, it was necessary that this second ultimatum should be couched in much sharper language than the first. The ultimatum, moreover, was not to be presented till the 28th instant, and, as the Persian Government must have been aware from the language held to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by M. Poklewski on the 24th instant, that Mr. Shuster's dismissal would be insisted on, they would have had sufficient time for reflection. The new demands were, his Excellency contended, most moderate, and had been purposely restricted to matters connected with the incident that had provoked the presentation of an ultimatum. In reply to an enquiry which I had addressed to him respecting the second half of the first demand, his Excellency explained that it was intended more especially to apply to the ten new Americans, whose appointment had already been sanctioned by the Medjliss, but that it would be left to M. Poklewski to decide whether any action should be taken with regard to any other foreigners holding appointments in the Persian service. He also said that, should the Russian demands not have been accepted before the troops reached Kazvin, he thought that they would probably make a few days' halt in that town before advancing on Tehran.

I expressed the hope that, even should they have to occupy the capital, the Russian demands would not be further increased, and his Excellency gave me to understand that in that case all that would be asked for would be a larger indemnity.

I omitted to mention that M. Nérotof informed me on the 25th instant that M. Poklewski would be instructed to consult with Sir George Barendse, and to join him in the reply which you propose to return to the appeal addressed to the two Governments by the Bakhtiari khans.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[48348]

No. 449.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 350.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 29, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying memorandum, which M. Nératof handed to me on the 25th instant, for the purpose of furnishing you with material for replying to any interpellations that may be addressed to you in Parliament with regard to the dispatch of Russian troops to Persia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 449.

Memorandum communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Nératof on November 25, 1911.

LE conflit actuel entre la Russie et la Perse, dont la cause immédiate a été l'incident survenu pendant la confiscation des biens du Prince Schoa-es-Sultaneh, doit être envisagé comme la suite d'une série d'événements qui ont provoqué le mécontentement bien fondé de la Russie et qui avaient pour cause principale l'attitude irréconciliable envers elle du parti radical persan, ainsi que les procédés arbitraires de Mr. Morgan Shuster. Ce dernier, dès son arrivée en Perse, s'est toujours refusé à prendre en considération les légitimes réclamations de la Russie au sujet des nombreux intérêts qu'elle possède dans ce pays. En effet, la tentative de Mr. Shuster de s'ingérer dans la compétence des administrateurs belges des douanes persanes, en violation du contrat passé entre la Banque russe et le Gouvernement persan, son refus opiniâtre de renoncer à employer Mr. Stokes dans l'administration de la gendarmerie financière, la nomination de Mr. Lecoffre, &c., fournissent une preuve suffisante de l'attitude hostile prise par cet étranger à l'égard de la Russie. Enfin, le dernier incident, au cours duquel les ordres donnés par Mr. Shuster à ses gendarmes avaient eu un caractère visiblement provocateur envers le consulat général de Russie, a épuisé la patience du Gouvernement russe, qui s'est justement vu outragé par ces procédés et s'est trouvé forcé d'abord de demander une réparation et ensuite, lorsque cette dernière ne lui a pas été donnée, d'avoir recours à des moyens de rigueur.

Tout dernièrement encore Mr. Shuster a commis un acte inadmissible de la part d'un fonctionnaire au service de l'État en publiant dans le "Times" sa lettre contenant des accusations arbitraires contre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et surtout en distribuant en Perse une traduction persane de cette lettre, augmentée de nouveaux détails, dans le but manifeste d'exciter le peuple persan contre la Russie.

Le but que se propose le Gouvernement russe est d'établir des relations normales et stables avec le Gouvernement persan et d'écarter les éléments de discorde qui nuisent au développement des rapports amicaux des deux pays. C'est à ces fins que la Russie compte formuler certaines nouvelles demandes.

Dans son action entreprise en ce moment en Perse le Gouvernement russe ne poursuit que la défense de ses intérêts légitimes dans ce pays, dans la zone qui lui est réservée en vertu de la convention de 1907; son activité n'est nullement en contradiction avec les dispositions de cette convention, puisqu'il ne poursuit aucun but pouvant porter atteinte à l'intégrité ou à l'indépendance de la Perse. Il tient en outre à constater d'une façon catégorique que les mesures militaires prises par lui sur le territoire persan n'ont qu'un caractère purement provisoire et qu'il n'a aucunement l'intention d'enfreindre les principes qui régissent l'accord existant entre la Russie et l'Angleterre relativement à la Perse.

Résumé de causes qui ont provoqué les premières exigences de la Russie.

Laisant de côté la question de la confiscation des biens du Prince Schoa-es-Sultaneh, contre laquelle les représentants russes à Téhéran n'ont jamais protesté en principe, il faut noter que le mécontentement du Gouvernement Impérial a été provoqué d'abord par la manière de laquelle cette mesure a été mise à exécution par la gendarmerie financière persane, agissant conformément aux ordres de son chef, le conseiller

financier Morgan Shuster et ensuite par la démarche du Gouvernement persan tendant à approuver la façon d'agir de ses employés et à rejeter la responsabilité sur les fonctionnaires russes.

Il appartient évidemment au Gouvernement Impérial seul de juger des procédés de ses agents sur les lieux, et après un examen attentif le Gouvernement Impérial est arrivé à la conclusion que ces procédés ont été conformes aux droits du Gouvernement russe et aux usages locaux. D'autre part, le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg a constaté que l'attitude du conseiller financier et de ses agents dans la présente affaire était visiblement hostile et outrageante à l'égard des employés russes. A ce propos on peut appuyer surtout sur les faits suivants:—

1. La réoccupation par force de la maison du Prince effectuée avant la fin des pourparlers entre le consul général de Russie et les agents de Mr. Shuster.

2. L'envoi dans ce but d'une force de plus d'une centaine de gendarmes, comme si Mr. Shuster prévoyait la possibilité d'une collision entre cette force et l'escorte du consul général.

3. Le point culminant de l'affaire—le fait que les gendarmes persans se sont permis de viser de leurs fusils les employés du consulat général avec l'intention manifeste de tirer sur eux.

4. L'envoi par le Gouvernement persan, contrairement à toute tradition, de deux notes consécutives exigeant le rappel du consul général russe et d'un de ses subordonnés, malgré la réponse donnée verbalement par M. Poklewski à la première note qu'il considérait cette demande comme non-avenue.

5. Cette affaire doit être mise en rapport avec les procédés antérieurs de Mr. Morgan Shuster, qui bien des fois déjà avaient suscité le mécontentement du Gouvernement russe.

6. L'effet défavorable à Téhéran même pour le prestige des autorités russes qui s'est produit à la suite de la manière d'agir outrageante des autorités persanes et dont la colonie russe à Téhéran se ressent.

Les raisons pour lesquelles le Gouvernement russe trouve nécessaire de poser au Gouvernement persan de nouvelles exigences.

1. Le Gouvernement persan n'a pas donné dans un délai raisonnable une réponse à la note contenant les premières exigences, ce qui a forcé le Gouvernement russe d'envoyer des troupes en Perse.

2. L'explication que la réponse à cette note n'avait pu être donnée, vu l'absence d'un Cabinet ne saurait être acceptée, étant donné que l'ancien Ministre n'avait démissionné que quelques jours après la présentation de la note, et que sa démission elle-même témoignait à nos yeux de l'intention de se soustraire à la nécessité de satisfaire aux exigences russes.

3. *Le point principal.*—La lettre adressée par Mr. Morgan Shuster au "Times" contenant des assertions fausses et des accusations arbitraires contre la Russie, et surtout la distribution par lui à la population indigène d'une traduction persane de cette lettre augmentée de nouveaux détails, dont le but manifeste est d'exciter le peuple persan contre la Russie.

4. Le Gouvernement russe, désireux d'établir des relations normales et stables avec le Gouvernement persan, juge nécessaire d'obtenir de ce dernier des garanties réelles de ce que les éléments de discorde qui nuisent au développement des rapports amicaux entre les deux pays seront écartés.

[48349]

No. 450.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 351.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 349 of the 29th instant, I have the honour to report that I called yesterday afternoon on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency greeted me by expressing the great satisfaction which your speech in the House of Commons had caused him, adding that he had instructed Count Benckendorff to convey to you his thanks and acknowledgments. I replied that I regretted to say that I had been charged by you to deliver a message of a very different character. The expectations which you had founded on the assurances which had been given us by the Russian Government had been disappointed, and now a

second ultimatum had been presented to the Persian Government that required an answer within forty-eight hours, without anything having happened in the meanwhile to justify such a drastic mode of procedure. I repeated to him what I had said in previous conversations with regard to the shortness of the time limit, and urged on his Excellency the importance of allowing you sufficient time to use your influence with the Persian Government in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of this incident. An occupation of Tehran by Russian troops would, I said, be interpreted in England as an infraction of the Anglo-Russian understanding, and would tend to estrange English public opinion, and an understanding that could not count on the support of public opinion was worthless. In order, moreover, that he might realise how strongly you felt on the subject I read to him, in French translation, your telegrams Nos. 728 of the 28th and 736 of the 29th instant.

M. Nératof, in the course of a long conversation, once more explained the reasons which had forced the Russian Government to give a more peremptory character to this second ultimatum. The ultimatum had, he believed, been presented that morning, but, as he had not yet received confirmation of this from M. Poklewski, he could not give me its actual text. The three points, however, recorded in my telegram No. 303 of the 26th instant exactly reproduced the instructions sent to Tehran, though a few words had been added to the effect that the amount of the indemnity and the mode of its payment would be settled when the three demands had been complied with and the actual cost of the expedition established. The Russian Government would not press for an immediate payment, nor would they, he believed, increase their demands. He declined to accede to my request to do away with the time limit altogether, or even to extend it, and would not give me an assurance that the troops should make a halt of a week or ten days at Kazvin. On my urging that such an extension might be granted, were the Persian Government to inform M. Poklewski of their readiness to take the three demands into consideration if only the Russian Government would allow them more time for their examination, M. Nératof declared that this was impossible. Eventually, however, he said that, if the Persian Government would give a definite assurance in writing that they would comply with the three demands, he would allow them another fifteen days to arrange the various details connected with Mr. Shuster's dismissal, such as the question of the indemnity to be paid him, &c. He also promised to wait till Saturday before sending telegraphic instructions for an advance of the troops from Resht to Kazvin.

His Excellency, at my request, then telephoned to the President of the Council, who replied that he would receive me at once.

I repeated to M. Kokovtsoff what I had said to M. Nératof, using almost precisely similar language, and urging him, in the interest of the Anglo-Russian understanding, to meet your wishes in a more generous spirit, as I considered that the assurances which I had received from M. Nératof did not go nearly far enough.

His Excellency said that His Majesty's Government could naturally take a calmer view of the incidents which had recently occurred in Persia, as they had not been directly touched by them. This was not the case with Russia. Her dignity had been offended, and he could tell me that the Emperor felt this very deeply. The only way to make the Persians understand that Russia would not be trifled with was to present an ultimatum, requiring an immediate answer and holding out no hope of a possible compromise. The Russian Government had gained nothing by adopting a less drastic form in presenting their two original demands, but had had to wait for an answer till their troops had arrived at Resht. On my remarking that the satisfaction which they had now received with regard to the first incident ought to make them adopt a more lenient attitude as regarded the second, M. Kokovtsoff said that, at the Council of Ministers at which the second ultimatum had been drafted, he had reduced the demands to be presented to a minimum, though some of his colleagues had advocated adding considerably to their number. He could assure me that Russia had no desire to occupy Tehran, and, if you could induce the Persian Government to yield, and thus save her the necessity of ordering the troops to advance, he would be most grateful. He understood from all that I had told him that it was not the demands themselves to which you took exception, but the form in which they had been presented, and the manner in which they were to be imposed on the Persian Government. It might give rise to a possible misunderstanding were he to give me any definite assurances with regard to the various points touched on in your telegrams without first consulting his colleagues, and he would, therefore, ask me to send him copies of those telegrams. He would then submit them to a Council of Ministers to be held on the following afternoon, and let me know their decision through M. Nératof.

In the course of our conversation, M. Kokovtsoff gave me the positive assurance that the Russian troops would be withdrawn as soon as the three demands had been complied with, even were compliance to be delayed till Tehran had been occupied. As regarded the indemnity, he said that he was not going to play the part of a Shylock and insist on having so many pounds of flesh before recalling the troops. A few hundred thousands of roubles were nothing to him, but public opinion in Russia demanded that, if Persia wantonly provoked military intervention, she should pay for the cost of the expedition. He would be satisfied with a definite assurance from the Persian Government that the indemnity would be paid, and would not be too hard on them with regard to the term in which payment must be made. Though his Excellency received my remarks with regard to an extension of the time limit and a halt of a week or ten days at Kazvin in a more conciliatory spirit than M. Nératof, he declined to pledge himself in any way.

I have this morning forwarded to M. Kokovtsoff paraphrases in French of your two telegrams above referred to, and have, in the covering private letter, expressed the hope that he will use his powerful influence to induce the Council of Ministers to decide this question in a manner conformable to your wishes.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[48369]

No. 451.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 643.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

IS it desired that I should keep Government of India informed? Except in the case of the insurrection on which I had special instructions, I have not done so since telegram from Government of India No. 343 of 18th June, 1910, addressed to the Foreign Office No. 643, repeated to Government of India No. 75.

[48370]

No. 452.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 644.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see the first paragraph of my telegram No. 640 of this morning.

I should explain that it is very generally believed in Tehran that the Russian troops will be utilised for the restoration of Mohamed Ali, and a story is even current that assassinations will continue until all the men have been killed whom he would be likely to appoint Ministers. Those of the old régime from whom vengeance is expected are especially marked down.

[48413]

No. 453.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 645.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

SITUATION in Tehran.

There was a continuance of patriotic demonstrations throughout the day yesterday.

Though the crowds appear to be orderly so far, the fact that Yeprim, the chief of police, has resigned may affect the situation, as there are signs of possible trouble between his followers and the Bakhtiariis.

Public feeling is so excited that the possibility of danger to foreigners cannot be excluded, but as far as I can judge the danger is not imminent.

[48414]

No. 454.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 646.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 629 of 2nd December.

Following from His Majesty's representative at Resht 3rd December:—

"800 men who left on night of 2nd December ordered back to Resht three hours later.

"1,000 infantry and 600 Cossacks left this morning for Tehran."

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48453]

No. 455.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 647.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see your telegram No. 405 of the 2nd instant and my telegram No. 645 of to-day.

If the Persian Government could be told that the presence of Russian troops would not be used to press further demands so long as the Persian Government maintain order in Tehran, and that as soon as the present demands are satisfied the troops will be withdrawn, the public excitement here might, perhaps, subside somewhat.

[48586]

No. 456.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 649.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 620 of 1st December.

In a private letter to me Stokes absolutely denies he has taken part at any meeting.

[48587]

No. 457.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 650.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

HORMUZ oxide.

Please see your telegram No. 361 of the 20th ultimo.

I have only just been able to obtain authoritative copy of the law, and am sending to you by post to-day a translation.

The Muin has not yet made any agreement with the Ministry of Public Works for the execution of its provisions.

The treasurer-general, I understand, still maintains that the law is illegal.

[48590]

No. 458.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 651.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 605 of 28th November.

Bakhtiaris have asked the Russian Minister for the text of our reply in writing, which they want to show to Sardar Assad, who should reach Tehran to-day.

[48578]

No. 455.*

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 648.)

(Telegraphic.) Code.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegram No. 641 of 3rd December: Indian troops in South Persia.

It appears that conflict was occasioned by attack by 30 or 40 tribesmen on a caravan of 600 camels and mules, which cannot be prevented from attaching itself to British troops, and was travelling at a short distance in front of latter. Eckford, officer commanding troops, on being informed of attack, moved troops forward to endeavour to cut off robbers.

Is there any objection to our complying?
 Russian Minister is telegraphing in same sense.
 (Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[48596]

No. 459.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 652.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegrams Nos. 522 of 28th October and 534 of 2nd November.

Shuster has now revoked appointments of Lecoffre, Haycock, and Schindler.

[48599]

No. 460.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 319.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 4, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 639 and 640 of the 3rd December.

It does not necessarily follow from the fact that Russian agents are engaged in intrigues with Mohammed Ali that the Russian Government are parties to such intrigues, but I think it might be well for me to inform M. Nératof of the reports which have reached us, and warn him of the grave consequences that would result from the ex-Shah's return, seeing that it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to recognise him, and that the two Governments might thus be placed in direct opposition to one another.

M. Nératof's assurance that the ex-Shah, if he attempted to return, would receive no support from the Russian Government, was given, I believe, in perfectly good faith. I would venture, however, to submit to you, before you decide to make the public statement suggested by Sir G. Barclay, the following considerations :—

In the event of the Bakhtiari withdrawing to their own country and standing entirely aloof, it would be quite possible for the ex-Shah to appear at any moment with a force of Turcomans and reoccupy the throne, or the Bakhtiari might even help him to accomplish this. Russia, when reminded of her assurances, might then reply that she had observed them faithfully, and had not given any support to the ex-Shah, but that she could not now expel him, as that would be contrary to the principle of non-intervention in internal conflicts which had hitherto been observed by the two Governments. Once the suggested statement were made in Parliament that we should never recognise the ex-Shah we could never go back on it, even if such recognition were the only alternative to far greater evils.

It is possible, on the other hand, that the proposed statement might impede or prevent altogether the return of the ex-Shah; but His Majesty is scarcely likely to be deterred by your statement from any attempt that he may contemplate, if he knows that Russia is not a party to that statement. The question therefore arises whether it would not be better, instead of burning our boats altogether by a public statement in Parliament, to confine ourselves to repeating to M. Nératof, in the most serious form possible, the warning which I have already conveyed to him.

Our only other course would be to invite the Russian Government to join us in making a declaration to the effect that neither of us will consent to the return of the ex-Shah. I am not in a position to say how such an invitation would be received, but we could point out that a declaration of the kind suggested on the part of Russia would go far to abate the opposition evoked in England by her present action, and to preserve the co-operation of the two Powers in Persian affairs. M. Nératof would, of course, have to consult the Emperor and the Council of Ministers before taking a decision on such a question, and it would perhaps be wise, should you think it worth while to try such a step, for me to sound M. Nératof privately in the first instance.

[48589]

No. 461.

Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tokyo, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 52 of 1st December.

Japanese Government will be exceedingly grateful if His Majesty's Government will exercise their good offices regarding any reasonable claim against Persian Government in this matter.

[48268]

No. 462.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 407.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

PROTECTION of Regent.

You may join your Russian colleague in any action taken in the sense of Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 318 of December 2.

[48280]

No. 463.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 408.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

HIS Majesty's Government feel that they should adopt a strictly neutral attitude as regards the point raised in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 640 of yesterday. Although we would not be entirely averse from accepting a solution given to the question by Persia herself, we cannot have responsibility for what may occur now that Persia has rejected Russian demands, and must maintain our policy of non-intervention, allowing matters to take their own course.

Such recognition of a Persian solution would, however, be susceptible of reservations, such as a *prima facie* objection to Bakhtiari solution and our definite opposition to restoration of ex-Shah.

[48282]

No. 464.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 410.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 642 of 3rd December.

Do you think it necessary to increase His Majesty's Legation escort? If so, some men from the reinforcements sent to the south might go to Tehran.

[48278]

No. 465.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 411.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 638 of 3rd December.

Journey expenses of Stokes will be paid as requested. I am in communication with India Office as to earlier date of leaving.

[48264]

No. 466.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 413.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 624 of 2nd December.

Do you apprehend danger to legation?

[48369]

No. 467.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 414.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 643 of 4th December.

Yes.

[48590]

No. 468.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 415.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 651 of 4th December.

No objection if your Russian colleague is similarly authorised.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 769.)

[48268]

No. 469.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 763.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

PROTECTION of Regent.

You can inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of contents of my telegram No. 407 of to-day to Tehran.

[48280]

No. 470.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 765.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

After what Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has said, I do not think that Russian Government could be embarrassed if I were to make a statement here to the effect that, whatever other changes may take place at Tehran as result of pending events, His Majesty's Government cannot again recognise Ex-Shah. I feel that some such statement is essential, and in informing Acting-Minister for Foreign Affairs of this, you might add that a favourable impression would be produced if I might add that we are in agreement with Russian Government on this point.

[48754]

No. 471.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 653.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Reference to my telegram No. 636 of the 3rd December.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs last night. His Excellency informed me that he had done everything possible to induce the Medjliss to consider the Russian demands. He went on to say that after the vote of the Medjliss, rejecting these demands, the Cabinet had resigned, but owing to the representations of the Regent and the entreaty of the Medjliss, it had been persuaded to continue in office. His Excellency was now anxious to enter into negotiations with Russia on lines that would not conflict so directly with Persian independence as did the demands that Russian Government were now putting forward. Even were the Medjliss to be induced to accept the present demands, a lasting feeling of rancour would be aroused in the country, which would produce a result contrary to the object desired by Russia and expressed in the ultimatum of laying the foundations of friendly and stable relations between the two countries.

[1524]

His Excellency enquired whether I thought there was any possibility of Russian Minister advising his Government to soften the demands in some manner. In reply I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I could give him no hope of his doing so, but I promised to communicate what he had said to M. Poklewski, whom I was to see that evening.

I have now, after consultation with my Russian colleague, informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that I fear it would be useless for him to attempt to persuade M. Poklewski to advise his Government to make any modification.

[48755]

No. 472.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 654.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

MY telegram No. 646 of 4th December.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that further troops left Resht for Tehran yesterday.

Up to date 2,000 infantry and 300 Cossacks have left.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[48756]

No. 473.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 655.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 410 and 413 of 4th December.

I apprehend no danger to the legation, and no increase of escort is needed.

[48757]

No. 474.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 656.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

MY telegram No. 645 of 4th December.

There was less manifestation of excitement yesterday. In order to avoid conflict with Bakhtiari, Yeprim has sent his men out of the town.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[48766]

No. 475.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 320.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 5, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I communicated the views contained in your telegram No. 756 of the 2nd December to M. Nératof in a private letter, and when I saw his Excellency to-day he said that, after all the assurances he had given me, he could not quite understand why you were so anxious and thought that there must be some misunderstanding.

I said that we had full confidence in the assurances which he had given us, but pointed out that the danger always existed of circumstances arising which might make it difficult or even impossible for these assurances to be carried out. New incidents might arise, or there might be assassinations, and we might be told that in view of these Russia found herself compelled to ask for some exemplary satisfaction. Force of circumstances might, moreover, convert a temporary occupation into a prolonged one, and so strike a death-blow at the Anglo-Russian understanding. Such were the reasons that induced you to urge that Russia should only send her troops to Tehran in the last resort.

M. Nératof said that eight days must pass before there would be enough troops at Kazvin to continue an advance; that the troops would have to rest there, and that arrangements would have to be made to establish communications with Enzeli, so that a fortnight would probably elapse before the troops could reach Tehran. If the Persians gave satisfaction before the troops left Kazvin, there would be no advance on Tehran. There was always the chance, of course, that M. Poklewski might find himself compelled to summon a detachment in all haste for the protection of foreigners.

On my then pressing M. Nératof with regard to the possibility of Russia eventually putting forward further demands, his Excellency promised that, without your consent, no demands would be presented that would touch on Persia's political future. In my telegram No. 317 of the 2nd December, I have already mentioned two demands which M. Nératof referred to as possible; he now said that Russia might possibly be willing to renounce her claim for an indemnity in exchange for railway concessions. He added that there might possibly be other demands in connection with outstanding claims of private individuals, but it would scarcely be necessary to consult you about demands of this nature. I pointed out that you would have to justify them in Parliament, and that it would, therefore, perhaps be better that he should submit them to you before presenting them. I added that I felt sure that you would not make difficulties. I understood from him that he would do as I desired.

Turning to the question of the ex-Shah, I spoke as instructed in your telegram No. 765 of the 4th December. I said that an excellent impression would be created and a guarantee would be secured for the continuance of our co-operation in Persia if only you were enabled to state in Parliament that the two Governments had agreed that under no circumstances would they recognise the ex-Shah.

M. Nératof replied that only a few days ago he had caused a message to be sent to Mohammad Ali informing His Majesty that he must not expect support from Russia. At the same time he could not quite understand the necessity of making such a declaration at the present moment. If such a declaration were made and the Shah were later on to be recalled to Persia (say in a few years' time) then the two Governments would be virtually bound not to recognise him.

I said that you had come to an irrevocable decision that in no circumstances would you recognise the ex-Shah. An idea had got abroad that His Majesty was to be replaced on the throne by Russian troops and that Russian agents in Persia were aiding and abetting him, and the public must be undeceived on these points. I reminded his Excellency that, on the ex-Shah's landing in Persia last summer, His Majesty's Government had proposed to take action, but that his Excellency had then put forward the plea that this was an internal conflict in which the two Powers could not intervene. At present the situation was entirely changed. Mohammad Ali had made his attempt and failed, and his cause was as good as lost. If he now succeeded in getting back his throne the action of Russia would be directly though not intentionally responsible for his success, for the powerlessness of the Persian Government to offer him any opposition was due to Russia's action.

M. Nératof said that he quite understood my meaning, but a declaration of the kind that I had proposed was too sweeping. He was prepared to declare that so long as the Russian troops were in occupation Russia would not recognise Mohammad Ali, and that she would only recognise him with the consent of His Majesty's Government. I remarked that if any time limit were set this would be equivalent to inviting the ex-Shah to return on the expiration of such limit. After he had made several other suggestions, I appealed urgently to him to consider the difficult position in which you were placed, and, in the interest of our understanding, to do as I asked. I pointed out that Mohammad Ali had no qualities to recommend him and said that I felt sure that you would co-operate with the Russian Government to secure that a Regent and a Government friendly to Russia should be established at Tehran. You were as anxious as he was himself that a stable régime should be set up in Persia, and this object could be achieved more effectually by our two representatives at Tehran working harmoniously together than by Russia presenting demands to Persia at the bayonet's point.

M. Nératof promised to consider the matter and to endeavour to find a formula satisfactory to both parties. He begged that for the present his suggestions should be treated as confidential.

[48277]

No. 476.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 637 of 3rd December.
Following sent to India:—

" (Private.)

" My private telegram of 1st December: Stokes.

" Sir E. Grey wishes him instructed, in reply to Barclay's No. 638 of 3rd December, to leave Tehran within a week at the latest. He should travel via Caucasus and London, and Foreign Office will pay his expenses from Tehran to London. He can get advance from Barclay, subject to adjustment. Instructions should be sent to him with least possible delay."

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 771.)

[48599]

No. 477.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 770.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

I feel that it would be unreasonable of Russia to maintain an obstructive attitude with regard to return of ex-Shah. His restoration cannot, in my opinion, be the only solution to the problem of securing a Government in Persia which would have due regard for Russian interests, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as of real importance to her, while, at the same time, it makes things difficult for us.

In my opinion, it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to recognise the ex-Shah after his flagrant breach of faith in returning to Persia.

[48596]

No. 478.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 772.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.

M. LECOFFRE.

Treasurer-general has revoked M. Lecoffre's appointment to post at Tabreez. You might ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether Russian Government, in demanding Lecoffre's dismissal, meant thereby his dismissal from Persian service. He has now been in this service two years, and I conclude that cancellation of his appointment to the Tabreez post was all that Russia desired.

[46382]

No. 479.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 316.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris*, giving the substance of a conversation between his Russian colleague and a Bakhtiari chief, presumably Sardar Assad, which M. Isvolsky gave to Sir F. Bertie.

Your Excellency should take an opportunity of communicating the substance of this paper to the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the information already furnished to his Excellency in conversation with that chief by

* No. 324.

Mr. O'Beirne in accordance with the instructions contained in my despatch No. 264, of the 19th October last.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[48828]

No. 480.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 6.)

Sir,

India Office, December 5, 1911.

IN reply to your letters, dated the 23rd and 30th November, 1911, respectively, I am directed to say that the Secretary of State for India in Council accepts as a charge against Indian revenues a moiety of the cost of erecting temporary quarters for the Indian troops at Shiraz, on the understanding that the other moiety be defrayed by the British Exchequer.

He observes that the cost of providing these quarters is provisionally stated at 4,500l., but that a further estimate will in due course be communicated to this department.

He concurs in the view of Secretary Sir E. Grey that the purchase of land at a cost of some 3,200l. would not be justified, and he would suggest that, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, instructions be given to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that all possible economy be exercised in the provision of the quarters.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[48865]

No. 481.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 657.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 5th December.

Yeprim has been reinstated as chief of police, and he and his men are apparently reconciled with Bakhtiari.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[48869]

No. 482.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 658.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY telegram No. 648 of 4th December.

Squadron arrived at Ispahan without further incident; wounded officer progressing favourably.

Douglas telegraphs officer commanding was in no way escorting caravan. On hearing that caravan in front of him was attacked, he galloped up and drove off robbers. Douglas thinks no other course open to him.

[48855]

No. 483.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 659.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY telegram No. 654 of 5th December.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that a further Russian detachment of 900 infantry left for Kazvin on 4th December.

(Sent to India; repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[1524]

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[48856]

No. 484.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 860.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*SARDAR ASSAD arrived in Tehrap yesterday.
(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)*Tehran, December 6, 1911.*

[48910]

No. 485.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 661.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ASSURANCES to Bakhtiari.

Please see your telegram No. 415 of the 4th instant.

The Russian Government have authorised M. Poklewski to give the assurances to the Bakhtiari khans in writing, but they have instructed him to let the khans understand at the same time that they would not sympathise with any change of dynasty.

The restoration of the ex-Shah is thus not precluded, and in view of your telegram No. 408 of the 4th instant I should be glad if you would telegraph further instructions to me before I take joint action with my Russian colleague.

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

[48914]

No. 486.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 662.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs earnestly hopes that as he and the Regent are doing everything in their power to persuade the Medjliss to find some possible basis of agreement with Russia, Russian troops will not advance beyond Kazvin without some delay, as, should they do so, matters would be precipitated.

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

[48915]

No. 487.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 663.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 581 of 17th November.

Both post and telegraph offices refuse communications for Kermanshah. Last telegram from British consul dispatched from Hamadan pressing by a runner, and received yesterday, stated that communications with Bagdad were closed. Telegram foreshadowed pillaging of town.

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

[48912]

No. 488.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 322.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No 772 of 5th December.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to employment of Lecoffre by Persian Government outside Russian zone.

St. Petersburg, December 6, 1911.

[48913]

No. 489.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 323.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Your telegram No. 770 of the 5th December.

In conversation to-day with M. Nératof I again mentioned the question of the ex-Shah, Mohammed Ali.

M. Nératof said that he had not yet succeeded in finding a formula which would be satisfactory to you without tying the hands of the two Governments in future eventualities. He repeated that we could not foresee what the future might have in store, and that it would therefore be a mistake to tie our hands definitively. If the Bakhtiari were to replace Mohammed Ali on the throne, what were we to do?

I said that you had taken all possible eventualities into consideration, and that your decision was irrevocable. I observed that the devotion of the Bakhtiari to the ex-Shah was not so great that they would insist on having him back if they knew beforehand that he would not be recognised by us. M. Nératof then touched on the question of appointing a new Regent, and asked what your attitude would be. I said that you had sent me no instructions, and I could only repeat to him the personal views to which I had given expression in our conversation of yesterday. In conclusion, M. Nératof said that, before giving me a definite answer, he must have a few more days for consideration, but he felt sure that some formula satisfactory to both parties would be found.

If I were authorised to tell M. Nératof that you would not offer any opposition to any candidate whom he might put forward for the Regency, I believe he might be more inclined to meet our wishes in regard to the ex-Shah. I do not know whether you would be prepared to give such an assurance, nor do I know who his candidate would be. Sardar Assad is the only person whom he has ever mentioned to me in this connection. If Sardar Assad is the candidate whom he has in view, our acceptance of his candidature would render the Bakhtiari less disposed to recall Mohammed Ali.

It occurs to me that a formula somewhat as follows might get over M. Nératof's objection to any statement which would bind the two Governments for the future:—

(R.) His Majesty's Government have informed Russian Government that, in conformity with attitude which they have adopted ever since ex-Shah returned to Persia, they would be unable to recognise His Majesty were he now to re-establish himself on the Throne. Russian Government have on their side assured them that they will never recognise ex-Shah without consent of His Majesty's Government, and that so long as Russian troops remain in occupation they will do nothing either to encourage or facilitate His Majesty's return to the throne." (End of R.)

M. Nératof's objections to a declaration to the effect that we would never recognise the ex-Shah might perhaps be met by the use of the word "now," while your object is virtually secured by the assurance that Russia will not recognise him without our consent.

To my enquiry as to whether he would be willing to state that so long as the Russian troops remained in occupation Russia would not allow the ex-Shah to regain the throne, M. Nératof said that such a declaration would entail too great a responsibility.

If I find it impossible to induce the Russian Government to join us in making an absolute declaration that neither party will recognise the ex-Shah, you might perhaps be able to suggest a better formula than the one outlined above. I should be glad if I could be furnished with instructions with as little delay possible, both on this question and on that of the choice of a new Regent.

I informed M. Nératof of the language held by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir G. Barclay (see the latter's telegram No. 653 of the 5th December). His Excellency observed that in the Russian demands the only point that might wound Persian susceptibilities was the engagement as to foreign advisers required in demand No. 2. Any concession on this point, however, would expose us to the risk of the Persians appointing another foreigner, who would act precisely as Shuster had done, and he did not see how he could make any. The Russian demand, moreover, was only the expression of the principle on which both Powers had always insisted, and

which had been observed in practice. With regard to the demand for an indemnity, if the Persian Government would only consent to give the required engagements the Russian Government would be willing either to accept some concession in lieu of a money payment or to extend such payment over a number of years.

[48920] No. 490.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Stockholm, December 6, 1911.

SWEDISH officers for Persian gendarmerie.

I learn confidentially from the secretary-general of the Swedish Foreign Office that the seven officers who are proceeding to Persia will be instructed by telegram not to go for the present beyond Baku.

The Russian Foreign Office was consulted before this measure was decided on.

[48587] No. 491.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 421.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.

WE might inform Persian Government that in any arrangements they may make with Muin, we expect them to have regard to obligations entered into by Muin with Weir and Ellinger. What are your views? Reference is to your telegram No. 650 of the 4th December.

[48976] No. 492.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 422.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

You should discuss with M. Poklewski the urgency of replacing Shuster with the least possible delay the moment the Russian demands have been complied with, and also the question of who would be the most acceptable and suitable nominee. Although it would be inadvisable for us to suggest a name in the first instance, Colonel Reddoes has made a suggestion here that the Dutch Minister might be a suitable candidate for the post.

[48977] No. 493.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 423.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.

AMERICAN Ambassador tells me that his Government have stated at Tehran that they have no responsibility for official relations of Shuster with Persian Government, but that he is entitled to protection as an American citizen, that they hope he will be treated with proper consideration, and that your American colleague has been instructed to explain to yourself and your Russian colleague that Shuster is entitled to fulfilment of contracts made with Persian Government.

I have said that Russian Government have taken into their own hands the enforcement of their demands, and that we are not intervening further in the matter, but that you will use what influence you can in favour of safety of Shuster and of his being treated with proper personal consideration.

You should inform your Russian colleague.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 776.)

[48910]

No. 494.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 424.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 661.

You should let M. Poklewski make his own communication on his own responsibility.

Unless there is some statement that restoration of ex-Shah would not be regarded with favour, I do not desire to be committed to any opinions as to further developments. Addition as to change of dynasty seems ambiguous.

[48977]

No. 495.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce.

(No. 487.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.

THE American Ambassador informed me to-day that a month ago his Government had stated in Tehran that they had no responsibility for the official relation of Mr. Shuster to the Persian Government. A few days ago they had made another communication in Tehran to the effect that, as an American citizen, Mr. Shuster was entitled to their protection, and that they hoped he would be treated with proper consideration. The American Minister in Tehran had been instructed to explain to his British and Russian colleagues that Mr. Shuster was entitled to the fulfilment of contracts made with the Persian Government. The Ambassador told me that this meant that he should receive a proper indemnity if his contract was broken. In effect, the American attitude was that the United States Government were responsible for Mr. Shuster as an American citizen, but not as a Persian official. The Ambassador was sure that we should feel this to be a very proper attitude on their part.

I said that I quite understood their position. We could not, for reasons which I had explained in public, object to the demands which the Russian Government had put forward. Mr. Shuster's action had caused us much embarrassment, and he had rejected our advice. The Russian Government were now enforcing their demands. We had advised the Persian Government some days ago to comply, and since then we had not intervened in any way, and we had no force to control things in Tehran. I would, however, send instructions to the British Minister in Tehran to use his influence in whatever way he could to secure Mr. Shuster's safety, and to arrange that, whatever happened, he was treated with proper personal consideration.

The Ambassador observed that he had heard favourable reports as to Mr. Shuster's ability and integrity, but he also heard, not for the first time, that he was a "three-cornered" man, and lacking in tact.

I told the Ambassador that, in my public utterances, I had been careful to say nothing which would reflect on Mr. Shuster's character or good intentions, but we really could not allow the action of an individual to embroil two great nations such as the Russians and ourselves, especially when we had warned the individual against the action which he was taking.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[49018]

No. 496.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 355.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 4, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 351 of the 30th November, I have the honour to report that I received at 7 o'clock on the evening of the 30th ultimo a letter from M. Klemm, the head of the Persian department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which a copy is enclosed, stating that M. Nératof, who had not yet returned from the Council of Ministers, had requested him to inform me of the instructions that were being sent to the Russian Minister at Tehran. M. Poklewski, he stated, was to insist on compliance with the Russian demands within forty-eight hours, but was at the same

[1524]

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time authorised to allow the Persian Government whatever delay he might deem necessary to regulate the position of Mr. Shuster, though the Russian troops would not be recalled till Mr. Shuster's dismissal was an accomplished fact. As regarded the question of the indemnity, he was to state that it would be sufficient were the Persian Government to agree to settle the matter when the amount had been fixed.

As it was too late for M. Nératof to receive me, I wrote privately to his Excellency pointing out that the above-mentioned letter did not touch the question as to how long the troops were to be halted at Kazvin, and said nothing about the assurance which the president of the Council had given me that the troops would be recalled, even had they already arrived at Tehran, when once the demands were accepted, and without any fresh ones being put forward. In his reply, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, M. Nératof stated that the troops would in any case rest a few days at Kazvin, and that though it was not at present the intention of the Russian Government to put forward any further demands, he could not give me a categorical assurance on the subject, as all would depend on the circumstances under which the march into the interior would take place.

I saw M. Nératof on the following day, and received from him the assurance that the Russian Government would, in conformity with the wish which you had expressed, do all they could to facilitate the appointment of new foreign advisers. His Excellency then proceeded to inform me that the Medjliss had categorically refused to comply with Russia's demands. He had hardly expected that they would accept them straight away, but he had hoped that they would have contented themselves with leaving them without an answer, instead of shutting the door on all further conversation. The order for an advance from Resht would not, as he had promised me, be dispatched till the following afternoon, and a halt of a few days would be made at Kazvin. There was, however, now no prospect of a compliance on the part of the Persian Government unless the Medjliss could be sent about their business. He was not sure whether the constitution conferred on the Regent the power to dissolve them, but His Highness was hardly the man to take action of this kind. Sardar Assad had, however, arrived at Baku, and orders had been sent to allow him to continue his journey to Tehran unmolested. It was, therefore, just possible that the Bakhtiari might decide to make a *coup d'état*.

In the conversation which ensued I once more endeavoured to impress on his Excellency that the occupation of Tehran would inevitably cause serious complications and give rise to fresh incidents, which would in their turn occasion the presentation of fresh demands. The Russians would on their arrival there find no regular Government with which to treat, while the ex-Shah would probably try to profit by the confusion to re-establish himself on the throne. To this, as I had once before told his Excellency, His Majesty's Government would under no circumstances consent. It would, however, I supposed, be necessary to find someone to exercise the functions of Regent.

His Excellency assured me that the Imperial Government would give the ex-Shah no support whatsoever, and suggested the name of Sardar Assad as a possible Regent. I replied that I could not say what view you would take of such an appointment.

I subsequently reminded him of the difficult position in which His Majesty's Government would be placed were Russia to press matters too far, and begged him to take that position into account. M. Nératof replied that Russia's prestige must be upheld. The Government, he added, were being constantly attacked in the press for not showing sufficient firmness in dealing with the situation, but they would confine their action to what was absolutely necessary to accomplish the object which he had just mentioned.

I called again on M. Nératof on the 2nd instant and spoke to him in the terms of your telegram No. 748 of the 1st instant. As I was afraid that in view of the refusal of the Russian demands he might not be prepared to give such categorical assurances with regard to Russia's intentions as he had given before the receipt of the Persian reply, I enquired whether you might use for a statement in Parliament the two letters which I had received from him and M. Klemm on the 30th of last month, as well as the *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 350 of the 29th November. I drew his Excellency's special attention to the third and fourth paragraphs of the last-mentioned document, in which the most categorical assurances are given that the Imperial Government do not propose to violate the integrity or independence of Persia, that the military measures which they are taking are of a purely provisional character, and that they have no intention of infringing the principles which govern the Anglo-Russian agreement with regard to Persia.

After perusing the several documents, M. Nératof said that you were at liberty to

use them. He pointed out, however, that the instructions to M. Poklewski which formed the subject of M. Klemm's letter had ceased to have any practical interest now that the Russian demands had been rejected, and that as regarded the halt of the troops at Kazvin, which was referred to in the letter which he had written to me, he could tell me that the commander of the troops had been ordered not to advance beyond that town without further instructions from St. Petersburg or from the Russian Legation at Tehran. He could not, however, guarantee that the troops would stop at Kazvin, as should disorders break out at Tehran it might be necessary to order them to proceed at once to the capital for the protection of the legation.

I then enquired if he could not give me some more precise assurances with regard to the eventual demands which Russia might possibly put forward, and after some further conversation he approved the following statement, which I wrote down and showed to him:—

"Should circumstances arise to render necessary the presentation of further demands, those demands will not go beyond questions having a particular interest for Russia, such as the settlement of outstanding matters in dispute or other matters having an exclusive interest for Russia in the zone that has been reserved to her, and will not touch questions of a general political interest."

His Excellency said that he could not tell me anything more definite with regard to these possible demands, as they had not yet been considered by the Council of Ministers; but I gathered from what he said that they may include one for a first option in the matter of railways in North Persia or one for the creation of a police force under Russian control, in return for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Tabreez.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 496.

M. de Klemm to Sir G. Buchanan.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 17 (30) novembre, 1911.

M. NÉRATOF, qui se trouve en ce moment au Conseil des Ministres, m'a chargé de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence ce qui suit.

D'après un télégramme de M. Poklewsky, reçu hier soir, la note contenant nos nouvelles exigences a été remise par lui au Gouvernement persan hier à midi.

Aujourd'hui M. Nératof vient de télégraphier à M. Poklewsky l'informant de ce que la réponse persane sera considérée par nous comme satisfaisante si dans les quarante-huit heures fixées dans notre note le Gouvernement persan lui annonce par écrit que les trois points contenant nos exigences sont formellement acceptés et que la démission de Shuster et Lecoq est un fait accompli. Cependant, vu que les formalités à remplir par rapport à la démission de Shuster pourraient exiger un certain temps, M. Poklewsky est mis en mesure d'accorder au Gouvernement persan, pour la liquidation complète de la position de ce fonctionnaire, le délai qu'il jugera nécessaire d'après les conditions locales. Quant à la question du remboursement des frais de l'expédition de nos troupes en Perse, il suffirait que le Gouvernement persan s'engage actuellement à régler cette question lorsque le montant de ces frais aura été fixé.

Si une réponse satisfaisante est reçue, notre détachement n'avancera pas au delà de Recht; mais son rappel en Russie ne pourra avoir lieu que quand l'affaire Shuster aura été complètement terminée.

Veuillez, &c.

W. DE KLEMM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 496.

M. Nératof to Sir G. Buchanan.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 17 (30) novembre, 1911.

POUR ce qui concerne l'arrêt des troupes à Kazvine, il a été décidé au Conseil des Ministres qu'on devra nécessairement donner aux troupes un repos de quelques jours sans d'ailleurs préciser le temps exact de cet arrêt.

Il me semble cependant que sur ce point nous avons de la marge et que, le cas échéant, nous pourrions en causer.

Quant à la question du rappel de nos troupes, il m'est difficile de vous donner une réponse catégorique, puisque tout dépendra des circonstances dans lesquelles s'effectuera la marche à l'intérieur du pays. En ce moment-ci il n'entre pas dans nos vues de formuler d'autres demandes en dehors de celles déjà connues, mais si nous sommes forcés d'employer la force pour arriver jusqu'au bout, nos demandes peuvent être augmentées.

Votre sincèrement dévoué.

A. NÉRATOF.

[49019]

No. 497.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 356.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 4, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that, with the exception of the Constitutional Democratic organ the "Retch," all the more important St. Petersburg newspapers entirely endorse the action taken by the Russian Government in Persia. The "Retch" has taken the defence of Mr. Morgan Shuster, and argues that the dispatch of Russian troops to Tehran must prove destructive to Persian independence; but being always in an attitude of irreconcilable opposition to the Government on every question, the utterances of this paper carry very little weight.

The "Novoe Vremya," which at one time violently attacked both M. Nératof and M. Poklewski for lack of firmness in dealing with the situation, now energetically supports the decision of the Russian Government. In a leading article published yesterday it deals with the attitude taken up by the German press in regard to the Persian crisis, and observes that the latest events in Persia have given the German newspapers ample material for their usual attempts to undermine the Anglo-Russian agreement. They are endeavouring to convince British public opinion that the entry of Russian troops into Persia places England in the position of an idle spectator of the Russian occupation of North Persia, and a similar campaign is being conducted in certain political circles in England. "Every reasonable and justly-minded man," says the "Novoe Vremya," "must see that Russia does not seek territorial possessions in Persia. She sent her troops only when forced to it by the Persian Government, and now she only desires to remove the causes of the endless attacks on herself. Russia is still abiding by the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement." After referring to the "Tägliche Rundschau's" recommendations to Russia to occupy Persia as speedily as possible, the "Novoe Vremya" proceeds: "Only fools and fanatics can be deluded by such clumsy incitements, but the sane part of Russian and English public opinion will not be led away by this crude Machiavellism."

The Moderate Liberal "Bourse Gazette" also fully approves the Government's policy, while Nationalist papers and organs of the Extreme Right, such as the "Svief" and the "Zemschina," criticise it only as being not sufficiently decided.

The semi-official "Rossia," in a leading article of yesterday, refers to the clause in the Russian ultimatum stipulating that the invitation of foreigners to enter the Persian service shall in future take place only after preliminary consultation with the Russian and British Legations in Tehran. The "Rossia" explains that this stipulation, which is one of considerable importance for Russia, is a logical outcome of that concordance of action between the two Powers in Persia which continues since 1907. Since 1908, when the question of bringing in foreigners to reorganise the various branches of the Persian administration first arose, Russia and England decided that in order to avoid complications between themselves and Persia the latter ought, in her own interest, to consult them before taking any step in the direction indicated. This view was communicated in a friendly form to the Persian Government, but the latter, and more particularly the Medjliss, refused to be guided by the considerations laid before them by the two Powers, and, after some unsuccessful attempts to engage Frenchmen and Italians, their choice finally fell on Americans. Not wishing to create any unnecessary difficulties, Russia and England raised no objection, but they pointed out to the Tehran Cabinet that in future a disregard of the counsels of the two Powers on this question might lead to injurious results. The consequences brought about by Mr. Shuster's appointment need no comment, and it is sufficiently clear why the Russian Government have now deemed it necessary to make the stipulation above referred to. When, further, it is considered that the activity of a foreigner employed in the Persian service may

extend to the whole of Persia, irrespective of the spheres of influence established by the Anglo-Russian agreement, it will be understood, concludes the "Rossia," that Russia could not undertake to decide alone as to the suitability of any proposed appointment.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[49039]

No. 498.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 7.)

Sir,

India Office, December 6, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th November regarding an alleged violation by the Indian authorities of the Baluch-Persian frontier near Piran, and, in reply, to enclose copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the Government of India, dated the 5th December, 1911, on the subject.

Pending receipt of their report, I am to remark that uncertainty as to the exact line of the frontier in that neighbourhood (as to which reference is invited to the correspondence forwarded with this Office letter of the 22nd June, 1907) is the cause of occasional complaints of this nature from the Persian Government, of which the last appears to have been made in 1908: see papers forwarded in this Office letters of the 1st July and the 1st December, 1908, and the 26th January, 1909.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 498.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

India Office, December 5, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 524 to consul, Seistan: Piran. Formal complaint has now been made by Persian Government, to which, however, it is not intended to reply. But Foreign Office would be glad if enquiry can be made as to facts. Please report by mail. Such incidents may give Persian Government pretext for raising question of frontier.

[49032]

No. 499.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 7.)

Sir,

India Office, December 6, 1911.

IN continuation of letter, dated the 18th September, 1911, regarding the proposed Persian Gulf order in council, I am directed by the Secretary of State to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been now received from the Government of India upon the subject.

They are, it will be seen, in accord with the political resident in thinking that a single comprehensive order, to embrace both the Persian and the Arab littoral of the Gulf, is undesirable, even if practicable, and that the most that can be done is to have an order in council which would cover the Arab principalities from Koweit to Muscat inclusive. The Secretary of State for India concurs in this opinion, and would suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey on further consideration sees no objection, the amendment of the "Persian Coast and Islands order in council, 1907," should now be proceeded with on the lines proposed in my letter of the 15th June last.

As regards the preparation of an order to cover the Arab principalities, the Secretary of State for India feels some doubt whether there is sufficient advantage in drafting such an order now, if the Persian provisions of the fuller order are abandoned as proposed. The work would presumably occupy some time, and meanwhile the draft Bahrain order, of which the early issue appears very desirable, would be in abeyance. The Secretary of State for India would be glad, however, to be favoured

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with Sir E. Grey's views upon this point, and whether, if the draft Bahrein order is proceeded with, instructions should further be sent to Colonel Cox to resume his work on a draft order relating to the crucial chiefs, with a view either to its separate issue later (if desirable), or the inclusion of its provisions in a comprehensive order covering the whole of the Arab principalities.

As regards the point dealt with in your letter under reply as to the power of the Sheikh of Bahrein to delegate his jurisdiction over foreigners to His Majesty's Government, I am to add that the Secretary of State for India accepts the opinion expressed by Sir E. Grey in this matter.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 499.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 22, 1911.

PROPOSED order in council for Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 15th September.

Following telegram received from resident, Persian Gulf, whom we consulted in the matter. We concur in resident's views:—

"Though not an easy matter, it would, I think, be possible to evolve a comprehensive order in council by which Arab principalities from Muskat to Koweit inclusive would be covered. A British representative is practically in the position, in regard to all these principalities, of agent of the protecting Power, rather than the head of a diplomatic (? mission) to one or more foreign Courts.

A British representative on the Persian side is merely a consular officer who is accredited, among others, to a foreign Government, nominally civilised, with whom Great Powers are in direct relations. It would be impracticable, in my opinion, to devise one order in council to embrace both Arab and Persian littorals, owing to dissimilarity of most of administrative conditions. There would also be objection to such an arrangement from political point of view. For example, the importance of maintaining Government of India's unattached and distinct position in regard to Arab principalities is demonstrated by proceedings in current dispute regarding Abu Musa. Further, as regards British subjects in (group undecypherable) [sic] Bahrein, our rights of jurisdiction rest on the prospective (? prescriptive) rights which the convention of the 31st May, 1861, confirmed, and which Sheikh has not challenged; our rights also rest indirectly on the fact that the subjection of Bahrein itself to form of British protection has been publicly declared by us. I submit that the above authority will suffice; no other is known to me."

[49053]

No. 500.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 664.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

HORMUZ oxide.

Please see your telegram No. 421 of yesterday.

The Persian Government might interpret a communication of the kind you suggest as a shifting of our ground. I do not think that we should gain anything by such a step, as we have already treated the breach of engagements entered into with Weir and Ellinger as a *fait accompli*, for which damages have been claimed from the Persian Government.

Besides, the maintenance of Muir's former obligations with Weir and Ellinger is incompatible with Strick's contract, and the confusion would only be increased if the Persian Government were to cancel the latter virtually at our invitation.

The Persian Government would, as a matter of fact, presumably reply that Messrs. Strick's contract holds good under the new arrangement, and that Messrs. Strick have pledged themselves to indemnify all legal claims arising from the breach of engagements with Weir and Ellinger, whether brought against the Persian Government or against Muir.

[49054]

No. 501.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 665.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister tells me that 400 Russian troops have reached Kazvin.
(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[49058]

No. 502.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 666.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

MR. SHUSTER'S successor.

Please see your telegram No. 422 of yesterday's date.

I see no special reason for selecting the Dutch Minister. So far as I am aware he would not be especially palatable to the Persians, who have invariably reminded me, whenever I have mentioned Dutch subjects as possible advisers, that Dutch interests are in Russian hands when the Dutch Legation is vacant. The Dutch Minister is on leave at the present moment. I might add that he married an Englishwoman.

My Russian colleague is strongly in favour of Mornard as successor to Shuster. Mornard has been administrator-general of the Persian Customs since Naus' departure. While I have always found him satisfactory, I fear that, in consequence of the strong line which he took up against Mornard in the controversy with Shuster last summer, the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia might not view his appointment favourably. Still, I think that in view of his long experience of Persia and of the harmonious manner in which he has hitherto worked with the two legations, his appointment would be the most practical in the circumstances; any nominee of the two Powers would be viewed by the Persians with a certain amount of dislike, and I do not know that Mornard would be more unpalatable to them than any other.

[49059]

No. 503.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 667.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

THE situation in Tehran.

Sardar Assad has, contrary to expectation, been using his influence for moderation, and his return to Persia seems therefore to have relieved the situation.

The Regent to-day informs me that the general feeling is more reasonable. He says that all parties in the Medjliss, including the Democrats, are inclining towards submission, and he gave me to understand that the Cabinet would be able to persuade the Medjliss to comply with the Russian demands.

[49055]

No. 504.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 779.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.

It is desirable that I should explicitly put on record certain matters of importance, so that all risk of possible difference between the two Governments may be avoided, and that the lines of future co-operation may be indicated.

You should hand M. Nératof an *aide-mémoire* of these views, and add that while the present crisis is in progress I do not wish to press him inconveniently on matters of detail, but that more immediate action regarding the dismissal of Mr. Shuster does not seem impossible. I trust, moreover, that the Russian Government will agree that the policy outlined is in general accordance with their views.

I recognise that the solution of the present crisis must be such as to secure a Government in Persia which will conform to the principles of the Anglo-

Russian agreement, and not disregard the special and respective interests of the two Powers.

2. I trust that the Russian Government will not allow any solution which would entail the return of the ex-Shah. Such a restoration could only embarrass an already complicated situation, and is not essential to the object aimed at by both Governments. It would not, moreover, be consistent with our dignity to recognise him now, after his recent disregard of the warnings of both Governments not to return, and his restoration would give rise to apprehension of vindictive measures on his part against those in Persia who were instrumental in expelling him.

3. Mr. Shuster should above all be at once succeeded by some foreign financial adviser. The British and Russian Ministers at Tehran might make some recommendation, after consultation with each other, so as to ensure the new candidate being acceptable to the two Governments.

4. As soon as Russian demands have been conceded, it will be desirable to prevent chaos, and to enable Persian Government to restore order; the two Governments should therefore co-operate to facilitate measures, such as a loan, in order to secure this object.

5. The Persian Government would be seriously hampered in this connection were the Russian Government to exact an indemnity, and I trust that when the crisis is over some way of avoiding this difficulty may be found.

6. It is understood that occupation of Persian territory by Russia and the military measures now in progress are not permanent, but provisional, and that they will cease as soon as order in Northern Persia has been re-established, and when Russian demands have been complied with.

[48913] No. 505.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 782.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
EX-SHAH.

Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.

Formula you suggest would be acceptable. Failing this you might work on lines indicated in my telegram No. 779 of to-day.

We should raise no objection to Sardar Assad becoming Regent should events in Persia necessitate such a change. In any case a condition should be made that present Regent should be treated with all consideration and respect if he retires.

[49055] No. 506.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.

MY telegram No. 779 of 7th December to St. Petersburg.

You should give a memorandum of this to M. Sazonow, either direct or through Count Benckendorff, for his information.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 428, and St. Petersburg, No. 789.)

[48017] No. 507.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 319.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.

THE Russian Ambassador gave me on the 28th ultimo a memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed,* relative to the dispatch of Russian troops to Khoi.

I remarked that Khoi, being close to the Russian frontier, a Russian officer having been wounded, and Turks mixed up in the affair, this was on a different footing to the action being taken towards Tehran.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* Not printed.

[49186]

No. 508.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 608.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
THE Regent.

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

His Highness no longer talks of resigning office. I hear to-day that he is resolved to stay in Tehran until the present crisis is over, unless something unforeseen occurs, and that he then intends to take leave of absence for a time.

[49201]

No. 509.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 609.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 322 of 6th December.

I should not have thought that Russia would find it necessary to insist on removal of Lecoq from the subordinate post in the Ministry of Finance, which he has held for two years without any expression of objection from the Russian Government, and where he has done useful work.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[49202]

No. 510.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 670.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit to the Russian Legation yesterday afternoon and spoke about the Russian demands. He said that the second was the one which presented the greatest difficulty, as it attacked Persian independence. Supposing that Persia undertook that she would take into consideration and would not harm the interests of the two Powers when engaging foreigners; his Excellency thought that this form of wording would, in practice, achieve the desired result and would not so clearly attack Persia's independence. It might also be acceptable to the Medjliss, who might also be induced to accept the other two demands. His Excellency gave the Russian Minister an assurance that in any case if the Medjliss persisted in their rejection of the three demands, it would be dissolved and the Cabinet would itself comply with them.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped that the Russian Government would then recall the troops, and he added that as it was generally believed that the real object of the dispatch of troops was to restore the ex-Shah, it would be an excellent way of showing that friendly relations had been restored between Russia and Persia were His Majesty to be got rid of. His Excellency also remarked that Persia would be in great need of a loan or an advance, and that they would require Russia's assistance in procuring one.

[49203]

No. 511.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 671.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Sardar Assad called at His Majesty's Legation this afternoon and said that he thought his efforts to bring about compliance with the Russian demands would prove successful. He said that if certain changes were made in the Cabinet he had hopes of being able to persuade the Medjliss to dissolve itself; before dissolving, the Medjliss would give the Cabinet full powers to effect a settlement with Russia.

In order to persuade those who are opposed to the idea of submission to Russia, he relies chiefly on the argument that the troops will not advance beyond Kazvin if the demands are complied with. He told the Russian Minister, who was present

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3 X

throughout the interview, that if this argument were falsified by events, his position would be ruined.

Russian Minister replied that he had already asked for instructions from his Government, and that pending a reply he could give no definite assurances. But he added that the troops would in the natural course come to Tehran should the demands not be complied with, and that the only possible chance of arresting them at Kazvin was therefore to comply.

[49204]

No. 512.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 672.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

RUSSIAN demands.

M. Poklewsky, in his interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, promised the latter that he would inform the Russian Government of the substance of his remarks.

This was omitted from my telegram No. 670 of to-day.

[49200]

No. 513.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 17)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 8, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I saw M. Nératof to-day and handed him an *aide-mémoire*, and spoke to him in the sense of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 779 of the 7th December.

M. Nératof promised to examine the contents of the *aide-mémoire* carefully, and to give me a reply in a few days in writing. He observed, with reference to point No. 3, that it would be no easy task to find a suitable successor to Mr. Shuster, as he felt strongly that no more foreign advisers should be recruited from any of the Great Powers. It would, moreover, be necessary, in order to prevent Mr. Shuster's successor assuming dictatorial powers, to define the attributions of the post.

[49372]

No. 514.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 328.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 8, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Your telegram No. 782 of the 7th December.

I to-day submitted to M. Nératof the formula suggested in my telegram No. 323 of the 6th December, as I found it was impossible to induce him to waive the objections which he has consistently maintained to being a party to a declaration that we would never recognise the ex-Shah.

M. Nératof objected to the passage from the words "in conformity with" down to "Persia," on the score that its terms would call forth hostile criticism here. In deference to his objection I agreed to omit these words, subject to your approval. M. Nératof also took exception to the use of the word "never" in the second sentence. Though the Russian Government would never recognise Mohammed Ali without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government, he deprecated the use of the word "never" in a public statement, as it would be tantamount to declaring that Russia would not recognise the ex-Shah in any conceivable circumstances. He suggested that it might be possible to use the word "now" in the second sentence in the same way in which it was used in the first. The second sentence, as now altered, would therefore run as follows:—

(R.) "Russian Government have on their side assured them that, were ex-Shah now to attempt to regain throne, they would equally not recognise him, and that," &c. End of R.)

To this amended text M. Nératof had no objection to offer, but he said that he must first consult M. Sazonow, as the latter was already engaged in conversations in Paris with Sir F. Bertie, and Count Benckendorff and he could not engage the Russian Government without his consent. I fear that it will be impossible for me to get anything better than the text as now amended, and I should be glad to know whether you would be disposed to accept it.

On M. Nératof then enquiring whether I had any assurances to give him as to the appointment of a new Regent, I told him what you had said in your telegram No. 782, and asked whether he wished to put forward any special candidate. He said that he had no fault to find with Nasr-ul-Mulk, but that it might be necessary, if the Medjliss persisted in its present intractable attitude, to appoint a stronger man who would be prepared to dissolve that body in case of necessity. In that case it would be for the two Ministers at Tehran to suggest some suitable candidate after consulting together. He said that he did not know whether Sardar Assad would be a good choice, but he could think of no one else to suggest, though he once let fall the name of the Sipahdar.

I told him that Sir G. Barclay had reported (see his telegram No. 667 of the 7th December) that Nasr-ul-Mulk now seemed to view the situation in a more hopeful light, and he observed that, in the event of the Medjliss now yielding, it might not be necessary to raise the question of a change of Regent at all. He said that the Persian chargé d'affaires here had mentioned the subject of the second Russian demand at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he hinted that the Russian Government might perhaps still find it possible to present this demand to the Persian Government in a form which might prove more palatable to them.

I said that, now that there seemed to be a little more hope that the Persian Government would give way, I earnestly hoped that orders would be sent to delay as long as possible any advance of the troops beyond Kazvin.

[49205]

No. 515.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 202. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, December 8, 1911.

THIS afternoon I began a conversation with M. Sazonow by some observations on the evil effect which any differences in Persia between England and Russia would have on the general political situation, and in case any of your arguments had been omitted by Count Benckendorff in his account to M. Sazonow of the conversation which you had with the Ambassador on the 2nd instant, I handed to his Excellency your despatch No. 315 of that date to Sir G. Buchanan for his perusal. I afterwards communicated to M. Sazonow, in the form of a memorandum, your views on the subject of Persia, as set forth in your telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, No. 779 of the 7th instant. So far as M. Sazonow is personally concerned he concurs in and accepts those views, but in the matter of the indemnity demanded by the Russian Government he cannot say whether they would meet with the acquiescence of the Russian Minister of Finance. However, on reaching St. Petersburg on the 13th instant his Excellency will discuss the whole Persian question with His Majesty's Ambassador, and he will do his best to get the demand dropped or to bring about some sort of compromise by which its burden would be mitigated.

[49055]

No. 516.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 346.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 8, 1911.

MY telegram No. 779 of yesterday.

You should supplement *aide-mémoire* given to Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs by following explanation regarding point C.

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 789).

This stipulation was intended to mean that as soon as order was re-established all Russian troops, including those at Tabreez and Ardebil, should be withdrawn from Northern Persia.

[49240]

No. 517.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 537.)

Sir,

Paris, December 8, 1911.

A DINNER was given last night by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in honour of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In addition to the Russian Ambassador and the whole of his staff there were invited to it of the diplomatic body the Ambassadors and the Servian Minister, the French Cabinet Ministers, ex-Presidents of the Council, ex-Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and some French officials.

After dinner I had a few minutes' conversation with M. Sazonow, whom I knew well in 1903 and 1904 at Rome, where he was secretary of the Russian Legation to the Vatican when I was accredited to the King of Italy, and in the autumn of 1904, when he was councillor of the Russian Embassy and I was acting as Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in the place of Sir Thomas Sanderson, who was then ill.

In reply to my enquiry as to whether he was going direct to St. Petersburg from here, M. Sazonow stated that he had wished, as was natural, to go to London and see and confer with you before returning to St. Petersburg, but he had had an abscess on the lung, for which he had undergone an operation, and the wound from it in his side was still open. Being a bad sailor he had been strongly advised by the surgeon who had attended him not to run the risk and danger of sea-sickness, for it might be a serious matter in his present condition. He was, therefore, obliged to postpone a visit to London until the spring, when he certainly would carry out the intention which for the present he was obliged to abandon. I said that you would much regret not seeing him and particularly the cause which prevented it.

M. Sazonow expressed the wish to discuss with me the situation in Persia and to explain to me, for your information, his views on the present situation in that country. I told him that I was expecting instructions from you. His Excellency proposed to come to this Embassy, and he did so this afternoon.

I began the conversation by referring to the anxiety which you felt at the situation created in Persia by the demands made on the Government of that country by the Russian Government and the presence there of Russian troops. I said that the world generally was in a disturbed state; the Morocco question was not entirely settled; the German people were in a very irritated condition; and the German Government would no doubt be glad to take advantage of any differences between England and Russia in the question of Persia to endeavour to separate Russia from England, and so lessen one of the securities for the preservation of peace, viz., a thoroughly good understanding between Russia, England, and France. It was most important to avoid such differences, as they must inevitably have an evil effect on the general political situation. M. Sazonow concurred, and, in case the Russian Ambassador in London had omitted from his account to his Excellency of the conversation which he had with you on the 2nd instant any observations of importance which you had made to the Ambassador on that occasion in regard to the question of Persia, I gave to M. Sazonow for perusal the despatch (No. 315) to Sir George Buchanan in which you recorded the conversation. I afterwards handed to his Excellency a memorandum, of which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy, giving your views as described in your telegram No. 779 of yesterday to Sir G. Buchanan.

M. Sazonow said that, so far as he was personally concerned, he concurred in and accepted your views. He could not answer, however, for the acquiescence of the Russian Minister of Finance in your view in regard to the indemnity. He would, however, on reaching St. Petersburg on the 13th instant do his best to bring about either the dropping of the demand for a money payment or a compromise of some sort the effect of which would be to mitigate the burden of it, and he would discuss the whole question of Persia with His Majesty's Ambassador after he had examined the situation at St. Petersburg. M. Sazonow then referred to the grievances of Russia against the Persian Government. They were many, he said, and had become more accentuated owing, he feared, to what was Russian consideration for Persian weakness, but had been interpreted as Russian weakness by the Persian Government, viz., the

premature withdrawal of the Russian troops when on a previous occasion they were marching towards Tehran. Oriental peoples were not persuaded by any argument but force, and the Persian Government had traded on the patience of Russia. M. Sazonow said that he fully appreciated the importance of not allowing the Persian question to assume dimensions that might react on the general relations between Russia and England, and you might depend upon his doing his best to bring about a settlement to avoid such a result. He thought there was unnecessary nervousness in England in regard to Russian policy in Persia. The Russian Government had no desire to occupy Tehran unless absolutely necessary to obtain satisfaction, nor to see a restoration of the ex-Shah. His Majesty was entirely discredited in Persia, and he could not be of any service to Russian designs against the integrity of Persia if such designs existed, which they certainly did not.

M. Sazonow leaves Paris on the evening of the 10th instant.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 517.

Memorandum communicated to M. Sazonow.

THE question of Persia is the source of great anxiety to Sir Edward Grey. He has spoken seriously on the subject to Count Benckendorff, who will no doubt have reported to M. Sazonow the conversation which Sir Edward Grey had with the Ambassador on the 2nd instant.

Sir Edward Grey desires to put on record now his views on certain points in order to avoid the risk of a possible difference between the Russian and British Governments, and to indicate the lines on which, in his opinion, they may continue to co-operate; and in doing so he considers it desirable that he should be explicit on certain matters of importance, viz. :—

1. He recognises that the outcome of the present situation must be to secure the establishment of a Government in Persia that will conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian agreement and pay proper regard to the special interests of Great Britain and Russia respectively.

2. It would not be consistent with the dignity of England to recognise a restoration of the ex-Shah after the manner in which he has disregarded the warnings given to him by both the Russian and the British Governments not to return to Persia. His restoration cannot be essential to the object described in point 1. It would, moreover, give rise to apprehension in Persia of vindictive measures on his part against those who were instrumental in expelling him from the country. Sir Edward Grey therefore trusts that the Russian Government will not add to the embarrassments of the situation by permitting the restoration of the ex-Shah to be the outcome of the present crisis.

3. The Russian and British Ministers at Tehran should at once confer together as to the selection of a foreign financial adviser to be recommended as successor to M. Shuster, for it is most important that one should be found who would be acceptable to both England and Russia.

4. As soon as the Russian demands on the Persian Government have been conceded, the British and Russian Governments should together consider and co-operate in measures, a loan being one of them, for preventing chaos, and for putting the Persian Government into a position to restore order.

5. The demand for an indemnity, put forward by Russia, would, if exacted, materially impair the object set forth in point 4. Sir E. Grey hopes that when the present crisis is past the Russian Government will find means of avoiding the difficulty which would be caused by an insistence on the payment of an indemnity.

6. Sir E. Grey understands that, as soon as the Russian demands have been complied with and order in Northern Persia has been restored, the military measures and occupation of Persian territory, which are now in progress and are stated to be provisional and not permanent, will cease.

Sir Edward has directed Sir Francis Bertie, when communicating his views to M. Sazonow, to state that the only point on which it seems possible to take immediate action is the consideration by the British and Russian representatives at Tehran of the question of a successor to Mr. Shuster, but Sir E. Grey trusts that M. Sazonow will

[1524]

3 Y

concur with him that the policy which he has outlined accords with the views of the Russian Government.

Paris, December 8, 1911.

[49324]

No. 518.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th December, 1911, relative to Major Stokes.

India Office, December 9, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 518.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

December 9, 1911.

FOLLOWING telegram was sent to Barclay on the 7th instant, with reference to his telegram of the 2nd instant, Major Stokes having stated his intention to obey orders:—

"Stokes should be instructed that he is directed by commander-in-chief to leave Tehran for India within one week at most. He may draw on you for travelling expenses subject to adjustment of advance, and he should travel via Caucasus and London."

[49286]

No. 519.

Notes on Mr. Shuster's Charges.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, December 9, 1911.)

Retour de Mohammed Ali.

Les archives du Ministère Impérial témoignent, avec documents à l'appui, des nombreux avertissements expédiés à l'ex-Schah à Odessa en vue de prévenir toute agitation de sa part.

Arrestation d'émigrés russes.

Le Gouvernement persan lui-même avait signalé au Gouvernement Impérial la conduite nuisible de ces individus et avait demandé leur expulsion; la Légation Impériale s'est déclarée toute prête à faire droit à cette demande sitôt qu'elle aurait reçu des renseignements circonstanciés sur eux.

Déclarations de Sardar-Arshad concernant l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne.

Ces déclarations ont été dûment démenties (il est affirmé dans la lettre de Mr. Shuster qu'elles ne l'ont pas été).

"Best" de Reschid-ul-Mulk, Gouverneur d'Ardabil au consulat général de Russie à Tabriz.

Cette circonstance, avec beaucoup de détails très exagérés, est invoquée comme preuve de violation de neutralité. En réalité, Reschid-ul-Mulk a pris "best" pour échapper à une exécution sommaire (sans jugement) que le Gouverneur général local se déclarait impuissant à empêcher. Ayant été à la tête de forces tout à fait insignifiantes envoyées contre les Shahzévènes, il avait été mis en fuite par ces derniers et était pour cela accusé de trahison.

Maintien du calme à Tabriz.

Cette mesure, comme le fait très justement remarquer le "Times," était plutôt en faveur du Gouvernement persan, puisqu'elle constituait un obstacle à la conquête de la ville par les troupes du Schah.

L'incident du fonctionnaire persan arrêté par le consul russe à Astrabad.

Cet incident est présenté sous son vrai jour par le "Times."

Infraction de neutralité.

Toutes les mesures visées à ce sujet par Mr. Shuster étaient en réalité indispensables pour la protection des intérêts et sujets russes.

"Best."

En critiquant la coutume du "best" et du "protégéship," Mr. Shuster témoigne de son ignorance des conditions locales.

Abus de protection.

L'accusation contre la légation et les consulats russes d'accorder assistance au Persans qui chercheraient à se servir de la protection russe pour éviter leurs obligations vis-à-vis de leur Gouvernement, est également de mauvaise foi. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que le Ministre de Russie a été chargé de déclarer à un des plus anciens Kadjars, le Prince Uz-ad-Dowlé, qu'il perdrait la protection russe si l'accusation de se dérober au paiement des taxes régulières se trouvait fondée.

[49336]

No. 520.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 329.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

PERSIA.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 669 of the 8th December.

I spoke to-day to M. Nératof in the sense of the above telegram.

He replied that the employment of M. Lecoffre in the Ministry of Finance at Tehran would not be agreeable to the Russian Government, both because of Lecoffre's well-known anti-Russian sentiments and of the intimate relations in which he had stood to Shuster and Stokes. It ought not to be difficult, he said, to find an appointment elsewhere for M. Lecoffre.

M. Nératof added that he was now convinced, from information which he had received recently, that Stokes was at the bottom of all the troubles that had caused the present crisis. It was Stokes who had inspired Shuster's policy, and been his evil angel.

[49337]

No. 521.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 330.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

MY telegram No. 327 of 8th December.

I have received private letter from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that he is instructing the Russian Minister at Tehran to consult Sir G. Barclay as to choice of successor to Shuster and to communicate result of their [?] deliberations] as soon as possible. His Excellency states that, according to established principle, official must be chosen from subjects of some secondary Power. He added that it is essential that certain limits should be imposed beforehand on activity of future financial adviser, whose functions must be strictly confined to those of an adviser to Finance Department. Powers conferred by Medjliss on Shuster will therefore have to be considerably curtailed, and he is consulting with Russian Minister as to best means of effecting this.

[49434]

No. 522.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 331.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

Tehran telegrams Nos. 668, 670 and 671 of 8th December.

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof this afternoon I spoke very seriously to his Excellency on the Persian question. Lest he should think that I was exaggerating the opposition which you have to face in Parliament, I said that I would read to him, for his confidential information, some remarks on the situation which so true a friend of Russia as Sir A. Nicolson had made to me in a private letter, and I then read to him extracts from the letter from Sir A. Nicolson which reached me by this morning's messenger. I said that it now seemed possible that Persia might yield and agree to the Russian demands, but that, if such a desirable result were to be attained, it was essential that the Russian Government should give a definite assurance that, in the event of the Persian Government complying with their demands, they would withdraw the Russian troops. I repeated my warning that the Anglo-Russian Agreement would hardly bear the strain of an occupation of Tehran by Russian troops, and that such an occupation must therefore be avoided at all costs.

M. Nératof repeated once more his old arguments in justification of the action taken by Russia, and added that M. Sazonow was expected back in St. Petersburg on Wednesday next, and that his position at present was consequently a somewhat delicate one. He believed, however, that his Government would be willing to give an assurance that no forward movement from Kasvin would be made before 21st December, and that if by that date the Persian Government had complied with the Russian demands Russia would immediately withdraw her expeditionary force, provided that the Persians had created no fresh incident, such as an attack on a consulate or any similar act of provocation in the meanwhile. With regard to the troops at Tabreez their withdrawal would have to be made the subject of a special arrangement by which the Persian Government would engage to create a police force under Persian control in northern Persia. M. Nératof promised to let me have a definite reply as soon as possible after he had discussed the question with M. Kokovtsoff.

We then turned to the question of the Regency. M. Nératof said that he would have no objection to Nasr-ul-Mulk retaining that office if only his position in relation to the Medjliss could be strengthened. In the present state of things Nasr-ul-Mulk was not a strong enough man to cope with the difficulties of the situation. The present régime was not in accordance with the Constitution as originally framed, and the powers of the Medjliss ought to be curtailed, and steps ought to be taken to establish a Senate.

M. Nératof then asked whether the Russian Government could count on our support in the event of their wishing to recommend some Persian to the Regent for the post of Prime Minister. I said that I was not in a position to give him an answer on this point, but I repeated to him the substance of your conversation with Count Benckendorff, and what you had said as to the two Governments securing the establishment at Tehran of a Government well disposed towards this country. I observed that on several occasions lately his Excellency had hinted to me his desire to secure our support for demands which the Russian Government might eventually put forward without clearly stating the nature of those demands. He scarcely seemed to know himself exactly what he wanted, and it was, therefore, rather too much to expect us to promise beforehand to support them. In my personal opinion the best course would be for the two Ministers at Tehran to consult together as to any proposals which M. Poklewski might wish to make with a view to settling the relations of Persia with Russia on a more friendly and stable footing. Sir G. Barclay could then communicate to you his views on such proposals.

M. Nératof agreed with my suggestion, admitting at the same time that his Government had not yet given serious consideration to the question of what measures might ultimately have to be recommended at Tehran. His Excellency said that it would be impossible for the Russian Government to accept the Persian counter-proposal with regard to the second demand as its wording was far too vague, but, at the same time, he really does seem desirous to avoid an advance of the Russian troops to Tehran; and I think it would encourage him to pursue a policy of conciliation if I were authorised to tell him that instructions had been sent to Sir G. Barclay to discuss with M. Poklewski any suggestions that the latter might lay before him; and if I were

authorised to add that, in the examination of all such proposals, you would be swayed by a strong desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[49053]

No. 523.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 435.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

OXIDE.

Foreign Office, December 9, 1911.

Please see your telegram No. 664.

Although anxious to help Weir's as much as possible, we should prefer not to press their claim against Persian Government, in view of argument we have employed against the German Government in the Abu Musa case, namely, that "cancellation of concession by sheikh cannot give rise to claim for damages against him or German subject who holds contract with concessionaires." (See "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia" volumes and print.) Would not Muin be rendered amenable to suggestion that Weir's rights must be safeguarded by compensation from Muin or otherwise, from the fact that, as far as I can see, Weir has claim against latter (which would not be barred by clause in supplementary contract with Weir) if Muin regains concession on condition of carrying out contract with Strick. Whether Muin would then have right of recovering amount from Strick does not concern us. Something might, I should say, be done on these lines. I presume that under new contract Muin's agent will still be Ellinger.

[49058]

No. 524.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 436.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 9, 1911.

TREASURER-GENERAL: Your telegram No. 666 of the 7th December.

The appointment of M. Mornard would be quite agreeable to His Majesty's Government. The important point is that a successor should at once be appointed to Mr. Shuster's post as soon as the latter retires.

[48587]

No. 525.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, December 9, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 30th October and the 4th, 6th, 13th, and 29th ultimo, relative to the question of the shipment of red oxide from Hormuz.

It appears from a telegram received on the 4th instant from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that, while the Bill providing for the restoration of the Hormuz oxide concession to Muin-ut-Tujjar has passed the Medjliss, no agreement executing its provisions has yet been made between Muin and the Minister of Public Works.

Sir E. Grey is, therefore, disposed to think that Muin has not yet decided whether he will accept the concession on the terms offered by the Persian Government, and feels that, until the decision arrived at by Muin is ascertained, he is not in a position to give any advice with regard to the claims of Messrs. Weir and Co. and yourselves, or to undertake responsibility for any statements you may desire to make to Muin in reply to his recent letters.

The position of your claim, and that of Messrs. Weir and Co., is receiving most careful consideration, and when the actual facts of the situation have become clear a further communication will be made to you.

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I am, however, to point out to you that it is impossible to stop further shipments of oxide except by the use of force, and that such action on the part of His Majesty's Government is, of course, quite out of the question.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[49596]

No. 526.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 332.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 10, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me a statement of views of Russian Government with regard to ex-Shah and the eventual movements of Russian troops which will, he trusts, furnish you with necessary material for a parliamentary statement on Russian policy in Persia.

Following is a translation:—

"Imperial Government, having repeatedly declared that military measures to which it has been forced to have recourse in Persia have absolutely no connection with Mohammad Ali Shah's aspirations to Persian throne, desires to reconfirm that declaration in most categorical manner. It would not on any account wish that the intention could possibly be attributed to it of imposing a Sovereign on Persia and of acting contrary to the principle of non-intervention in the struggle between ex-Shah and the present Government—a principle which it had proclaimed from the beginning.

"Imperial Government consequently declare that if ex-Shah were now to take advantage of the presence in Persia of the Russian expeditionary corps to realise his designs, the Russian Government would not recognise him as Sovereign in the country without a previous arrangement with His Majesty's Government.

"Russian Government has taken note with pleasure of Sir G. Buchanan's communication announcing that the Cabinet of London on its part promises its energetic support for the establishment of normal relations between Russia and Persia, as well as for formation and maintenance of a Cabinet, and for the election, should question arise, of a Regent well disposed towards Russia.

"Imperial Ministry is in a position to declare that Russian detachment concentrated at Kazvin will not continue its march on Tehran before the 21st December, unless Russian Minister is obliged, in the event of situation becoming threatening, to call up troops to capital before this date.

"Imperial Government is animated by desire to recall the said detachment from Kazvin as soon as possible, and it intends to put this design into execution as soon as Persian Government shall have submitted to demands which have been presented to it. Russian Government trust that no new incident will intervene, such as acts of violence against person of a Russian agent, an attack against Russian institutions or our troops, acts of provocation against Russia, disorders in general, &c. Acts of such a character would obviously render recall of detachment impossible." (End of R.)

The official communication from me to which the statement refers is one in which I confined myself to informing M. Nératof of the views expressed in your telegram No. 782 of the 7th December with regard to Sardar Assad, and to repeating to his Excellency what you had said to Count Benckendorff, as given in your despatch No. 315 of the 2nd December. In case you should consider that M. Nératof is interpreting your views too widely, it would be well that I should point this out to him.

I had hoped to be furnished with something much more precise with regard to the ex-Shah and the recall of the Russian troops, but I fear that it will be impossible for me to make any progress in the matter until M. Sazonow's return to St. Petersburg.

[49653]

No. 527.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 673.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

MY telegrams Nos. 588 of 19th November, 603 and 604 of 27th November. Douglas now thinks that he can erect the necessary temporary accommodation for 6,500 tomans covered by contract signed already.

I trust that this will be sanctioned pending more permanent arrangements if required.

(Addressed London; repeated Foreign and Shiraz.)

[49677]

No. 528.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 674.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

ASSURANCES to Bakhtiariis.

Please see my telegrams Nos. 651 and 661 of the 4th and 6th instant respectively.

I told Sardar Assad of the assurances given to the Bakhtiari khans. My Russian colleague and I agreed, therefore, that unless we were pressed to give them in writing it was not necessary to do so, as the ostensible reason for the request for them in writing no longer existed.

We are now being pressed to give them, and, as the khans were led to expect them, I think we must do so.

The Russian Minister tells me that when telegraphing to his Government the text of our verbal assurances he added the words "whoever is in power" at the end, after the word Bakhtiariis. He used these words in the conversation reported in my telegram No. 592 of the 21st ultimo, but they were not inserted in the verbal communication reported in my telegram No. 607 of the 28th ultimo. My Russian colleague would like to insert them in the written communication. I see no objection to their insertion, as they do not appear to increase in any way our obligations. Would you let me know your views?

[49654]

No. 529.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 675.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister informed me that Russian troops will be concentrated at Kazvin by to-morrow or the day after.

(Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[49672]

No. 530.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 676.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Reference to my telegram No. 670, dated the 5th December.

In a private letter yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I expressed the hope that the efforts which are being made to induce the Medjliss to accept the Russian demands would be successful, and I reiterated the views expressed in your telegram No. 392 of the 30th November.

In conversation this morning, Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that Cabinet had undergone certain changes, and that it would be presented to Medjliss to-day in its new form. His Excellency assured me that the changes that have been made were such as inspired the full confidence of the Medjliss, adding that the

Medjliss intended to invest the Cabinet with full powers to come to terms with Russia on lines which would not conflict with the independence of Persia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that the Cabinet had decided to make the immense sacrifice of dismissing the treasurer-general, and would agree to second demand in the Russian ultimatum if it were modified as follows: "In engaging foreigners in Persian service, Persian Government will try to avoid any difficulties which might injure the interests of the Powers." In reply, I remarked that this formula differed from that which he had proposed to Russian Minister, which he had repeated to me from memory (please refer to my telegram No. 670 of the 8th December), but Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained the wording cited above.

Minister for Foreign Affairs further stated that third demand would be complied with on the condition that Persian Government were assured that Russia would not press for a large indemnity, but would only ask for such sum as could be paid by Persia in her extreme penury.

In conclusion, his Excellency begged that His Majesty's Government would use their good offices to bring about the retention of the troops at Kazvin while negotiations were proceeding.

[49666]

No. 531.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 677.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me this morning. He said that he was instructing the Persian Minister in London to express to you the desire of the Persian Government to take part in the conversations which he had heard were now proceeding between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government as to a programme to regulate the relations between the two Powers and Persia. The Persian Government also desired to be a party to any tripartite agreement which might be the outcome of these conversations.

The Persian Government, his Excellency said, were very desirous of being freed from the many preoccupations which had hitherto prevented them from dealing with the internal situation; they were in consequence most anxious to secure a stable basis of good relations with Russia; it would be easier to achieve this end were the Persian Government to participate in the present conversations, as they would be thus enabled to make their views known and to prepare the ground in Persia for the acceptance of an eventual agreement should any be reached. The Persian Government might, otherwise, be confronted with some agreement concluded between Great Britain and Russia which they would find it impossible to accept.

[49327]

No. 532.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 799.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 328 of 9th December.

Your language approved.

We will accept amended text if M. Sazonow confirms it.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 442.)

[49807]

No. 533.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 801.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister informs me that dismissal of Shuster is practically agreed to. He represented very earnestly that some formula should be found about foreign advisers, and asked my intervention for this. I replied that I could promise nothing; Russia having announced demands, it was not consistent with her dignity to waive them. I

should be very glad if formula could be found which, while giving sufficient assurance about future foreign advisers, would be easier in form for Persian Government to accept, but this I thought could best be discussed direct with Russian Minister at Tehran.

You should inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say that, if Russian Government think any concession can be made in point of form without sacrificing substance, Sir G. Barclay will be instructed to co-operate at Tehran in getting Persians to accept it. (End of R.)

Your telegram No. 331.

You may speak to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in sense of last paragraph.

Persian Minister asked me to-day that if any changes other than those affected by the three fundamental Russian demands were required, they should be settled quietly in consultation with Persian Government, and that no public demands should be put forward.

I replied that I would be ready to use all my influence in this direction when once the three demands had been complied with, provided I was assured of real desire of Persian Government to co-operate with the two Powers.

[49200]

No. 534.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 801.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

We might find precedent for new treasurer-general in correspondence respecting M. Bizot's appointment in 1908. This might obviate question of curtailment of powers.

Reference is to your telegram No. 330 of the 9th December, and, with regard to the correspondence referred to, please see particularly Mr. Marling's despatch No. 65 of the 24th March, 1908.

[49009]

No. 535.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 153.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 5th instant to ask unofficially whether His Majesty's Government would be disposed to take steps towards requesting the Russian Government to refrain from advancing their troops further than Kasvin, so as to give time to the Persian Government to discuss in what manner they could best meet the wishes of the Russian Government.

Sir A. Nicolson told Mehdi Khan that he thought that the best and most direct plan would be for the Persian Government to converse with the Russian Minister at Tehran—as His Majesty's Government could hardly, as matters now stand, act in the manner proposed.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[49667]

No. 536.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 154.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 8th instant. He was especially anxious that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to induce the Russian Government to modify the second of their demands on the Persian Government.

Sir A. Nicolson told Mehdi Khan that some time back, before the present crisis, both legations had made a similar request to the Persian Government on two occasions. It was not done with the object of curtailing in any way Persian independence, but for the simple motive of avoiding any subsequent friction and complications.

Mehdi Khan said that the Persian chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg had

[1524]

4 A

telegraphed to him that he thought the Russian Government might be disposed to compromise on the question.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that if Russia were ready to subscribe to any formula which might, so to say, save the face of the Persian Government, no difficulty would be raised here.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49668]

No. 537.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 321.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

M. BARDAC and Count d'Arnoux called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 7th instant to say that they represented all the principal financial establishments in Paris in regard to instituting a "société d'études" to examine the question of a Trans-Persian railway. They enquired what were the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the line. Sir A. Nicolson told them that His Majesty's Government had no objection in principle to the line, in fact, regarded it benevolently, but expressed no opinion as to its economic or financial side, and would grant no guarantees. Moreover, if the line were ever constructed we should wish it to follow a certain *tracé* in the south.

They said that they had seen Lord Revelstoke and were to see him again this afternoon, and that they wished to form a "société d'études" from the French houses with an English representation, which they thought should be the London Committee of the Ottoman Bank. Lord Revelstoke had not welcomed this combination.

Sir A. Nicolson remarked that the project seemed rather outside the province of the Ottoman Bank, and, after some further conversation, asked them to let him have a memorandum as to their views and desires, which they had better draw up after they had seen Lord Revelstoke again.

They promised to do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49830]

No. 538.

Mr. Greenway to Mr. Mallet.—(Received December 12.)

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
December 11, 1911.*

Dear Mr. Mallet,

I ENCLOSE copy of a letter I wrote last mail to Mr. Brown, and shall be much obliged if you can see me to-morrow afternoon—if possible, between 3.30 and 4 P.M.—in connection with the matters referred to therein.

Yours truly,
C. GREENWAY.

Enclosure in No. 538.

Mr. Greenway to Mr. Brown (Tehran).

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
December 7, 1911.*

Dear Mr. Brown,

I DULY received your letters of the 18th and 31st October, and duly note contents of same. I have not previously acknowledged them, because, in the present state of affairs in Persia, it would be only waste of time to continue in the meantime our correspondence about the railways and mines. I have no doubt, however, that you are arranging in such a way that negotiations may be resumed at the point at which they have been dropped as soon as the present troubles are over with Shuster, or whoever may step into his shoes. Vakil-y-Royal was, I suppose, kept *en courant* with all you were doing, and will, I presume, be ready and willing to assist in the negotiations again whenever Shuster, or anyone else, is in a position to resume?

The object of this letter is chiefly to acquaint you with some information I have obtained in connection with Wilson's negotiations in the matter of the extension of the

road concession. In his letters he has stated that Shuster and the Foreign Minister had both indicated that they were opposed to the extension, because of the difficulties it would create in connection with the negotiations with us for the construction of railways over the same alignment. Wilson thereupon, he writes, assured them that there were no grounds at all for their fears, as the extension of the road concession would not in any way interfere with the building of a railway along the same route [? by Lynch]. Shuster was, he says, eventually quite convinced by his representations, and promised to support his application for the extension, which was, Wilson writes, to have come before the Medjliss shortly after the date of his letter.

Wilson further writes that he saw Sir George Barclay, to whom he made similar representations, and that Sir George also promised to do his utmost to assist him in securing the extension.

All this is news to me, and is extremely difficult to understand.

I can understand Sir George Barclay agreeing to support Lynch's application for an extension, provided it was made clear that no railway rights were given with it, because the British Government do not, of course, want the road concession to entirely lapse, so long as a railway concession has not taken its place, for fear that the road concession might fall into hostile hands.

But I cannot understand his agreeing to support an application for an extension of the concession on its original terms (*i.e.*, with prior rights to railways), in view of his knowledge of the negotiations which you have, with the full support of the Foreign Office, been carrying on on behalf of the Persian railway syndicate.

Still less can I understand how Wilson has succeeded in convincing Mr. Shuster that a renewal of the road concession in its original terms will not interfere with the construction of a railway over the same alignment by the Persian railway syndicate, or others, and in securing his support to its renewal.

Knowing, as we do, that Lynch's last wish is to see railways built in Southern Persia (his only objective being the protection of his carrying trade on the Tigris), we may be absolutely certain that, if he succeeds in getting a renewal of the road concession in its original terms (*i.e.*, with priority of claim to railway construction), he will block the proposed Mohammedrah-Khorembad Railway to the utmost possible extent, and not permit its construction unless his rights under the road concession are bought out at a very big figure—such a figure as would compensate him for the damage that such a line would probably do to his Tigris carrying trade.

I shall be glad if you can throw any light on the above points, because I have understood from your previous letters that the Persian Government and Mr. Shuster were fully alive to the "pitfall" that confronted them in the railway rights included in the original road concession. Perhaps they, or you, see some way of avoiding this. I confess I don't; and it appears to me and to other members of the syndicate that Lynch's whole object in desiring to become a member, and in unsuccessfully fighting, as he did, for control, was to create some such a position as the one which there now seems to be danger of his securing.

There is, of course, no objection at all to Lynch securing an extension of the road concession, minus the railway rights, and, in fact, we should do everything we can to support him in this; but I hope you will make Sir George, Shuster, and everyone else realise that, if renewed in its original form, it will undoubtedly mean that the construction of the Khorembad Railway will be indefinitely postponed, because such a railway would mean a very serious reduction in the income of the Tigris and Euphrates Navigation Company, and consequently heavy personal loss to Lynch himself. This factor—*i.e.*, the protection of Lynch's interests on the Tigris—is, many of us are quite convinced, the "key-note" of all Lynch's political scheming, which, expressed in plain language, is "anything to keep Persia from securing railways," or, at any rate, railways that have any other outlet than the River Tigris.

In this connection, I may mention confidentially that Lynch has asked me to endeavour to get the Foreign Office support for a railway from Bagdad or Chesophon to Mendeli, and thence to Kermanshah, with, of course, the above object in view, and because he thinks such a line might indefinitely postpone the building of the Khorembad line.

Yours sincerely,
C. GREENWAY.

[49855]

No. 539.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 678.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

STOCKHOLM telegram No. 23 of 6th December.

Seven Swedish gendarmerie officers have reached Resht.

[49868]

No. 540.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 679.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

HORMUZ oxide.

Please see your telegram No. 435 of the 9th instant.

Unless a suit were brought against Muin in the Persian court, and I do not see on what ground such a suit could be brought with any hope of success, it would be quite hopeless to try to persuade Muin to pay compensation. His obligations towards Strick under the terms of the new concession preclude him from carrying out his contract with Weir just as effectively as the cancelling of the previous concession, and it would be difficult to substantiate a claim on the ground of fraud. I think, in view of the supplementary contract and the undoubtedly ambiguous terms of the firman of 1904, that there is no reason to suspect that in signing his contract with Weir Muin was actuated by other than good faith, while it is shown that he was not acting in collusion with the Persian Government by his vigorous protests to the Medjliss.

I have never thought, since the supplementary contract was brought to my notice, that Mr. Weir, and still less Ellinger, had any claim against the Persian Government except one in equity.

If the claim against the Persian Government is not to be pressed, and in my opinion, as you already know, part of it—Ellinger's larger item—is exceedingly weak, and if a compromise among the parties at home is still unobtainable in spite of the change in the situation, I think that, as there would presumably be no objection on the part of Muin to pay Messrs. Weir and Ellinger whatever compensation he could expect to recover (under the indemnity clause in Strick's contract) in a British court from Strick, our best course would be to consult the Law Officers of the Crown as to what procedure could be followed in order to subordinate a claim against Muin to a decision of a British tribunal as to the extent of Strick's liability and how best such legal proceedings could be facilitated.

The arguments on which the ultimate decision of a British court would be founded might possibly directly stultify those used here by the legation in enacting the claim, whether against Muin or against the Persian Government, and our reputation for just dealing might be seriously injured. For this reason I find it difficult to share your view that the ultimate decision of a British court does not concern His Majesty's Government.

So long as the Strick contract is being worked off Muin would, so far as I can see, have no reason to employ an agent (see last paragraph of your telegram under reply).

[49869]

No. 541.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 680.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

News that the Persian Government were entertaining hopes that some modification might be effected in the terms of the Russian demands having reached the Russian Legation, my Russian colleague informed the Persian Government last night, that his Government had not empowered him to negotiate in any way respecting the ultimatum, and that when negotiating with the Medjliss with a view to inducing them to yield the

[49875]

No. 542^a.*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)*

(No. 682.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

REFER to my telegram of 6th December.

I learn from Minister for Foreign Affairs that the force sent by the Government to Kermanshah has now reached that town.

[1524]

4 B*

Cabinet must work on the basis of the original wording of the three demands of the ultimatum.

The Russian Government have asked the Russian Minister whether a slight modification of the second demand would have any effect locally. M. Poklewski has telegraphed in reply, that acceptance of the Russian demands might be facilitated thereby, but that the Persian Government would be encouraged to ask for further concessions if it were known now that there was any chance of some mitigation. Russian Minister added that if the Russian Government, therefore, were prepared to soften the second demand, their best course would be merely to authorise him to accept such a formula as the Russian Government would agree to, should he see that compliance by the Persian Government with the three demands would be the result of his acceptance of it.

[49854]

No. 542.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 681.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

THE new Persian Cabinet and the Medjliss.

Please see my telegram No. 676 of yesterday.

A secret sitting of the Medjliss was held yesterday afternoon at which the Cabinet foreshadowed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs attended. The sitting was, I am told, stormy. There was no public sitting of the Medjliss, nor was the Cabinet presented publicly to it.

[49878]

No. 543.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—Received December 12.

(No. 683.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegrams Nos. 676 and 681 of yesterday and to-day respectively.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs' assurance to me yesterday as to the extent of confidence placed in the new Cabinet by the Medjliss has not been fulfilled.

I have just learnt from one of the Ministers—a Bakhtiari—who attended the secret session of the Medjliss yesterday, that the reason why the new Cabinet was not formally presented to the Medjliss was that the latter would not consent to authorise the Cabinet to effect a settlement of the present dispute with Russia.

The attitude of the Medjliss had left my informant without any hope that there was a chance of their proving complaisant; he hinted, however, that the Cabinet was determined to settle with Russia, and that they would find some other means than the consent of the Medjliss.

[49885]

No. 544.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 684.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see penultimate and ante-penultimate paragraphs of telegram No. 331 from St. Petersburg, and the last paragraph but four and penultimate paragraph of telegram No. 332 from St. Petersburg.

Unless the carrying out of a programme, such as that indicated by the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, is supported by a foreign occupation of the capital, I do not see how its execution is feasible.

The guarantees that Russia desires such as the installation, under conditions of her own of a Regent and a Premier of her choice, or modification of the powers of the Medjliss, are so far reaching that, in view of the activity of a certain number of the population, who are really permeated with modern nationalist ideas, and the lack of any preponderant armed force on the part of any individual or party who might be

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known to have been put into power by outside pressure, I do not at present see how any efforts to obtain them can prove successful without the presence of Russian troops at Tehran.

[49886]

No. 545.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 685.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

A STRONG rumour is current in Armenian circles here that five Turkish battalions have been advanced towards Salmas and that a larger mobilisation is being effected. This step on the part of the Turkish Government is said to have been provoked by the dispatch of Russian troops to Khoi. In any case the presence of so large a Russian force at Khoi is evidently exercising the Turkish Embassy here a good deal.

[49883]

No. 546.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 334.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 12, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia. Your telegram No. 801 of the 11th December.

In conversation this afternoon with M. Nératof I spoke in the terms of the telegram above referred to, and urged his Excellency to introduce such modifications into the form of the second Russian demand as might make it more palatable to the Persians. I suggested whether the word "consent" might not be replaced by the word "consultation."

M. Nératof said that he could not make such an alteration, but that he had instructed M. Poklewsky to endeavour to find some formula less wounding to Persian susceptibilities. His Excellency said that the Russian Government would not insist on the use of the words "engages to" or of the term "consent." They would be satisfied with a formula by which the Persian Government would declare that in future they would not engage foreigners without coming to a previous understanding or agreement with the Russian and British Legations. M. Nératof expressed satisfaction with the language which you had held to the Persian Minister. He said that he considered it of the highest importance that the Russian public should not get the impression that the Russian Government, in any concession which they might make, were acting under pressure from Great Britain. He therefore hoped that we would confine ourselves to urging the Persian Government to accept the demands of the Russian Government.

I then made to his Excellency a communication in the sense of the last paragraph of my telegram No. 331 of the 9th December. He thanked me, and promised to instruct M. Poklewsky to communicate to Sir G. Barclay any proposals touching the general political situation which the Russian Government might wish to put forward. From this I gather that proposals dealing with exclusively Russian interests will not be communicated to Sir G. Barclay.

M. Nératof wishes to make public the views of the Russian Government before you make your statement in Parliament, and is accordingly publishing an article to-morrow in the semi-official "Rossia," which will embody the views given in the *aide-memoire*, of which I telegraphed a translation in my telegram No. 332 of the 10th December. On my expressing disappointment that the language of his assurances had not been more precise, M. Nératof maintained that the assurances had been given in quite explicit terms.

[49884]

No. 547.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 335.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 12, 1911.

PERSIA: Mr. Shuster's successor.

Your telegram No. 804 of the 11th December.

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof this afternoon, I suggested that the manner of M. Bizot's appointment might furnish us with a precedent, and I read to him the instructions given to that official (see Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 68 of 1908 and its enclosure) at the time of his appointment.

M. Nératof observed that this precedent might perhaps be followed if the person to be chosen was a Frenchman, as in that case we could have confidence in him, but the nationality of the future treasurer-general was still quite unknown, and it would be for the Persian Government to furnish him with his instructions. Shuster, in virtue of the powers conferred on him by the Medjliss, had had full control in such matters as concessions, loans, &c. M. Nératof admitted that Mr. Shuster's successor ought to have extensive powers in the administration of finance, and even a consultative voice in matters of the nature referred to above, but, at the same time, some steps must be taken to prevent his exercising absolute authority in these latter matters.

[49336]

No. 548.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 808.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

M. LECOFFRE.

Although we cannot object to Russian Government's attitude, yet we must stipulate that another post be found for M. Lecoffre outside Russian sphere. We hope that Russian Government will agree to his being allowed to wait for the new appointment before being dismissed.

Reference is to your telegram No. 329 of the 9th December.

[49978]

No. 549.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 811.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

MY telegram No. 801 of 11th December, second paragraph.

Russian Ambassador informs me that it is possible some concession of this kind may be made, but, if so, it should only be on initiative of Russian Minister at Tehran. I have said that if informed when any concession of this kind has been offered by Russian Minister we shall, if Persians ask our advice, advise them to accept it.

(Repeated to Sir G. Barclay, No. 447.)

[49677]

No. 550.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 445.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 674 of 11th December.

I see no objection to assurances being given in writing with addition proposed by your Russian colleague.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 807.)

[49582]

No. 551.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 324.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 321 of the 11th instant relative to the Trans-Persian railway scheme, I have to inform your Excellency that M. Bardac and Count d'Arnoux called on Lord Revelstoke after seeing Sir A. Nicolson on the 7th instant.

Lord Revelstoke, in order that some British participation should be secured in the Société d'Études, agreed to contribute a third of the sum required. Considerable pressure was placed on him from Paris to join in the undertaking.

The capital to be at the disposal of the Société d'Études will be 75,000*l.* to be divided into equal shares between the British, Russian, and French groups.

I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum left at this Office on the 9th instant by Lord Errington, giving the outline of the proposed scheme, and I am also awaiting a memorandum from M. Bardac and Count d'Arnoux on the same subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 551.

Memorandum of Conversation between M. Goukassow and Lord Revelstoke at 8, Bishopsgate, December 7, 1911.

IN reply to Lord Revelstoke's enquiries, M. Goukassow dictated the following:—

The main objects of the Société d'Études of the Trans-Persian railroad are as follows:—

1. To obtain a concession from the Persian Government for a line connecting the Russian railways at the Russo-Persian frontier with the Indian railways at the Perso-Beluchistan frontier.

2. To prepare a full service for the whole route.

3. To carry on negotiations with the Governments of Russia and of Great Britain with the object of finally determining the alignment.

4. To conclude the necessary contracts (*a*) with the Russian Government for any indirect guarantees that may be given to the Trans-Persian line; (*b*) with the Government of Great Britain for the carriage of the Indian, Australian, and New Zealand mails; and (*c*) with other parties, such as the Compagnie internationale des Wagons-Lits.

[50220]

No. 552.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 330.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF told me to-day that M. Sazonow had said to him in Paris that he was determined to maintain not only the Anglo-Russian Convention, but also the *entente* between Great Britain and Russia that depended on it. After reading the general lines of policy with regard to Persia that I had laid down, M. Sazonow had said that he saw nothing to object to in them, but the Russian troops in Tabreez and Ardebil could be withdrawn only when order was made very secure.

I explained to Count Benckendorff that I had been bound to add the stipulation as to Russian troops in Tabreez and Ardebil, because otherwise my memorandum might have seemed to imply that the original conditions on which they had been sent there had disappeared, and that the occupation was to be regarded as permanent as far as those troops were concerned.

I went on to say that, when the three Russian demands had been complied with, we ought to cooperate to put the Persian Government on their feet. We had suggested, some time ago, that British officers might be employed by the Persian Government to organise a Persian force to protect the southern roads. In the same

way, eventually, a Persian police force might be organised under Russian officers to give protection in the north. If that was done, we might find some time hence that order was more secure in northern Persia than it had ever been during recent years, and then all Russian troops might be withdrawn. The outcome of the present difficulties might thus be a more favourable situation than there had yet been.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[45474]

No. 553.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter, most Confidential, of the 14th ultimo, transmitting a copy of a memorandum dealing with German trade and shipping in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that Sir T. Jackson, manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, called at this Office recently, when opportunity was taken to call his attention to the periodical scarcity of money at the Bushire branch of the bank, and the consequent complaints made by British firms.

Sir Thomas Jackson stated that the reason for the success of Messrs. Wönekhaus and Co. was that this firm showed far greater enterprise and perspicacity than any of their British competitors.

It was, he said, true that the bank was approached by a London firm in the summer to telegraph credits to Messrs. Wönekhaus at Bushire. It was difficult to refuse the request of this firm, which had long been in relations with the bank, and he (Sir T. Jackson) was away at the time of the application.

No applications for coin had been received from British houses, and as a matter of fact, it would have been impossible to send coin to Bushire owing to the state of the roads.

Sir Thomas went on to say in confidence that had he been in London he should have hesitated to comply with the application. When asked what Messrs. Wönekhaus would have done, and whether, if he had placed difficulties in their way, it would not give an impetus to the establishment of a German bank in the gulf, Sir T. Jackson replied that it would undoubtedly do so, and added that when he was in Hong Kong, he had for many years prevented the establishment of a German bank there by always showing readiness to accommodate German customers.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[49968]

No. 554.

Extract from the "Daily Telegraph" of December 12, 1911.

BY RAIL TO INDIA: THE TRANS-PERSIAN LINE.

(From a Correspondent.)

THE British Government has notified the international committee which is promoting the trans-continental railway through Persia to India that it is prepared to join with the Russian Government in submitting the proposal to the Persian Government, provided that the Indian Government are satisfied as to the route and conditions for the line. This notification was made shortly before the present Persian crisis, with which it has no connection.

The Indian Government has now duly formulated its conditions, which have been agreed to by His Majesty's Government, and they have been communicated to the Russian Government as those on which His Majesty's Government are ready to assent in principle to the project, and to agree to the initiation of negotiations between its promoters in this country and in Russia. These conditions are not final in all details,

[1524]

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and may be varied, with the concurrence of the Indian Government. There is, so it is stated, no prospect of the British or Indian Governments entering into a financial guarantee of the railway. Before discussing the conditions of the Indian Government, it is advisable to state exactly what are the figures upon which the promoters of the line base their scheme:—

	Total Length of Line.	Miles.
Russian section— Baku to Astara	118
Persian section— Astara to Gunttar	1,392
British (Baluchistan) section— Gunttar to Kurrachee	373
Total	1,883

Financial Estimates of Persian Section.

	CAPITAL ACCOUNT.	£
Cost of line as estimated by Russian committee (13,758 <i>l.</i> per mile)	19,125,000
Add interest during construction as estimated in French review of Russian estimates	2,868,750
Total	21,993,750
To be provided for as follows:— 2,125,000 <i>l.</i> by shares	2,125,000
19,868,750 <i>l.</i> by 4 per cent. debentures at 85	23,375,000
21,993,750 <i>l.</i>	25,500,000
	REVENUE ACCOUNT.	
Charges— Interest and sinking fund on debenture capital	987,000
Interest and sinking fund on share capital	129,000
	1,116,000
Deduct net revenue	736,000
Net deficit to be met by rebates from traffic on connected lines, or partly from this source and partly otherwise	380,000

Notes.—The net income on the Russian system which would be available, at least partly, to meet this deficit is estimated at 467,500*l.*

To this one point may be added. The promoters of the line hope to obtain, in addition to the Russian assistance above mentioned towards meeting the deficit, what are known as normal Indian company terms for feeder lines. These are those under which the interest on the capital cost of branch lines is guaranteed by a rebate on the receipts from traffic on the main line contributed by or carried over the branch line. It can also be stated that the above estimates are, in the opinion of experts, by no means of a too optimistic nature. There is encouragement in a comparison between the estimated total receipts per verst, which amount to 11,066 roubles, and the actual receipts per verst on the Siberian Railway, which in 1908 amounted to 11,942 roubles. The country to be traversed by the projected line is undeveloped, but it is in part well cultivated, and is held in expert circles to compare, on the whole, favourably with a large extent of the country through which the Siberian line runs. Moreover, in the estimate for revenue the receipts from the carriage of the mails, including parcels, have been purposely estimated at a very low figure, and no allowance is made for many commodities, such as tea, in which a large and increasing traffic may be anticipated.

The Indian Government has formulated some six conditions, the most important of which is that the route of the railway shall follow the coast from Kurrachee to Bunder Abbas, and it is further understood that Mr. Johns, the chief engineer of the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway, has been detached to examine its feasibility. At the same time, the Indian Government does not preclude the alternative scheme of the railway leaving the coast at Charbar and thence going direct north-west to Kerman, which is in the British sphere. It will, therefore, be necessary to make two surveys—one along the coast from Charbar to Bunder Abbas, and from Bunder Abbas up to Kerman, and the other from Charbar direct to Kerman. The Indian Government also stipulates for the ultimate construction of five feeder lines, of which the most important is what is known as the Kurr Valley line, from Mohammerah to Khorehabad. Finally, there is also a reference as to further railway construction.

SURVEY PROPOSALS.

Last week the "comité d'études" met in Paris and formulated proposals for the survey, under which, so it is thought in expert circles, French capital secures an altogether disproportionate interest, since Russia and France would practically survey two-thirds of the line (partly, too, in our sphere of influence), while we should only survey one-third. It is true that such a survey does not bind the British Government or the Russian Government as to the conditions under which the construction of the route shall be ultimately carried out; but both in political and in financial circles it is regarded as a very inadvisable precedent, and the hope is expressed that it will not be adhered to. The original scheme was that Russia should survey her portion of the line and Great Britain her portion, and that an international company could be formed, on a basis to be considered subsequently, to carry out the work of construction, due regard being had to the independence of Persia. Therefore, it is held in this country that French capital should be in a minority, both in regard to any assistance it intends to give to Russia on the one hand and may wish to offer to Great Britain on the other. The scheme thus presents a signal opportunity for British finance to secure due British participation in one of the most important lines of modern times—a line which ultimately is held to have very hopeful prospects.

The main condition of the Indian Government—that the line should skirt the coast to Bunder Abbas—is by no means approved in well-informed circles, and there seems to be considerable doubt as to whether it will be insisted on. Bunder Abbas is in the neutral, not in the British zone, while it would considerably add to the length and cost of the journey if Kerman, which is one of the chief trade centres and is in the British zone, was approached by such a circuitous route. The crux of any such trans-continental line will be the decision as to where the break of gauge is to occur. To be of any use to British trade, it should not be further south than Ispahan; if it were to be at Bunder Abbas it would be altogether disadvantageous, both for this country and for India.

Finally, it may be stated that arrangements for the survey will at once be taken in hand. The proposed line is wholly surveyed to Tehran, and a sort of survey embracing levels was made some ten years ago as far as Charbar. Probably all the figures require revision, in view of the lapse of time since the estimates were made. It is held that the sum of 40,000*l.* should amply suffice to complete what is necessary to enable a project to be drawn which will satisfy the British Government's requirements.

Although there is no mention of German capital in the undertaking, the belief prevails in financial circles that to some extent the German banks are operating through the five French banks backing the proposal.

[49897]

No. 555.

Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 173. Confidential.)

Sir,

The Hague, December, 9, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a memorandum by Count Bentinck of a conversation respecting British and Russian affairs in Asia, which he has had with Count C. Pahlen, a Russian senator.

I imagine that Count Pahlen's views are shared by many of the Court or Grand Ducal party in Russia, and His Majesty's Government are, I am sure, well aware of the proper weight which is to be attached to them.

Count Bentinck's memorandum may perhaps be interesting as a sidelight, especially as it gives the personal experiences as well as the views of a Russian who has officially penetrated to the Afghan and Persian boundaries.

I have, &c.

ALAN JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure in No. 555.

Memorandum by Count Bentinck.

(Confidential.)

COUNT CONSTANTINE PAHLEN, a Russian senator, came here to remove the belongings of his brother, the retiring Russian Minister. Count Pahlen had recently made two official journeys in a representative capacity at the head of a large staff to Turkestan with the object of introducing reforms into the administration of those regions. He had penetrated as far as the Persian and Afghan frontiers.

Discussing the present Persian question, Count Pahlen said that Russia could not go on tolerating the repeated rebuffs which she had received from the Persians in the last few years. She had lost prestige in her war with Japan, and the Persians would not respect her if she allowed Shuster to defy her. She would besides lose all prestige in the Caucasus and Turkestan. Before the war with Japan she had practically had all Persia within her grasp. Now, to please us, she had given up the south and she could not go on losing influence in the north. He had never realised till he had been in Central Asia himself how much Russia's position depended upon her prestige.

The principle outlet for Russia's trade was in Persia, and this state of anarchy must not continue. Russia had far more interests at stake than had England. Shuster was too anti-Russian and was endeavouring to destroy Russia's influence. The best solution of the problem would be to divide up Persia between Russia and England. We could annex Beluchistan and Southern Persia and their need be no neutral zone between our respective territories. It should not be difficult to delimit a frontier.

It surprised me that a high principled man like I know Count Pahlen to be should thus advocate a flagrant breach of the stipulations of the Anglo-Russian Agreement regarding the integrity of Persia, and favour the policy of grab which is popular in Europe at the present moment.

Referring to the benefits which England had derived from the Russian agreement, Count Pahlen said that when he was on the Afghan border heads of tribes representing 50,000 souls had come over the frontier and begged to be allowed to become subjects of the Great White Czar. It had been explained to them, however, that Russia could not accept them as she was the friend of England and had agreed not to interfere in Afghanistan. The tribesmen could not understand why the Great Czar seemed afraid of the English. Nothing, my informant declared, would be easier than for Russia to push her frontier forward to Herat, where the tribes would gladly exchange her rule for that of the Afghan Amir, but out of loyalty to England Russia would not do this.

Afghanistan itself, Count Pahlen said, was a natural fortress and quite impregnable. Neither the Russians nor the English could possibly cross it to attack one another.

Count Pahlen observed, further, that Merv was absolutely dependent for its existence upon the water supply of the River Murghab. Since the Afghans had started cotton growing they had been holding up at its source some of the waters of this river. This could not go on or Merv would become a desert, and sooner or later the Russian Government would have to enter into negotiations with England on the subject.

England had thus derived advantages from her *entente* with Russia by the latter having retired from the field in Southern Persia and Afghanistan. In Europe also, the fear of the Russian army in her flank had held Germany in check. Although he considered it a good thing that England and Russia should work together, as they had done with such good results in the time of Napoleon, he personally was more in favour of Russia concluding an alliance with Germany, for Russia and Germany together would rule the world.

[49920]

No. 556.

Sir G. Barelly to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 686.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

MY telegram No. 680 of 12th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Russian Minister last evening and proposed another formula for second demand as follows:—

"As regards engagement of foreign officials or officers needed by Persia for the organisation of the public services, Persia, animated by the desire to maintain on all occasions the best relations with Great Britain and Russia, will see to it that the choice of these persons shall not be such as to injure the legitimate interests of the two Powers in Persia. Consequently the Persian Government will be ready, as regards these officers and officials, to enter into an exchange of views with the two legations."

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured the Russian Minister that, if the Russian Government would accept this formula, the Persian Government would accept the other two demands. If Medjliss refused consent it would be dissolved.

Russian Minister is submitting the above to his Government.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg and India.)

[49945]

No. 557.

Sir G. Barelly to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 687.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see your telegram No. 804 to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

It would be, in my opinion, very unfortunate if the two Powers were to encourage the idea of curtailing the powers of Shuster's successor. There is, unfortunately, every probability of the Persian Government curtailing these without any encouragement from us.

It was owing to the support of the Medjliss and to his executive powers that Shuster was able to husband resources so effectually. The support of the Medjliss will certainly not be forthcoming to any nominee of the two Powers and he will therefore be compelled to rely for his usefulness on executive powers, unless he has the backing of foreign troops like the advisers in Egypt.

A financial adviser who lacks both the support of the Medjliss and executive powers and relies exclusively on the moral backing of the two Powers, one of which has so many protégés amongst the richer Persians with whose recalcitrancy Shuster was striving with some success to deal, would be no more than a mockery. Such a financial adviser would be as powerless to effect any reform as Bizot proved to be.

[49946]

No. 558.

Sir G. Barelly to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 688.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative, Meshed, 8th December, received yesterday:—

"Situation serious, as population arming. My Russian colleague, after consulting with me, summoned reinforcements.

"(Sent to India.)"

Russian consul has asked for large reinforcements both for Meshed and Kuchan but Russian Minister has advised dispatch of only 100 Cossacks for present.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[49964]

No. 559.

Sir G. Barelly to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 689.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

QUESTION of Regency.

According to my Russian colleague, his Government look upon Sardar Assad as just as likely to favour British interests as the ex-Shah would be to favour Russian interests: the Russian Government would not, therefore, welcome him as Regent.

[1524]

A D

They have suggested Saad-ed-Dowleh as a suitable candidate: Russian Minister in reply has deprecated such a choice in the strongest terms.

This information was given me by my Russian colleague most confidentially, so that I would prefer that it should not be used at St. Petersburg.

[50001]

No. 560.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 690.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 686 of this morning.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a message to the Russian Minister, after a Cabinet Council last night, to the effect that the assurances given as regards compliance with the Russian demands were conditional on an assurance from Russia that the troops would be recalled from Kazvin immediately after the demands had been accepted.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expects that compliance with the demands will render the Ministers the objects of an outburst of popular indignation, and he tells me that it will be impossible for the Cabinet to take the very grave step of dissolving the Medjliss—which is a necessary preliminary to the acceptance of the demands—unless they are assured that the troops will be withdrawn; the Cabinet will then have some argument with which they may hope to pacify the popular indignation.

In order to make it clear that the legations must be consulted in the case of every appointment, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has amended his formula for the second demand by inserting the words "engagement of" in the final sentence between "as regards" and "these officers."

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

[50000]

No. 561.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 336.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 684 of the 12th December.

St. Petersburg, December 13, 1911.

I agree with the views expressed by Sir G. Barclay in the above telegram, but at the same time I think it would be a mistake for us to say anything more at present with regard to the changes in the Persian Government or constitution which the Russian Government may eventually decide to recommend. In my assurance to M. Nérot (see my telegram No. 334 of the 12th December) I only committed His Majesty's Government to examining in a friendly spirit any proposals which Russia may wish to make with a view to establishing on a more stable basis her relations with Persia. I understand that at present the all-important points are to avoid a military occupation of Tehran, and to secure the withdrawal of the Russian troops. We must, in order to secure the accomplishment of these immediate essentials, be prepared to run certain future risks and face such difficulties as may be inseparable from the proposals which Russia may eventually put forward. If, on the other hand, we were to say to Russia now that she apparently contemplated putting forward proposals of a too far-reaching nature, which would necessitate the employment of force for their execution, she would only be less inclined to order the withdrawal of her troops. She might even insist on our giving her, as a preliminary condition to their withdrawal, categorical assurances that His Majesty's Government would give their support to any proposals which the Russian Government might eventually decide to formulate.

[50140]

No. 562.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 348.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIA.

Please refer to Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 685 of the 12th instant.

I had an interview to-day with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who

Constantinople, December 13, 1911.

complained that Russian Government had sent to Khoi a general, 2,000 men, and 2 batteries. According to Assim Bey they have said they intend to escort caravans over what is, according to the Turkish Government, part of the contested zone. The Turks, however, maintain that this territory is part of the region which, until a definite settlement of the question was arrived at either by means of a joint commission or by The Hague conference, was, under the *status quo* arrangement, to be occupied by the Turks.

By "*status quo* arrangement," situation as it was in April 1910, would seem to be meant by Turkish Government.

Turks will be obliged to increase numbers of their troops now in occupation if Russians trespass on this territory. Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, did not say that reinforcements had actually been dispatched.

[49830]

No. 563.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 450.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 13, 1911.

PLEASE report as to how matter stands regarding Lynch's road concession, and what are prospects. According to Mr. Greenaway you have promised Wilson to support the application for extension, including right of railway construction. Reference is to my despatch No. 127 of 18th October.

[49039]

No. 564.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 157.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 13, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 200 of the 21st October last relative to the alleged violation by the British Indian authorities of the Baluch-Persian frontier, near Piran.

I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence exchanged with the India Office with reference to this question,* and have to inform you that I approve your proposal to abstain from replying to the note addressed to you by the Persian Government on the subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[48828]

No. 565.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 13, 1911.

COPIES of recent correspondence dealing with the provision of quarters for the reinforced Indian escort of His Majesty's consulate at Shiraz have been sent to your department from time to time for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and I am now directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you copy of a letter from the India Office intimating that the Secretary of State for India in Council accepts as a charge against Indian revenues a moiety of the cost of erecting such quarters on the understanding that the remainder will be defrayed by the British Exchequer.†

The cost involved is provisionally estimated at 4,500*l.*, and, inasmuch as the troops are suffering hardship from exposure, I am to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners will sanction the arrangement proposed at an early date.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

* To India Office, November 28, 1911; India Office, December 6, 1911.

† No. 481.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 360.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 756 of the 2nd instant I addressed a private letter to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing the hope that he would not present any more far-reaching demands to the Persian Government without first consulting you; and in a conversation which I had with him two days later I reverted to the subject, observing that the Imperial Government hardly seemed to realise the danger of allowing the Persian question to become so acute as to involve the question of the general foreign policy and future co-operation of the two Governments.

M. Nératof said that he had not replied to my letter at once, as he wished to ask me whether some misunderstanding had by any chance arisen, for he could not otherwise understand why you should, after all the assurances which he had given me, take so serious a view of the situation.

I replied that we placed entire confidence in his Excellency's good faith and in all that he had told me with regard to the intentions of the Imperial Government; but circumstances might arise which might so alter the situation that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Imperial Government to give effect to their assurances. This was the reason why you were urging that the occupation of Tehran should only take place in the very last resort. The march of Russian troops on the capital would be sure to give rise to regrettable incidents, while it was more than likely that there would be a series of assassinations at Tehran itself. We might then be told that the Imperial Government had found it necessary, in consequence of some fresh provocation, to demand satisfaction of a more exemplary character. Then there was the further danger that what was now intended to be a mere temporary occupation might, by the force of circumstances, be converted into an indefinite one; and an occupation of this nature would infallibly give the death-blow to the Anglo-Russian understanding.

His Excellency replied that there were only two grounds on which an advance to Tehran would be ordered, namely, if no satisfaction had been received before the troops had left Kazvin, or if M. Poklewski should consider their presence necessary for the protection of the lives of foreigners. The main body of the troops would not reach Kazvin for eight days, as it would be necessary to provide for the maintenance of communications with Ezzeli, and they would probably have to rest there two or three days. We had thus got nearly a fortnight before they would reach Tehran, always supposing that M. Poklewski did not ask for a detachment of Cossacks to be dispatched at all speed for his protection. It seemed from the reports which had reached him that a small body of men, with a couple of guns, was being organised at Tehran to oppose the advance of the Russian troops. This was unfortunate, as, though the resistance which it might offer would be of no account, it was very desirable to avoid a regular conflict on account of the complications to which it might lead. The conduct of the military operations would, his Excellency added, be naturally in the hands of the general in command; and he would have to decide, if the occasion arose, as to which parts of the town it would be advisable to occupy.

On my turning the conversation to the question of the possible presentation of further demands, M. Nératof said that he would not put forward any that touched the political future of Persia without first consulting you and obtaining your consent. He had in our last conversation told me that Russia might perhaps ask for the creation of an armed force of some kind to maintain order in North Persia, in return for the withdrawal of her troops from Tabreez, as well as for a first option in the matter of railways. She might possibly, in return for such railway concessions, renounce her claim to an indemnity, while any other demands which she might make would only have reference to outstanding cases in which Russian subjects had claims against the Persian Government. Under these circumstances it would hardly, he thought, be necessary to consult you before any of the above demands were presented. I replied that, though I was sure that you would not raise any unnecessary difficulties, it would be preferable that such demands should be first submitted to you, in view of the fact that you would eventually have to justify them in Parliament. His Excellency, who still seemed unconvinced, finally gave a half-hearted assent.

I then proceeded to speak in the terms of your telegram No. 765 of the 4th instant, on the subject of the ex-Shah. If, I said, his Excellency would authorise you to state in Parliament that the two Governments had agreed not to recognise His

Majesty under any circumstances, such a statement would go far to abate the opposition to Russia's recent action, and would, at the same time, serve as a pledge for our future co-operation in Persia.

M. Nératof told me, in reply, that he had only a few days ago caused a message to be sent to Mohammed Ali, warning him that he must not count on Russia's support. He did not, however, quite see the object of such a statement as you had proposed at the present moment. It went, moreover, too far, and would have the effect of binding the two Governments never to recognise the ex-Shah should he be recalled to Persia in a few years' time.

I said that the decision which you had taken was an irrevocable one, and that it was essential that publicity should be given to it at the present moment. It was generally believed in Persia, and even in certain quarters in England, that Russian agents were preparing the way for Mohammed Ali's return, and that Russian troops were about to replace him on the throne. It was necessary, therefore, to undeceive public opinion, and to show that there was no truth in these reports. I reminded M. Nératof that when the ex-Shah landed in Persia last summer, he had declined to join us in notifying to His Majesty that we would not recognise him on the plea that such a procedure would be contrary to the principle on which we had always acted, of never intervening in these internal conflicts. The situation now was entirely different. Mohammed Ali had made his attempt and had failed; he had undergone defeat after defeat at the hands of the Government troops, and his cause was a hopeless one. If he now succeeded in regaining the throne it would be solely due to the fact that Russian troops were on their way to Tehran, and that, in consequence, the Persian Government was powerless. If we now kept silence, the whole blame for what might happen would be laid at the door of the Russian Government.

His Excellency admitted that there was much truth in what I had said, but again contended that if there was a popular movement in his favour in a few years' time, we might be compelled to recognise him. I observed that when a few months ago there was a question of the ex-Shah again seeking asylum in Russia, his Excellency had himself told me that we might be quite easy as regarded the future, as His Majesty had been so bitterly disappointed with the reception which he had met with in Persia that he would never show his face there again.

M. Nératof then put forward several suggestions that he thought would meet the requirements of the case, of which one was that the Russian Government should give an assurance that the ex-Shah should not be recognised so long as the Russian troops remained in occupation, and another that they would not recognise him without the consent of His Majesty's Government. I pointed out that a declaration to which a time limit was attached would amount to an invitation to His Majesty to return when the time specified had expired, and I finally appealed to him to act as you suggested out of regard for the difficult position in which you were placed, as well as in the interest of the Anglo-Russian understanding. The ex-Shah, I remarked, had never displayed any qualities that rendered him desirable as a ruler, and if only his Excellency would meet your wishes on this point, I was sure that you would co-operate with him to secure the appointment of a Regent and the constitution of a Government at Tehran that would be friendly disposed towards Russia. The object which both Governments had in view was the same. They both desired to see a stable régime established in Persia, and they were only at variance on the question of the means to be employed to accomplish this end. I was, however, firmly convinced that concerted action by our two representatives would be found more effectual than the presentation of demands at the point of the bayonet.

M. Nératof replied that he sincerely desired to see the co-operation of the two Governments maintained, adding that he would endeavour to find a formula that would give you satisfaction.

In a conversation which I had with him on the following day, M. Nératof, while expressing the confident hope that we should eventually find a solution that would suit both Governments, still maintained his objection to any statement that would bind the two Governments irrevocably in the future. In support of his contention he remarked that some of the Bakhtiari were said to be in favour of recalling Mohammed Ali, and asked what would be our position after making such a statement, supposing that they placed him once more on the throne. I replied that you had considered this, as well as other possible eventualities, and that nothing could now alter your fixed determination. The Bakhtiari, I observed, were not so enamoured of the ex-Shah as to insist on restoring him, were they informed beforehand that we would not recognise him.

From the language which his Excellency held in the course of our subsequent conversation, I gather that he might be more disposed to waive his objection to your proposed statement were he to be officially assured that His Majesty's Government would meet the wishes of the Russian Government with regard to the appointment of a new Regent. I told him that I had received no instructions to discuss this subject, but that I knew that you were anxious that the Government which might eventually be installed at Tehran should be well disposed towards Russia, and that the term Government presumably included the Regent. Though he had in a previous conversation mentioned Sardar Assad's name as a possible Regent, his Excellency did not on this occasion say anything to indicate whom he had in his mind as a candidate for the post.

I called again on his Excellency yesterday and handed him an *aide-mémoire*, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, embodying the six points laid down in your telegram No. 779 of the preceding day. I explained that you had thought it right, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, to record the lines of policy that would enable the two Governments to continue to work together, and I further expressed the hope that the Russian Government would be able to say that the views held by His Majesty's Government were in accordance with their own. After promising to give these six points his careful consideration, M. Nératof remarked that, as regarded Mr. Shuster's successor, it was, in his opinion, essential that no foreign advisers should again be engaged from among the subjects or citizens of any of the Great Powers, and that the attributions of the future financial adviser should be carefully defined, so that it would be impossible for him to usurp dictatorial powers.

I subsequently submitted to M. Nératof the proposed parliamentary statement with regard to the ex-Shah, the text of which you had approved in your telegram No. 782 of the 7th instant. His Excellency took exception to the words "in conformity with the attitude which they have adopted ever since the ex-Shah returned to Persia" in the first sentence, and to the word "never" in the second. After discussing various amendments, his Excellency finally accepted the following text as open to no objections, though he added that he must first submit it to M. Sazonow, who was now at Paris:—

"His Majesty's Government have informed the Russian Government that they would be unable to recognise the ex-Shah were he now to re-establish himself on the throne. The Russian Government have, on their side, assured them that, were the ex-Shah now to attempt to regain the throne, they would equally not recognise him, and that so long as the Russian troops remain in occupation, they will do nothing either to encourage or facilitate His Majesty's return to the throne."

His Excellency once more reverted to the question of a possible change of Regent, and on my informing him that you would not raise any objections to the appointment of Sardar Assad, observed that he had not any particular candidate in view. The Russian Government had indeed nothing whatever against Nasr-ul-Mulk, except the fact that he was not a strong man: and a strong man would be required if the Medjliss continued recalcitrant. In that case the only way out of the present difficulty would be for the Regent to dissolve them. There were, however, very few strong men in Persia. Perhaps the Sipahdar was one, but he did not know whether either he or Sardar Assad was really qualified for the post. Should the occasion arise it would perhaps be best that Sir George Barchey and M. Poklewski should consult together and submit the names of those whom they considered most suitable for the post.

On my informing his Excellency that according to the latest telegrams received from Sir G. Barchey the Medjliss seemed more disposed to yield, M. Nératof said that were the Russian demands complied with it might perhaps not be necessary to effect the change in the Regency.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 566.

Aide-mémoire.

Il est nécessaire que la situation actuelle en Perse ait pour résultat l'établissement d'un Gouvernement persan qui ne négligera pas les intérêts spéciaux de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne, et qui se conformera aux principes de l'accord anglo-russe.

2. Pour atteindre ce but il ne peut être indispensable que l'ex-Schah remonte sur le trône. Cette restauration donnerait lieu de craindre des mesures de représailles de la part de l'ex-Schah contre ceux des Perses qui ont pris part à son expulsion. Vu le peu de cas que Mohammed Ali a fait des conseils qui lui ont été donnés par les deux Puissances de ne pas retourner en Perse, il serait incompatible avec la dignité des deux Puissances de la reconnaître maintenant. Sir E. Grey se plaint donc à espérer que la Russie n'ajoutera pas aux difficultés de la situation en permettant que la crise actuelle ait comme résultat la restauration de l'ex-Schah.

3. Il est de la plus haute importance que Mr. Shuster ait sans aucun délai pour successeur un conseiller financier étranger qui serait également acceptable à la Russie et à la Grande-Bretagne. Les deux représentants à Téhéran devraient, après s'être préalablement consultés à ce sujet, soumettre une recommandation à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

4. Lorsque les demandes russes auront été acceptées, les Gouvernements britannique et russe devraient coopérer pour faciliter les mesures, telles qu'un emprunt, qui mettraient le Gouvernement persan en mesure de rétablir l'ordre et de mettre fin à l'anarchie existant en Perse.

5. Si la Russie exigeait le paiement d'une indemnité, ceci constituerait un empêchement sérieux à la réalisation du but indiqué dans l'article précédent. Sir E. Grey aime par conséquent à croire que lorsque la crise actuelle sera passée, le Gouvernement Impérial trouvera moyen d'éviter cette difficulté.

6. Il est bien entendu que l'occupation de territoire persan et les mesures militaires que la Russie prend en ce moment ont un caractère non pas permanent, mais provisoire, et qu'ils prendront fin dès que satisfaction aura été donnée aux demandes russes et que l'ordre aura été rétabli dans le nord de la Perse.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 25 novembre (8 décembre), 1911.

[50087]

No. 567.

Mr. Yate to Mr. Mallet.—(Received December 14.)

Dear Mr. Mallet,

Beckbury Hall, Shifnal, December 10, 1911.

I VENTURE to trespass for a few minutes upon your time, hoping that what I write may justify my doing so. I am in no sense financially or from the point of view of any prospective advantage concerned in the Trans-Persian Railway.

The meeting in Paris on Thursday, the 30th November, was inconclusive as regards finance. The French financier, M. Bardac, would not commit himself, much to the disappointment of the Russian group, which was strongly represented. It was known further that the British financiers approached had also held back. What transpired gave me a direct insight into Russian aims and ambitions, which made me welcome some delay. When I heard one Russian representative reiterate the statement, "Russia must have a port at Charbar," I thought of Lord Curzon's denunciation of the Minister who would grant a foreign Power a port on the Persian Gulf, and I asked myself, "If we are so tenacious of Koweit and the Turkish littoral, are we to be less so of Charbar and the Persian?" It seemed to me that the Russian had a vision of a Russian railway (5-foot gauge) constructed right across Persia to Charbar, and carrying thousands of tons of Indian and Ceylon tea to the Russian market; but I conceive that British and Indian financiers, contractors, and manufacturers look forward—and justly—to financing, constructing, and supplying the trans-Persian line from Kurrachee, at least as far as the western border of the British sphere in Persia. The Indian Government reserves to itself the right of admitting railways from the Persian side into Afghan territory. Surely the approach of railways to the Persian Gulf must be no less carefully safeguarded.

When I addressed the Central Asian Society in February last, I dwelt on the importance of a Trebizond-Tabreez-Kazvin Railway as a feeder of the trans-Persian line. The Paris correspondent of the "Times," writing on the 8th instant and supporting most strongly the Anglo-Russian *entente* in Persia, mentions that German merchandise now enters Northern Persia through Trebizond. (I should say, myself, not only German, but the merchandise of many nations.) If we consent to excluding the Trebizond traffic from the Trans-Persian Railway we shall deprive that "international" railway of that which may enable it to pay a dividend, and at the

same time afford Germany an extra cause for grievance. There was a report in the press the other day that Russia was in the humour to accede to Turkish railway expansion in North-East Asia Minor. If that be so, and should British influence advocate the union of Turkish and Persian lines—a union that surely must come sooner or later—then I urge that no obstacle be put in the way of the construction of a line from Trebizond to Tabreez.

Whether in connection with the Trans-Persian Railway the "battle of the gauges" will be fought out with the same vigour, not to say acrimony, with which it was fought out in India years ago, remains still to be seen.

I heard an Anglo-Indian engineer who witnessed it all, and rose to high position, remark the other day that India was now regretting that it had not universally adopted the standard gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in. I think it is possible that Persia may live to regret that it was not allowed to adopt that gauge. What I foresee is this: Russia pushing her 5-foot gauge everywhere she can, and thus enforcing on Persia numerous breaks of gauge both in the interior of the country and on its frontier, where it marches with Turkey. This, no doubt, will admirably suit Russia, whose manufacturers will supply rails, rolling-stock, and all material, and whose contractors will construct the line. If it is the destiny of more than half Persia—say to a line drawn from Khanikin through Isfahan and Yezd to Meshhed and the Hari Rud, i.e., the northern half—to become Russian territory, then we cannot but compliment Russia on the foresight which prompted her to extend to that territory the Russian railway gauge. If, however, the independence and integrity of Persia, as guaranteed under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, is maintained, then I have a strong conviction that the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge will suit Persia best. It is less costly than the broader, and therefore the International Trans-Persian Railway will sooner pay a dividend.

My latest information is that the French financiers are now eager to get into this enterprise, and that the English ones are following suit. It looks as if the first Indo-European railway was about to become a reality.

I remain,
Yours truly,
A. C. YATE.

[50110]

No. 568.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

India Office, December 13, 1911.

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with Mr. Langley's letter of the 28th July, 1910, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of correspondence with the Government of India in regard to the proposed establishment of wireless telegraph stations in the Persian Gulf.

It will be observed that it is proposed to erect five permanent stations at Bushire, Henjam, Bahrein, Koweit, and Debai (or Zora), at an estimated initial cost of 2,78,800 rupees, and an annual recurring expenditure of 69,700 rupees, and a portable station at Lingah, at an estimated initial cost of 7,500 rupees. These estimates are stated to be approximate only; the actual expenditure will depend on the agency employed for the erection and working of the stations, and it is possible that the royalty payable to the Marconi Company may have to be considerably increased beyond the amount assumed.

Subject to any observations the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may wish to make, the Marquess of Crewe proposes to approve the scheme submitted by the Government of India, on the understanding that the cost is met jointly from the Imperial and Indian exchequers, as agreed to in principle by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury in their letter to the Foreign Office, dated the 29th September, 1909.

Should the proposals of the Government of India eventually be approved, it will presumably be necessary, as intimated in the letter from this Office, dated the 13th July, 1910, to inform the Persian Government of the intention to erect a station at Bushire.

The Marquess of Crewe will be glad to receive at an early date the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the proposals of the Government of India.

A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for any observations they may wish to offer.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 568.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Secret.)

My Lord Marquess,

Simla, August 24, 1911.

WE have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with Lord Morley's Secret telegram, dated the 7th January, 1910, on the subject of the establishment of communication by radio-telegraph in the Persian Gulf.

2. In his Secret despatch, dated the 16th July, 1909, Lord Morley stated that he would be prepared to consider any detailed proposals for the installation of radio-telegraph stations on the shores of the Persian Gulf on the receipt of a reply from Lord Minto's Government to his remarks on the separate scheme for the establishment of wireless telegraph stations on and near the coasts of India, in connection with which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had expressed the opinion that at least one station in the Gulf should be able to communicate with an Indian coastal station. In the scheme for the establishment of wireless installations in India, sanctioned in the despatch from your Lordship's predecessor, dated the 29th April, 1910, it was proposed that an installation should be immediately erected at Jask with a radius of 600 miles, which, by forming a link with Kurrachee, would complete our coastal system. It was requested that steps should be taken at once for the inception of this installation, and, in a Secret telegram from Lord Minto's Government, dated the 6th December, 1909, the eventual establishment, as funds became available, of radio-telegraph stations at Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Koweit, Bahrein, and Debai was proposed. Lord Morley decided, however, that there should be no question of introducing this latter scheme until such time as a complete estimate of its cost had been submitted to him, and the scheme sanctioned. In the meantime, the temporary radio-telegraph station, which is still being worked by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, had been established at Jask in December 1909 in connection with the operations for the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.

3. The general question of wireless telegraph installations in the Persian Gulf, the great importance of which to Imperial interests from a commercial as well as a political point of view is recognised by His Majesty's Government, has again been subjected to careful scrutiny, and, in view of the opinion expressed by his Excellency the naval commander-in-chief, East Indies squadron, in his letters, dated the 4th February, 1911, and the 18th March, 1911, respectively, copies of which are annexed to this despatch (Enclosures 1 and 2^a), we now recommend the establishment of stations at Bushire, Henjam, Lingah, Koweit, Bahrein, and Debai, or possibly at Zora, on the Katar coast, instead of at the latter place.

4. We consider that the stations at Bushire, Henjam, Bahrein, Koweit, and Debai should be of a permanent nature, those at Henjam and Bushire being of 3 kilowatt output, and those at Bahrein, Koweit, and Debai of 1½ kilowatt only. Bushire and Debai (or Zora) would be able to communicate with Henjam, and Bahrein and Koweit with Bushire. At Lingah a portable station, to be erected when required, is, in our opinion, all that is necessary at present. The existing temporary station at Jask should be maintained until the conclusion of the arms traffic operations, when it will be demolished, and the apparatus treated as spare stores to be used in case of any renewals being required elsewhere. The permanent station, with a radius of 600 miles, proposed for Jask in paragraph 6 of the despatch from Lord Minto's Government, dated the 21st October, 1909, will not now be required.

5. The probable expenditure involved in our proposals is shown in the detailed estimates attached to this despatch (Enclosure 3^a). The estimates of the cost of the apparatus and plant required are based on figures previously supplied by the Marconi Company for somewhat similar stations, and provide for the erection by the Indian telegraph department of apparatus purchased in England. The estimates of the cost of the establishment to be employed and of the necessary buildings have been framed

* Not printed.

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from figures supplied by the director, Persian Gulf section, Indo-European Telegraph Department, and have been prepared on the assumption that the stations at Henjam and Bushire will be kept open day and night, but that the service at the remaining stations will be limited to twelve hours. We are informed that a portion of the staff which would be required for the Henjam station can be met by utilising the services of the staff of operators already employed there, whose work at present is very light. It will be seen that, excluding the temporary station at Lingah, the initial cost of which is estimated at 7,500 rupees, the total initial expenditure on the five permanent stations is likely to amount to about 2,78,800 rupees, and the recurring charges to about 69,700 rupees a-year. The estimates are, however, approximate only, and the actual expenditure involved in the execution of the scheme will depend largely on the agency employed for the erection and working of the stations. We are of opinion that the stations, when erected, should be maintained and worked by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and that the Indian share of the cost of their provision should be shown in the accounts of that department. We therefore leave the question of the agency by which the apparatus should be provided and erected for your Lordship's decision.

6. We strongly recommend the establishment of these radio-telegraph stations for your Lordship's approval, and we trust that, in accordance with the principle advocated in the letter from the Foreign Office to His Majesty's Treasury, dated the 9th September, 1909, and accepted by the latter in their reply, dated the 29th idem, half the cost of providing and maintaining the proposed stations will be met by the Imperial Exchequer.

We have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.
O'M. CREAGH.
GUY FLEETWOOD WILSON.
J. L. JENKINS.
R. W. CARLYLE.
S. H. BUTLER.
SAIYID ALI IMAM.
W. H. CLARK.

[50132]

No. 569.

Mr. Greenway to Mr. Mallet.—(Received December 14.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,

December 13, 1911.

Dear Mr. Mallet,

I HAVE been discussing the question of a successor to Mr. Shuster with several of my colleagues, and we are strongly of opinion that it would be very desirable, if possible, to avoid the appointment of a nominee of one of the minor neutral Powers as treasurer-general if the new incumbent is to be given similar powers to those which have been held by Mr. Shuster, because of the very great opportunities which such a position affords for venal practices.

If, as no doubt is the case, the appointment of an Englishman to the post is quite impracticable, we think perhaps the best way of overcoming the difficulty would be to form a "Treasury board," composed of (1) an Englishman, (2) a Russian, and (3) a nominee of a minor neutral Power.

With the presence of an Englishman on such a board the proper administration of the revenues would be ensured, and, at the same time, both British and Russian interests would be safeguarded by the equal representation on the board of each country.

The slight extra cost need not be considered at all, as, by the proper administration of the revenues, Persia would, according to Shuster's estimate, benefit to the extent of fully 3,000,000*l.* per annum.

I hope you will not think that I am exceeding my province in putting forward this suggestion, but in view of the importance of our interests in Persia and with our knowledge of the malpractices now going on in the Customs, we feel that it is our duty to point out the very serious dangers both to British and Persian interests attendant upon the appointment of a treasurer-general nominated by one of the minor continental Powers.

For the third member of the board above suggested we are of opinion, from

[50163]

No. 569*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 14th December, 1911, relative to Trans-Persian Railway surveys.

India Office, December 14, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 569*.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

December 14, 1911.

WE are arranging for Mr. W. A. Johns, C.I.E., to make a railway reconnaissance to Gwettur from Kurrachee at once in connection with the Trans-Persian Railway scheme. His experience in this direction has been considerable.

experience gained in our business associations, that, if possible, a Dane or a Dutchman would be the best possible selection.

Yours sincerely,
C. GREENWAY.

[50091]

No. 570.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 691.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 418 of 5th December.

Stokes left this morning.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg and India.)

[50158]

No. 571.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 692.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 686 of the 13th instant.

The Cabinet have devised a new way of solving the situation. As the resignation of some twenty deputies would leave the Medjliss without a quorum, they are endeavouring to persuade the Moderate deputies to resign their seats. The acceptance of the Russian demands would thus be facilitated. I am told that the resignation of the requisite number of deputies is assured.

[50148]

No. 572.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 693.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

MY telegram No. 690.

Russian Minister made a communication yesterday to the Persian Government in the sense of the last two paragraphs of the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement reported in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No 332.

[50139]

No. 573.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 694.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

LYNCH and railway concessions.

Please see your telegram No. 450 of yesterday.

Previous to the receipt of your despatch No. 127 of the 13th October I had spoken twice to the Persian Government on behalf of the concession of the Persian Transport Company, but I have not spoken again since receiving your despatch.

I am assured by company's manager that Lynch declares that there is no *arrière-pensée* in his desire to obtain the extension, and the manager says he is merely pressing for an extension of the old concession, which carries with it no rights of railway construction. According to the manager the Minister for Foreign Affairs is only waiting till the present crisis is over to get the matter through. The Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed very hopeful about it when I last spoke to him early in November, provided a certain claim which the company have against the Persian Government was dropped.

I do not know whether the company may continue to receive legation support, and pending instructions on this point I hesitate to approach the Minister for Foreign Affairs again.

[50173]

No. 574.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 696.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

ACTING consul reports that chief mullah at Shiraz has published order forbidding Moslems to have any dealings with British troops, and that priests are actively preventing shopkeepers from selling to them, and are molesting builders and other Persians employed by troops. Question of supplies threatens to become acute. I am bringing to notice of Persian Government and urging them to stop this boycott.

(Repeated to India.)

[50175]

No. 575.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 698.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

MY telegram No. 525 of 29th October.

A Government force is reported to have been defeated at Damgham by ex-Shah's Turkomans on Meshed road.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg and Government of India.)

[50176]

No. 576.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 699.)

(Telegraphic.) Decode.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

FOR a few days past, owing to mischievous agitation of mullahs, there has been a run on Imperial Bank at Shiraz, and acting consul now reports that notes are being presented at daily rate of 15,000 tomans. This is more serious as a specie caravan for Shiraz branch is held up at Kazerun for want of guard.

[50177]

No. 577.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 700.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

TURKEY and Russia.

Please see my telegram No. 685 of the 12th instant.

The rumoured advance of Turkish troops is not confirmed from Tabreez. His Majesty's consul telegraphs that the Russian troops at Khoi are to be used to patrol the Khoi-Urmia road. The Turks not only claim, but are actually in occupation of territory which this road traverses, so that, if incidents are to be avoided, great prudence will have to be exercised.

[50171]

No. 578.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 337.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 14, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

I have just had a conversation with M. Sazonow on Persian affairs. I told his Excellency that this question was causing you serious preoccupation, and he replied by expressing a hope that all the suspicions and misapprehensions as to Russian intentions which had prevailed in certain circles in England had now been finally removed.

We then proceeded to discuss the three Russian demands. M. Sazonow said that Shuster's dismissal, which formed the subject of the first demand, must be actually

carried out. If Shuster were to be permitted to remain at Tehran for a short time it could only be on the distinct understanding that, neither directly nor indirectly, should he take any part in Government business.

The text of the latest formula of the demand as to the engagement of foreign officials, as drawn up by the Persian Government and reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 686 of the 13th December, was then read to me by M. Sazonow, who said that he would be ready to accept it if the words "enter into an exchange of views" were altered to "arrive at an understanding." In his opinion, no real engagement was implied in the term "exchange of views." We had some discussion on the subject, and I suggested the following wording:—

(R.) "To enter into an exchange of views for the purpose of arriving at an understanding with the two legations." (End of R.)

M. Sazonow finally said that he might be satisfied with some such formula, but that he must first submit it to the Emperor before he could give me any definite promise.

We then discussed the demand for an indemnity, and M. Sazonow assured me that Russia had no intention of extorting a large sum from Persia, and would not deal hardly with her.

On my asking whether Russia would not now give Persia a definite assurance that on her compliance with the three above demands Russia would withdraw her troops, M. Sazonow replied that he would be quite willing to give such an assurance to His Majesty's Government, but that the Persians did not deserve any assurances, and would not get any more from him. At the same time, he also expressed the hope that you, too, would give them no assurances. I then mentioned to him M. Nératof's *aide-mémoire*, and said that the assurance on this subject which it contained had probably been communicated by you to-day to Parliament. He said that he had no objection to such a communication, but that of course the assurance did not imply that the troops would be withdrawn from Persia altogether, but only that they would be moved back from Kazvin to Resht or to some other point. I pointed out that the assurance could not possibly be interpreted in this restricted sense, and M. Nératof was sent for, and at once confirmed my view that the assurance meant that the expeditionary force would be completely withdrawn from Persian territory. M. Sazonow expressed his satisfaction at this, since it seemed to bring a settlement within sight. He authorised me to assure you that he had absolutely no desire to see a Russian occupation of Tehran, and that he trusted that speedy compliance on the part of the Persian Government with the three Russian demands would soon obviate all necessity for such a step.

[50172]

No. 579.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 338.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 14, 1911.

PERSIA: M. Lecoffre's appointment.

M. Sazonow, to whom I spoke to-day in the sense of your telegram No. 808 of the 12th December, is obviously very unwilling that M. Lecoffre should remain for any length of time at the Ministry of Finance at Tehran. The most that he would concede was that M. Lecoffre might perhaps be allowed to remain there for a fortnight or three weeks. He said that a post for M. Lecoffre in the British sphere ought not to be difficult to find.

[50170]

No. 580.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 351.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, December 14, 1911.

FOLLOWING telegram repeated to Sir G. Barclay:—

"Please refer to my telegram No. 348 of the 13th December.

"Turkish Government are evidently much disturbed at Russian action and ask that His Majesty's Government should intervene at St. Petersburg.

[1524]

4 G

"Minister for Foreign Affairs maintains that it is Russia who is preventing Persia from signing protocol for Delimitation Commission.

"Roads from Khoi to Salmas and Dilman to Urmia (both crossing territory effectively occupied by Turkish troops) are those on which Turkish Government complain Russian troops propose to escort caravans.

"Orders have been given, Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me, to Turkish commanders not to allow Russians to pass."

[50251] No. 581.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received December 15.)

3, Satter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,
December 14, 1911.

Sir,
WE have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a telegram just received from Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Co., our agents at Bagdad, having reference to the difficulties to business there owing to the insecurity of the trade route into Persia.

We have, &c.

(For Secretary),
FRED. W. PERRY.

Enclosure in No. 581.

Messrs. Lynch and Co. to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 13, 1911.

TWO months' traffic suspended on the Hamadan road owing to insecurity. Our own clients' goods to value of 8,000L., also over 300,000L. of other British goods, cannot be forwarded at present. Shippers suspended January, February, March shipments from Manchester; the loss will be great for the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Limited).

[50284] No. 582.

Sir T. Jackson to Mr. Mallet.—(Received December 15.)

Dear Mr. Mallet, 25, Abchurch Lane, London, December 15, 1911.

THE enclosed speaks for itself. It is the usual difficulty of transferring specie from place to place; it is a constant danger to the bank in the present unsettled state of Persia.

I hope the military escort asked for will be promptly granted.

Yours very truly,

T. JACKSON.

Enclosure in No. 582.

Translation of a special Telegram received from Tehran.

December 15, 1911.

THERE is a run on our notes at Shiraz. It is very serious owing to detention specie caravan at Borazjan. Is of the utmost importance obtain Foreign Office sanction for Indian military escort. British Minister has telegraphed Foreign Office. Please consult Foreign Office regarding same.

[50289] No. 583.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 339.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 15, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia: Russian troops.

Last paragraph of my telegram No. 337 of 14th December.

It is evident that when M. Sazonow spoke to me he was not aware of the fact that M. Poklewsky had already given assurances to the Persian Government with regard to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kasvin, as reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 693 of 14th December.

[50250] No. 584.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 701.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

SHIRAZ branch of Imperial Bank of Persia.

The manager of the Imperial Bank has just been to see me: he affirms that the Shiraz branch will no longer be able to finance our troops in view of the shortage of cash.

There is a caravan of specie detained at Borasjun for lack of escort; but I see no prospect of a Persian guard being provided, and until it reaches Shiraz there seems no prospect of any relief to the bank's situation.

I am strongly tempted to allow the specie to attach itself to the escort which will accompany Smart, who will soon be starting from Bushire, but unless you sanction this step I cannot myself authorise it.

[50285] No. 585.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 702.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see telegram No. 336 from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

I had understood that we should be bound, unless we acted as Sir G. Buchanan suggests in the penultimate paragraph of his telegram No. 332, to give Russia, under any circumstances, our most energetic support for the formation and maintenance of a Cabinet, and, should the question arise, for the election of a Regent well disposed towards Russia, and that we should be especially bound if any statement were made in the press in the sense of the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' *aide mémoire*.

I still think the considerations in my telegram No. 684 of 12th December apply to these points.

[50291] No. 586.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 703.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

MY telegram No. 701 of 15th December.

Guard for specie caravan has been obtained locally, and caravan is now proceeding. (Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[50295]

No. 587.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 704.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

TURKEY and Russia.

Please see telegram No. 351 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

The Turkish contention that Russia is preventing Persia from signing protocol is, I believe, quite untrue.

The Russian Minister was told by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th December that the Persian counter-proposals on the lines of our advice had been sent to Constantinople two months ago, and that no reply had been received; it would, therefore, appear that the matter is being held up at Constantinople.

[50298]

No. 588.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 705.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

SHIRAZ boycott.

Please see my telegram No. 696 of the 14th instant.

I have received the following telegram dated to-day from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz:—

"The question of supplies is becoming very grave. Purchase is now practically impossible, and we have only enough in hand of many necessary articles for one day more. Some energetic local action will be forced upon us, unless the Central Government can be induced to take immediately effective measures to stop this scandalous state of things.

"The attitude of the local authorities is excessively obstructive. The karguzar clearly indicates his own approval of the action of the mullahs by writing to me officially that the local authorities cannot interfere with the mullahs.

"I shall warn the karguzar when I call on him this afternoon that the local authorities are incurring very serious responsibility in not attempting to check the hostile agitation. I have as yet no indication that the instructions which the Minister of Foreign Affairs states he has sent have been received here. I will try to discover from the karguzar this afternoon whether this is so or not."

[50172]

No. 589.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 455.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 15, 1911.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 338 of 14th December.

It is important that a post outside Russian sphere be found for Lecoffre. Is anything available? If not, could he go on leave of absence for a short time until something be found for him?

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 826.)

[50350]

No. 590.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 368.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 331 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a leading article which appeared in the semi-official "Russia" of to-day's date in regard to Russian policy in Persia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 590.

Extract from the "Russia" of December 13, 1911.

ACCORDING to the latest news from Tehran the influential Bakhtiari Khan, Sardar Assad, who recently arrived there from Paris, has definitely declared for Persia's acceptance of the Russian ultimatum, and is trying with the Government to incline the Medjliss to that effect. Our only hope is that the efforts of the Persian Government and of Sardar Assad be crowned with success, and that Russia should not be obliged to take further coercive steps to obtain the satisfaction demanded, which must, before all, remove all causes of constant mutual friction and discontent, and create a favourable soil for the re-establishment of the traditional friendly relations between the two Governments.

Russia was far from desiring to have recourse to such serious steps, as, for instance, the occupation of the Persian capital by Russian troops, and even now the expeditionary force is still a considerable distance from Tehran, which gives the Persians time to reflect. We are informed that the troops concentrated at Kazvin will only start their advance in eight days, provided, of course, that no extraordinary event occurs to oblige the Russian Minister in Tehran to call for the detachment earlier. The dispatch of troops to Persia was a measure which the Russian Government took very reluctantly, and only when forced to by events, and, certainly, as has been said more than once, without any intention of violating the integrity and independence of her neighbour, with whom she has been living peacefully for a century. Hence, as will be understood, as soon as Russia's demands are satisfied, a further stay of the Russian forces in Kazvin will be superfluous, provided that no new complications arise, such as attacks on Russian officials or institutions, or any new act against Russia, general great disorders, &c., which events would render the recall of the Russian troops impossible.

The nervousness manifested in certain circles in England regarding recent events in Persia has been provoked in large measure by the suspicion that the final object of Russia's action was to reconstitute the situation in Persia by replacing the ex-Shah Mahommed Ali on the throne. It is scarcely necessary to dilate on the fact that there is really nothing in common between Russia's action in Persia and the movements of the ex-Shah. As is known, since the appearance of the ex-Shah on the Persian frontier, the principle of non-intervention in the struggle between him and the Persian Government has been established and acted on by Russia, considering it an internal Persian matter. From this principle Russia has never departed a step. And now Russia has no desire to be suspected of forcing a ruler on the Persian people against their will. It is scarcely likely that Mahommed Ali would himself desire such an act, as his position in such case would be very insecure. We can hardly conceive of a Shah who had to be propped up entirely by Russian bayonets.

Without speculating on the probable fate of the ex-Shah, and leaving him entirely to his own resources, the Russian Government certainly could not allow him to make an entry into Tehran behind the back of the Russian troops. If, however, he should by some means succeed in doing so, the Russian Government would feel bound not to recognise him, unless in this regard some separate agreement should be come to between Russia and England.

The basis of Russian policy in Persia must remain as hitherto, complete agreement and harmony with England on the foundation of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, by the observance of which alone is it possible that the country should develop on normal and peaceful lines, as is so important from the standpoint of the economic and political interests of the two Powers adjoining her, and for her own establishment of internal good order.

[50451]

No. 591.

*Count d'Arnaux to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received December 16.)**1, Avenue Marceau, Paris.**December 14, 1911.*

Dear Sir Arthur,

IN accordance with your wishes, I send you herewith the *aide-mémoire* concerning the conversation my brother-in-law, M. Bardac, had with you last week referring to

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the project of a trans-Persian railway. We are at your entire disposal if you require further information.

Believe me, &c.
G. D'ARNAUX.

Enclosure in No. 591.

Aide-mémoire.

M. NOËL BARDAC a exposé à son Excellence Sir Arthur Nicolson que sur le désir exprimé par le Président du Conseil, M. Kokovtsoff, il s'était chargé de faire les arrangements financiers nécessaires pour mener à bonne fin la construction du Chemin de Fer transpersan entre la Russie et les Indes anglaises.

M. Noël Bardac veut avant tout s'assurer que la réalisation de cette entreprise a l'approbation générale du Gouvernement anglais ainsi que celle du Gouvernement français au sujet de la participation financière des nationaux de ce Gouvernement.

Le tracé de la ligne dans la zone sous l'influence de l'Angleterre serait exécuté conformément aux instructions des autorités anglaises.

Le plan général de cette affaire est tout d'abord la constitution d'une société d'étude au capital de 750,000 roubles, qui serait fourni par tiers par les groupes anglais, russe et français.

[50467]

No. 592.

London Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)

*Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London,
December 15, 1911.*

Dear Sir,

REFERRING to my private interview with you on Wednesday, I made a brief report thereon to the council of this chamber at its meeting yesterday, when it was fully realised that it was undesirable that any agitation should take place in London in respect of the questions raised in the telegram from the Persian merchants, which I showed you at our interview, and which I now enclose for your records.

Yours faithfully,
STANLEY MACHIN,
Chairman of the Council.

P.S.—Of course we do not intend to give any information to the press on this matter.

S. M.

Enclosure in No. 592.

Report by London Chamber of Commerce.

THE chairman read the following cablegram, received on the 7th December from Tehran, addressed to the British Chamber of Commerce, London:—

"We, the representatives of the mercantile class in Persia, desire to appeal to the feelings of justice and humanity of British commercial circles at this critical moment in the history of our country, to the end that they may use their strong influence in bringing about a solution of the situation created by Russia's determination to put into execution by armed force the terms of an ultimatum which so flagrantly violates the integrity and independence of Persia. These aggressive and unjust methods have raised such a storm of indignation and protest throughout the country that Russian goods are being boycotted. We think it our duty to warn British merchants that the astounding policy of *laissez faire* consistently pursued by Great Britain cannot but have prejudicial consequences for British commercial interests in this country.

"Representative committee of Persian merchants, Muin-ul-Tujjar, and other members."

He said they had every reason to believe that this cablegram was a truly official and important document. He had thought it his duty to communicate with the Foreign Office, and had seen Mr. Mallet, one of the permanent secretaries, who had assured him that the Government was fully alive to the importance of the points raised in the cablegram; and that the Government was doing its very utmost to safeguard British commercial interests, and the interests of the Persians themselves, in every possible way. Sir Edward Grey would be making a statement on this subject in the House that afternoon. He therefore suggested that in the circumstances no action need be taken by the chamber.

The president said that this came before the General Purposes Committee on the very day that Lord Curzon was bringing forward a motion in the House of Lords, and he had undertaken to show him a copy of the cablegram the same day. He, the president, believed that it was a *bonâ fide* communication, although the name with which it was signed was a general term for expressing a person in high authority. He had shown the cablegram to Lord Curzon, who said, that after the satisfactory statement made in the House of Lords on that occasion on behalf of the Government that it would be unwise for the London Chamber to take any special action on this matter on their behalf. There was no doubt that the boycott which was being extended to the Russian merchants on this occasion might still be enlarged to include British merchants, but at the same time he did not think that the London Chamber of Commerce should take any special action in the matter.

The council agreed that no action beyond an acknowledgment of receipt of the telegram should be given at the present time.

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No. 593.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)

*25, Abchurch Lane, London,
December 16, 1911.*

Dear Sir,

THE enclosed extracts are from letters received to-day; they describe a very serious state of affairs, rendering banking operations not only difficult, but dangerous. We are doing our best under the circumstances.

I am, &c.
T. JACKSON, *Chairman.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 593.

Imperial Bank of Persia (Kermanshah) to Imperial Bank of Persia (Hamadan).

(Extract.) *October 31, 1911.*
HEREWITH per special kossid we beg to hand you the undermentioned letters, which we shall be glad if you will kindly dispatch per registered post to their respective destinations:—

One for Imperial Bank of Persia, London.
Two for Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran.
Two for Eastern Rug and Trading Co., Sultanabad.
One for Imperial Bank of Persia, Ispahan.
One for Imperial Bank of Persia, Tabreez.

Enclosed in the packet are also two covers for yourselves.

The posts being completely disarranged we have been obliged to adopt this course, and trust you will excuse the trouble we are giving you.

For your information we would inform you that this place is completely cut off from other parts; the telegraph line from [illegible] to Kangovar, and from Kaoidashi to Kerind, is totally destroyed, the posts having been burnt, the insulators broken, and the wires carried away, and it is said that it will take at least two months to put right from date of commencing to repair it. The posts also on both sides of us are being robbed, on the north by the Kakavendis and to the south by Daood Khan, of the Kalhurs, both at the instigation, it is said, of the Salar-ed-Dowleh. Thus, with such disorders, our operations are being conducted with considerable difficulty, and we

would be much obliged if you would be so good as to advise us by kossid of any change in the sterling rate in Tehran, and also in the Bagdad-London rate, both of which rates concern us considerably here.

Enclosure 2 in No. 593.

Imperial Bank of Persia (Kermanshah) to Imperial Ottoman Bank (Bagdad).

November 7, 1911.

(Extract.)

WITH reference to your remarks re 2,000*l.* on London at 54, we beg to refer you to our telegram of the 30th September, in which we informed you that, as the telegraph lines to Tehran were interrupted, we were ignorant of the ruling rate. We are at present selling to local merchants at 3 m/d 55, with the proviso that when we hear from Tehran as to the rate of the day the rate will be adjusted accordingly. If you would care to operate on these terms we shall be happy to meet you in any way we can. For your information, we have neither received any telegram nor any posts from the north since about three weeks ago. The country round about here is in great disorder.

Enclosure 3 in No. 593.

Extracts from Bushier Report on the Progress of the Bank, received December 16, 1911.

THE decrease in our purchases of local exchange is the result of the decrease of the available business on account of the plague and the state of the Shiraz road. We have utilised all possible funds in the purchase of bills on Shiraz, but have had, owing to the state of the town of Shiraz, to exercise more than ordinary caution in buying only first-class bills, on which bills, of course, the profit is rather lower than on ordinary bazaar bills.

The very large increase of 24,524 kr. for charges on notes was caused by our being obliged, owing to the increase in our circulation and the dilapidated state of our stock of notes, to ask for new notes. Owing to the state of the roads, Tehran office sent these via London. We much regret that this enormous charge was incurred; the amount is quite out of proportion to any immediate benefit which we shall receive, and has turned what would otherwise have been a profitable year into an unprofitable one.

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No. 594.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 706.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegrams Nos. 676 and 690 of the 11th and 13th instant respectively.

The Russian Minister made a communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, to the effect that as soon as the Persian Government complied with the three demands the Russian Government would begin to withdraw the troops from Kasvin. This assurance is, of course, subject to the conditions referred to at the end of the *aide mémoire* handed to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Nératof (see Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 331), and the Russian Government may possibly construe as acts of provocation the anti-Russian agitation throughout Persia in which the clergy with the Ulema of Nejed have now joined.

The Russian Minister also informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he would accept, with a slight amendment, the latter's formula for the second demand (see my telegram No. 686 of 13th December).

The submission of the Persian Government thus seems to be facilitated, but even though a sufficient number of deputies have, I understand, resigned their seats so that there will be no quorum in the Medjliss. It is by no means certain whether, in view

of the popular indignation which the Cabinet are much afraid of, they will have the courage to comply with the Russian demands. They, doubtless, foresee that if there should be any delay in withdrawing the troops the general indignation will be intensified.

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No. 595.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 707.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

MY telegram No. 629 of 2nd December.

Following from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht, 15th December :—

"200 infantry and 400 Cossacks have arrived at Enzeli."

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

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No. 596.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 708.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

SHIRAZ boycott.

Please see my telegram No. 705 of last night.

Strong orders were sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Karguzar last night.

I have told acting consul to take no active measures without consulting me. I have also instructed him to inform the Karguzar that I shall demand his dismissal unless he bestirs himself to stop the boycott.

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No. 597.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 709.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see telegram No. 339 from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

The Russian Minister's communication to the Persian Government of the 13th December (reported in my telegram No. 693 of the 14th December) merely expressed the Russian Government's intention of withdrawing the troops, and was not very convincing to the Persian Government. The new communication, made yesterday, reported in my telegram No. 706, was more explicit.

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No. 598.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Stockholm, December 16, 1911.

SWEDISH press states that Swedish officer, Lieutenant Denuphi, has resigned his commission and started for Persia on private promise from Persian Government of employment with gendarmerie. Swedish Foreign Office inform me that they have had nothing to do with the matter, but cannot prevent officer leaving the country. They have refused a passport for his journey.

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No. 599.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 458.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

SUPPLIES for Shiraz escort.

See your telegram No. 705 of yesterday.

You will have to authorise Shiraz troops to take what measures are absolutely necessary to provide supplies for themselves. Acting vice-consul should consult with commander of troops as to measure which seem to them possible or desirable or to take with force at their disposal. In event of other means failing, force can be resorted to. A receipt for everything taken must be given, so as to secure eventual payment.

Do you think situation at Shiraz would be in any way improved by dispatch of troops?

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No. 600.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 459.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

YOUR private telegram to Sir A. Nicolson.

Are not existing Persian Cossacks at Tehran sufficient to preserve order without backing of foreign troops? I was not aware that the Persian Government have asked for help in money and arms as condition of complying with these demands.

As regards Shuster, His Majesty's Government could not object to his dismissal after all that has passed, nor could they ask Russia to rescind this demand. You can, however, discuss with M. Poklewski how the two Governments can now best obviate the adverse consequences of his dismissal. Thus, it would not be necessary to hamper effectiveness of new treasurer-general in internal administration by a formal curtailment of his powers if he promises to consult the two legations.

You should confer with your Russian colleague, and you could point out to him all the difficulties of the situation and extreme undesirability of pressing for any new demands which would involve an advance on Tehran. My view is that the three original demands should be adhered to and their number not increased. Should any changes subsequently appear desirable, they should be discussed in the first instance by you and your Russian colleague and the two home Governments and then discussed with the Persian Government later.

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No. 601.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 202 of yesterday. See my telegram No. 779 to Sir G. Buchanan, point 1, for expression of extent of my pledge to Russian Government.

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No. 602.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther

(No. 457.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 704 of 15th December.

Inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of the substance of last paragraph, and say that origin of delay appears to be at Constantinople.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 832, and Tehran, No. 460.)

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No. 603.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 834.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister has again made earnest appeal to me desiring assurances about second Russian demand to be private. I pointed out that Russia, having put forward demand publicly, could not be expected to be satisfied with private assurances thus giving impression in public that demand had been waived. I said I understood a formula had been proposed by Persian Government, which Russian Government were considering sympathetically, though it would require strengthening. When pressed for assurances about withdrawal of troops and other matters I said I would add nothing to assurances given direct by Russian Minister to Persian Government about troops, and generally that I could not assume position of mediator. Russian Government would naturally, after all that had passed, not accept mediation concerning three demands. Till these were complied with there was very little I could do; after they were settled my influence for future measures helpful to Persia would be used as outlined in my speech in Parliament on Thursday. Persian Minister made it clear that Persian Government desire to concede Russian demands, but are hampered by public opinion that is beyond their control; they therefore desire to have things made easy for them in form.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 462.)

[50472]

No. 604.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 710.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

SITUATION at Kermanshah.

Please see my telegram No. 682 of the 12th instant.

I have just received a telegram, dated the 9th December, from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah. The telegram was forwarded by runner to Hamadan, whence it was dispatched yesterday. Fighting was proceeding on the 9th December between Salar-ed-Dowleh's party and Government troops. The telegram states that business was suspended, the streets were unsafe, the Imperial Bank of Persia and the consulate were in the line of fire, and that there was general danger to life and property.

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No. 605.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 711.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see final paragraph of your telegram No. 459 of yesterday's date.

The Russian Minister's instructions, mentioned in my telegram of 16th December to Sir A. Nicolson, referred to ulterior measures. They had no reference to the present demands. The final paragraph of my telegram should be read in connection with my telegrams Nos. 684 and 702 of the 12th and 15th instant respectively.

I do not think that the Cossack brigade as at present constituted could establish or maintain a régime which was distasteful to the people. It did not succeed in saving Mohammed Ali in the revolution of 1909.

When the present Cabinet are considering the force at their command for dealing with any outbreak of popular indignation, I think they will take into account the support which they may expect to receive from the Bakhtiaris and from Yeprim's men rather than that which the Cossack brigade might afford.

Though the Persian Government have more than once expressed the hope that Russia would, after satisfaction of the three demands, facilitate a loan or advance and the purchase of arms (see my telegram No. 670 of the 8th instant), the Persians have not made help in money and arms a condition of compliance with the demands.

It would appear from your telegram that the meaning of my telegram to Sir A. Nicolson has not been clearly understood. If you have anything to add or change in your instructions I should be glad to receive fresh instructions as soon as possible.

In view of the present temper of the Russian Government, as indicated in the telegrams received from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, it will be very difficult for me, in view of the "extreme undesirability of pressing anything new which would involve the dispatch of a force to Tehran," to join my Russian colleague in advising any changes of a sufficiently drastic nature to satisfy the Russian Government.

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No. 606.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 712.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

SHIRAZ.

Please see my telegram No. 703 of the 15th December.

I am told by the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia that the situation at Shiraz will be only partially relieved by the arrival of the specie caravan now on its way up from Bushire. Bank manager urgently begs that another caravan of specie which is waiting to start from Bushire may travel under the protection of the escort which will accompany Smart.

I have told manager that I must obtain your special sanction before authorising such a step, but in the meantime I am endeavouring to stop Smart, who has either just left Bushire or is just leaving for Shiraz.

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No. 607.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 713.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

SHIRAZ.

Please see your telegram No. 458 of yesterday.

I have received several further telegrams from His Majesty's acting consul, from which it appears that the Kargazar is taking some steps to check the boycott agitation.

Acting consul has found himself compelled to accept an offer from the deputy governor to obtain a week's supplies, but this arrangement is obviously unsatisfactory.

I fear that the boycott movement might only be aggravated by the dispatch of ships to the ports. I would therefore deprecate any action of this nature.

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No. 608.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 714.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 706 of yesterday.

The Russian Minister learns from Sardar Assad that one more effort will be made to pass the Russian demands through the Medjliss. Until the result of this effort is seen the resignations of the Moderate deputies will not become effective. The Medjliss will sit on Tuesday, and if it again refuses to give satisfaction to Russia the above-mentioned resignations will be made effective; it will then be announced that the present Medjliss has ceased to exist.

The real truth is, I believe, that the public agitation has frightened those deputies who had been induced to resign into withdrawing their resignations. Although the patriotic demonstrations which marked the days immediately succeeding the ultimatum have ceased of late the influence of the clergy is having a powerful effect on public

opinion, and the feeling against compliance with the demands is growing. A Russian boycott which has been in operation for some time appears to grow rather than to diminish.

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No. 609.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 224.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

THE Electoral Law was passed by the Medjliss on the 22nd October, and was ratified by the Regent on the 4th instant. The wording of His Highness's rescript shows that he desires to make it quite clear that he entirely dissociates himself from the provisions which the law contains, as he says that he passed it on to the Minister of the Interior at once, without having had time even to read it.

The Electoral Law of 1909 (see my despatches of the 17th June and the 19th July, 1909) provided for 120 members of Parliament and for elections through electoral colleges. The present law, of which I transmit a translation herewith, provides for 136 members and for direct elections in accordance with a schedule which forms an appendix to the Electoral Law. The principal provinces are allotted the following number of representatives:—

Azerbaijan	19
Khorassan	15
Arabistan	4
Kermanshah	4
Kerman and Baluchistan	7
Mazandaran	5
Ispahan	5
Tehran	15
Fars	13
Ghilan	6
Yezd	4

Azerbaijan and Tehran are unchanged as compared to the last Electoral Law, but Fars is allotted 13 members instead of 8, while the remainder show practically no change.

It is, perhaps, not a matter for surprise that although the last Electoral Law provided for the election of 120 representatives there never have been more than 80 present in Tehran, and the divisions usually show an attendance of between 60 and 70 deputies.

The present law provides practically for universal suffrage, the only important qualification being 6 months' residence in the electoral district. Political offenders who have taken action against the Government are now added to the list of persons disqualified both from electoral rights and candidature for election.

The important change, of course, is from indirect to direct elections, and it remains to be seen how this system will prove practicable in a country where no census has ever been taken.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 609.

Electoral Law of November 4, 1911.

SECTION I.

THE number of national representatives and their division according to provinces and departments.

Article 1.—The number of the national representatives for the National Consultative Assembly in the Empire of Persia is 136.

Art. 2.—The distribution of the national representatives proportionally to the estimated population of the provinces is in accordance with the table which is appended to this law.

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SECTION II.—*Qualifications of Electors.*

Art. 3.—The electors must possess the following qualifications:—

1. They must be Persian subjects.
2. They must at least be 20 years of age.
3. They must be residents of the electoral district, or they must have been domiciled there at least for 6 months before the election.

Art. 4.—Persons who are deprived of electoral rights:—

1. Women.
2. Persons not within years of discretion, and those who stand in need of a legal guardian.
3. Foreign subjects.
4. Persons whose apostasy from the orthodox religion of Islam has been established in the presence of a duly qualified representative of the Holy Law.
5. Persons under 20 years of age.
6. Fraudulent bankrupts.
7. Mendicants and persons who earn their living by dishonourable means.
8. Murderers, thieves, and other criminals who deserve punishment in accordance with Islamic law.
9. Political offenders who have risen and taken action against the constitutional Government and the independence of the State.

Art. 5.—Persons who are deprived of electoral rights owing to their occupation and position:—

1. Military and naval men, excluding those having honorary posts.
2. Officers and employés of the police and gendarmerie within the district of their employment.

SECTION III.—*Qualifications of Candidates for Election.*

Art. 6.—Candidates for election must possess the following qualifications:—

1. They must profess the faith of His Holiness Mohammed, the son of Abdallah, unless they represent the Christian, Zoroastrian, or Jewish communities.
2. They must be Persian subjects.
3. They must be able to read and write Persian to an adequate degree.
4. They must be well known in the electoral district.
5. Their age must not fall short of 30 nor exceed 70 years.
6. They must have the reputation of being trustworthy and upright.

Art. 7.—Persons who are debarred from being elected:—

1. Princes in the first degree (sons, brothers, and paternal uncles of the King).
2. Women.
3. Foreign subjects.
4. Employés of the gendarmerie and police, as well as naval and military men, excluding officers holding honorary posts.
5. Governors, vice-governors, and their assistants within the district of their employment.

Note.—Other Government employés are eligible for election on condition that they resign their posts for the period of their election.

6. Fraudulent bankrupts.
7. Murderers, thieves, and other criminals who deserve punishment according to Islamic law.
8. Persons reputed to be heretics, or persons whose apostasy from the orthodox faith of Islam shall have been established in the presence of a duly qualified ecclesiastical judge.
9. Political offenders who have risen and taken action against the constitutional Government and the independence of the State.

SECTION IV.—*Formation of the Council of Supervision.*

Arts. 8 to 12.—Provide for a temporary committee to supervise elections under the local governor and some members of the local assembly.

SECTION V.—*Method of Election.*

Art. 13.—The election of representatives for the National Consultative Assembly in the whole Empire of Persia will be direct and of one degree.

Art. 14.—In the localities where, according to the electoral distribution, they (the electors) have the right to elect one representative, the elections will be "singular," and in localities where they (the electors) must elect more than one representative, the elections will be "plural."

Explanation.—The meaning of "plural" election is that every elector will write on the voting paper the names of a number of persons to be elected in that district. The meaning of "singular" election is that every elector will write on the voting paper the name of one person to be elected.

Art. 15.—The election of representatives will be by a relative majority.

Art. 16.—In case of an equality of votes between two or more persons, if the election of one of them be necessary, that one shall be determined by vote.

Art. 17.—The principal tribes will, in accordance with the electoral table, each send a representative direct to the National Consultative Assembly. The other tribes not mentioned will vote in their own districts.

Art. 18.—In every electoral district where several other places have to take part in the election, in case a certain number of those places should not, within the time which the central committee appoints (within the limits of this law), carry out their elections, their right of election will be forfeited, and the elections in other parts of that district will hold good.

Art. 19.—No one of the electors has the right to vote more than once save in cases where a new election shall be necessary.

Art. 20.—The electors are not absolutely compelled to elect from those resident in their own quarter.

SECTION VI.—*Issue of the Voting Papers to Determine the Electors.*

Arts. 21 to 24.

SECTION VII.—*Concerning the Taking and Counting of the Votes and the Determination of those Elected.*

Arts. 25 to 43.

SECTION 8.—*On Complaints in Reference to the Elections.*

Arts. 44 to 48.

SECTION IX.—*Miscellaneous.*

Art. 49.—As soon as half the representatives of the people, plus one, shall reach Tehran, the National Consultative Assembly shall be opened, and the decision of a majority of them shall be valid and effective.

Art. 50.—The period of the parliamentary session is two solar years, beginning on the day on which the National Consultative Assembly is opened.

Art. 51.—The travelling expenses of the deputies from the electoral district to Tehran and back will be paid to them by the Government at the rate of 5 krans a farsakh. The necessary expenses pertaining to the elections will be paid by the Government, with the knowledge of the local governors.

Art. 52.—If ever a member of the National Consultative Assembly should resign or die, and more than three months remain of the session, the people of the place (his constituency) will elect (another representative) in his place, but if the people of the place (his constituency) have not elected their own representative within three months from the date of notice, the National Assembly will elect a person in the place of the representative who has died or resigned.

Art. 53.—Three months before the expiration of every session the Government will give notice of a general election, and the people may, if they desire, re-elect any of their previous representatives.

The Electoral Law, which is composed of fifty-three articles, was passed by a majority of fifty-two votes at the sitting of the 28th Shaval, 1329 (22nd October, 1911).

HUSSEIN, MOTAMIN-UL-MULK.

President of the National Consultative Assembly.

This Electoral Law of the National Consultative Assembly is brought to my notice by virtue of articles 17 and 33 of the Fundamental Law. On this 12th day (4th November, 1911), at sunset, this law was for the first time brought to me through the Ministry of the Interior, and as there was no time to read it, it was at once given to the Ministry of the Interior in order to cause no delay.

NASER-UL-MULK, NAIB-ES-SULTANEH.

12th of Zikadeh, 1329 (4th November, 1911).

In accordance with the commands of His Highness the Regent, it is put into execution,

KAVAM-ES-SULTANEH,

Minister of the Interior.

12th of Zikadeh, 1329 (4th November, 1911).

SCHEDULE OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS.

Names of Provinces and Districts.	Names of Subsidiary Places in the District.	Number of Representatives.	Centre of Electoral District.
Azerbaijan (19 persons.)	Tabreez, &c. Ardebil, &c. Karabedagh, &c. Serab, &c. Maragha, &c. Soujhoulak, &c. Urna, &c. Khoi, &c.	9 2 1 1 2 1 1 2	Tabreez. Ardebil. Ahar. Serab. Maragha. Soujhoulak. Urna. Khoi.
Astrabad (1 person.)	Astrabad, &c.	1	Astrabad.
Isfahan (5 persons.)	Isfahan, &c. Kumishab, &c. Porejoun, &c.	3 1 1	Isfahan. Kumishab. Nejefabad.
Luristan (4 persons.)	Burujird, &c. Khoremsabad, &c.	2 2	Burujird. Khoremsabad.
Khoremsan (15 persons.)	Meshed, &c. Kolāt, &c. Turshiz, &c. Sabzevar, &c. Turbat, &c. Nishapur, &c. Kuchan, &c. Bujourd, &c. Tebbas, &c. Kahnat, &c. Seistan, &c. Zenjan, &c.	4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3	Meshed. Derregez. Sultanabad. Sabzevar. Turbat. Nishapur. Kuchan. Bujourd. Tebbas. Birjand. Seistan. Zenjan.
Khamsab (3 persons.)	Semnan, &	1	Semnan.
Semnan and Daughan (1 person.)	Savah, &c.	1	Savah.
Shahrud (1 person.)	Shahrud, &c.	1	Shahrud.
Tehran (15 persons.)	Tehran, &c. Ghar, &c. Khar, &c. Shahrud, &c.	12 1 1 1	Tehran. Shahabulazim. Aivanikeif. Kurdan.

Names of Provinces and Districts.	Names of Subsidiary Places in the District.	Number of Representatives.	Centre of Electoral District.
Demavend (1 person.)	Demavend, &c.	1	Demavend.
Irak (2 persons.)	Sultanabad, &c.	2	Sultanabad.
Arakbistati (4 persons.)	Dizful, &c. Shushter, &c. Mohammereh, &c. Beni Truf, &c.	1 1 1 1	Dizful. Shushter. Mohammereh. Beni Truf.
Fars (13 persons.)	Shiraz, &c. Fassa, &c. Abadeh, &c. Behbahan, &c. Bashire, &c. Lar, &c. Abbas, &c. Jahrum, &c.	3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1	Shiraz. Fassa. Abadeh. Behbahan. Bashire. Lar. Abbas. Jahrum.
Kazvin (2 persons.)	Kazvin, &c.	2	Kazvin.
Kashan (2 persons.)	Kashan, &c.	2	Kashan.
Kurdistan (4 persons.)	Semneh, &c. Sakkis, &c.	3 1	Semneh. Sakkis.
Kermanshah (4 persons.)	Kermanshah, &c.	4	Kermanshah.
Gerrus (1 person.)	Bijar, &c.	1	Bijar.
Kerman and Baluchistan (7 persons.)	Kerman, &c. Rafsinjan, &c. Sirjan, &c. Rayin, &c. Jiruft, &c. Baluchistan, &c.	2 1 1 1 1 1	Kerman. Rafsinjan. Sirjan. Bam. Jiruft. Ghohtij.
Gulpaigan (2 persons.)	Gulpaigan, &c. Kemerah, &c.	1 1	Gulpaigan. Mahallat.
Ghilan (6 persons.)	Resht, &c. Enzeli, &c. Khamsch, &c. Fomen, &c. Lahijan, &c.	2 1 1 1 1	Resht. Enzeli. Kerganrud. Fomen. Lahijan.
Mazanderan (3 persons.)	Sari, &c. Barfrush, &c.	2 3	Sari. Barfrush.
Malayir (2 persons.)	Malayir, &c.	2	Dowlatabad.
Hamadan (2 persons.)	Hamadan, &c.	2	Hamadan.
Yezd (4 persons.)	Yezd, &c. Nain, &c.	3 1	Yezd. Nain.
Tribes (5 persons.)	Bakhtiari Shahsevan Turkomans Kashgal Khamseh	1 1 1 1 1	To be fixed by the Ministry of the Interior.
Other religious denominations (4 persons.)	Armenians of Azerbaijan and Chaldeans Armenians of the South Paraces Jews	1 1 1 1	

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No. 610.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 225.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit extracts from a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht respecting the conduct of the Russian consulate at Astrabad and of the Russian commissioner for the Turkomans at Gombad Kabuz. Mr. Rabino's information is based upon reports from our native agent at Astrabad, and I have no means of verifying whether these are too highly coloured or not.

I have brought the most serious instances of alleged interference on behalf of the

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ex-Shah to the notice of my Russian colleague, but the fashion in which the recent high-handed action of the Russian consul-general in Tehran has been endorsed by the Russian Government at the cost of open disavowal of the Russian Minister must go far to paralyse the latter's efforts to restrain the over-zealous consular and other officers nominally placed under his orders in Persia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 610.

Extract from "Astrabad News" No. 10.

THE conduct of Russian officials at Astrabad is surprising, not to say extraordinary, in the extreme.

In answer to a complaint from the Saad-i-Lashkar (the then deputy Governor of Astrabad) that Chigit horsemen were helping the ex-Shah, the Russian consul informed him that the Sunni gazis had issued a fatwa instructing all good Sunnis to help the King of Islam, and that the Tekkeh and Chigit horsemen were, therefore, only obeying the dictates of their conscience in helping the ex-Shah. On the other hand, the Russian commissioner of Gombad Kabuz went to Gumish-tepe with fifty sowars and arrested two or three Turcomans, who were accused of being in favour of the Constitution and brought them to the ex-Shah. He also arrested five Caucasians who were on their way from Khojeh Nefes to Gumish-tepe, brought them to town and lodged them in prison at the Russian consulate.

The Russian commissioner is also reported to be using all his efforts to prevent the Turcomans from abandoning the ex-Shah, and to be spreading disquieting reports in Astrabad.

A number of people have asked the consul for protection. He informed them that should they present him a petition signed by a large number of townsmen and inhabitants of the districts, he would ask his Government to lend troops for the protection of their lives and property. The merchants refused to submit to him such a petition.

The Hajjib-ed-Dowleh, with 200 Turcoman sowars, entered Astrabad and summoned the merchants to pay a contribution of 12,000 tomans. Only 4,000 tomans, however, were forthcoming, and were paid in at the Russian consulate and sent to the ex-Shah by a ghulam of the Russian consulate.

After the defeat of the Serdar Moby and the Government troops the Russian consul set out for Yekeh Maya, and is reported to have invited the Turcomans to advance against the city. However this may be, soon after his return to the city large numbers of Turcomans were seen to be arriving on the outskirts of the city. The inhabitants were in a real state of alarm, and many of them have taken refuge at the Russian consulate.

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No. 611.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 226.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 222, Confidential, of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that before the expiry of the time allowed by the Russian Government for the satisfaction of their demands in connection with the taking possession of the Shoah-es-Saltaneh's properties (*i.e.*, 48 hours, though this period was not expressly mentioned to the Persian Government), the remnant of the Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had resigned. M. Poklewski was therefore in some doubt as to how to act on his instructions, which he received on the 14th instant, to break off relations with the Cabinet. He telegraphed to his Government that if the new Cabinet when formed did not forthwith satisfy the two demands—*i.e.*, tender a formal apology and substitute Persian Cossacks on the properties in question for the Treasury gendarmes—he would break off relations with it. In reply, he was instructed to break off relations at once. His Government had informed him as to the measures they contemplated in the event of the Persian Government's refusing to satisfy the two demands. These measures were the dispatch of a Russian force to

Kazvin to permit of a detachment's being summoned by him to Tehran to remove the Treasury gendarmes from Shoah-es-Saltaneh's properties, and M. Poklewski had recommended that, in order to make sure of the attainment of the object in view, a force of 4,000 men should be sent. M. Poklewski was now informed that orders had been given to the Caucasus authorities to dispatch these troops.

On the 18th November the Russian Minister carried out his instructions, sending his chief dragoman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to say that his relations with the Government were severed, and that for the conduct of current affairs communications were to be addressed to his staff. He added that troops were being dispatched.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, who though he had resigned was still carrying on the affairs of his Ministry, at once sent his "chef de cabinet," Moin-el-Vezireh, to beg me to convey to you an appeal from the Persian Government to mediate at St. Petersburg with a view to suspending the dispatch of troops. Moin-el-Vezireh stated that a Cabinet was on the eve of formation, and assured me that all indications pointed to the new Ministry's giving prompt satisfaction to Russia's two demands. On the 20th, Moin-el-Vezireh again visited me, and stated that if the Persian Government were assured that the troops would be withdrawn on the satisfaction of the two demands, and that their presence would not be used to put forward other demands, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would apologise as soon as the Cabinet was formed, and the gendarmes would be withdrawn from Shoah-es-Saltaneh's properties and be replaced by Persian Cossacks. I notice that a similar communication was on the same day made to you by the Persian Minister in London when he asked, on behalf of his Government, for the advice of His Majesty's Government.

On the receipt of the instructions you sent me on the assurances given by the Russian President of the Council to Sir G. Buchanan (see the latter's telegram No. 288), I let the Persian Government know verbally and by *pro-memoria* that His Majesty's Government had reason to believe that, if they satisfied the two demands, the Russian troops would be withdrawn, and I added that it would be wiser for the Persian Government to comply without loss of time. I made this communication on the morning of the 21st, and the same evening Vossuk-ed-Dowleh sent me a message that Samsam-es-Sultaneh had at last formed his Cabinet, which would be presented on the following day. Moin-el-Vezireh who brought me the message was to ask me to express to you the gratitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs for your good offices and advice. He was to add that my communication had been discussed by the members of the new Cabinet and by the prominent deputies of the Medjliss, with the result that it had been decided that after the Cabinet had been presented to the Medjliss on the following day, the two demands would be satisfied forthwith.

The Cabinet was introduced to the Medjliss in a somewhat incomplete form on the 22nd November, and Moin-el-Vezireh called in the evening to say that the Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, who had resumed his portfolio but had been, owing to indisposition, unable to attend at the Medjliss, hoped to be well enough to tender the formal apology on the following day, and that the gendarmes would be replaced by Cossacks as soon as possible.

By this time I had learned from Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 290 that there was some likelihood that the assurances given by the Russian President of the Council to Sir G. Buchanan would not be fulfilled, and I was in some doubt how far I ought to let the Persian Government know that our reason for believing that the troops would be withdrawn on the Persian Government's satisfying the two demands was no longer so strong as it had been. On the one hand, I felt that to do so might retard a settlement of the two demands, satisfaction of which would always be something gained, besides which, I thought that your representations at St. Petersburg might bear fruit. On the other hand, if I gave the Persian Government no hint how the hand lay it would make it all the harder to face the tempest of recrimination which was likely to ensue on the discovery that the Persian Government in following our advice had not secured the withdrawal of the troops. In the circumstances, I thought it well merely to emphasise the delay which had occurred since our advice was tendered on the morning of the 21st instant. I enclose a copy of a letter which I addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with this end in view. Copies of the reply and of my rejoinder are also enclosed.

Early on the 24th I received a further letter from Moin-el-Vezireh, asking me when the Russian Minister would receive the formal apology from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and stating that Persian Cossacks had already replaced the Treasury gendarmes on Shoah-es-Saltaneh's property. An appointment for Vossuk-ed-Dowleh's visit was made for the afternoon, and at 2-30 he called on the Russian Minister in his official

robes and tendered the desired apology. By this time the Treasury gendarmes on the principal property had already been replaced by Persian Cossacks, and parties of the latter force had been dispatched to take over the properties in the suburbs.

After receiving the apology of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Russian Minister told his Excellency that he was authorised to resume relations with the Cabinet, but that, in view of the delay which had occurred in complying with his Government's two demands and in view of the fact that some of the Russian troops had already landed, he did not think that his Government would be entirely satisfied by the reparation accorded. They would probably present further demands, and this was all the more likely, seeing that since the presentation of the original demands Mr. Shuster had given further provocation by distributing among the public in Persia translations of his recent open letter to the press.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 611.

Sir G. Barclay to Moin-el-Vezirch.

My dear Moin-el-Vezirch, Tehran, November 23, 1911.
EVERY moment's delay renders the chance of the withdrawal of the troops less. I am, therefore, intensely surprised that the gendarmes have not already been replaced by Persian Cossacks. The indisposition of Vossuk-ed-Dowleh was most unfortunate, and I wish he had been able to apologise yesterday.

Yours, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 611.

Moin-el-Vezirch to Sir G. Barclay.

My dear Minister, Tehran, November 23, 1911.
I HASTEN to state, in reply to your letter of this morning, that we have lost no time in acting upon the advice of your Government to comply with the Russian demands, on the express understanding that the Russian troops will be withdrawn forthwith.

The real and personal properties will have been taken over this evening and the gendarmes relieved by Persian Cossacks.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh is still waiting to hear from your Excellency at what time he can execute proposal No. 2. I am glad to say that he is better to-day.

Yours, &c.
HUSSEIN KHAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 611.

Sir G. Barclay to Moin-el-Vezirch.

My dear Moin-el-Vezirch, Tehran, November 23, 1911.
I MUST, in reply to your note just received, point out that there is no express understanding that the Russian troops will be withdrawn forthwith.

You will remember that the phrase used was "have reason to believe," which exactly expressed the state of the case at mid-day on Tuesday.

As soon as the Russian Minister learns from Colonel Vadholski that the gendarmes have been replaced by Persian Cossacks, he will be ready to receive the Minister for Foreign Affairs in "Khilaa" for the apology.

Yours, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

No. 612.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 227.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 25, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 208 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the engagement reported in that despatch in the neighbourhood of Bander Gez seems to have been more serious than at first appeared, a Government force of some 600 men having been completely defeated by the ex-Shah's brother Shoa-es-Sultaneh and 700 Turkomans. I have no more recent information on which I can rely, but the whole district of Astrabad appears to have fallen back into the ex-Shah's hands.

The situation at Tabreez has been somewhat relieved, Shuja-ed-Dowleh having allowed several of the roads leading to the town to be opened for the importation of provisions, in order, it is believed, that the villagers should be enabled to sell their produce, and thus be a more profitable prey to his exactions. A deputation of the townspeople visited him at Basminch to open negotiations a week or two ago, but these have led to nothing, and he still threatens the town with a force of some 1,500 men. There was talk at one time of sending troops from Tehran to deal with him, but, so far, these plans have not materialised.

Salar-ed-Dowleh was pursued into Luristan by the Bakhtiariis under Sardar Bahadur, who, according to reports received by the Government, inflicted a second defeat on him in the neighbourhood of Barujird on or about the 16th November. He had with him at the time some 2,000 horsemen, 500 of whom are reported to have been killed or wounded. His present whereabouts is unknown.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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No. 613.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 229.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 592 and 593 of the 21st instant and your telegram No. 378 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to transmit the text of a verbal communication which the two legations made yesterday to the Bakhtiari khans.

It will be observed that the wording of the first part departs from that of your telegram No. 378, but I could not bring my colleague to join in a communication exactly on the lines of that telegram. He evidently feared lest his Government might object to the discouragement which the khans would read into your opening phrase. The khans were pressing for a reply to their enquiries, and I did not think the difference between your text and the one desired by my colleague sufficient to warrant the delay which would have been involved by further reference to our two Governments.

The communication was made by Mr. Churchill and M. de Giers to the Samsam-es-Sultaneh and Amir-i-Mujahid, who seemed to be highly satisfied with it, as it dispels the fears some of the khans apparently have felt as to the probability of any attempt on their part to take power into their own hands (as they express it) leading to military action by Russia which would deprive them of the fruits of their efforts. They asked Mr. Churchill and M. de Giers a number of questions as to the exact bearing of the reference in the communication to the "interest" of the two Powers, and further questioned M. de Giers as to the eventual attitude of Russia with regard to the ex-Shah and as to the ultimate withdrawal of the Russian troops. The two dragomans explained in general terms that the two Powers, whose wish was to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia, would be guided in their relations with this country by the attitude of the Persian Government towards them, and the different specific questions they had raised would no doubt be dealt with on their merits.

The khans were anxious to have a written copy of the communication, but this the dragomans were not empowered to give them, but they allowed one of the khans to take down a copy of their translation of it.

They gathered that Samsam-es-Sultaneh, who had that morning handed in his resignation to the Regent, was being strongly urged by a section of the khans to bring

about a *coup d'état* with a view to putting an end to the Medjliss and forming a purely Bakhtiari Cabinet with autocratic power, which they would use in the first place to satisfy Russia's demands and place their relations with the two Powers on a sound working basis. On the other hand, there are not wanting signs of dissensions among the khans, and some of them, notably Amir Mufakhem and Sardar-i-Jang, are thought to have the interests of the ex-Shah at heart. Sardar Assad is now on his way back to Persia, and is at this moment at Rostoff. His return to Tehran, which the other khans are endeavouring to prevent, may modify any plans which his brothers and cousins may have made in the meantime, as he is reported to be hand-in-glove with the Ultra-Nationalists or Democratic party.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 613.

Anglo-Russian Verbal Communication to the Bakhtiari Khans, made on November 27, 1911.

THE two Powers do not see their way to giving advice to the Bakhtiari in this matter, which is of a purely internal nature, but they can tell the Bakhtiari that they do not contemplate any interference so long as their interests are respected.

As regards guarantees, the two Ministers can only assure the khans again of the friendly sympathy of their Governments so long as the Bakhtiari act in a manner friendly to the two Powers. This friendly sympathy should ensure fair treatment for the Bakhtiari.

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No. 614.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Greg.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 230.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 28, 1911.

THE past few weeks have been a period of protracted crisis, and Samsam-es-Sultaneh is still as far as ever from achieving that desideratum on which the Regent has always laid such stress—a strong Cabinet backed by a stable majority in the Medjliss.

As reported in my telegram No. 565 of the 14th instant, the remnant of the Cabinet, composed only of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on the 13th instant. For weeks past Samsam-es-Sultaneh had been vainly endeavouring to fill the vacant posts, but he could not induce the Medjliss to accept his candidates. The post over which there was the greatest difficulty was that of Minister of the Interior, which the Medjliss insisted should be resumed by Kawam-es-Sultaneh, who had left the Cabinet owing to dissensions with the Prime Minister. Kawam-es-Sultaneh is an advanced democrat, and is more than ever unacceptable to the Regent and Samsam-es-Sultaneh as a candidate for the Ministry of the Interior now that the elections are impending. It was, I believe, the difficulties Samsam-es-Sultaneh found in completing his Cabinet more than the Russian ultimatum which led him to resign.

For ten days there was no Cabinet at all, and the Ministry, which Samsam-es-Sultaneh at length on the 22nd instant introduced to the Medjliss, only consisted of four members. It was introduced in this incomplete form in order not further to delay satisfaction of the two Russian demands in connection with the incident at Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties created by the Russian consul-general. Up to now the vacant posts have not been filled, the Medjliss still stubbornly refusing the candidates proposed by Samsam-es-Sultaneh. The artificial moderate majority so carefully nursed by the Regent has disappeared, and the democrats, who have been joined by a section of the Medjliss which had hitherto wavered between the two parties, now appear to command a majority. It is the incompatibility of a compact and united moderate Cabinet with the present Medjliss which is the Regent's despair, and there seems little likelihood of the new elections thinning the democrat ranks. The message of sympathy from the two Governments delivered to the Regent, as reported in my telegram No. 551 of the 8th instant, produced no effect, and His Highness appears still

determined, if not to resign, at least to go on leave, which may prove to be the stepping-stone to resignation.

The situation to-day is confused and uncertain to the last degree. The Cabinet is demoralised, the Regent apparently on the point of deserting his post, the Bakhtiari are contemplating a *coup d'état*, and on the top of this utter confusion comes now a second Russian ultimatum demanding within forty-eight hours the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and other things. To allow only forty-eight hours for compliance with these far-reaching demands is a mockery, and before the end of this week we may expect to see the Russian troops, some 2,000 of which have already landed, on their way to Kazvin. It is, I fear, very doubtful whether even this will induce the Medjliss to vote the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and to consent to the undertaking demanded in the matter of the engagement of foreign assistants. It will be remembered that the presence of a detachment of Russian troops at Kazvin did suffice last year to secure the prolongation of the copper mining concession in Azerbaijan, or the concession to run motor cars on the Russian roads—matters of comparably less difficulty than what is now demanded. Possibly the advance of the Russian troops may give impetus to Bakhtiari ambitions and they may attempt the contemplated *coup d'état*. This, if successful, would extricate Russia from a difficult position, and there can, I think, be little doubt that it is the development which would be the most welcome to the Russian Minister, but there is no certainty that it would prove successful. At present there are only some 700 Bakhtiari in Tehran, and one branch of the tribe is believed to be playing rather for a restoration of Mohammad Ali than for Bakhtiari ascendancy, the spoils of which it feels would, in the event of a successful *coup d'état*, fall to the rival branch. Moreover, the Bakhtiari in equipment are not equal to the men whom Yprem could muster on behalf the Medjliss. I see no possible development that could cause us any satisfaction. Even supposing the Medjliss, yielding to *force majeure*, were to comply forthwith with the Russian demands and dismiss Mr. Shuster, this means at best the breakdown of the one serious effort of Persia to extricate herself from the morass of disorder in which she has sunk. She had at last brought herself to vest in a very able foreigner sufficient powers to effect some reform. It is truly deplorable that this first really hopeful experiment at comprehensive reform should have failed. It is all the more so in that the demand for Mr. Shuster's dismissal must always be in some degree associated with an incident in which the Russian consul-general in Tehran played a part entirely in harmony with the reputation he very generally enjoys as an *agent provocateur*.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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No. 615.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Greg.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 530 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, forwarding a report from His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, of a conversation with the Sheikh of Mohammerah regarding the Mohammerah-Khorembad railway.

As regards article 4 in the draft contract providing for the free grant of land by the Persian Government for the purposes of the railway, Captain Haworth suggests that it might be possible to make a private arrangement with the sheikh allotting him a certain number of shares in the company. This suggestion would appear to be impracticable from the nature of the undertaking.

The sheikh, however, as well as other powerful landowners, will doubtless require compensation for the land used, and I am inclined to think that when the negotiations are resumed with the Persian Government, it would be better to modify article 4 in a sense less likely to provoke the hostility of those whose lands would have to be expropriated.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 615.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Bushire, October 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, copy of a letter received from His Majesty's consul, Mohammerah, on the subject of the application for a concession for a Khor-Musa-Khoreinabad railway and the interests of the sheikh of Mohammerah in connection therewith.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Persia, &c.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 615.

Consul Haworth to Colonel Cox.

Sir,

Mohammerah, October 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 964 and 965 of the 2nd October, I informed the Sheikh of Mohammerah that a company of high standing had approached the Persian Government with the offer of a loan for the construction of a railway from Mohammerah or Khor-Musa to Khoreinabad, that the company was an entirely British one, and proposed to construct and work the line, and that the treasurer-general had placed the proposals before the cabinet with a view to their being submitted to the Medjliss. The sheikh left himself entirely in our hands, and said he trusted that we would see that his rights were maintained; as in my former conversation with him on the subject he referred to the fact that a railway would render him far more accessible to the Persian Government, and said that he relied on us to support him against encroachments.

I would suggest that while pursuing the terms of article 4, that all land would be given by the Persian Government free, it might be possible to make a private arrangement with the sheikh allotting him a certain number of shares in the company; it has to be remembered that though the Persian Government is, or may be, content to give the land free, they do so for a definite consideration; the sheikh, who does not participate in that consideration, can hardly be expected to follow their example.

In so far as the railway line passes through the sheikh's territories he will be expected to give protection and safety to its employes; the suzerain Power then receives the benefits of the concession in the sheikh's lands, but it will be the latter, in reality, who will be called upon to supply all that the company requires—a fact which, I trust, will not be lost sight of in the carrying on of the negotiations.

I have, &c.

L. HAWORTH.

[50540]

No. 616.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 232.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

IN my despatch No. 212 of the 31st October I alluded to the possibility of the increase in our consular escorts making its moral effects felt in a diminution of disorder on the southern roads.

So far this seems to have been the case as regards the Shiraz-Bushire road, as, except for the robbery on the 4th November of a small caravan of local produce and telegraph stores at the hands of Kashguis near Kazerun, and the attack on the caravan conveying the two Japanese reported in my telegram No. 589 of the 20th November, no robberies have been reported to me since the two squadrons of Indian cavalry left Bushire on the 2nd instant, and a telegram received to-day from the acting consul at Shiraz states that ordinary caravans are moving fairly freely, though the authorities profess themselves unable to provide guards for the passage of caravans conveying specie, which is urgently needed by the Imperial Bank of Persia at Shiraz.

At the same time it was thought necessary that the sepoys leaving Ispahan on their return to India should not travel alone between Kazerun and Bushire, in consequence of a report from Mr. Vice-Consul Chick, who accompanied the cavalry as far as Kazerun, and on his way south had an opportunity of gauging the effect on the local tribal chiefs of the passage of our troops. He stated that the chiefs were considerably exercised as regards the question of "rahdari," or illegal road tax, which culminated on one occasion in an imprudent road guard firing off his rifle to intimidate one of the muleteers belonging to the troops' caravan. His rifle and those of the other tufangchis were confiscated. This incident and the inaccurate reports in local newspapers of the future intentions of the British Government as regards the employment of the troops as caravan escorts seems to have put the khans in a dangerous temper.

As regards the Shiraz-Ispahan road there is no improvement to report. His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan reporting on the 11th November that on the Shiraz road there was practically no caravan traffic, and repeating the same remark on the 18th November. One caravan on its way to Kumisheh was attacked near Orchini Pass by Kuhgeluis. On the 8th November the merchants of Ispahan telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior protesting against the insecurity of the roads in general.

The Bakhtiari road continues in a very unsatisfactory condition, but severe cold with a corresponding decrease of robbers is setting in.

Large arrivals of merchandise formerly abandoned on the road are now reported.

An attack on a caravan of 150 camels chartered by Messrs. Lynch occurred at Malamir during the month, and on the 8th instant, near Gav Peeseh, two bags containing the whole of the kit of two sowar reliefs proceeding to the Ispahan consulate were stolen, the value of which I shall claim from the Persian Government as soon as I have received particulars.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[50541]

No. 617.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 233.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 617.

*Summary of Events in Persia for the Month of November.**Tehran.*

The Cabinet.—After repeated crises, and considerable opposition on the part of a section of the Medjliss to the inclusion of Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh, the Cabinet was completed on the 29th November as follows:—

Premier and Minister of the Interior	...	Samsam-es-Sultaneh.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	...	Vosouk-ed-Dowleh.
Minister for War	...	Sardar Mohtashem.
Minister for Finance	...	Zoka-ul-Mulk.
Minister for Public Instruction	...	Mushir-ed-Dowleh.
Minister for Posts and Telegraphs	...	Moazed-es-Sultaneh.
Minister for Justice	...	Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh.

The Medjliss.—On the 31st October a Bill was passed abolishing the pensions and allowances of those who had risen against the Government since the general amnesty of 1909, and on the 9th November a further Bill was passed abolishing the pensions of well-known reactionaries to the extent of 18,785 toman a-year, while certain other pensions were reduced.

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On the 2nd November a Bill was passed giving Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar the lease of the oxide mines in the island of Hormuz. The text of this Bill is transmitted in a separate despatch.

Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh's concession regarding Government control over the importation of silkworm seeds was discussed on the 11th November, and a proposal to extend it for seven years was rejected.

At the same sitting a Bill was passed authorising the employment of ten more American officials for the Ministry of Finance, and a credit of 24,900 dollars a-year for their pay was voted.

At this sitting an important letter addressed to the Medjliss by the Regent was read, in which His Highness threatened to resign if certain conditions were not fulfilled. A translation of this letter is annexed. Telegrams from Tabreez, Resht, Meshed, and some other towns, urging the Medjliss to prolong its session, were read at the same sitting, and after considerable debate on the 12th and 13th, a majority of 46 out of 69 votes decided, on the 13th November, that the session should be prolonged until just over half the members of the new Medjliss are in Tehran. The two years' session of the Medjliss came to an end on the 14th November.

A committee was chosen to discuss matters with the Regent in connection with his proposed resignation, and presented a report to the Medjliss which, however, was not read in public. The committee stated that in view of the Regent's indisposition it was proposed that he should go to Europe on short leave after the formation of a Cabinet.

On the 22nd November Samsam-es-Sultaneh presented three Cabinet Ministers by letter including Vosouk-ed-Dowleh as Foreign Minister, and on the 29th November, after a stormy debate, the Cabinet was completed as reported above, forty-one deputies supporting it and eighteen rejecting it.

Russian Demands.—The Russian demands regarding Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property were first delivered to the Persian Government on the 11th November. On the 23rd November the Treasury guards were removed from the property, and the following day the Foreign Minister tendered the desired apology to the Russian Minister.

On the 29th November the Russian Minister presented Russia's ultimatum demanding Mr. Shuster's dismissal within forty-eight hours.

Miscellaneous.—On the 28th October Sardar Jang arrived at Tehran from Hamadan and Amir Mufakham from Sultanabad.

On the 3rd November Mr. Shuster sent Treasury guards to collect certain taxes from Ali-ed-Dowleh, who at once complained to the Prime Minister. Amir Mujahid and Sardar Jang accompanied Ali-ed-Dowleh back to his house and disarmed the Treasury guards. The Prime Minister eventually apologised to Mr. Shuster, and the incident was closed.

Farrukh Farma left Tehran for Tabreez as Governor-General on the 4th November.

A translation of Mr. Shuster's letter to the "Times" was circulated largely at Tehran on the 12th November, a few days after it appeared in London.

Colonel Merrill left Tehran on the 13th November with 200 Treasury guards for Kazvin and Zenjan, to collect revenue.

M. de Borchgraeve, the newly-appointed Belgian Minister, has arrived with his family.

Prices continue to rise and bread is very dear.

The Press.—The newspaper "Medjliss" is the only daily paper.

The "Tamadon," which was suppressed a few months ago, has reappeared, and has published a full translation of Mr. Shuster's letter to the "Times."

A comic paper published a caricature depicting Mr. Shuster as working in the interests of the British Government, and was promptly suppressed.

G. P. CHURCHILL.

His Highness the Regent to the President of the Medjliss,

November 11, 1911.

I transmit to you a memorandum which I request you to submit to the careful consideration of the members of the Medjliss. As you are fully aware of the present state of affairs, I am sure you will agree that I am justified in sending this memorandum, and, in requesting you to explain it fully to the deputies, I hope that it will produce a satisfactory result.

To the National Assembly :

As the deputies are fully aware of the present state of affairs, any explanation is superfluous. I need only say that, as you are fully aware, for some time past the Cabinet has been incomplete and practically on the point of dissolution. Although the services rendered by His Highness Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the Premier, are well known to the State and nation, he has been so hampered by repeated crises and want of co-operation that he actually decided to hand in his resignation, which I have prevented him from doing. But it is obvious that without the formation and completion of the Cabinet, as well as the necessary co-operation, he cannot put his good intentions into execution.

As a general election is at hand and troubles are apprehended next spring, it is obvious that if a Cabinet is not formed at once with the necessary co-operation of the Medjliss and does not put into execution a properly drawn up programme for the maintenance of security in the country—on which the carrying out of the elections greatly depends—and the prevention of trouble in the spring, and if the Medjliss does not approve of the measures proposed for the maintenance of order, it will be extremely difficult at this critical juncture to feel assured that the necessary measures for the prevention of future difficulties will be carried out.

Under these circumstances, I need only point out the importance of the occasion and to express the hope that the Medjliss will give its full support to the Premier in his task of forming and completing the Cabinet and of drawing up a programme.

Furthermore, I consider it necessary to say that, as I stated in my telegrams from Europe, the support of everyone is necessary to a constitutional Regent and that party differences cause obstruction and bring about crises, and that therefore, seeing that tranquillity is absolutely essential under the present circumstances, such crises are detrimental to the interests of the country.

At the time when I went through certain legal formalities at the Medjliss, I stated that if discord should unfortunately bring about further confusion in affairs, I would not be able to continue to witness such an unfortunate state of affairs. But as from three months ago the signs of discord, and even of imputations against the Regency, which should be respected by all, became apparent—as is well known to all the deputies—I at that time decided to resign the Regency. As, however, troubles of a most serious nature supervened, I had patience, and postponed the carrying out of my resolve lest it should be thought that I had been indifferent to my responsibilities. But in order that this matter should not take place unexpectedly without any preparations having been made, I took measures, during the last few days, to ask the deputies to consult with the authorities, and to take such measures as they may consider advisable. I therefore remind the Medjliss that if serious measures are not taken in this matter, I will find myself forced to carry my decision into effect without any further preliminaries, and to make the matter public. At the time of my going through the legal formalities at the Medjliss, I declared that no conscientious person could hold me responsible for this act, and in trying to put an end to discord, I have made superhuman efforts, but I regret to say that they have proved vain.

In my opinion, the deputies are responsible to the public, and it is incumbent upon them to devote their whole energies to the carrying out of these important affairs. They must not look upon themselves as freed from their responsibilities until they have arrived at a satisfactory solution of these difficulties.

In conclusion, I must again insist on the importance of the occasion—on the essential need of giving effect to the above-mentioned objects, and on the evil consequences of their neglect. I point out my irresponsibility, and by doing my duty and drawing your attention to the above matters I free my conscience of all further obligation.

Tabreez.

There is no improvement in the situation at Tabreez. The investment of the town by Shuja-ed-Dowleh, at the head of some 2,000 followers, continues.

The state of affairs in the town is very serious, and several of the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages have taken "bast" in the country seat of the Russian consul-general, as a protest against the miseries they are suffering. The townspeople have failed to come to terms with the Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and are powerless to relieve the situation unless the Government at Tehran intervenes. The presence of the Russian troops is, apparently, the only assurance for the maintenance of tranquillity. The

Cossack battalion, which has fallen below strength owing to the departure of time-expired men, is to be relieved by a fresh battalion.

Chilan and Mazanderan.

The British consular agent at Astrabad reports that Mohammed Ali is still at Khoja Nafis, and that the Russian consul is giving every encouragement to the followers of the ex-Shah. Also that the Turkomans attacked the town on the 11th November, killing forty-seven men and capturing thirty-five, and that owing to their presence in the vicinity of Astrabad, large numbers of the inhabitants are taking refuge in the Russian consulate.

The Russian consular guard at Astrabad is to be strengthened by 200 Cossacks with two quick-firing guns, with a view to protecting Russian lives and property.

The following Russian troops had arrived at Resht by the 27th November: 300 Cossacks, 1,720 infantry and artillery; total, 2,020, with 8 guns and 6 machine-guns.

Meshed.

Ruku-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General-elect of Khorassan, has not yet arrived.

Nayer-ed-Dowleh is still endeavouring to induce the Government at Tehran to separate again Nishapur from Khorassan.

Meshed itself is not in a disturbed state, but the roads in the vicinity are infested by robbers.

Ispahan.

The discontent in the town, owing to the dearness of provisions, is increasing. The province is in its normal state of insecurity, owing to the presence of Bakhtiari and Kuhgelui raiders. This state of affairs is adding to the unpopularity of the governor, Sardar Ashja. The chief merchants, who have protested to Tehran against the insecurity of the roads, would probably welcome the advent of even foreign troops for the policing the roads.

The appointment of Mr. E. C. Haycock, a British subject, as agent to the treasurer-general, is giving evident satisfaction to the masses in Ispahan. The Governor-General, the former Treasury agent, and the clergy have failed in their attempts to organise any opposition to Mr. Haycock.

Recruiting for the Treasury gendarmerie has commenced, and by the 11th November twenty-nine men had been enrolled.

One squadron of Indian cavalry left Abadeh for Ispahan on the 27th November.

Yezd.

Amir Azem, the new Governor of Kerman, is failing to restore order and punish the participants in the recent disturbances in a satisfactory manner.

The Taftis and other banditti infest the country, and render the roads unsafe. The telegraph wire has also been wrecked on several occasions.

The Parsees, whose business is being carried on under increasing difficulties and losses, are apparently desirous of foreign intervention.

Shiraz.

Ala-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General-elect of Fars, has not yet left Tehran.

On the 29th October a caravan from Ispahan for Shiraz was looted near Khanik-horreh, and Dr. Ross, who was travelling with it, was ill-treated and lost all her personal effects. She managed to reach Abadeh. On resuming her journey she was robbed a second time, and had to return to Abadeh.

On the 23rd November two squadrons of Indian cavalry reached Abadeh. One proceeds to Ispahan, and one escorts Miss Ross to Shiraz leaving on the 27th instant.

On the night of the 24th-25th November, a band of thieves attacked a garden near the consulate, a brisk fusillade being kept up for some time.

Two squadrons of Indian cavalry arrived at Shiraz on the 12th-13th November. There were no noteworthy incidents on the road.

Several robberies are reported, but on the whole the state of unrest at Shiraz and district seems to be decreasing.

Seistan.

The state of the roads in Seistan and the Kainat is quiet, but caravans cannot travel without strong escorts.

Kerman.

The condition of the province of Kerman remains the same as reported in last month's summary.

The number of Baluchi robber bands is increasing, especially in the neighbourhood of Bam.

One Nifat-i-Nizam, who has great influence with the Baluchis, is attempting to alienate men employed by the telegraph department.

Kermanshah.

His Majesty's consul reports that the situation is growing worse in Kermanshah, and that robberies are so frequent that he is placing British flags on warehouses containing British goods.

Luristan.

Official reports to the Central Government announce the defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh by the Bakhtiari force under Sardar Babadur on the 15th November, near Burujird. Salar-ed-Dowleh is reported to have lost about 500 killed and wounded and the Bakhtiaris about 50.

Bushire.

Tangistan is the chief centre of unrest where skirmishes between the followers of local healmen are of frequent occurrence.

Ahwaz.

The working of the telegraph line has been very unsatisfactory during the past month, and great inconvenience and loss has been caused to British firms at Ahwaz and Mohammerah. Extensive repairs are necessary.

During the first week in October one caravan left for Ispahan; since then the road has been closed as the Bakhtiari guards have fled owing to the prevalence of cholera. There appears to be no hope of reducing the accumulation of goods at Ahwaz, and Messrs. Lynch Brothers are making arrangements for storing during the rainy season.

Bandar Abbas.

Five large caravans left for Kerman and Lar during the first week in October. Other trade routes are infested by several small parties of robbers, and no serious measures are ever taken against them by the local authorities.

W. M. FORDHAM, *Military Attaché.*

[50542]

No. 618.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 234.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 226 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit a translation of the ultimatum which, as I reported in my telegram No. 610 of the 29th November, was presented to the Persian Government by the Russian Minister at noon on the 29th ultimo.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 618.

M. Poklewski to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency.

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

IN our interview of Friday last (the 24th November) I had the honour to draw your attention to the reasons for which the Imperial Government would have to make some further demands, and in this connection I was awaiting further instructions from my Government, which I have now received.

I now have the honour to make the following demands on behalf of the Imperial Government:—

Firstly, the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre; and the status of other persons invited by Mr. Shuster to serve the Persian Government will come under the second item of these demands.

Secondly, an undertaking on the part of the Persian Government not to invite any foreigners to join their service without the previous consent of the British and Russian Legations.

Thirdly, payment by the Persian Government of the expenses of the present Russian military expedition to Persia; the sum payable to the Imperial Government and the manner of its payment will be fixed after the receipt of the Persian Government's reply.

I consider it my duty to explain that the reason for these measures is firstly the absolute necessity of obtaining compensation for the movement of troops which the Imperial Government has been forced to send to Persia, and for Mr. Shuster's recent offensive actions towards Russia, and furthermore the sincere desire of Russia now to remove the principal source of the differences which have arisen, and for the future to lay the foundations upon which the two Governments can build up friendly and stable relations, and to give a prompt and satisfactory solution to all Russian matters and pending questions.

Furthermore, it is necessary for me to warn you that the Imperial Government cannot wait more than forty-eight hours for the fulfilment of these conditions, during which time the Russian troops will remain at Resht: but if, before the expiration of this term, no answer is received or if the answer is unsatisfactory, the troops will advance, and this course will of course increase the sum payable by the Persian Government to the Russian Government.

I avail, &c.

S. POKLEWSKI-KOZIELL.

[50544]

No. 619.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Eduard Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 236.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 201 of the 21st October, copy of Diary No. 7 reporting the conclusion of the journey of the British and Russian delegates on the Turco-Persian frontier.

Copies of Annexes Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to Diary No. 6 are also enclosed.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 619.

Diary (No. 7) of the Itinerary of the British and Russian Delegates from Urmia to Tehran through Anzal and Salmas, September 9-16, 1911.

OUR second stay in Urmia lasted nine days owing to sickness among the men of our caravan and to the necessity entailed upon us of receiving the numerous persons who were desirous of laying before us the losses which, they alleged, they had suffered from the Turkish advance. Among other visits paid to us was that of Agha Khan Mir Pendj, the largest land-owner in that part of the country, who confirmed to us the

facts already laid before us by his son Haidar Khan in Dol (*vide* Diary No. 3). He confessed, however, that the Turks allowed him to levy one-tenth (in place of a former one-fifth) of the produce of the villages in Baranduz, though even that amount could only be got in at irregular intervals and with great difficulty, while of his estates in Deshtebil he had never been able to regain possession. Some deeds were shown us bearing the official endorsement of Saadi Bey (Turkish consul in Urmia, e.g., No. 111 of 23 Shaaban, 1329, &c.) recognising his (Agha Khan's) rights on the villages in the last-mentioned district, but even with these documents he had been unable to eject Riza Khan Zerza by whom they were being detained (see Diary No. 6).

We should not omit to mention the very interesting conversation which we had with Saadi Bey on the 7th September. The latter fully admitted that Persian land-owners had greatly suffered from the Turkish occupation, and quoted among other instances:—

1. Agha Khan's villages in Deshtebil seized with no right whatever by Riza Khan;
2. The villages of Ali Kan, Zindasht, and Bahlé in Upper Anzal, belonging to an Urmia seyyid, Hadji Ali Agha, appropriated with an equal absence of right by the family of Amer Hénaré; and
3. Nasr-ed-Dowleh's villages in Lower Anzal (*i.e.*, Kahriz, Koolindji, and Djomalava), the inhabitants of which now refused to pay any dues to their proprietor.

Saadi Bey informed us that he had felt obliged to send in his resignation on the 17th August (the date, it may be noted, of the visit to Urmia of the Kalnakam of Sulduz and the Turkish consul in Soujboulak) in view of the difficulties which were being constantly created by the military officers who were insufficiently qualified for the performance of the civil duty now entrusted to them. His (Saadi Bey's) own opinion was that the frontier between the two States should be constituted by the Kandil range, as Turkey derived no advantage from transgressing this natural limit, there being no good roads and no commercial profit to be made. Though he was, he said, free to admit that the object sought for by the Turkish advance was the creation of a fresh base against Russia, he himself had no very high opinion, from a strategical point of view, of the advantages of the territory newly acquired. Constantinople, he thought, was badly informed, as in no other way could he account for the extraordinary declaration made in the Turkish Parliament some two months ago by Rifaat Pasha that the Turkish occupation did not extend to the Urmia Lake. As a good patriot, he considered it would be better for Turkey to revert to the former frontier than to leave the occupied districts in their present position of administrative confusion. There was, however, one aspect of the case which he wished to bring before us, *viz.*, the question of the maintenance of order should the Turkish Government decide on withdrawal. The Turks, he maintained, had at least shown their ability to control the lawless propensities of the Kurds, which the Persians were entirely powerless to do. His own suggestion would be that, pending a final solution of the problem, an arrangement might be come to with Persia by which Turkey should be empowered to police temporarily the districts in question, otherwise, and if nothing was put in place of the present occupation by the Turks, the retirement of the latter would be followed by an era of indiscriminate pillage and massacre. Further, the withdrawal of Turkey should in any case be subject to the conclusion of a treaty assuring to her the right of eventual reoccupation of these provinces, if necessary, in order to guard against their seizure by any third Power.

September 9.—We left Urmia at 10.5 A.M., and after a ride of four and a-half hours reached Kerim-Abad, which we found was held by a Persian detachment consisting of some few horsemen poorly clad and badly drilled under command of Abdul Ali Khan Sartip. The latter complained to us of the difficulties he met with in repulsing the attacks of the Kurds from the occupied district, who, on several occasions, had endeavoured to get possession of the village of Djebel-Kendi, his own residence, situated on the road between Urmia and Salmas. We were also informed that the Turks had at one time occupied many of the villages on the northern edge of the Urmia plain, but had since abandoned them. In the villages of Hissar and Bashlanbooshloo, for instance, situated near the lake to the east of Kerim-Abad, Turkish military posts under the command of Shukri Effendi had for some time been stationed.

September 10.—Starting at 7.55 A.M., we reached at 8.50 A.M. a Persian guard-house called Haruni-post-Khamesi, where we entered the district known as Lower Anzal, situated between Sonai and the lake. Having passed at 10.10 the ruins of a "rahlar-khané" (toll bar), where road taxes (abolished in Persia in 1901), were formerly levied from the caravans, we turned to the left of the main road going to

Kooshehi, and made for Imam-Kendi, a village situated under the mountains and belonging to Nasr-ed-Dowleh. As Imam Kendi is considered to be now on the limit of Persian territory, our Persian companions left us at a point a little beyond the hill of Meslehet Tépe at the commencement of the fields of Káhrizé now in Turkish occupation, there being, however, no visible mark to distinguish where one frontier begins and the other ends. We sent on our ghulam with a letter under open envelope addressed by Saadi Bey to the officer in Káhrizé, but, on receiving the reply that the latter was absent, entered the village at 11:30 A.M., and met with a hospitable reception at the hands of the Chaoush left in charge of the soldiers, forty-four in number, and belonging to the 2nd taboor of the 101st Regiment. We were informed that while the village of Hammamlar, situated in the gorge above Káhrizé, paid to its owners, Bakhsali and Lutfuli Khans by name, their dues, the villagers of Káhrizé, on the other hand, who had themselves called in the Turks, refused to pay a penny to Nasr-ed-Dowleh, alleging that the payments hitherto exacted by him had far exceeded the sum due to him from the small portion of the village really belonging to him, and that it was he, therefore, who ought to make restitution to them. Being now in the occupied territory again, and being desirous of adhering to the instructions laid down for us in such case, we requested and obtained from the Chaoush several soldiers to act as our escort to the next Turkish post.

After a ride of one hour and a-half, we arrived at the large village of Koolindji (some 400 houses) which belongs to Nasr-ed-Dowleh, but, as is the case with Káhrizé, has ceased to pay dues to the proprietor. We paid a visit to Yuz Bashi Dervish Effendi who, in addition to being in command of a company (1st taboor of the 101st Regiment) stationed in Koolindji, and housed in barracks over which the Turkish flag is flying, acts at the same time as Governor of Anzal. We were received civilly by Dervish Effendi, but our ghulam who had been sent on advance informed us that he had at first flung Saadi Bey's letter on the floor, declaring that the men of our escort would not be allowed to enter Koolindji. This latter threat, however, was not executed. We were told by Dervish Effendi that the fields and appurtenances of the villages occupied by the Turks in Anzal extended as far as the lake, and that the highway from Urmia must consequently be considered to be within the occupied zone. Traffic, however, on the road in question was not being subjected to interference by them, the Turks.

Gowlan, where we arrived next at 3:10 P.M., is only half-an-hour's distance from Koolindji. There are some hundred houses in the village, all of them Christian (Protestant, Orthodox, Catholic). It belongs to a certain Navid-ed-Divan, of Urmia, to whom no dues are now being paid. "As none were paid to the Nasr-ed-Dowleh," (*vide supra*) "why," asked the villagers, "should they pay anything to Navid, who was no greater a personage than Nasr?" Dakhdat was not given by Gowlan, the Turks taking possession of it owing to its situation between the other occupied villages. There are no Turkish soldiers in Gowlan, though a detachment of twenty-six troopers (23rd Cavalry Regiment), under Second Lieutenant Niezi Effendi, were stationed there last winter, these latter having been in the following spring transferred to Verdan (Salmas). On the villagers expressing a hope that the detachment in question would not return to Gowlan next winter, and on our enquiring what their reasons were for expressing such a hope, as it had been always understood by that the soldiers paid for the fodder and provisions used by them, we received the answer that this was only partly true, as the Turks offered at most only half the value, even for commodities which the villagers had to purchase themselves; while, should the latter refuse to furnish what was asked for, it was taken by the simple process of requisition.

At Gowlan we made a short stay at the house of the Orthodox priest Kasha Guiverguis. Learning that Remiz Bey, commander of the 1st taboor of the 101st Regiment, stationed in Chehrik, was then in the village for the purpose of inspecting the firing practice of the Anzal detachments, we sent the Turkish soldiers accompanying us to inform him that we purposed paying him a visit. The only response to this, however, was the appearance of Remiz Bey's orderly, who delivered to us the somewhat curt message of his chief to the effect that, while we ourselves were free to remain in the village, our escort must leave it immediately. Thinking that Remiz Bey might not be in possession of the additional instructions issued by the Turkish Foreign Office, we sent him Saadi Bey's letter, following it up by a personal visit.

Kol-Aghassi Remiz Bey is a strong advocate of a forward policy. To a question we put to him whether the hill of Kúl-tépé (a little to the north of Djebel-Kendi) was in Turkish occupation or not, he answered in the negative, adding, however, that

Turkish territory extended to the shore of the Lake of Urmia, lying between Kúl-tépé and the fields of Kooshehi, and as such included that portion of the Urmia road situated within the above-mentioned boundaries. He was, he said, convinced that the frontier would have to be rectified, and that both Djebel-Kendi and Kooshehi would, as well as Kerimabad, which had already, though for a short time only, been in Turkish occupation, be handed over to Turkey, which, according to its historical rights, ought to possess all Azerbaijan up to Kaslankuh. Remiz Bey, further, expressed his indignation at the fact that Sheker-Yazy (see Diary No. 1) had been restored to the Persians by Ahmed Refik Bey, the frontier commissioner, when on a tour inspection of the new district. Urmia, he thought, was identical with a certain Toprak-Kala, on which place the Kurds now under Turkish rule had rights of property, as shown by documents in their possession dating some ninety or a hundred years back. The name itself of Urmia ("Roomiyé") in Turkish was, according to him, another proof of its having been at one time in the possession of Turkey, the latter country being known as "Room" throughout the whole of Kurdistan. Expressing the opinion that rightfully all Kurds belonged to Turkey Remiz Bey went on to stigmatise violently the Avdoi clan of the Shekkaks living now in Persian Kotur as inveterate robbers and evil-doers, adding that, if their chief Simko were not handed over to Turkey by Persia, Omer Khan, son of Mamed Sherif, would be directed by the Kaimakam of Chehrik to seize Dilman. On our asking him how it came about that Omer Khan's men, whom he (Remiz Bey) considered to be Turkish subjects, were levying road taxes in Khan-Takhti, in Salmas, in Persian territory, the reply was that these Kurds formed an independent division. He concluded by stating that the frontier was in any case, as at present constituted, not a matter of any importance, as it would have to be rectified by the inclusion of many places which had not yet come under Turkish sovereignty.

With an individual holding extremist opinions of this kind and using arguments to match it is, perhaps, not surprising that we should have had difficulties with regard to our escort. Remiz Bey in fact, while professing his willingness to give us a Turkish escort to accompany us during the remaining stretch of Turkish territory, made it a condition of his so doing that we should leave our own escort behind. On our producing our letter from Saadi Bey (see above under heading 10th September), Remiz Bey refused to read it on the ground that it was addressed not to him but to the officers in command at Káhrizé. A rejoinder on our part that the letter in question was intended for all the Turkish commanders on the line of our route—as Remiz Bey could see for himself if he would only look at the concluding paragraph—was met by the latter with the reply that the only orders he could recognise were those emanating from his military superiors. A suggestion made by him that we should send back our escort we entirely declined to accept, pointing out the absurdity of a course which would entail the passage of our men through two Turkish posts, whereas, by continuing their journey in our company there would be only one, namely Djemalava still to pass before reaching Persian territory. This aspect of the matter was apparently not without effect on Remiz Bey who yielded the point as far as our being accompanied by our escort was concerned, although he still insisted that we should pass outside instead of through Djemalava. The officer, however (Refik Effendi), commanding the detachment stationed in the latter place who had been present during the whole of the discussion, intimated to us, while not venturing to comment openly on the decision taken by his chief, that he would himself personally accompany us and arrange the matter as we desired. On this we took leave of Remiz Bey who, throughout, had appeared to us to be labouring under an unaccountable state of excitement and a quarter of an hour later passed through Djemalava, a village of some 150 houses, in company of our own escort and under the guidance of Refik Effendi, the officer above alluded to. The force at Djemalava in command of the latter consists of the 3rd company of the 1st taboor (101st regiment) and is quartered in an old mud-built Persian fort which overlooks the village and which has been reconstructed by the Turks. In addition to the above-mentioned company there are also in the fort two quick-firing guns with the necessary men to work them under the command of Lieutenant Ahmed Effendi who joined us on leaving Djemalava.

At 6 P.M. the two officers took leave of us at a point where there was nothing whatever in the nature of the country to show that a frontier existed, and declared that, this being the limit of the fields of Djemalava and the beginning of Persian territory, they could proceed no further. Twenty-five minutes later we reached the large and rich village of Kooshehi (400 houses), of which a part belongs to Nasr-ed-Dowleh, the rest being held by small proprietors. There is a Persian telegraph office in the place,

standing just at the entrance to the Vergéviz Pass, through which the whole traffic by land between Urmia-Khoi-Russia and Urmia-Salmas-Tabreez is carried on. We were informed that Kooshehi had once been occupied by the Turks, who, however, were obliged to evacuate it on perceiving that the inhabitants were prepared to turn them out by force. A fight, in fact, took place in the neighbourhood in October 1910, on which occasion the Kurds, brought by the Turks to Koolindji and Djemalava, destroyed a Persian detachment on the high road to Kooshehi, killing its chief, Aidin Pasha, with some twenty of his men. By the aid of a reinforcement, however, from the village of Karabagh, the inhabitants of Kooshehi succeeded in maintaining their independence.

September 11.—We left Kooshehi at 8:40 A.M., and at 10:20 A.M. reached the summit of the Vergéviz Pass, where, in a half-ruined Persian sentry-house, we found some six men on duty, who told us that they were forced to pass the night at their homes in Kooshehi for fear of the highwaymen. We began our descent at 10:45 A.M., and, leaving the main road at 11:10, visited (12:5 P.M.) the village of Isti-su (or Abi-gom), situated in the midst of the hills overlooking the valley by which both the above-mentioned main road and the telegraph line pass to Dilman, to the north of the Vergéviz Guedigui. A noller met by us near the village, and questioned by us as to whom the inhabitants owed allegiance to, answered, in a very resolute tone, "Ottomans have now become our masters." We were informed when in Urmia that the population of Isti-su called in the Turks in order to escape payment of dues to their proprietors—some seyyids of Karabagh. At the village we found twenty-two soldiers belonging to the company stationed in Kährizé, under command of Lieutenant Hassan Effendi. Hussein Effendi, Yuz Bashin of the Kährizé post, was also in Isti-su on the day of our visit there.

We continued our journey at 2:45 P.M., being accompanied down the valley by Hassan Effendi and some five or six Turkish soldiers on foot as escort, who took leave of us at 3:55 P.M. on reaching a side gorge (Moghul-Deressi) of the above-mentioned valley. Hassan Effendi, when asked by us at what particular point the boundary-line had been drawn along the valley, told us frankly that he did not know himself. All that he was sure of was that the road along which the Persian telegraph passed was included in the sphere of his observation. Shortly after we had separated from the Turks a villager came running up to us, and said that the officer, with whom he had himself just been speaking, had made a mistake, as the fields of Isti-su extended, not only to both sides of the valley, but even to its northern end, where it opens into the Salmas plain, and where a ruined sentry-house stands, which we reached at 4:25 P.M.

At 5:20 P.M. we passed the small village of Khantakhti near which we were met by a number of Shekkak Kurds and a Persian Mirza, the latter of whom explained to us that he had been placed there by Aziz Khan Amir Tuman, the chief of the highway police of the Urmia district, and that the Shekkak Kurds, who were under his orders, had been given him by Omer Khan living in Sidan (Sonai) and Hussein Khan now residing in Zindasht (Upper Anzul), both of which places are in Turkish occupation. The road taxes levied by them from the caravans were 12 shahis per camel or horse without a load and 16 shahis from the loaded ones. We learned afterwards that no exception was made for foreign subjects, and that an attempt, unsuccessful, had even been made to exact the tax from our own caravan which had gone on ahead of us. We reached Dilman at 8:20 P.M.

September 12.—We made an excursion to the large Nestorian village of Khosrova where we were received with every demonstration of joy and hospitality. Here we were informed that a new association called "Union nationale chaldéenne" had been founded by the inhabitants, and that this fact had caused much discontent among the Salmas committee of the Armenian Dashnaktzootoon Society to whose agency the several murders, including that of Yousouf Khan, the president of the "Union" which had occurred recently in Khosrova, were attributed by the Chaldeans. As we were unable to investigate the matter we were not in a position to verify the statements made to us. It is, however, certainly the fact that we met several of the members of the Union in question now living in Dilman who stated that they had been forced to abandon Khosrova for fear of the Armenians, adding that, if no other means could be found to put a stop to the persecution they were undergoing, they would not hesitate to call the Turks to their aid.

September 13.—We made an excursion by Mughandjik to Seramerik in order to gain a nearer view of the Turkish positions in the valley of Kâresindi (or Hoder) situated to the north of Dilman on the road to Khoi. The inhabitants of Seramerik (Armenians) who are in constant intercourse with the occupied villages, informed us that in addition to Silaw (two companies of the 101st Regiment) visited by us on the 10th June (see

Diary No. 1), Turkish soldiers were stationed in Yezdikan situated on the northern slope of the range at the head of a valley opening into the Khoi plain (thus considerably diminishing the strategical value of Kotur as a means of penetration from Turkey into Northern Azerbaijan), and Verdan where some thirty cavalry (transferred from Gowlam *vide supra*) were posted in addition to some forty infantry under a Yuz Bashi (an Arab by birth). There is no natural boundary or land-mark of any kind dividing the villages of Seramerik and Chiehek, which are under Persian rule, from Verdan and Rikava which are under Turkish occupation. The main carriage road from Dilman to Khoi by which the telegraph line (Urmia-Salmas-Khoi-Tabriz) passes is here again intercepted by a wedge of pretended Ottoman territory extending in this region from Silaw to Kenyani.

In Dilman we had many visits from the local landowners, who complained to us of Turkish encroachments. Iman Djuma gave the following list of his villages in Sonai seized by the Kurds:—

1. Mamakan now occupied by Mamed Sherif Dalan.
2. Berdian now occupied by Ibrahim Agha Kerdar.
3. Shor Gol now occupied by Mamed Sherif.
4. Berde Spi now occupied by Mamed Dai Kerdar.
5. Mastakan (five-sixths) now occupied by Ali Agha Dalan.

Saade Lashker's list was the following:—Mirava, Aslanykh, and Kûdvan near Chehrik, with Sofian and Mingöl in Sonai, in addition to the villages owned by him in partnership with Ibrahim Agha Sarraf: viz, Chehrik, Zola, Behek, Kasrik, Sirvan, Iakova, Kashiava, Haspeshé, Kahriz, and Lilos. The following are the villages belonging to Russian subjects and which are now in Turkish occupation: belonging to Abbas Ali Bahayeff, Nazarava, Gökadan and Gabrava; to Khosrov Avakyantz, Zevédjik; to Yakoob Babloyantz, Adjivadji.

The above-mentioned landowners admitted that the Kaïmakam of Chehrik acknowledged their right to levy one-tenth of the harvest from the villages (instead of a former fifth), but as this acknowledgement of their rights had not been accompanied by the permission to send their men to the villages in question, they had for the past year or two practically received nothing. The Governor of Salmas, Muin-es-Saltaneh, gave us a list of villages in the western districts belonging to Salmas and since occupied by the Turks. These villages were:—

In the district of—	Villages.
Kezan	23
Chehrik	14
Shepiran	22
Gnerdian	16
Shimetal	13

(In addition to the villages of the Hoder district (i.e.) in the Salmas plain itself.)

September 14.—We left Dilman at 9:5 A.M. and after forty minutes made a halt at the large and most thriving Armenian village of Kaleser, then, continuing our journey at 11 A.M., we reached at 1:50 P.M. the village of Kengerin, situated quite close to the Lake of Urmia, and which had been unsuccessfully attacked by the Kurds a week or so previous to our arrival. When we had come within a short distance of the village a shot was fired—to give the alarm, as we afterwards discovered—by one of the sentries who were keeping a look-out on all sides. The coming of so large a party as our own had created a state of great excitement among the villagers, by whom a renewal of the attack by the Kurds was, we found, almost hourly expected. We ourselves, in fact, were afforded an opportunity of witnessing the effect on the villages of the perpetual state of siege under which they were living, for, just previous to our departure, the alarm was given that a party of horsemen had been caught sight of in the distance, apparently making for the village. At once shots were fired to warn the intruders off, and, though the alarm fortunately turned out to be groundless, the quickness with which the men rushed to seize their rifles, and perhaps more than all the remarkable rapidity with which the village cattle were driven in, testified to the reality of the danger to which these poor people felt themselves exposed. It may be mentioned that in the attack above alluded to the Kurds left no less than seven of their number dead on the field, of whom the villagers were able to identify the following, viz.: Hussein, personal musician to Omer Khan Dalan; Hassan Zola, Dirho, and Yousouf, the servants of Ibrahim Agha; and Temer Django respectively, all undoubtedly Shekkaks from the district of Sonai in Turkish occupation. The

accusation which, we pointed out to the villagers, had been brought against them of committing an act of treachery in firing on the Kurds—as the latter, it had been alleged, had merely come for the purpose of buying salt—was repudiated by them with considerable warmth. No peaceful purchasers of salt, they said, would have fought as the Kurds did for forty-eight hours, while the numbers with which they came excluded all doubts as to their intentions.

Having left Kengerlu at 3:50 P.M., we passed at 6 the old sentry house near Almaserai, which we had left about three months before on our outward journey, and after some wandering in the fields, owing to the darkness, reached the village of Kyzyl'dja, our halting place for the night, at 8:10 P.M.

September 15.—In the morning we had a visit from the kekhuda of the village (Mir Abdul Hussein), who informed us that some twenty-six days before our arrival Kyzyl'dja had been plundered by a party of seventy Mamedli Kurds, led by their clansman, Ismail Agha, now resident in Chelarik. The villagers recognised him at once, as he had passed through the village some three years ago on his way to Tasooj, to which place he had been summoned for assistance by the local Anjumea. The owner of Kyzyl'dja, Andjed-ul-Mulk, now living in Tabreez, had obtained letters from the Ottoman consul in the latter city and Khel, but though he, Abdul Hussein, had presented them to the Kaimakam of Chelarik, no steps had up to the present been taken by the latter. The kekhuda added that on several occasions the inhabitants of his village had been recommended by persons living in villages which had passed under Turkish occupation to give "dakhalet," which, according to them, would have the effect of putting an immediate stop to Kurdish raids.

We started at 8:25 A.M. and by a forced march, and by not making the usual midday halt, succeeded in reaching Dizé-Khalil at 6:45 P.M.

September 16.—Leaving Dizé-Khalil at 7:5 A.M., and following the road by which we had first set out on our journey on the 8th June, we passed without any difficulty the village of Karanalik, then occupied by some Government horsemen, finally reaching our respective consulates at 5:45 P.M., after an absence from Tabreez of 101 days.

Our journey, we are happy to say, passed off without any serious incidents or complications. The health of our party was on the whole good, and, though all of us suffered more or less from occasional attacks of illness inevitable on a journey such as ours, only two of our men were seriously laid up—a Cossack with typhoid and our cook with enteritis. Many of our horses suffered considerably from the rough work entailed on them by the mountainous nature of the country we passed through, and two of them succumbed when on the road.

H. S. SHIPLEY.
V. MINORSKY.

Tabreez, October 26, 1911.

Annexe 2 to Diary No. 6.

Translation of Letter to Mr. Leloux, Inspector-in-Chief of the Azerbaijan Customs, 28th Djowza, 1323 (circa June 25, 1905).

Two days ago two masons, one bricklayer and four workmen were sent from Soujboulak to the village of Jabriyé. Yesterday, Mamed Emin Beg, chief of the Piran tribe, went to the site of the custom-house to make a further inspection of the place. The reason of his going there is that he (Mamed Emin Agha) has declared that in winter snow falls to the depth of 15 feet, to the level in fact of the hills in front, at the spot where "M. Leloux told you to build it." Besides this, he said, "There is no water; the water now running is snow water which in ten days will disappear. Water will not be found either for building or drinking purposes." I therefore went with him and found it impossible to build in the place designated by you. Beyond Guélooshinka lies Turkish territory. I do not know what to do as at the place you chose the water is less than half since the time you saw it. All the water is becoming less. Without water masons cannot work and in winter the custom-house will be completely covered with snow. A hundred and fifty yards on the hither side of the place you indicated, near the high hill from the top of which Mamed Emin Agha pointed out to you the roads, that is between Guélooshinka and the above high hill, we found a plain with water, which commands all three roads. According to what Hamarash Kedkhuda says, there is not much snow in winter, and it is a well-watered and safe place. Mamed Emin

Agha says that there is no difference between the place your Excellency assigned and the place of which I am speaking. From both places all three roads are visible but, the snow being less, you can go anywhere from the latter spot which it is not possible to do from the former. Mamed Emin Agha says, "You can build only at the place which I first pointed out and from which the graveyard of Sheikh Kemal-ed-din can be seen or at the place which we have now found." From this latter spot the roads to Guélooshinka and Kiz-Kapan are clearly visible as well as the road which goes to the Mangur district. I did not dare to begin building at the place which we have now found, and as the other site according to Hamarash Kedkhuda and Mamed Emin Agha is not advisable, I have written this to get instructions. Mamed Emin Agha says, "The place which I showed on the other side of Guélooshinka is the best one, but, as I do not know the frontier of these two States by the map, I am afraid to suggest building near the cemetery because perhaps, after having built, they will bring a frontier map and prove the place to be Turkish soil; then I shall be responsible, for although I get the Government taxes from the other side of Guélooshinka as far as the village of Sheikh Kemal-ed-din and know all these places to be Persian territory, yet, at a future time when they delineate the frontier it may perhaps prove to be Turkish soil, then the result will be bad." The place I am now speaking of is 150 yards on this side of Guélooshinka and is on the river which it is true dries up in summer but there is a brook which flows all the time. Please give an immediate reply so that I may act accordingly.

MUHAMMED RUFAAT.

Annexe 3 to Diary No. 6.

Translation of a Letter, dated 28th Djowza, 1323 (circa June 25, 1905), addressed by Mamed Emin Agha Piran to Mr. Leloux, the Director-in-Chief of the Azerbaijan Customs.

(After compliments.)

Since you have left here the boundary of Köhne Lahidjan and custom affairs are in good order as before. Nothing disagreeable has occurred.

With respect to the central administration of customs of Lahidjan, certain defects have been met with in the matter of the construction of the custom-house, so that Mirza Rufiat Khan has sent a messenger to ask you where they are to erect it. It seems that you wish it to be built on the precise spot designated by you, but this is beyond the power of anyone, as there is no water, and to bring water from a great distance is impossible. In winter especially one cannot remain one hour in that building. There are snow storms, and the wind drifts all the snow of the hills over the building. Therefore a place has been discovered which commands all the three roads, and as horsemen are always on the road commercial goods cannot be lost by any means. They have already laid down the foundation and are working in the said place. Since you have left, two horsemen of mine are in Mirza Rufiat Khan's service, but unfortunately, as the homes of these horsemen are at a great distance, they have to travel 2 farsukhs every day merely to get their food. Rufiat Khan will not pay the expenses of Sherif Bey and other horsemen of mine. This is quite opposed to the usual practice of the customs service, because going for food, they will not, in the meanwhile, be available for any emergency. Taking into consideration the circumstances, please be kind enough to fix wages for them, equal to those received by the others, so that they may attend to their duty with contentment. Besides these, some other horsemen are necessary for the director, as he cannot do the work with three only. I have written about these matters personally to yourself, as Mirza Asadullah Khan, out of private grudge, did not tell you about them, otherwise you would have accepted my request at once.

MAMED EMIN.

Annexe 4 to Diary No. 6.

Translation of a Letter, dated 26th Rejeb, 1323 (circa September 23, 1905), addressed by Mamed Emin Agha, Chief of the Piran Kurds, to the Governor of Urmiä.

(After compliments.)

All has been quiet until now on the Lahidjan frontier, but to day, Wednesday, the 26th instant, 130 Turkish soldiers arrived at the house of Sheikh Kemal, joining there

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Abdur Rahman Effendi and his suite. I write this for the information of your Highness. I shall comply with whatever order received from you. Another commanding officer—a colonel named Izzet Bay—and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdullah Bey, with three taboors, will arrive on the Vazné boundary from the direction of Pishder.

MAMED EMIN.

[50545]

No. 620.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 237.)
Sir,

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No 234 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit a translation of the reply of the Persian Government to the Russian ultimatum, as well as a brief report on the debate on the ultimatum, which took place on the morning of the 1st instant, notwithstanding that that day was a Friday, when all public business is generally at a standstill, and which resulted in the almost unanimous vote to reject the Russian demands.

The message contained in your telegram No. 392 of the 30th ultimo was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 10 A.M. in the Medjliss during the debate on the ultimatum. It will be observed that he informed the Medjliss of its nature.

The Persian Government have now formally rejected the Russian demands. These demands are, in my opinion, most ill-advised. I cannot but feel that unless Russia is playing for a protectorate she has blundered badly, for, unless the Medjliss is removed by a *coup d'État*, there is, so far as I can see, no chance of the Persian Government's complying. Russia cannot now draw back, or submit to the stale mate involved by the retention of her troops at Kazvin while the Medjliss remains obdurate, and I fear that unless there is some Persian *coup d'État* she will be compelled to advance her troops to Tehran, and turn out the Medjliss herself. Even should the unexpected happen and the Medjliss yield, I fear that Mr. Shuster's dismissal would be followed by even worse chaos in the administration than existed before his able hands took over the task of reform.

It is, in my opinion, most unfortunate that the Russian Government should have formulated these far-reaching demands. Had M. Poklewski been given an opportunity, in concert with me, of giving his advice, they would, at least, have gone more slowly, in which case it is not impossible that M. Poklewski and I could have come to a *modus vivendi* with Mr. Shuster. Mr. Shuster's continuance here is of such immense importance if Persia is ever to emerge regenerate as an independent country, that it would, at any rate, have been worth while to make a comprehensive attempt to come to terms with them.

It may be asked why Mr. Shuster is so indispensable, and why some other man would not serve the purpose. My answer is, that for any foreigner to be able to effect any comprehensive and real reform, he must, unless a régime such as that in Egypt were set up, have the support of the Medjliss. Without it he would have no chance of dealing with the thieving and corruption universal in official Persia. Mr. Shuster has the support of the Medjliss, as no nominee of the two Powers, even were the Medjliss willing to accept one, could possibly have it. Such nominee would have to rely entirely on backing from the two legations, and that unless it were reinforced in the material backing that the British advisers in Egypt enjoy would leave him, even if on paper he were given executive powers, in little better position than M. Bizot, who failed to secure the support of the Medjliss and to effect anything, because he was regarded as the tool of the two Powers.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 620.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to M. Poklewski.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

IN answer to your Excellency's note No. 158 of the 29th November, I have the honour to say that, after the Imperial (Russian) Government had made certain demands of my Government through your Excellency's note No. 156 respecting the seizure of

Shoa-es-Saltaneh's property, and though the Persian Government had already made known to your Excellency, through verbal messages, the true state of the case and their views respecting the matter, and though there had been a Cabinet crisis for some time before the receipt of the above-mentioned note, the Persian Government took the prompt and immediate measures compatible with the necessary friendly relations and the maintenance of good-will on the part of this Government in order to fulfil the demands of the Imperial Government.

This peaceful intention and accommodating spirit on our part was considered to be the means of removing any kind of irritation or annoyance felt by the Russian Government, and it was on this account that we acted as we did. But, as against this accommodating spirit, the Russian Government, in their note No. 156, did not stipulate any specified time for the fulfilment of their demands, while they were aware of the Cabinet crisis. Although in the above-mentioned note and in verbal messages no notice was given as to the dispatch of troops in the event of the conditions referred to above being rejected, suddenly it was announced that relations were severed and that troops were being dispatched; and, after the fulfilment of the conditions, orders were not sent for the return of the troops whose dispatch was known to you to be connected with the non-fulfilment of the demands. Unfortunately, the Russian Government did not limit themselves even to this, and the ancient friendly relations, which have always been apparent and reflected in the notes of your legation, have not been observed and maintained. Now, in your note No. 158 you put forward other demands to the Persian Government. The extraordinary importance of these demands is obvious; some of them are clearly contrary to the independence of the State, while the time (allowed) is so little that it is physically impossible to give them the necessary consideration and examination, and the door is closed to discussion.

What is more astonishing is that your note explains these demands, firstly, by attributing them to the absolute necessity of obtaining compensation, then to the insulting actions of Mr. Shuster, and, finally, to the sincere desire of the Russian Government to remove causes of difference and to establish the basis of an understanding and good relations; whereas in the matter of the dispatch of Russian troops the Persian Government were in no way involved.

There can be no cause of complaint until the real necessity for compensation is shown and until the Persian Government have refused to give satisfaction with respect to the insult referred to, which has not been discussed by the two Governments as to whether it actually occurred, its circumstances, and before a preliminary enquiry has been held.

The removal of differences, together with the establishment of the basis of an understanding and unity, are naturally more compatible with peaceful methods.

After the above preamble, while inviting your Excellency and the Imperial Government to consider the true state of the case and the good relations existing between the two Governments and the importance of maintaining them, I beg that the Persian Government may be excused from fulfilling the demands. I have, however, the honour to inform your Excellency of the Persian Government's readiness to discuss alterations in the above-mentioned proposals, and to accept any just proposals which may be made to the Persian Government.

I avail, &c.
VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 620.

Proceedings of the Medjliss on December 1, 1911.

THE following Cabinet Ministers were present at the debate:—

Mushir-ed-Dowleh (Education).
Moazed-es-Sultaneh (Posts and Telegraphs).
Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh (Justice).
Vosuk-ed-Dowleh (Foreign Affairs).

The Foreign Minister made the following speech:—

"On Wednesday last, at noon, a note was sent to the Foreign Office by the Russian Legation, as the deputies are aware, and I now read it for the information of the public."

After reading the note containing Russia's three demands and giving forty-eight hours for their fulfilment, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh said:—

"The Foreign Office having reason to expect that some such demands would be made, serious steps were taken before and after the receipt of the note, but unfortunately with no result. As part of the note is vaguely worded, and we believed that other demands might follow the three contained in this note, explanations were requested, and we are now convinced that no other demands will follow. The Cabinet therefore unanimously recommends the acceptance of these demands. I may add that we also wrote to the British Legation asking for the mediation of Great Britain, and the legation has recommended that the demands should be accepted without delay. Now, of course, we will do as the Medjliss may decide."

Several speeches followed, and though their tone was moderate, the acceptance of the demands was firmly deprecated as incompatible with the independence of the country.

Matin-es-Sultaneh, acting in pursuance of a plan prearranged with the Cabinet, said he proposed that the Government should be authorised to comply with the first and third demands, but that the second demand should be rejected as incompatible with the independence of the country. This motion was, however, only supported by six votes.

Haji Ez-ul-Mamalek, after opposing the acceptance of the demands, made the following motion, which, it is understood, had been prepared beforehand:—

"After having heard the statement made by the Government, the National Assembly considers that the demands of the Russian Government are incompatible with the independence of the country, and we cannot therefore comply with them. The Government is requested to enter into communications with a view to their modification, and the discussions in the Medjliss on the subject are brought to a close."

The motion was carried practically unanimously, only six members voting against it.

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No. 621.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 238.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 361 of the 20th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Bill conferring on Muin-ut-Tujjar certain rights in connection with the mining of Hormuz oxida.

No agreement in accordance with article 8 has as yet been executed between the Ministry of Public Works and the Muin-ut-Tujjar.

I understand that Mr. Shuster disputes the validity of the law, principally on account of the absence of his imprimatur to it, which he claims is necessary under the law, defining the attributes of the treasurer-general.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 621.

Bill passed by the Medjliss at the Sitting of November 2, 1911, in regard to the lease of Hormuz Oxide.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1. The Government hands over to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar the mine of oxide of iron which is in the Isle of Hormuz, for ten solar years from the beginning of Hamaul II II, 1328 (22nd March, 1910), on the condition that all undertakings which, in accordance with a separate contract, were arrived at on the 16th Zighedebeh, 1328 (19th November, 1910), between the previous Cabinet and Mr. Strick should be fully carried out by Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar during its term, which is five solar years, and that should he act in a manner contrary to the articles of the said contract so as to cause a loss to the Government, he shall have to make good any losses occasioned to the Government.

Art. 2. The Government undertakes that from any quantity of soil which may be over and above the 13,000 tons of the oxide of iron now ready belonging to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar, which it bought and gave him an order of payment for the sum of 24,000*l.* to be realised by him as against the value of 11,294 tons of soil, up to the amount of 30,000 tons of soil which in accordance with the contract must be delivered to Mr. Strick, to pay Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar 15 per cent. for the expenses of excavation, on condition that should the soil now ready belonging to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar be less than 13,000 tons he should pay the Government for the deficit up to 13,000 tons at forty-two shillings and a half per ton, and that should the soil now ready be more than 13,000 tons Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar will not claim the price of the surplus.

Art. 3. Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar, after deducting the 13,000 tons, is bound to pay the Government the remaining cost of the soil purchased by Mr. Strick until the expiration of Mr. Strick's contract, and in case the appointed instalments should not be met, the Government will be able to revoke this contract.

Art. 4. If until the expiration of the Government's contract with Mr. Strick, which is for the first five years, Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar should, during this period, sell anything over and above the 30,000 tons to him or to any other body, he will pay 75 per cent. of the cost of the soil to the Government.

Art. 5. After the expiration of Mr. Strick's contract, any quantity of soil which may be excavated from the said isle, 75 per cent. of the cost of the same will be the Government's share, and 25 per cent. of it will belong to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar for the expenses and his commission.

Art. 6. All transactions which Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar may within the period of ten years do with anyone in regard to the red soil of oxide of iron must be with the Government's information.

Art. 7. If within ten years Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar should excavate and store a greater quantity of soil than can be disposed of by sale, it (the surplus) will belong to the Government.

Art. 8. The necessary agreement will, according to the above articles, be exchanged in duplicate between the Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar and the Ministry of Public Works.

The contract for the excavation of the oxide mine on the Isle of Hormuz for a period of ten years, which contains eight articles, was, at the sitting of 10th Zighedebeh, which corresponds with the 9th Agrab, 1329 (2nd November, 1911), passed by a majority of thirty-four votes.

HUSSEIN,

President of the National Consultative Assembly.

MOTAMEN-UL-MULK.

[50560]

No. 622.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 905.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 6, 1911.

CURRENT events in Persia, and particularly the successive ultimatums presented by Russia, have naturally attracted considerable attention in the press here, but there has hitherto been a noticeable absence of violent anti-Russian language. As an example I may mention that even so extreme an exponent of Young Turk chauvinism as Ismail Hakki Bey Babanzade, the Union and Progress deputy for Bagdad, in a lengthy article in yesterday's "Tanin" is satisfied with remarking regretfully that though Turkey should be the natural protector of Persia she at present needs all her strength for herself.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[50496]

No. 623.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 365.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 10, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 316 of the 5th of this month, I have the honour to report that I yesterday communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign

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[1524]

Affairs the substance of the conversation which Sardar Assad had had with the Russian Ambassador at Paris.

M. Nératof, in thanking me for this communication, said that Sardar Assad had, since his return to Tehran, spoken to M. Poklewski in very similar terms, and had assured him of his friendly sentiments for Russia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

50500]

No. 624.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 371.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 13, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 360 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that, in a conversation which I had with M. Nératof on that day, I once more tried to bring home to him the gravity of the present situation, pointing out that the occupation of Tehran by Russian troops would put such a strain on the Anglo-Russian understanding that it ought to be avoided at all costs. The action recently taken by the Imperial Government in Persia had, I said, evoked numerous expressions of disapproval in the House of Commons, and His Majesty's Government were even being taken to task for having tolerated it. In order that he might not underestimate the opposition with which you were confronted, I would adopt a very unusual course and read to him, in confidence, passages from a letter which I had that morning received from so warm a friend of Russia as Sir A. Nicolson that was intended for my personal information alone. His Excellency would then see how strong was the feeling to which I had referred, and what serious consequences might ensue were matters now to be pushed too far. After reading, in a somewhat modified form, what Sir Arthur had written to me on the subject, I told his Excellency that, according to the latest telegram from Sir G. Barclay, the Persian Government seemed now more disposed to comply with the Russian demands. If, however, any hopes that we might entertain of their speedy submission were to be realised, it was absolutely necessary that the Imperial Government should at once give a definite assurance that the Russian troops would be recalled as soon as the Persian Government had accepted the three demands.

M. Nératof, in reply, contended that the action to which Russia had had recourse had been forced on her by Persia, and that the demands themselves were most moderate. He could not, at the present moment, take upon himself the responsibility of giving me such an assurance as I had suggested, as he was in rather a delicate position owing to the fact that M. Sazonov was expected back next Wednesday. He would, however, talk the matter over with the president of the Council. He personally thought that the Imperial Government might give an assurance that the troops would not advance beyond Kasvin before the 21st of this month, and that, if the three demands were complied with by that date, the expeditionary force would be recalled, provided that, in the meanwhile, no fresh incident occurred, such as an attack on a Russian consulate, &c. As regarded the withdrawal of the troops from Tabreez, to which I had previously called his attention, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 789 of the 8th December, M. Nératof said that this would have to be made the subject of a special arrangement with the Persian Government in return for the creation of a police force, under Russian control, to maintain order in the north. His Excellency added that he was still unable to give me a definite undertaking with regard to the non-recognition of the ex-Shah, and I rather gathered from his allusion to Lord Morley's recent speech in the House of Lords that he was somewhat disagreeably surprised to find that we had not awaited his reply before making a statement on the subject.

On my informing him that Nasr-ul-Mulk had not apparently any intention of resigning the Regency, M. Nératof said that Russia would not object to his remaining provided that his position could be strengthened. As things were at present, he was by far too weak a man to cope with the Medjliss; and the powers usurped by the latter, in violation of the constitution ought to be restricted. A Senate ought also to be created, as such a body would be able to give valuable support to the Regent.

M. Nératof then proceeded to enquire whether the Russian Government could count on your support, should they wish to put forward any particular candidate for the post of Prime Minister. I replied that this was a question which I could not answer, but that I knew that you had, in a recent conversation with Count Benckendorff, spoken

of the possibility of the two Governments securing a Persian Government that would be well-disposed towards Russia. His Excellency had, I said, on several occasions, lately thrown out hints that he expected you to support proposals which he might eventually think it advisable to formulate at Tehran. He had, however, never clearly defined the nature of these proposals, nor did he apparently really know his own mind with regard to them. He could, therefore, hardly expect us to promise him our support beforehand, when he could not even tell us for what purposes it would be required. His Excellency admitted the justice of what I had said, and expressed his concurrence when I suggested that it would perhaps be best that M. Poklewski should submit to Sir George Barclay any proposals which the Russian Government might think it desirable to make for the purpose of placing Perso-Russian relations on a more stable and friendly basis. Sir George Barclay would then be able, after discussing them with M. Poklewski, to furnish you with his views with regard to them.

On the following evening, the 10th instant, I received a private letter from M. Nératof, of which a copy is enclosed, transmitting to me a statement of the views of the Russian Government on the subject of the ex-Shah, and giving certain conditional assurances with regard to the eventual withdrawal of the Russian troops.

In a conversation, which I had with M. Nératof two days later, I told him that I had been rather disappointed to find that the language of his *aide-mémoire* was not quite so precise as he had led me to hope. His Excellency, however, would not admit this, and maintained that the assurances which it recorded both with regard to the ex-Shah and to the eventual withdrawal of the Russian troops were quite explicit.

I subsequently urged his Excellency to try to find some formula for the presentation of the second demand that would render it more acceptable to the Persian Government, and suggested that this might be done by substituting the word "consultation" for "consent." M. Nératof, however, replied that this was impossible, and also declined to consider several other suggestions which I submitted to him. He could not, he said, make any concession as regarded the tenour of the demand in question, though he was willing to admit a modification of its text. He had already authorised M. Poklewski to try and find a formula that would take more account of Persian susceptibilities, and he would not insist on the retention of the words "consent" and "engages to" if suitable equivalents could be found. He would, for example, be satisfied were the Persian Government to declare that they would not in future engage foreign advisers without a previous *entente* or "accord" with the two legations.

On my communicating to him the substance of your conversation with the Persian Minister, reported in your telegram No. 801 of the 11th December, M. Nératof said that he was very glad that you had held such language to his Excellency. It was most important that the Russian public should not imagine that His Majesty's Government were bringing pressure to bear on the Imperial Government, and that they should believe that any concessions which the latter might make were made spontaneously and not in consequence of our intervention. He therefore hoped that we would avoid saying anything that might inspire such a suspicion, and that we would confine ourselves to urging the Persian Government to comply with the demands which Russia had formulated. He thanked me for the assurance which you had authorised me to give him that Sir G. Barclay would be instructed to discuss with M. Poklewski any proposals which the latter might submit for the purpose of placing Russo-Persian relations on a more friendly and stable footing, and that you would approach all such proposals with a sincere desire to meet as far as possible the wishes of the Imperial Government. His Excellency added that M. Poklewski would not fail to communicate to Sir G. Barclay any proposals that the Imperial Government might think it advisable to make with regard to the general political situation; but I gathered that he did not think that it would be necessary to do so with regard to matters which concerned Russian interests exclusively.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 624.

M. Nératof to Sir G. Buchanan.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 27 novembre
(10 décembre), 1911.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE vous trans mets, sous ce pli, un exposé de notre manière de voir au sujet de l'ex-Shah, qui correspond en général au projet que vous m'avez laissé vendredi. J'ai

eu devoir y ajouter notre point de vue sur les mouvements éventuels de notre détachement de Kazvine.

J'aime à croire que cet exposé fournira à Sir Edward Grey la matière nécessaire pour une déclaration au Parlement au sujet de la politique russe en Perse, ainsi qu'il en avait exprimé le désir.

A. NÉRATOF.

Enclosure 2 in No. 624.

Aide-mémoire.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ayant déclaré à plusieurs reprises que les mesures militaires auxquelles il a été forcé d'avoir recours en Perse n'ont absolument aucun rapport avec les aspirations de Mohammed Ali Schah au trône persan, il tient à confirmer à nouveau cette déclaration de la manière la plus catégorique. Il ne voudrait en aucun cas qu'on pût lui attribuer l'intention d'imposer un Souverain à la Perse et de déroger au principe de non-intervention dans la lutte de l'ex-Schah avec le Gouvernement actuel—principe qu'il avait proclamé dès le début.

Par conséquent, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare que si l'ex-Schah profitait actuellement de la présence en Perse du corps d'expédition russe pour réaliser ses desseins, le Gouvernement russe ne le reconnaîtrait pas comme Souverain du pays, sans un accord préalable avec le Gouvernement britannique.

Le Gouvernement russe a pris connaissance avec plaisir de la communication de Sir G. Buchanan annonçant que le Cabinet de Londres, à son tour, lui promet son appui le plus énergique pour l'établissement de rapports normaux entre la Russie et la Perse, ainsi que pour la formation et le maintien d'un Cabinet et pour l'élection—s'il en est question—d'un Régent, bien disposés envers la Russie.

Le Ministère Impérial est en mesure d'affirmer que le détachement russe concentré à Kazvine ne continuera pas sa marche sur Téhéran avant le 8 (21) décembre si toutefois le Ministre de Russie ne se voit pas forcé, dans le cas où la situation deviendrait menaçante, d'appeler les troupes dans la capitale avant cette date.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est animé du désir de faire retirer ledit détachement de Kazvine aussitôt que possible, et il compte mettre à exécution ce dessein dès que le Gouvernement persan se sera soumis aux exigences qui lui ont été formulées. Le Gouvernement russe aime à espérer qu'aucun nouvel incident ne viendra à se produire, tel que des actes de violence sur la personne d'un agent russe, une attaque contre les institutions russes ou nos troupes, des actes de provocation envers la Russie, des troubles en général, &c. De pareils faits rendraient évidemment impossible le rappel du détachement.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 27 novembre (10 décembre), 1911.

[50501]

No. 625.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 352.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 360 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to enclose copy of a supplementary *aide-mémoire* which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 789, I addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th instant, explaining that paragraph 6 of my *aide-mémoire* of the 8th instant was intended to mean that all the Russian troops in Persia, including those at Ardebil and Tabreez, would be withdrawn when order was re-established.

2. I have the honour also to enclose copy of a letter from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 26th November (9th December), referring to stipulation 3 of my *aide-mémoire* of the 8th instant, and stating that his Excellency sees no objection to the two representatives at Tehran being instructed to consult together as to the choice of a foreigner to replace Mr. Morgan Shuster without delay. M. Nératof adds that the functions of the official selected should be limited strictly to those of Adviser to the Persian Financial Administration. I had the honour to inform you of the substance of M. Nératof's letter by my telegram No. 330 of the 9th instant.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 625.

Aide-mémoire communicated to M. Nératof.

EN se référant à l'aide-mémoire du 25 novembre (8 décembre), l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères que l'alinéa 6 de cet aide-mémoire doit être compris dans ce sens que les troupes russes en Perse, y compris celles qui se trouvent à Tauris et Ardebil, seront rappelées dès que l'ordre aura été rétabli.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 27 novembre
(10 décembre), 1911.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 625.

M. Nératof to Sir G. Buchanan.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 26 novembre
(9 décembre), 1911.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE m'empresse de vous informer que je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à ce que les Ministres de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne à Téhéran soient invités à s'entendre sur le choix d'un fonctionnaire étranger pour remplacer sans délai Mr. Shuster Morgan, ainsi que vous le proposez au point 3 de l'aide-mémoire que vous m'avez remis hier. Il va sans dire que, selon le principe établi, le fonctionnaire en question doit être choisi parmi les sujets des Puissances secondaires.

Je télégraphie en ce sens à M. Poklewski, en le priant de me faire connaître sans délai le résultat de son échange de vues avec Sir George Barchin à ce sujet.

Il y a cependant un point essentiel sur lequel je dois attirer votre attention—c'est la nécessité de poser préalablement certaines limites à l'activité du futur conseiller financier, dont le rôle doit être strictement réduit à celui d'un conseiller pour l'Administration des Finances. Il s'agit, par conséquent, d'obtenir une réduction considérable des droits que le Medjliss avait déferés à Mr. Shuster et à la suite desquels ce dernier jouissait d'un pouvoir presque dictatorial. La situation se trouverait sans doute peu améliorée si le successeur de Mr. Shuster pouvait continuer à exercer une influence pareille à celle de son prédécesseur.

Je demande à M. Poklewski son avis sur la meilleure manière d'arriver à ce résultat.

A. NÉRATOF.

[50730]

No. 626.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received December 18.)

Treasury Chambers, December 16, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to request you to inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that, in the circumstances represented in Mr. Mallet's letter of the 13th instant, they are willing to accept as a charge on Imperial funds half the cost, provisionally estimated at £500L., of providing quarters for the reinforced Indian escort of His Majesty's consulate at Shiraz.

My Lords assume that, as suggested in India Office letter of the 5th instant, a copy of which accompanied the letter under reply, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran will be instructed to exercise all possible economy in the provision of these quarters.

I am, &c.

T. L. HEATH.

[1521]

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[50672]

No. 627.

Sir G. Borelay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 715.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 18, 1911.

RUSSIAN Bank manager at Hamadan, who is also Russian consul, reports that Russian lives and property are in danger. Russian Minister is accordingly sending 100 Russian Cossacks from Kazvin to Hamadan.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[50786]

No. 628.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 18, 1911.

ON the 17th December I gave M. Sazonow the substance of your telegram No. 834 of the 16th December in a private letter.

As I was indisposed and unable to go and see M. Sazonow to-day, Mr. O'Beirne went in my stead. His Excellency told Mr. O'Beirne that my proposed modification of the formula submitted by the Persian Government for the second demand (see my telegram No. 337 of the 14th December) had been accepted by the Russian Government. The wording of the concluding passage would therefore now be something to the following effect:—

(R.) "Would enter into an exchange of views for purpose of arriving at an understanding," &c. (End of R.)

M. Sazonow said that he had sent the necessary instructions to M. Poklewski a day or two ago.

In accordance with an arrangement which I had made with him beforehand, Mr. O'Beirne then suggested to M. Sazonow that, in the event of the Russian Government contemplating an advance beyond Kazvin, they should give a definite warning to the Persian Government of their intention to advance in two or three days if their demands had not been accepted. Mr. O'Beirne explained that, if the troops advanced on the 21st December on Tehran without any further notice being given, critics of Russian policy would be sure to say that the Persians had not been given fair warning. The course he now suggested would remove all ground for such a charge. M. Sazonow demurred somewhat, but finally accepted the suggestion in a sympathetic spirit, saying that he must give the matter further consideration, but that he thought it might be possible for the Russian Government to let the Persian Government know verbally that on the 21st December they would still have three or four days left in which to make up their minds finally as to whether they would accept the demands or not. His Excellency remarked that, in the event of the Russian Government deciding to adopt this course, they would have to make their decision known to the public. Mr. O'Beirne suggested that a communication might be made to the press on the subject.

[50787]

No. 629.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 311.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 18, 1911.

RUSSIANS and Turks in North-West Persia.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 351 of the 14th December.

Mr. O'Beirne was informed to-day by M. Sazonow that the Turkish Government had instructed their Ambassador here to call the attention of the Russian Government to the danger of causing some regrettable incident by allowing Russian troops to escort caravans on roads in North-West Persia, which were already patrolled by Turkish troops. In carrying out these instructions, Turkhan Pasha had suggested whether it would not be possible for caravans under Russian escort, on their way from Khoi to

Urmia, to take the road which skirts the lake, and thus avoid those districts which are in occupation of Turkish troops.

M. Sazonow said that the practicability of using the road suggested was under the consideration of the Russian Government.

[50291]

No. 630.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 18, 1911.

WITH reference to Sir T. Jackson's letter of the 15th instant respecting the need of conveying certain specie to the Imperial Bank of Persia at Shiraz, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated the 15th instant, a guard for the specie caravan was obtained locally, and the caravan accordingly proceeded on its way to Shiraz.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[50804]

No. 631.

Sir P. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 611. Confidential.)

Sir,

Paris, December 18, 1911.

THE Persian Minister came to see me this morning in order to inform me and to request me to inform you that, in consequence of a conversation which he had with M. Sazonow, he had telegraphed to the Persian Regent, and had received from His Highness the reply of which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy.

The Minister had, he said, had an interview with M. de Selves on the subject of the relations between Persia and Russia, and M. de Selves had, at his request, telegraphed yesterday to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg the Regent's message for communication to M. Sazonow.

The Persian Minister has not communicated the message to the Russian Ambassador here, and therefore begs that it may not be mentioned to the Russian Ambassador in London.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 631.

Persian Regent to Persian Minister, Paris.

J'AI reçu votre dépêche. Le Gouvernement a appris avec reconnaissance vos démarches auprès de M. Sazonoff.

Comme à la suite des premières demandes qui ont été formulées par la Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial est tout disposé à suivre vos avis conciliants. Il est heureux de constater les intentions amicales que M. Sazonoff vous a témoignées, et, pour conserver à ses relations avec la Russie le caractère cordial auquel il tient, il est résolu à agir immédiatement dans le sens que vous indiquez.

Malgré toutes les difficultés que lui oppose l'état actuel de l'opinion, le Gouvernement Impérial est prêt à donner à la Russie la satisfaction manifeste qu'elle désire en renouant aux services de Mr. Shuster, dont le renvoi est l'objet principal des réclamations russes, et en déclarant qu'il recrutera désormais ses fonctionnaires étrangers chez les Puissances de second rang.

Mais le Gouvernement Impérial ne pourra résister à la pression de l'opinion publique que si, conformément à vos assurances, sans formuler, comme après son premier ultimatum, de nouvelles demandes et sans insister pour le versement d'une indemnité considérable, que la Perse, en dépit de sa bonne volonté, ne pourrait acquitter, la Russie prend à son tour la décision unanime de retirer aussitôt ses troupes du territoire persan.

Cette attitude du Gouvernement russe ne constituerait nullement un désaveu de son programme antérieur, puisqu'elle consisterait simplement à répondre aux procédés amicaux dont on use envers lui, à tenir compte de la situation matérielle de la Perse et à laisser de côté, en ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires étrangers, une formule que les déclarations faites par la Perse et suggérées par vous-même après votre entretien avec M. Sazonoff rendraient inutile.

En même temps, cette attitude permettrait au Gouvernement persan de placer en regard des sacrifices qu'il s'impose la solution définitive des difficultés actuelles, et de calmer ainsi, par un avantage positif et indispensable, les susceptibilités patriotiques de la nation.

Si M. Sazonoff a déjà quitté Paris, veuillez vous assurer qu'il recevra communication de la présente réponse en recourant aux bons offices du Gouvernement français, et, s'il se peut, à l'intermédiaire de son Ambassadeur, qui doit se rendre à Saint-Petersbourg. J'exprimerai au Ministre de France la reconnaissance du Gouvernement persan et je remercierai le Ministre de Russie du gracieux accueil que vous a réservé M. Sazonoff.

[50906]

No. 632.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 716.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 19, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 714 of the 17th December.

The Cabinet laid two alternative proposals before the Medjliss yesterday :—

1. That the Medjliss should give the Cabinet full powers to settle the Russo-Persian dispute.

2. That the Cabinet should be assisted in their task by a committee of the Medjliss; no further reference to be made then to the Medjliss.

Only five deputies voted for either of these proposals; twenty-six voted against.

As thirty-four deputies abstained from voting, the proportion of voting members did not constitute a quorum, and the votes on the proposals were therefore non-effective.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then recommended that a new Cabinet be formed to deal with the dangerous situation which had arisen.

I am informed that the president of the Medjliss sent for the democrats at the close of the sitting and gave them a severe lecture.

The Medjliss will, I understand, sit again to-day.

[50907]

No. 633.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 717.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 19, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident.

My telegram No. 716 of to-day.

Yesterday, at a sitting of the Medjliss, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made an earnest appeal to the members, urging them to accept one of the proposals put forward by the Cabinet.

Persia, he said, was menaced by many dangers. Reshid-es-Sultan (see my telegram No. 294 of the 28th July) had been dispatched by Shiya-ed-Dowleh to Ardebil and was now threatening Resht; Kermanshah had been recaptured by Salar-ed-Dowleh, and, finally, the forces of the ex-Shah had moved forward again and had reached Semnan.

[50474]

No. 636*.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to your herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, requesting authorisation to allow a caravan of specie to accompany the Indian guard which is escorting His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz from Bushire to his post.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey is disposed to sanction the proposed arrangement, and to express the hope that in the exceptional circumstances of the case the Marquess of Crewe may see his way to concur in this course.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[50908]

No. 634.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 718.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 19, 1911.

SHIRAZ boycott.

Please see my telegram No. 713 of the 17th December.

Certain supplies being urgently needed, the supply officer went in person yesterday morning to the bazaar to obtain them, but shop-keepers refused to sell. Acting consul and Douglas consulted as to course to pursue, result of which was that supply officer was sent back to the bazaar with another officer and twenty men. Their orders were that, in the event of meeting with another refusal, supplies needed were to be taken quietly and receipts left for the goods taken.

His Majesty's acting consul now reports that this demonstration was entirely successful; supplies were obtained, no incident occurred, and no protests were made.

[50918]

No. 635.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 343.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 19, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia:

My telegram No. 340 of 18th December.

M. Sazonow states in a private letter to Mr. O'Beirne that he accepts the latter's suggestion that, should it be found necessary to move the troops beyond Kasvin, further notice should be given to the Persian Government before orders for the advance are given.

[51014]

No. 636.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 356.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, December 19, 1911.

I HAVE received the following telegram from the British acting consul-general at Bagdad:—

"Serious loss and the greatest embarrassment are being caused here to British merchants and trade owing to the trade routes from Bagdad into Persia having been practically closed for the last two months.

"A quarter of a million pounds worth of British goods are accumulated here at the present moment, the annual value of British trade representing over 1,000,000*l.* Does your Excellency think that there is any chance of the trade routes being soon opened?"

[50473]

No. 637.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 467.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

MEANING of your telegram to Sir A. Nicolson was quite clear, and did not give rise to misinterpretation here. What I wish you to discuss with M. Poklewski is any set of proposals he may wish to make for the future; I conclude that he will be instructed to discuss with you proposals which will form the basis of subsequent discussion with Persian Government after three demands have been conceded. Such proposals would be those affecting facilitation of war, powers and position of new treasurer-general, and formation of efficient gendarmerie. You can bring these into discussion, and report anything else which your Russian colleague is instructed to propose. The

[1524]

* T

results of your joint deliberations should be reported for examination by His Majesty's Government and Russian Government.

Reference is to your telegram No. 711 of the 17th December.

[50786]

No. 638.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 845.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

ref YOUR telegram No. 340 of 18th December.

ref I am glad to hear that agreement has been reached on formula for the second demand, and that Russian Government seem inclined to give further delay before advancing from Kazvin.

[50455]

No. 639.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 14th instant and communicated to Mr. Mallet the contents of a telegram from his Government to the effect that they had replied to the Russian Government by acceding to the demands of the latter, on condition that (1) some modification were made in the article respecting the engagement of foreign advisers, for which they suggested a formula, which was apparently the one mentioned in your telegram No. 686 of the 13th December; (2) the amount of the indemnity and the mode of payment were fixed; (3) the Russian troops were withdrawn from Kazvin immediately after the demands had been accepted; (4) no further demands were made; (5) facilities were at once afforded by the Russian and British banks for supplying the Persian Government with money; and (6) the purchase of arms was at once facilitated.

The Minister explained that the last two conditions were necessitated by the situation which would arise if the Russian demands were granted.

Mehdi Khan further expressed the desire to know my views respecting the reply, and whether I would urge the Russian Government to accept the Persian Government's conditions, which were their last word.

He was informed, in reply, that I was not disposed to press the Russian Government further in the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

50139]

No. 640.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

IN reply to your enquiry on the 11th instant, respecting the reported attitude of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in the matter of the Persian Transport Company's application for the extension of their road concession, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from Sir G. Barclay on the subject.

Sir G. Barclay states that he has not spoken to the Persian Government on behalf of the company's concession since the receipt of a despatch dated the 18th October last, forwarding to him a copy of your letter of the 12th October, though on two previous occasions he did so. He has, however, been assured by the local managers of the company that they are only pressing for an extension of the old concession, which includes no rights to construct railways. Mr. Wilson also informed Sir G. Barclay that Messrs. Lynch declare that in desiring to obtain the extension they are actuated by no *arrière-pensée*, and that as soon as the present crisis is over the Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes to get the matter passed through the Medjliss.

It therefore appears that your informant was mistaken in his belief that the right

[50474]

No. 640*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 464.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 712 of 17th December: Imperial Bank, Shiraz.

In the exceptional circumstances, you are authorised to allow caravan to accompany acting consul to Shiraz.

of railway construction is included in the original concession for the extension of which application is now being made, and, consequently, in his appreciation of Sir G. Barclay's attitude on this subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[51028]

No. 641.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 719.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 20, 1911.

SITUATION at Yezd.

Several members of the British community at Yezd, which is composed principally of women and children, have represented to British vice-consul there that local authorities would be unable to afford adequate protection to foreigners in the event of troubles. He has also been approached by the Parsis with a request for assistance.

Vice-consul, however, is of opinion that the foreign community is not at present in any danger.

I would propose to send a portion of the Ispahan consular guard to Yezd in the event of danger to foreigners becoming imminent. The distance between Ispahan and Yezd would be covered in four days.

[51040]

No. 642.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 720.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 20, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 714 of the 17th instant.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit to the Russian Legation yesterday evening and informed the Russian Minister that the Cabinet had no longer any hope of persuading the Medjliss to comply with the Russian demands. They were inviting those deputies who were in favour of submission to make their resignations effective. When that had been done the Cabinet would announce that the Medjliss had come to an end.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then reverted to the subject of the second demand and made the following proposals which the Cabinet, he assured the Russian Minister, were ready to carry into effect without consulting the Medjliss.

The Cabinet would pledge themselves verbally in the sense of the second demand, but no written undertaking should be demanded. The Minister for Foreign Affairs would undertake to give the Russian Government the three following concessions in return for this accommodation :—

1. The extension of the Karajadagh mining concession.
2. The right to run motor-cars on the Russian roads.
3. Either a concession for a railway from Julfa to a point on the southern limit of the Russian zone or the right to build railways on the Russian roads.

I am to see the Russian Minister this afternoon and will telegraph to you again after seeing him, but I understand that he is putting these proposals before his Government.

[51096]

No. 643.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 721.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 20, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 20th December.

Russian Minister has submitted the proposals of Minister for Foreign Affairs to his Government.

(Sent to India and St Petersburg.)

[51097]

No. 644.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 722.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Tehran, December 20, 1911.

Please see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 716 of the 19th instant.

There was some doubt from the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Medjliss whether the Cabinet had tendered its resignation or not. I am now informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that it has not resigned, as the Medjliss had not been able to elaborate any new combination of Ministers.

[50730]

No. 645.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 470.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 20, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 673 of 11th December: Quarters for troops at Shiraz.

I approve.

You will of course instruct colonel to exercise all possible economy.

[51014]

No. 646.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 463.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 20, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 356 of 19th December: Trade routes into Persia from Bagdad.

You may reply that apparently there is no such prospect at present.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 471.)

[51028]

No. 647.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 20, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* respecting the situation at Yezd and the possibility of danger to the British community in that town.

Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, to approve Sir G. Barclay's suggestion to dispatch, in the event of the danger becoming imminent, a portion of the Isfahan consular guard for the protection of the British subjects in Yezd.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[51192]

No. 648.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 723.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Tehran, December 21, 1911.

Please see my telegram No. 716 of the 19th instant.

The Medjliss held a public sitting late last night, at which the second alternative proposal reported in my above-mentioned telegram was voted. Five members will be chosen to act as an advisory committee to the Cabinet.

* No. 641.

[51180]

No. 649.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 724.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

LECOFFRE.

Tehran, December 21, 1911.

Please see your telegram No. 455 of the 15th instant.

Lecoffre appears to have no claim on the Persian Government, as he had no contract when employed at the Ministry of Finance prior to his appointment to Tabreez. Nor did Shuster give him a contract.

I am told that Shuster is taking steps on his behalf.

As soon as Lecoffre arrives in Tehran I will consult with him as to his future. I understand that he returns here shortly.

[50750]

No. 650.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 337.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 21, 1911.

TEWFIK PASHA called at this Office on the 15th instant and read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram which had been sent to the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburg in regard to the dispatch of Russian troops to Khoi and the neighbourhood. The telegram requested the Ambassador to speak seriously to the Russian Government on the subject, and to point out that if troops were needed for the protection of caravans the Turks would be happy to furnish the necessary escorts, but that the presence of Russian troops in strategical positions might possibly lead to collision with Turkish troops, which would create a most dangerous situation. The Turkish troops were occupying Salmas, &c., provisionally to maintain order, but the question would be much complicated if Russian troops were also to locate themselves in the disputed territory. The Turkish Government hoped that Sir G. Buchanan would be instructed to support the Turkish remonstrances at St. Petersburg.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that this was a question in which His Majesty's Government could not intervene in the sense desired, and which we must leave to his Government to arrange with that of Russia. We ourselves, as he knew well, had on more than one occasion protested against the advance of Turkish troops into the disputed territory, and indeed in one or two instances into undoubted Persian territory. The pretext on the part of his Government had been the maintenance of order. Sir A. Nicolson knew, too, that the Russian Government had complained of the occupation by the Turks of certain strategical positions; and he did not himself see that the Turkish Government had, therefore, a good case to complain of the measures recently adopted by the Russians.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[51461]

No. 651.

Note by Sir Edward Grey.

THE Italian Ambassador mentioned to me to-day that he had met Bishop Brent while staying with the American Ambassador.

Bishop Brent had been in the Philippines when Mr. Shuster was there. He said that Mr. Shuster was a very able man, but wanting in tact, and he had had to be removed from the Philippines because he could not get on with the American authorities.

E. G.

Foreign Office, December 21, 1911.

[1524]

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[51323]

No. 652.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received December 22.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, December 21, 1911.

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Langley's letter of the 16th instant, stating, by direction of Secretary Sir E. Grey, that the cost of erecting temporary quarters for the reinforced Indian escort at Shiraz is now estimated at about 2,300*L.* instead of the sum of 4,500*L.* mentioned in the enclosure to Mr. Mallet's letter of the 13th instant.

I am, &c.

T. L. HEATH.

[51306]

No. 653.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office.—(Received December 22.)

Sir,

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
December 21, 1911.*

I AM in receipt of your No. 50139 giving the result of communications with Sir G. Barclay on the subject of my enquiry of the 11th instant.

I note that the old road concession includes no right to construct railways, and regret that my information led me to suppose that the contrary was the case.

I now find that the claim which the holders of the concession believe they have to prior rights to railway construction is not based on anything contained in the concession itself, but on a letter written at the time the concession was granted by Amin-es-Sultan, the then Grand Vizier, to Yayha Khan, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom the concession was originally granted. This letter, I understand, gave very definite assurances that the concessionnaire would be entitled to the first claim to railway construction over the route covered by the concession, which assurance was, I believe, later on confirmed or supported by the British Government.

This being the case, my informant (whose name I mentioned to Mr. Mallet) is of opinion that if the road concession is renewed without specific exclusion of railway rights the holders of the concession will consider themselves entitled to claim the benefit of the above assurances.

Should you agree with this opinion, I would suggest that Sir George Barclay might be asked to suggest to the Persian Government that when renewing the road concession they should be careful to specifically exclude all rights to railway construction.

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY.

[51305]

No. 654.

Messrs. Ziegler and Co. to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

Sir,

Manchester, December 21, 1911.

YOU are doubtless aware that a boycott was declared about a fortnight ago in Shiraz against British goods, and our friends informed us at the time by telegram that all business there had come to a standstill. We had hoped that this veto on English trade would not be of long duration, but we are extremely concerned to find, according to a message which we have just received, that the boycott still continues. Our friends add that our customers are very dissatisfied, as native merchants continue selling from their stock there or from goods in course of transit, and they urge us to bring the matter immediately to your notice, stating further that the Persian Government must be held responsible for this further step in the direction of hampering British trade. We sincerely hope that you may see your way to bring such pressure to bear as shall solve the present deadlock, and trusting that our appeal to you may prevent the threatened extinction of British trade in South Persia.

We have, &c.

PH. ZIEGLER AND Co.

[51329]

No. 656°.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 728.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

TABREEZ incident.

I have received the following telegram, dated the 21st December, from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez:—

"One of the soldiers of a Russian party was repairing a telephone wire last night when, according to my Russian colleague, he was attacked by a member of a police patrol. The soldier fired and two police were killed. This morning fedais fired at a Russian patrol, with the result that one Russian was wounded. General firing ensued, most of which is concentrated at the citadel, within which some 200 fedais are entrenched. The Russians are now bombarding the citadel; resistance will probably cease with its capture.

"My Russian colleague has requested the Russian commandant to take the necessary measures to protect foreigners. At present British subjects are safe, the only danger being from possible stray bullets.

"I believe that the Russian troops, who were reinforced a few days ago by some 550 men from Ardebil, are quite capable of controlling the situation."

I have received the Persian version of this incident, and am telegraphing it to Tabreez asking for the consul's observations. It differs considerably from the above, and throws the responsibility on Russian provocation.

I am informed by the Persian Government that a similar incident has also occurred at Resht. But, so far, I have received no news from His Majesty's vice-consul. According to the Persian Government the Russian troops there ran amok, attacked the police force, massacred it and took possession of the telegraph office. They declare that the Russians are confiscating all arms, and that the Russian consul, by authority received from St. Petersburg, has taken over the reins of Government.

[51210]

No. 655.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 726.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

MY telegram No. 720 of 20th December.

Russian Minister is instructed to decline proposal of Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[51211]

No. 656.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 727.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister tells me that Persian Government yesterday informed him verbally that they accepted the three demands.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[51325]

No. 657.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 729.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

MY telegram No. 710 of 17th December.

His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah reports that Azam-ed-Dowleh, acting governor, has taken bast at consulate.

A later telegram reports arrival of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and St. Petersburg.)

[50487]

No. 658.

Foreign Office to London Chamber of Commerce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 22, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge, with an expression of his thanks, the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, reporting that upon your representations, the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce agreed that no action beyond an acknowledgment of receipt should be taken at present with regard to a telegram from a representative committee of Persian merchants on the subject of the present situation in Persia.

Sir E. Grey is much obliged for your action in the matter.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[50132]

No. 659.

Foreign Office to Mr. C. Greenway.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 22, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, suggesting that it might be practicable to replace Mr. Shuster, the treasurer-general of Persia, by a "treasury board" composed of an Englishman, a Russian, and a nominee of a minor Power.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Sir E. Grey fears that the scheme, though attractive, would incur too much opposition to be practicable.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[51245]

No. 660.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 725.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see your telegram No. 467 of the 19th instant.

So much depends on the compliance or non-compliance of the Persian Government with the three Russian demands and the consequent occupation or not of Tehran by the Russian troops that my Russian colleague and I, after careful thought, are of opinion that it would be better to postpone our joint deliberation for a few days until we can see more clearly how the situation is developing.

I trust that you will concur.

[51343]

No. 661.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 730.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

TABREEZ incident.

Please see my telegram No. 728 of this morning. I have received the following further telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, dated to-day:—

"The Russians kept up the bombardment of the citadel from their camp at intervals during the whole of yesterday afternoon; the defenders returned the fire vigorously; the Russians made no attempt to capture it by direct assault. A good deal of desultory fighting took place in the streets near the Russian consulate up to about 4 o'clock; these streets were held by a mere handful of Russian troops. There has been no general disorder, in fact, the Persian population has remained perfectly quiet, and no Europeans have been molested so far as I have been able to ascertain at present. The Russians appear, however, to be having more difficulty in their task than might have been expected. Communication with the outlying members of the British colony has been impossible. There was, however, even in the evening, no sign that Russian soldiers had been told off to protect the quarter which is chiefly occupied by British and German subjects, while the Russian consul-general was, since mid-day, cut off from communication with the Russian camp. Just before evening, however, I was able to assure myself that the Anglo-German quarter had not, so far as I could see, sustained any damage.

"The bombardment of the citadel was renewed early this morning, and is continuing at the present moment. The besieged do not, however, seem to be returning the fire so actively as they did yesterday."

[51344]

No. 662.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 731.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 727 of last night.

The "chef de cabinet" of the Minister of Foreign Affairs has just been sent to tell me that, having at length been able to overcome the difficulties in the way of complying with the Russian demands, the Persian Government have informed the Russian Legation that they accept the demands on the assurance that no new ones will be put forward, and that the Russian Government will immediately withdraw the expeditionary force from Persia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs trusts that, now that the Persian Government have accepted the demands, effect will be given to the promises made by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Minister in London, to the effect that the good offices of the British Government would be lent with a view to bringing about a complete reconciliation between Russia and Persia and the establishment of friendly and normal relations between the two countries.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs states that he and his colleagues are determined not to swerve from the attitude of conciliation which they have shown in this matter, and he declares that the most strenuous efforts are being made to calm popular indignation, though their task is likely to be gravely impeded by the aggressive action of the Russians in Tabreez and Resht.

[51351]

No. 663.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 377.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the semi-official "Rossia" of to-day's date publishes an article expressing its appreciation of your recent speech in the House of Commons. The writer hopes that the Persian nationalists will pay due attention to your weighty words, and will realise that their only chance of a favourable issue is to follow your advice.

The article concludes by saying that Russia owes you a debt of gratitude for having correctly estimated her attitude, and hopes that this will at last put an end to the idle gossip as to Russia's action in Persia having brought about a coolness in Anglo-Russian relations.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[51352]

No. 664.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 378.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Sazonow returned to St. Petersburg on the 13th of this month, and resumed the direction of foreign affairs. On the following evening I was received by his Excellency, and after congratulating him on his restoration to health, I proceeded to speak of the present situation in Persia, and of the grave preoccupation which it was causing you, dwelling more especially on the serious consequences that might follow an occupation of Tehran by Russian troops.

M. Sazonow said that Count Benckendorff, when he had been in Paris, had also spoken to him in much the same sense, but that he trusted that the misapprehensions and suspicions with which Russia's recent action in Persia had been regarded in certain quarters in England had now been dissipated. In any case he begged that I would assure you that he had not the smallest wish to order an advance on Tehran, and that he hoped that all necessity for such a step would be removed by a speedy compliance with the Russian demands.

Proceeding next to discuss these demands one by one, M. Sazonow explained that, as regarded the first, a simple engagement to dismiss Mr. Shuster would not suffice, and that the Russian troops would not be withdrawn until that gentleman's appointment in the Persian service had been formally cancelled. In reply to my question as to whether he meant by this that Mr. Shuster must have actually left Tehran, his Excellency said that if it was absolutely necessary that he should remain on there for a short time, it must be on the distinct understanding that he took no part whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the Government.

The second demand, respecting the engagement of foreign advisers, was, M. Sazonow remarked, the one which the Persian Government apparently found the most difficulty in accepting. They had now professed their readiness to accept a formula to the following effect:—

"The Persian Government, animated by the desire to maintain on all occasions the best relations with Great Britain and Russia, will see to it that the choice of these persons shall not be such as to injure the legitimate interests of the two Powers in Persia. The Persian Government will consequently be ready, as regards these officers and officials, to enter into an exchange of views with the two legations."

He on his part would be disposed to meet their wishes on this point, provided that the words "to arrive at an understanding" were substituted for the words "to enter

into an exchange of views," as the latter were far too vague and constituted no real engagement. I remarked that the amendment proposed by his Excellency seemed to me to take away all the value of the new formula from the Persian point of view, as an exchange of views left the door open for discussion and was not so binding as an engagement to come to an understanding. After some further discussion I suggested a compromise between the two, according to which the Persian Government would engage "to enter into an exchange of views for the purpose of (or with a view to) arriving at an understanding with the two legations." M. Sazonow accepted this suggestion favourably, but said that he could not take a final decision until the text had been submitted to the Emperor for approval.

With regard to the question of an indemnity, M. Sazonow gave me the assurance that he had no intention of being hard on the Persian Government or of endeavouring to extort some large sum from them.

I then pressed M. Sazonow to render it easier for the Persian Government to comply with the above demands by giving them the definite assurance that, were this done, the Russian troops would be at once recalled. To this, however, his Excellency objected, remarking that, though he was quite ready to give such an assurance to us, he would not give any more assurances to the Persian Government, as they did not deserve them. He would also prefer that you should not do so either. I remarked that such an assurance had been contained in the *aide-mémoire* which M. Nératof had sent me as material for your parliamentary statement, and that you might probably already have made public use of it. M. Sazonow replied that he had not heard of this *aide-mémoire*, but that he had not the slightest objection to your making such a statement in Parliament. The assurance in question, however, naturally only referred to the withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin to some point farther north, and not to their definite recall from Persian territory, as this latter step could not be taken till a settlement had been arrived at touching other matters in which Russian subjects were interested in Persia. I at once protested, pointing out that such an interpretation would be contrary not only to the terms of the *aide-mémoire* itself, but also to the verbal assurances given me by M. Nératof on the subject. His Excellency then sent for M. Nératof and asked him to explain whether the above assurances were to be taken in a restricted or in an unrestricted sense. M. Nératof at once said that the meaning which they were intended to convey was that the Russian expeditionary force would be withdrawn from Persian territory, provided that the three demands were complied with under the conditions laid down in the *aide-mémoire*. M. Sazonow raised no further objections, merely saying that he was very glad to hear this, as now it really seemed as if a settlement were in sight.

In the course of our subsequent conversation I urged M. Sazonow not to order an immediate advance from Kazvin, in the event of the Russian demands not being complied with by the 21st instant, so as to allow the Persian Government a little longer time to overcome the resistance of the Medjliss. His Excellency replied that he was not even aware that any term had actually been fixed, and that he could not, therefore, give me an answer without discussing the whole question with M. Nératof.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[51353]

No. 665.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 379.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 19, 1911.

I HAD the honour to receive on the 17th instant your telegram No. 834 of the previous day, informing me of a further appeal made to you by the Persian Minister on the subject of the Russian demands, and of the reply which you had given. I communicated the substance of your telegram to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by a private letter.

Yesterday, as I was prevented by indisposition from leaving the house, Mr. O'Beirne called by appointment on M. Sazonow in my stead and enquired what decision the Russian Government had reached with regard to the second of their demands. M. Sazonow stated that they had decided to accept the formula proposed by the Persian Government with the modification which I had suggested in my conversation

with him on the 14th instant; so that the concluding passage of the declaration to be made by the Persian Government would now run, "would enter into an exchange of views for the purpose of arriving at an understanding," &c.—or would be in terms to that effect. His Excellency added that the necessary instructions on the subject had been sent to M. Poklewski very shortly after my conversation with him.

Mr. O'Beirne, by previous arrangement with me, thereupon suggested that it would be extremely desirable that the Russian troops should not be moved beyond Kazvin without a definite intimation having been given to the Persian Government that the advance would take place if within a specified time, such as two or three days, the Russian demands had not been accepted. Mr. O'Beirne urged that an idea seemed to have been gaining ground in Persia that the Russians were reluctant to go beyond Kazvin. The Persian Government, thinking that they still had time before them, might very possibly now put forward some fresh proposal. If the Russian troops marched from Kazvin on Tehran on the 21st instant without any further notice having been given, critics of Russian policy in England would be sure to say that Persia had not been given fair warning and had been taken unawares. M. Sazonow at first objected that the course proposed would look like delivering another ultimatum to Persia, and remarked that there had been quite ultimatums enough. Mr. O'Beirne said that it would be sufficient for M. Poklewski to cause some verbal intimation to be made at the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. M. Sazonow said that if the intimation was not written the Persians might say that they had not received it; and Mr. O'Beirne then suggested that the fact of its having been made might be communicated to the press. The Minister for Foreign Affairs eventually said that he must think the suggestion over, but that he was inclined to accept it. He thought that the Russian Government might give Persia three or four days' notice, dating from the 21st instant. He would, he said, inform His Majesty's Embassy as soon as a decision had been come to.

This afternoon the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a private letter to Mr. O'Beirne, in which, after referring to another subject, he proceeds as follows: "As to your suggestion of not moving our troops from Kazvin to Tehran, should it come to that without a further notice, I am quite willing to accept it." I had the honour to inform you of this undertaking by my telegram No. 343 of this date.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[51372]

No. 668.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 226. Confidential.)

Sir,

Stockholm, December 19, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 25 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report, that on reading in the Swedish press that a Swedish officer, Lieutenant de Maré by name, had resigned his commission and started for Persia, on the strength of a private offer from the Persian Government of employment with the gendarmerie, I immediately telephoned to the secretary-general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to enquire into the truth of the report. Baron Ramel assured me that the Swedish Government had had nothing to do with the offer, but that, as the gentleman in question was no longer an officer, they had no power to prevent his leaving the country. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had, however, refused the application for a passport.

My Russian colleague tells me that he has also been in communication with Baron Ramel on the subject, and that he gathers that the offer was probably made through the senior Swedish officer already in Persia. The Swedish Minister for War has, however, promised to inform the Swedish officers in the Persian service that such communications must not be made direct to officers of the Swedish army, but that, if more officers are required, the request must be made in the usual way through the Swedish Government.

The Russian chargé d'affaires confessed that he had been somewhat taken by surprise, as one of the newspapers had stated that the officer in question was destined for the Persian army. He had, however, reassured himself on this point. He drew my attention to the fact that Lieutenant de Maré's resignation of his commission was not

publicly gazetted till the day after the statement as to his departure for Persia had appeared.

I have, &c.
KILMARNOCK.

[51415]

No. 667.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 23.)

Sir,

India Office, December 22, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th December, in which it is proposed that, in the event of danger to the British community in Yezd becoming imminent, a portion of the consular guard at Ispahan should be sent for their protection.

In reply, I am to say that, should the circumstances contemplated actually arise, no alternative seems possible, but that the further sub-division of the cavalry regiment and the dispatch through disturbed country of troops in numbers that might be likely to tempt rather than discourage attack are regarded with misgiving. Reference was made to this consideration in my letter of the 20th October last, and the incident mentioned in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 589 of the 20th November (when it was seriously thought that the relieved consular guard at Shiraz would have to retreat in the face of superior numbers) is an example.

It is, therefore, hoped that troops will not be sent to Yezd except in case of very real necessity, and after full consultation with Colonel Douglas as to the military conditions.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[57485]

No. 668.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 732.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 23, 1911.

THE Russian Government have recalled the Russian consular official, Petroff, who was the principal agent in the provocative action of the Russian consul-general, which brought about the ultimatum of the 11th November. He has been recalled for "affairs of service."

[51472]

No. 669.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 733.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 23, 1911.

RESHT incident.

Please see my telegram No. 728 of yesterday.

I have received the following account from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht of the incident which has occurred there:—

"On the 21st December threats were exchanged between some sowars from Talieh and some Cossacks, who crossed each other in the street. Later on in the day Cossacks came to the Government House, said that shots had been fired from it, and searched the stables: they also searched the post and telegraph offices. Firing started suddenly, and at once became general. The escort of the Russian consul started firing on the Sabzumaidan. The immediate cause of the commotion is at present unascertainable. Three Cossacks and at least eight Persians were killed. The proximity of Moharrem makes the situation dangerous."

The vice-consul also reports an affray at Enzeli on the 21st December, in which one Russian officer was wounded and ten Persians were killed.

[51473]

No. 670.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 734.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 23, 1911.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Please see my telegram No. 731 of yesterday.

I am told by my Russian colleague that he has given no promise regarding presentation of new demands, and that the only assurances regarding the withdrawal of the expeditionary force are those referred to in my telegram No. 709 of the 16th instant.

[51477]

No. 771.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 347.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 23, 1911.

I ASKED M. Sazonow this afternoon about the fighting at Resht and Tabreez, and his Excellency said that the attacks of the fedais on the Russian troops had been made in the most treacherous manner, and had, moreover, been entirely unprovoked. A detachment of from 500 to 600 men would be sent from Julfa to reinforce the Russian troops at Tabreez.

The decision of the Russian Government would not, M. Sazonow assured me, be influenced in any way by these fresh incidents, but that the expeditionary force would be withdrawn as soon as Shuster's dismissal had actually taken place and the Persian Government had confirmed in writing their verbal acceptance of the three Russian demands. His Excellency admitted that with regard to the Tabreez and Resht incidents the attitude of the Persian Government had been perfectly correct, and he said that these incidents must be regarded as a totally distinct question, having no connection with that which had occasioned the dispatch of the expeditionary force.

[51415]

No. 672.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 472.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 23, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 719 of 20th December: Situation at Yezd.

You may act as proposed in case of real necessity and after consultation with colonel, but India Office view with misgiving further subdivision of cavalry regiment.

[49032]

No. 673.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 23, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, intimating that the Secretary of State for India concurs in the view of the political resident and the Government of India that a single comprehensive Order in Council to embrace both the Persian and the Arab littoral of the Gulf is undesirable even if practicable.

I am accordingly to transmit, for the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, and before submission to the Law Officers of the Crown in the customary manner, the accompanying draft of a "Persian Coasts and Islands (Amendment) Order in Council," embodying the amendments contained in the India Office letter of the 15th June, 1911.

Sir E. Grey also agrees that the draft Bahrain Order in Council forwarded in the India Office letter of the 24th July, 1911, should now be proceeded with, and he is for

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4 Y

this reason now causing that draft to be carefully examined in this department. The amendments, if any, which he may be advised should be made in that draft, will form the subject of a further communication.

The extension of an Order in Council to the Trucial chiefs can be further considered when a settlement has been come to with Turkey in regard to the Arab littoral.

Sir E. Grey would in the meantime be glad of any observations which the Government of India may have to offer on the policy of such an extension in accordance with the request conveyed in my letter of the 30th August.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[51486]

No. 674.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 735.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

TABREEZ incident.

Please see my telegram No. 730 of the 22nd December.

I have received the following further information from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez:—

"Yesterday saw no cessation of the bombardment, and a very sharp fire was kept up for some hours between the roof of the Russian Consulate and a party of fedais posted at some little distance from the consulate. Though the bombardment has ceased on both sides this morning some Russians have been firing near the British Consulate, during which they killed a non-combatant Persian of the poorer class. I have informed my Russian colleague of this in order to prevent a repetition of such occurrences."

[51487]

No. 675.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 736.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Meshed, dated the 23rd December:—

"The military attaché has received a report from our agent at Askabad, to the effect that upwards of 10,000 rifles have been dispatched thence westwards by rail. It is said that these rifles are for the ex-Shah. Recruits have been collected by His Majesty's agents at Askabad, who have been offering high rates of pay.

"This last statement is corroborated by the information which I myself have learned."

[51245]

No. 676.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 473.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 24, 1911.

I CONCUR in your proposal to postpone deliberations with your Russian colleague respecting Russo-Persian relations (see your telegram No. 725 of the 22nd December).

[51488]

No. 675*.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 737.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Please see my telegram No. 704 of the 15th instant.

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador here signed the protocol for the Turco-Persian frontier commission at Constantinople on the 21st instant.

Article 4 of the protocol lays down that, if the interpretation and application of certain clauses of the treaty of Erzeroum cannot be agreed upon by the commission after six months, all the points on which there is a divergence of view shall be submitted to The Hague Tribunal *en bloc*, in order that a final settlement of the whole frontier question may be arrived at.

[51489]

No. 677

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 738.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

Please see my telegram No. 735 of this morning.

Telegraphic communication with Tabreez is interrupted, but the Russian Minister received a telegram late last night, reporting a continuance of the severe fighting. The Russian Consulate had been fired on; two Cossacks of the consular escort had been wounded and one officer killed.

Russian casualties in the general fighting are reported in Persian circles here to have been heavy, but as the Russian consul is unable to get into communication with the troops my Russian colleague has no recent information on this point.

[51490]

No. 678.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 739.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIA and Persia.

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

Please see my telegram No. 727 of the 22nd instant.

The Russian Minister has to-day received a note from the Persian Government stating that they accept the three demands.

As regards the first demand, the note announces that the Government have removed Shuster and Lecoffre from their service.

The note asks that the second demand may be amended in the sense indicated in my telegram No. 686 of the 13th instant, and in telegram No. 340 from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

The note expresses the confident hope that now that the Persian Government have complied with the Russian demands, relations between the two countries will improve; that the Russian Government will immediately remove all traces of the measures which they found necessary to take for the execution of the demands and that Persia may in the future count on the support of the Russian Government.

My Russian colleague, in his reply, declares himself satisfied and accepts the amended wording of the second demand.

[51491]

No. 679.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 740.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

A MONSTER meeting of all classes was held at the palace this afternoon. The Regent was present, but, being indisposed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the meeting on his behalf. He said that the Government considered that the Medjliss obstructed them in their foreign relations and in the internal administration. He proposed that it should, therefore, be closed. The proposal was entirely unopposed and the Government have now issued a rescript terminating the present session.

The precincts of the Medjliss were peaceably cleared this afternoon and the gates closed.

So far as I can judge, Yoprem and the Bakhtiari's have the situation entirely in hand and the bazaars were re-opened this afternoon, after having been closed for many days.

[51492]

No. 680.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 741.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz, dated 24th December :—

"Party going to meet Smart were fired on this afternoon by road guards from hills above Kotal Dakhter, near Kazerun, and lost one sowar killed. I have as yet no details."

I await further details before suggesting action, but meanwhile am informing Persian Government and drawing their attention to gravity of such attacks.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[51908]

No. 681.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 474.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 25, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister states that Russian troops in Tabreez have massacred 500 women and children. Is there any truth in this report?

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 855.)

[51493]

No. 682.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 742.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz states that the affair reported in my telegram No. 741 of this morning was an organised attack by road guards from a tower and neighbouring hill-tops. The road guards belonged to the Governor of Kazerun, Mohammed Ali Khan Kaskhuli, who is the official guardian of the road.

With a view to securing a safe passage for Smart's escort, Colonel Douglas is sending out a second party of fifty men to hold the top of the passes.

[51494]

No. 683.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 743.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

Please see my telegram No. 742 of this evening.

Colonel Douglas reports as follows :—

"The affair yesterday began with a treacherous attack by apparently friendly road guards on an advance party of three sowars. The road guards were outside a tower. One of the sowars was wounded, and before help could arrive the other two were overpowered and their rifles taken away. Tofangchis in the tower and on the surrounding hills then opened fire on the whole party, and before the latter could proceed, the hills had to be cleared and the enemy driven from the tower. A messenger sent back by the party with news to Mian Kotal was fired on at close range from there and had his horse shot under him. It is thus clear that the affair was prearranged. Our total casualties were one sowar killed and one wounded; we also lost four rifles and two horses killed. Our great difficulty throughout has been the hostile attitude of the road guards, and I have been obliged to issue instructions to fire at all armed men who may be on the hills overlooking the road."

[51495]

No. 684.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 744.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

SITUATION at Tehran.

An eyewitness informs me that the meeting at the Palace reported in my telegram No. 740 of yesterday was by no means so large as I had been given to understand. The Regent convened the meeting, which was clearly intended to justify a peaceful *coup d'Etat*.

There was a meeting of protest in the bazaars this afternoon, but the police had no difficulty in dispersing it.

[51496]

No. 685.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 745.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

Please see my telegram No. 743 of last night.

I have sent the following telegram this morning to His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz :—

"Very serious political consequences might result from the orders which you report in your telegram No. 457 that Colonel Douglas has now sent to the troops. This should be pointed out to the officer in command, who should be instructed to defer action on them until he is satisfied that there is imminent danger to our sowars. The tofangchis are presumably on the hills in the exercise of their duties, and only imminent danger to our sowars would justify our firing on them."

[51497]

No. 686.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 746.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

Please see my telegram No. 741 of yesterday.

I would suggest that we should follow the 1910 precedent of the murder of the two sowars of Bill's escort (please see your telegram No. 112 of the 26th April, 1910). I therefore propose to claim 1,000*l.* from the Persian Government, though, as in the previous case, we might accept a smaller sum if the money is forthcoming. Do you approve?

I have addressed a note to the Persian Government demanding the arrest of the guilty tofangchis, and His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz has also telegraphed to Mohamed Ali Khan direct demanding that they be arrested and sent to Shiraz.

[51498]

No. 687.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 747.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

MY telegram No. 728 of 22nd December.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs have sent me copy of a telegram from Acting Governor of Tabreez, dated 23rd December, declaring that Russian troops were killing indiscriminately men, women, and children. Telegram says :—

"This is how things began: On Wednesday night some Russian Cossacks killed without any cause a policeman and a gendarme. On Thursday Russians attacked and entered police station and shot every man they met."

I can get no communication with Tabreez.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[51499]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 748.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

Please see my telegram No. 743 of last night. The suggestion regarding compensation (see my telegram No. 746 of this morning) only referred to the sowar who was killed.

I shall await information respecting the nature of the wound sustained by the other before making any suggestion as to compensation.

[51500]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 749.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

SITUATION at Resht.

Please see my telegram No. 733 of the 23rd December.

I have received the following telegram, dated the 25th December, from His Majesty's vice-consul:—

"The strike at Enzeli has been terminated and the bazaar opened yesterday.

"The bazaar here at Resht remains closed. The Russians have searched houses and mosques. Arms and ammunition have been removed from the arsenal to the Russian quarter, which is situated outside the town. All is quiet now, and I do not anticipate any further disturbance."

[51501]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 750.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

MY telegram No. 743 of 25th December.

Following from acting consul at Shiraz:—

"When Birdwood's party had joined up with Smart's and was returning to Kazerun a general attack was made on them, and they had to fight their way for about 12 miles into Kazerun, with fresh fighting men coming out from every village to attack them. Smart is missing. He was last seen about 8 miles from Kazerun, and later his horse galloped by wounded. It was impossible to look for him, as party was in imminent risk of being surrounded. Casualties not yet accurately known beyond one killed and three wounded. Inhabitants of whole Kazerun valley seemed to have joined in attack."

Birdwood's party was sent out from Shiraz to meet Smart at Kazerun and to escort him to Shiraz.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[51478]

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 349.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 26, 1911.

PERSIA. Turks and Russians. My telegram No. 341 of the 18th December.

In conversation with Mr. O'Beirne yesterday, M. Sazonow said that, on investigation, it had been established that it would be impossible to make use of the road suggested by the Turkish authorities. Caravans escorted by Russian troops would therefore have to proceed to Urmia from Khoi by way of Dilman, and thus pass through country where Turkish troops were quartered. The Russian officers had, however, been warned that they must be careful not to allow themselves to be drawn into a conflict with them.

The Russian troops at Khoi, M. Sazonow said, now numbered 1,200. His Excellency further mentioned that a Russian force was also now in occupation of a place called Kuchunsi (?), an important strategic point situated either on or not far from Lake Urmia. He added that no additional Turkish troops had been sent recently to the region in dispute.

[51681]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 242.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of an able and interesting despatch which I have received from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, narrating the closing phase of the acute disorders in Shiraz which marked last summer.

At the close of his despatch, Mr. Knox bears testimony to the services of the sowar and sepoy detachments on duty at Shiraz and to the valuable assistance given him by Mr. Smith, Assistant Superintendent of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and by the consulate munshi.

I trust that his appreciation of the services of the sowars and sepoys and of the help rendered him by Mr. Smith, may be brought to the notice of the proper quarters, and I take this opportunity, now that Mr. Knox's charge is drawing to a close, of expressing my own high appreciation of the assistance rendered to me by Mr. Knox during the time he has been in charge of His Majesty's consulate, the greater part of which was a period of altogether unusual stress and anxiety. His action throughout has merited my entire approval, and his telegrams and despatches contain a valuable record of the complex situation of the past few months.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 692.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir,

Shiraz, October 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that since the date of my last despatch, dealing with the general situation in Fars (No. 28 of the 7th September), events here have moved more quickly, culminating at length in the dismissal of Nizam-es-Sultaneh and the termination of Kawan-ul-Mulk's five months' "bast" in His Majesty's consulate.

The Kashgai pickets which had been posted round the consulate, as mentioned in the despatch referred to, were, about the 7th September, considerably increased, and became most aggressive. Consulate servants were continually molested by them—one, whose identity was sufficiently apparent from the badge in his hat, being severely beaten and robbed, whilst others were detained for some hours—and those of the Telegraph Department and of other European residents in the same quarter were submitted to similar annoyances. The tribesmen, moreover, stated quite openly that they had been placed in the neighbourhood by order of the Governor-General to prevent intending "bastis" from reaching the shelter of His Majesty's consulate. At this time I made an energetic protest to Nizam-es-Sultaneh regarding the molestation of servants, and two days later the pickets were withdrawn, apparently under instructions from Tehran. A claim, however, for compensation for the assault, which was laid at the same time, has been completely disregarded.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 7th September, a considerable number of Arab and Bahari tribesmen had arrived near Shiraz and, after sharp fighting with the Governor-General's Kashgai force, entered the town under the command of nine of their more influential chiefs, who wrote to the consular corps notifying that they were come to avenge the murder of Nasr-ed-Dowleh, and had demanded from the Central Government the surrender of Nizam-es-Sultaneh and other intriguers. They added that if they were obliged to take violent measures to secure this object they would, in that event, ensure the protection of the lives and property of Europeans, provided that all the nationals of each consulate or consular agency were assembled in a single spot.

I replied, in conformity with your instructions, that the chiefs must prevent any looting of British houses, and that it was out of the question to entertain their proposal that British subjects should be collected together.

Skirmishes in the immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz were of frequent occurrence until, on the 13th September, Nizam-es-Sultaneh sent out to various positions north of the town all the Government artillery, consisting of four Austrian 75-millim. mountain guns and two antique muzzle-loaders, which for three days continued to bombard the eastern quarters without any appreciable result. At this time, acting on a suggestion of Colonel Cox that the situation might be relieved if he were to hand over Kawam-ul-Mulk to the Khamseh chiefs, after having first obtained from him a telegram to the Persian Government promising that he would remain with these tribesmen out of striking distance of Shiraz until they should themselves come to some decision regarding Fars affairs, I sounded the Governor-General, under your instructions, as to his views on the matter. Nizam-es-Sultaneh unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that Kawam while in "honourable confinement" in His Majesty's consulate was far less dangerous than he would be if at liberty with a large force of wild tribesmen at his back, and that even if such an undertaking as that proposed were given, it could not be expected to remain binding for any length of time.

Shortly after the commencement of the bombardment the Prime Minister had telegraphed the strongest instructions to the local military authorities to prevent any of the Government forces from taking part in the struggle. His orders, however, remained without effect: officers and men of the regular army continuing to serve the guns. During this time an incessant long-range rifle fire was kept up day and night on both sides, and on the 16th September after the bombardment had ceased the two parties came to closer quarters, the Kashgai attempting to rush various points in the town, whence they were on every occasion repelled with considerable loss. The next day, however, a brief lull in the fighting resulted, the local notables having received telegrams from the Persian Government announcing Nizam-es-Sultaneh's recall to Tehran and the appointment of Ruku-ed-Dowleh in his place, pending whose arrival the deputy governorship was placed in the hands of Mirza Habibullah Khan, the local representative of the Ministry of Finance. At the same time Kawam received from the Prime Minister notification of this step and instructions to give all his support to Mirza Habibullah Khan. Nizam-es-Sultaneh on the first receipt of the news, made it clear that he would again resist dismissal, and left no possible doubt of his intentions by sending out to Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who was then at Beza some 25 miles north of Shiraz, a mountain gun accompanied by a strong escort of sowars. On the same day I saw the secretary of the local revenue office, who told me that Mirza Habibullah Khan was ready to take up the deputy governorship, but not without considerable fear of Soulet's enmity, since in the course of the past year he had been obliged repeatedly to press this chieftain for payment of arrears of taxes amounting last March to the substantial total of 175,000 tomans; and, indeed, before twelve hours had elapsed a gang of Kashgai led by one of Soulet's body servants had broken in Mirza Habibullah Khan's house, beaten him and carried him off together with as much of his personal property and official records as they could lay their hands on. He was removed to Beza and subsequently to Firuzabad, where a large sum of was extorted from him before he was allowed to return to Shiraz, which he reached on the 19th October completely broken in health after the rough usage he had suffered on the journey. Here it was generally believed that this stroke, though actually executed by Soulet, had been inspired by Nizam-es-Sultaneh through the medium of Ata-ed-Dowleh, who had taken out the gun on the previous morning. At all events, the penalty was promptly visited on the latter, the Khamseh tribesmen burning his house in town and incidentally looting the entire dowry of a daughter of Kawam married to his son, Muntasir-ul-Mulk. This naturally was not effected without the pillage of a certain number of the surrounding houses belonging to quite inoffensive townspeople.

On the following day Soulet-ed-Dowleh himself arrived at the Bagh-i-Takht, a garden near His Majesty's consulate, which he quitted a few days later to take up his residence with Nizam-es-Sultaneh in the palace. He was accompanied by a force of about 800 men, some half of whom were mere villagers ill-armed and hastily raised; at the same time about some 400 tribesmen still remained with Nizam in the town. This new force immediately on its arrival fell to pillaging the surrounding country, one party even beating severely a servant of His Majesty's consulate who had the misfortune to cross their way. On this man's return, I sent him with a letter to Soulet requesting that he should be examined at once with a view to the prompt detection of his aggressors. The Kashgai, however, kept him waiting for some hours

without making any attempt to question him, and late on the following day returned to me an entirely irrelevant and flippant reply. I then wrote again, suggesting that as Soulet had not taken advantage of the servant's presence at his camp on the previous day, he should send some reliable dependent of his own to investigate the matter at the consulate. To this letter I have received no answer, and, acting on the assumption that any further application to Soulet while in this obstructive mood could only expose us to fresh discourtesy at a moment when it was most desirable to avoid this and could serve no useful purpose, I at once reported the matter fully to you, reserving what pressure I was in a position to exercise for a future occasion I felt to be near at hand, when this might be of the first importance as well as more likely to lead to some visible result.

By this time the situation had grown more than ever disquieting. The bazars were closed and remained so till the end of the struggle, all classes of the inhabitants were in fear of imminent pillage and the arrival of Soulet only served to redouble a panic already amply justified by the state of things prevailing; for, with some 1,200 Kashgai strongly entrenched in the commercial part of the town or encamped near by, in hourly conflict with about 2,200 Khamseh tribesmen, armed townspeople, and villagers established in the other quarters, ultimate looting on a very large scale was the first result to be expected.

The one step, to my mind, likely at this point to alleviate, in some degree, the situation was to ensure, if possible, the peaceful withdrawal of the Kashgai from Shiraz, since, with the weakness of Soulet's position fully established, by the evidence of the meagre following he had been able to raise, it was already very plausibly to be anticipated that the Arabs would gain the upper hand, and any effort of theirs to dislodge the Kashgai from their posts in the richest quarters of the town could only end in every kind of excess, from which British merchants would inevitably be the first to suffer.

Moreover, by the fact alone of abducting the deputy governor, Soulet-ed-Dowleh had sufficiently clearly shown himself to be in open revolt against the Persian Government, and his general attitude had given abundant proof that he could be influenced by nothing short of a direct menace. I therefore ventured to suggest that I should be authorised to warn him that if he did not forthwith remove himself and all his men from the neighbourhood and leave the Central Government a free hand to restore order in Fars as they saw fit, His Majesty's Government would take immediate steps to protect British interests, and would visit the penalties for any damage to these directly upon himself, and Nizam-es-Sultaneh. On the same day I wrote to Soulet that I was instructed by you to inform him that his presence and that of his tribesmen in Shiraz only made for disorder, and that should any harm to British lives or property render intervention necessary, the consequences would be visited on his head. After considerable delay, he replied that he had come to Shiraz with the object of restoring order, and that British subjects would be protected, asking me at the same time to make in future any official communication to him through the Karguzar. I have subsequently been informed that Soulet, receiving this warning when in company with a certain number of the local notables who had come out to visit him, read the letter aloud, and then threw it on the floor with insulting remarks. The fact that my informant, who was present at the time, recited accurately the contents of my letter, inclines me to credit his statement with substantial truth.

Meanwhile, on the 19th September the Prime Minister telegraphed to Kawam, instructing him to do all in his power to put a stop to the intrigues of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and to publish a notice in the town to this effect. Kawam accordingly, after I had obtained your sanction to his doing so while still in His Majesty's consulate, sent the text of the telegram to his son to be printed and circulated. This was followed by another message in which Samsam-es-Sultaneh enquired whether Kawam felt himself equal to assuming charge of affairs in Fars, and whether Zeighan-ed-Dowleh, if appointed Ilkhan of the Kashgai, could count on the general support of the tribes. He added that, if Kawam did not think this arrangement feasible, Ferman Ferman would be appointed Governor-General. Kawam replied that the Khamseh tribes could be fully relied on, and that the appointment of Zeighan-ed-Dowleh would be welcomed by the Kashgai, but that it would be impossible forcibly to expel Soulet and his men from Shiraz without great bloodshed and pillage. He suggested at the same time that the Persian Government should give a warning to Soulet strong enough to ensure his departure. Shortly after this the appointment of Ferman Ferman was announced. By this step which could not conceivably lead to any real improvement in the situation, the Persian Government apparently hoped to use the friendship existing between Soulet and Ferman

Ferina to detach the former from Nizam-es-Sultaneh. It was, however, regarded in Fars as mere hy-play, the universal opinion being that Ferman Ferma would in no circumstances exchange his dignified retirement at Tehran for the small personal profit likely to be found in Fars after the passage of Nizam-es-Sultaneh.

On the 22nd September Soulet issued a proclamation, in which he stated that he was about to drive the Arabs out of Shiraz, that he would attack them through the town, and that any householder who declined to afford the Kashgai free passage through his premises would be held fully responsible for the damage which might result to him from their forcible entry. The only attempt made to follow this up was the invasion by Kashgai of an entirely neutral quarter, in which they pillaged and even destroyed a number of houses. Within a few hours they were attacked there by the Arabs and, after a whole day's serious fighting, driven out with heavy loss. After this the ilkhani, feeling his position weakening, announced to the Persian merchants that he had resigned protection of the Bushire road, wishing apparently by this means to compel the mercantile classes to sue to him again, as so frequently before, for the defence of their interests. On this occasion, however, the plan was not successful; and he finally fell back on the time-honoured expedient of extorting from them by open force telegrams to the central authorities lauding his disinterested services. These messages were immediately cancelled by others dispatched over the British wire, it being by this time apparent to all that, whatever his wishes might be, Soulet was in no position to do anything to safeguard traffic on the road. At the same time he definitely abandoned a previously consistent attitude of consideration for these classes; and set to work to extort from them, in one case even under the sticks, forced contributions which were nominally intended to serve for the maintenance of the tribesmen he had brought with him, according to his own account, to restore order in Shiraz, and who were at the moment actually busy with the indiscriminate pillage of all properties outside the town.

About the same time Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, until recently in charge of His Majesty's consulate at Mohammerah, and at present deputed to examine possible railway alignments in Fars, was robbed by a gang of Kashgai within 12 miles of Shiraz. I had received only the shortest notice of his impending arrival; consequently, on account of the universal disorder prevailing, all my efforts to procure an escort or to get into communication with him with a view to stopping his journey until this should be available were fruitless, and at Puli-Fesa he fell in with a number of armed men, who robbed him of all his belongings, dragging him from his horse, tearing his clothes, and generally roughly handling him. The tribesmen then detained him in a village near by for some twenty-four hours while they continued their interrupted work of pillage, seizing everything they could lay hands on and brutally ill-treating the peasants. During this time reference was made to Soulet, who eventually ordered that his property should be restored, and himself escorted to the consulate, where he subsequently arrived in safety. Mr. Wilson's journey lay through a country which had recently been devastated both by Baluchi and Kashgai, and I had the honour in a previous despatch to transmit to you copy of an interesting diary kindly communicated to me by this officer, in which he gave a graphic description of the ravages created by this summer's anarchy in the fertile districts traversed.

Meanwhile, in Shiraz the situation was growing daily more critical; the attitude of Soulet and his followers was most menacing, several of the leading inhabitants receiving open threats of pillage or violence; severe fighting continued without intermission, and warnings constantly reached me from the most various quarters of an impending attack on the consulate, of which the Kashgai were talking freely. At the same time I was approached with frequent appeals for protection from British subjects, from British firms in Manchester and Bombay, on behalf of their native agents, as well as from Persian subjects of every class, including even the Governor of Bushire, who was most anxious as to the safety of his family in Shiraz. The Karguzar, in reply to my application for information as to what steps the Persian authorities proposed to take for the protection of British lives and property, had written to me—I believe at the dictation of Nizam-es-Sultaneh—that the ex-Governor-General declined to associate himself in any way with the administration of the province, that the newly appointed deputy governor (Mirza Habibullah Khan, who had just been abducted) had apparently left Shiraz, and that he himself was unable to deal directly with the tribal chiefs in such a matter. Two days, however, after I had apprised you of his reply, he collected a small number of ragged Persian soldiers and distributed them as guards to various British subjects. These, after a short-lived attempt to extort an excessive wage from the householders they were supposed to be protecting, left Shiraz, having received, they declared, no pay

for several months past. In the meantime I had distributed flags (or rather such substitutes for these as were locally obtainable) to British subjects, and to those accredited agents of British firms who could satisfy me that they had goods actually belonging to their principals on the premises. This measure was, however, quite inadequate to the requirements of the situation, since it was sufficiently clear that a horde of tribesmen, many of whom had in all probability never seen a European, would not, when once launched on a general pillage, be checked by any considerations of international comity or fear of ultimate reprisals; and, in view of the obvious impotence of the local authorities to make even the most elementary effort to protect the lives and property of foreign subjects, I could see no course open to us if Soulet-ed-Dowleh could not at once be dislodged by some very clearly worded warning from His Majesty's Government, but that some overt measure should be taken to protect our interests.

During these days the fighting, which had continued uninterruptedly, was marked by the invariable repulse of the Kashgai, and on the 29th September a reinforcement of some 1,500 Arabs crossed the passes and attacked the rival posts established on the northern side of the town. Having cleared these without meeting with any substantial resistance, and done great execution among the retreating Kashgai, they entered Shiraz and joined their companions in the eastern quarters, bringing the total of tribesmen there to more than 3,000. At the same time, seeing that the ultimate success of the Khamseh was now assured (and, indeed, Soulet-ed-Dowleh had then reached the point of sending one of his familiars and other emissaries to treat with Kawam), I wrote to their chiefs, giving a list of houses occupied by British subjects and of business premises of British firms, and stating that, in the event of need arising, every precaution must be taken to ensure that these be respected.

On the 3rd October, when the general panic had still further increased, I wrote to Soulet that I was instructed to notify him that, unless he immediately removed himself and his men from the neighbourhood, you would recommend His Majesty's Government to take immediate steps to protect our interests and to visit the penalty for any damage to these directly upon himself and Nizam-es-Sultaneh. At the same time I informed the Khamseh chiefs that, in the event of harm befalling the lives or property of British subjects, you would recommend His Majesty's Government to take steps to exact full reparation for it. In reply, these chiefs wrote to me enclosing copy of a telegram addressed to them by the Prime Minister, in which they were instructed to remain in Shiraz at the service of the Government, and stating that they would do all in their power to protect Europeans. From Soulet-ed-Dowleh I received no answer; two days later, however, his baggage, together with that of Nizam, left the town under a large escort.

Kawam-ul-Mulk about this time gave his signature to a document already signed by Soulet, in which it was principally stipulated that the property looted by either side was to be restored, that both parties should immediately dismiss their forces and recognise the ruling of the Central Government on the question of a Governor-General as final, and that Soulet-ed-Dowleh should continue to protect the Bushire road. Needless to say, none of these conditions were fulfilled, and so small was the importance attached by Kawam to this document that he did not even trouble to keep a duplicate, this piece of typically Persian hy-play being designed by Soulet (as his emissaries clearly explained) to silence the ridicule which his discomfiture would call forth from his family and immediate associates, and, in the case of Kawam, to give proof of his public spirit in coming to an arrangement, on the whole disadvantageous to himself, in the interests of the population of Shiraz. On the same evening Kawam received a telegram from Nizam-es-Sultaneh which announced the impending appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General and of Zeigham-ed-Dowleh as Ilkhani of the Kashgai. It stated at the same time that Ala-ed-Dowleh would not accept the post unless he had full assurances of Kawam's co-operation. Kawam, when discussing the question, told me that he could not reply satisfactorily until he had obtained a joint oath from all the Khamseh chiefs that they would give unreserved assistance to the proposed combination and a promise from me that, as deputy governor, he would receive the support of His Majesty's Government. I subsequently answered, as instructed, that if officially appointed deputy governor he could count on our sympathy and support.

On the following day Nizam and Soulet left Shiraz and camped for the night some 6 miles away, the latter having previously given out that his departure was inspired by a warning from His Majesty's Government that active measures might be taken against him; at the same time he declared publicly that he would raise such disorders on the

Bushire road as had not before been seen. No doubt his departure may in part be ascribed to the effect of our warning, but in all probability it was rather inspired by more immediate considerations, such as the fact that his small following were already deserting him in large numbers, and that if he wished to maintain any hold over the tribes, who were then well on their way to their winter quarters, he must follow after them before sedition, already well advanced, had time to spread too widely. On the same evening the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior telegraphed to Kawam, giving him full powers as deputy governor and announcing that 50,000 tomans were being placed to his credit at the Imperial Bank of Persia to serve for the upkeep of a force of Khanseh tribesmen until the arrival of the Governor-General. Kawam, however, was very loath to take up office, and had repeatedly explained to me that no semblance of good order could be maintained without the strongest measures against the sources of intrigue, and that, if he were to take these, it would universally be believed that they were inspired by motives of personal revenge; he had consequently telegraphed to the Persian Government before receipt of these telegrams, urging them to appoint Mulabber-es-Sultaneh, who, though himself a Shirazi, had maintained for the past few months a consistently neutral attitude, and who, being a complete political nonentity, could serve as a suitable mask for Kawam's administration of the province. The next day Kawam decided to quit His Majesty's consulate, and a large crowd of the same townspeople who five months previously had been crying for his blood assembled outside to welcome him. These were shortly joined by some 2,000 Khanseh tribesmen with all their chiefs, Intizan-ul-Mamalek (now Nasr-ed-Dowleh) and Asad-es-Sultaneh, a former Kashgai Ilkhan. The chiefs then came one by one to do homage to Kawam, kneeling in front of him and kissing his hand and knee, whereupon he addressed them at some length, dwelling particularly on the fact that they had never before been known in their history to be thus assembled together in the service of law and order, and that he hoped that after this experience of their complete success in such a cause they would continue orderly and united. His speech was met with every assurance of loyalty to the Government, to himself, and to anyone who might desire it. Kawam then gave orders for the tribesmen to divide into two parties, his son and himself following different routes. This precaution was well justified by the event, for within a few minutes of his quitting the consulate a heavy fire was opened on him from the saugars of Dehbozorg, a suburb on the north side of Shiraz, where his old enemy, Ali Akbar Khoridul, was entrenched with some eighty men. In the course of this fusillade five of the Arabs were killed and about twelve wounded, one of whom was shot within a yard of Kawam. He himself appears to have kept his head, and was at least successful in his efforts to prevent his escort of some 1,500 men from attacking the Dehbozorg, a step which could only have ended in the pillage of the main bazaar, with which the village directly communicates. The tribesmen finally consoled themselves by driving off 300 or 400 camels which were grazing in the neighbourhood preparatory to loading up a large quantity of merchandise deposited in the local caravanserai. This was almost entirely British-owned, and, as Ali Akbar fully recognised the possibility that its presence might render him immune from attack, I have had considerable difficulty assuring its removal from so dangerous a neighbourhood. Of the camels, some have been recovered and restored by Kawam, but nearly 150 are still missing and likely to remain so. Ali Akbar himself has since been allowed to leave in peace to join Soulet-ed-Dowleh in Firuzabad. This incident appears to have been very carefully organised, and I have subsequently learned that two other parties of hostile "tufangchis" were posted near the alternative routes which Kawam might follow from the consulate to his house. On the same day, too, intrigues commenced similar to those of last autumn, which had ended in the pillage of the Jews' quarter, and some of the heads of their community came in great trepidation to tell me that a Mussulman woman had been caught throwing a Koran into a cesspool in their quarter. This they declared had been done at the prompting of Nasir-ul-Mulk. I wrote at once to Kawam that the matter had been brought to my notice, and urged him to take every precaution to prevent any molestation of the non-Mussulman population. He replied that he had already arrested the woman concerned, and assured me that the incident had fortunately transpired early enough to prevent its having any unpleasant result. I learn, however, that considerable sums of money have reached Nasir-ul-Mulk and Ata-ed-Dowleh, and it seems not unlikely that all the intrigue at present in progress beneath the surface may end in some outburst before the new Governor-General's arrival.

Meanwhile, the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh had been officially announced, and was shortly followed by that of Zeigham-ed-Dowleh (under the title of Sardar Jitesham) as Ilkhan, and of Soulet-es-Sultaneh as Ilbeggi of the Kashgai. Nizam-es-Sultaneh at

the same time moved on from the neighbourhood of Shiraz to his own estates at Khesht, and Soulet-ed-Dowleh, after remaining a week to watch events and do what he could to direct them from near Jirreh has now reached Firuzabad. The tribesmen meantime during their southward migration have been more than ever out of hand, and by the 11th October all telegraphic communication with Bushire was cut off. The damage done was of an entirely wanton character, large lengths of wire being dragged from the poles and cut up into small fragments. Four gholams sent out at different times from Shiraz to examine the state of the lines were stripped of everything, including their tools and portable telephones, while still in sight of the town; Soulet-es-Sultaneh, nominally in charge of the passing tribesmen, was either unwilling or unable to provide guards for working parties, and it was only on the 19th October after ten days' total interruption that sufficient rough and ready repairs could be executed to allow of one of the three lines being worked. At the same time the conditions of the roads has been growing worse and worse until they are now quite impracticable. During the past three months several robberies of one or two loads of British goods have occurred on the Bushire road (in one case 400*l.* worth of opium being carried off), and towards the end of September, in view of the acute situation at Shiraz and the complete obscurity of the immediate trend of tribal politics, I have followed a course parallel to that of Persian merchants here, and recommended that our firms in Bushire should be advised to suspend forwardings. On the northern road one large caravan in the space of some ten weeks left for Ispahan by the Serhad route about the 1st September, and arrived there safely, but only after very heavy exactions by the Kashgai guards. Since that date, with the tribes quitting the higher country, this route has become impracticable and the telegraph road has been so disturbed that upward caravans have not ventured to leave Shiraz. This state of things has finally culminated in a formidable robbery on the northern confines of Fars, which occurred on the 12th October, and in which a caravan reported to consist of 700 mules bringing a large quantity of British-owned gum and opium from Ispahan to Shiraz, has been so far as is yet ascertainable totally looted by a band of Kuhgelus. At the same time a British lady doctor, Miss Ross, who is an independent practitioner unsupported by any religious or other society, was robbed of everything, beaten, and left to make her way as best she could on foot and without shoes or hat to Abadeh. There she still remains awaiting a safe opportunity to continue her journey to Shiraz, where her prospects of setting up a practice will, I fear, have been gravely interfered with by the loss of her drugs and instruments. A few days later near the same spot a body of 300 Persian soldiers, the last of the "Fars expeditionary force" to leave Shiraz unpaid and half-naked, were attacked, losing, according to such reports as reach me, ten killed and twenty wounded. There is to my mind in these two outrages a particular significance of the degree of unrestrained brutality now reached by these tribesmen. In the case of Miss Ross, her profession is one which hitherto has always been an adequate passport in all parts of the country; while Government troops in the past have consistently owed a real inviolability to the pitying contempt of the well-armed robbers for their abject misery and worthless equipment.

Thus, while the condition of Shiraz itself is far from reassuring, and that of the roads more than ever deplorable, the general anarchy throughout the province has reached a degree which it is difficult fully to realise in Tehran. The general disregard of all authority of the Central Government or its representatives, on which I dwell so strongly in my last report on the situation, has been still further intensified by recent events. Casualties during this summer's fighting in Shiraz amount, according to the most reliable estimates to 460 killed. During July, August, and September, Dr. Woodlatt and his assistants treated more than 200 cases of serious gunshot wounds, and some 300 others, which various circumstances made it impossible for them to attend, were brought to their notice. Such losses as these, which, if my memory serves me right, were more than double those of the whole conflict of 1909 in and around Tehran, seem to indicate the presence of a rottenness in Fars too deep for any but the most drastic measures to cure. Another point to which local opinion attaches the greatest importance is that, after the quite ineffectual bombardment of Shiraz, all the superstitious respect accorded even by tribesmen to artillery as the most formidable emblem of a central authority has entirely disappeared. At the same time, owing to the large quantities of grain that have been looted or destroyed in the surrounding districts and the failure of many crops in the higher country on account of the severity of the past winter, there is every probability that famine will shortly make itself felt. Added to this, the financial question is becoming acute; the 80,000 tomans, frequently stated since last February to have been dispatched by the Central Government for the first year's expenditure on General Maletta's gendarmerie, have not yet reached Shiraz; the sum of 50,000 tomans

promised to Kawam-ul-Mulk before his departure from the consulate, for the upkeep of a very necessary force, has not materialised; and the few regular troops who have not yet deserted are owed some nine months' arrears of pay and allowances.

After three months of the completest disorder here, which the Persian Government, so far as could be seen locally, have made no effort to check, they had apparently at length decided, but not before other tentative experiments, to dispatch Ala-ed-Dowleh and Zeigham-ed-Dowleh to Fars. Early last June I ventured to express the opinion that such a step would be the most likely to offer some hope of success. At that time there appeared every prospect that this change could be effected without difficulty; the general population, with the one exception of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his satellites, have long looked on Ala-ed-Dowleh as the one man, in the absence of Zil-es-Sultan, capable of governing Fars. Zeigham-ed-Dowleh was then in Ispahan with the Kashgai tribes near at hand, and, remembering with what alacrity these had flocked to him on Zaffer-es-Sultaneh's appointment a year previously, one could scarcely doubt that, with nothing more than the nominal support of the Persian Government, he could have won over the tribes and appointed to them such kalantars as he considered suitable. Now, however, it will be a very different matter for him to arrive near the tribes, perhaps as much as two months after the dismissal of Soulet, to find the subordinate posts which should be in his gift already filled—some it may be contrary to his wishes—and his rival left all this time free to cajole any waverers and prepare for a struggle. Yet, although this action cannot be expected to have the same effect now as before the outbreak of general disorder, there is still reason to hope that it may end at least in the permanent removal of Soulet-ed-Dowleh from the field of Fars politics, a result which I could only look on as an unmixed blessing. During the past eighteen months my predecessor and I have both had every reason to consider Soulet-ed-Dowleh as the chief source of disorder and unrest in Fars and to believe that his egregious greed and vanity form a very real menace, while his repeated assurances of devotion to His Majesty's Government and solicitude for our trade are even more hollow than is usually the case with his compatriots. These views, I venture to believe, have been amply justified by the events of the past summer, which have gradually culminated in his open revolt against the Central Government, the pillage of the entire district, and the wanton destruction of the telegraph lines by his men. It has been, however, urged, on the other hand, that Soulet is helpful to our trade and that his removal would open the way to an undesirable expansion of Bakhtiari influence in the direction of Fars and Arabistan. On the first point it seems to me axiomatic that any chieftain exercising the least control over the Kashgai could adequately safeguard the Bushire road (except against the large Boir Ahmad raids which usually occur in the early winter and which have been no less noticeable than before under Soulet's régime) without the unnecessary diversion of traffic and other political exploitation of his position so freely indulged in by the late ilkhani. It is also noteworthy that of the goods robbed during his period of responsibility an inappreciable proportion have been recovered by him. There is, too, a certain significance in the fact that the only robbery occurring this summer on the Serhad road, which lies entirely through Kashgai country, was the theft of a case of 1,500 toman's belonging to the Imperial Bank of Persia, which took place within a few hundred yards of Soulet's own tent. The genesis of his reputation as the protector of commerce seems to lie in the simple fact that the Kashgai chief, controlling the roads and being in an even better position to interrupt than to protect trade, can by the least threat of a stoppage of traffic exert a pressure on many of the merchants, which is both financially and politically useful to him; and, in the present case, I have little doubt that the high opinion of Soulet evidently prevailing at one time in commercial circles in Bushire was in great part due to the fact that the merchants in Shiraz, who habitually supply Soulet with rifles and ammunition, are at the same time the agents of two of the leading British firms in the Gulf (Messrs. Sassoon and Dixon), and that these, presumably finding Soulet's position a considerable asset to themselves, have duly impressed on their principals the importance of his retention in it. Curiously enough, however, throughout the disturbances here only one of the six most prominent Persian merchants, the same agent of Messrs. Sassoon, has declared for Soulet, two have remained strictly neutral, while three have openly stood by the Kawamis.

As regards the question of Soulet's removal leading to a régime under Ala-ed-Dowleh, Zeigham-ed-Dowleh, and Kawam hostile to Kashgai and pledged to support Bakhtiari interests, I believe from all that I have been able to see of tribal affairs in Fars that the assumption on which such a theory is based, namely, that there exists an innate hostility between the Bakhtiari (represented locally by the Kawamis) and the

Kashgai, is unfounded. So far as I can see a certain group of the Bakhtiari khans have undoubtedly a very strong personal enmity to Soulet-ed-Dowleh. This hostility, which is by no means unprovoked, is of apparently recent growth, and it is not surprising that the Bakhtiari, with a reputation to keep up as good constitutionalists, should resent their neighbour's somewhat windy pretensions to a dictatorship of Fars. The absence of any feud between the actual tribes seems to my mind incontrovertibly established by the fact that during the past months no appreciable effort was made by the Kashgai from their summer quarters to harry the neighbouring Bakhtiari territory, which one may reasonably suppose had been left to a great extent unprotected, owing to the dispatch of so many fighting men to the north. Nevertheless, in view of the importance attached to the possibility of a Bakhtiari domination in Fars, I have found occasion to point out to Kawam in conversation the extreme undesirability of any new element being introduced into the already complicated medley of tribal politics, and he has, on the first opening of the question of Ala-ed-Dowleh's appointment, telegraphed to Samsam-es-Sultaneh strongly deprecating the dispatch of any Bakhtiari to Fars with the new Governor-General. The differences between the Kawamis and the Kashgai are still more personal, having only come into existence with the appearance of Soulet-ed-Dowleh. Moreover, Kawam himself is on the best of terms with Soulet's three brothers, Zeigham-ed-Dowleh, Soulet-es-Sultaneh, and Ali Khan, Hishmat-es-Sultan, as well as many of the leading khans, such as Mohamad Ali Khan, Kashkuli and Ahmad Khan Shishbolooki, and the Kashgai as a whole, have had in general nothing but friendly relations with the Khansah tribes. It thus seems to me that with the advent of an ilkhani who had not set all his neighbours by the ears a great degree of general appeasement might well have been expected. Unfortunately, however, with the recent break-up of all authority in Fars, one can no longer have so reasonable a presumption that this result will ensue. The heavy losses suffered during the fighting in Shiraz will in all probability have provoked sufficient blood feuds to exercise the best efforts of the tribes for many years; at the same time the influence of the Central Government will no longer be sufficient to win a chieftain the obedience of his tribesmen, while the lesser khans, having seen to what extent personal predominance may reach, are not likely readily to accept another despot. Thus Soulet-es-Sultaneh has already received with a very indifferent grace the office of ilbeggi and the title of Salar Ashair, not hesitating to put forward his own claims to the ilkhaniship, and there is strongly current a belief that the Kashgai will before long divide into two entirely separate branches under two supreme chiefs.

Thus every indication which I have been able to find in the course of events here during the past six months leads, inevitably I fear, to the conclusion that Persia unaided will not be equal to dealing successfully with a situation so grave as that at present existing in Fars. One cannot easily forget with what blowing of trumpets the Persian Government made, nearly a year ago, their reply to a British announcement regarding the insecurity of the trade routes in Southern Persia by dispatching Nizam-es-Sultaneh, General Maletta and the "Fars expeditionary force" on urgent missions to Shiraz: their Governor-General, after giving up the province to the wearying monotony of rapine, murder, and universal anarchy which it has been my task for the past few months to detail, has now quitted his post, a prescribed fugitive; General Maletta's gendarmerie of which not one man has yet been raised owing to the niggardliness of the Central Government and the obstruction of the local authorities whom it has only interested as a possible source of peculation, has apparently dropped out of all recollection; the 5,000 troops stationed here last February have dwindled away, chiefly by desertion, to some 300 ragged units, who still clamour fitfully for nine months' arrears of pay; while of the guns dispatched with the "expeditionary force," one has been captured by Baharloo brigands and the rest have discharged their ammunition ineffectually into Shiraz itself. It seems then that all this "turgid bombast" has led to no more than the laying waste of the more orderly parts of the province and the exasperation of the remainder. In almost every village throughout the fertile plains surrounding Shiraz the crops have been either looted or destroyed, and the only visible traces of the Persian Government's misguided self-assurance are a greater misery than ever with more lawlessness and discontent. So from all that can be seen in Fars at least there is no apparent ground for thinking that the Persian Government have now any more than last year awakened to a sense of their responsibilities, and no manifest reason why a second similar attempt to repair the existing state of things should not end in equally lamentable failure. It would seem unfortunately to be the case that the better class of Persian public man does not care to sink himself in these wilder provinces, and that those who do not quit Tebran for such posts rapidly

take their colour from the general savagery of their environment, since, throughout this troubled time in Fars, I have lit on no sincere sentiments among the protagonists, save an unbounded greed and vanity; while as characteristics of a regenerated Persia I have seen, I fear, little else than universal peculation, lying, and poltroonery.

I venture, in conclusion of this inordinately long despatch, to draw your attention to the excellent services of the sowar and sepoy detachments (of the 25th Cavalry and 79th Carnatic Infantry, respectively) on duty here during the five months of Kawam-ul-Mulk's "last" in His Majesty's consulate. Throughout this period exceptional precautions have been called for, and the men have cheerfully and ably carried on a constant guard duty greatly in excess of that laid down as the minimum by regulations. I should like also to take this opportunity to express my great gratitude to Mr. J. Smith, assistant superintendent of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, both for the valuable help he has given me in matters connected with the tribes, where his twenty years' experience has been of the greatest service to me, and for his ready kindness in relieving me of much work at times of pressure by himself taking the labour of dispatching confidentially many of my messages. I would venture too, to point out the admirable way in which I have been served by the consulate munshi, Mirza Fazlullah Khan, who, though not a permanent Government employé, and nominally only engaged at the consulate for four hours daily, has willingly sacrificed almost all his free time in order to be at hand whenever I might require him for the urgent Persian work constantly arising during Kawam's presence here, and has served His Majesty's Government, under circumstances that have held for him many temptations, with a loyalty which I cannot too highly praise.

I have, &c.
G. G. KNOX.

[51582]

No. 693.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 932.)

Sir,

Pera, December 17, 1911.

THE president of the Ottoman Chamber having during the last few days received a number of telegrams from Persia, and in particular one from the Persian Medjliss, describing the situation in the country which has arisen owing to Russia's recent action, and inviting the Ottoman Government to intervene to prevent the partition of Persia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday made a statement in the Ottoman Chamber in which he defined Turkey's attitude in regard to current events in Persia.

In this statement, translation of which I have the honour to transmit herewith, Assim Bey describes the steps taken by the Ottoman Ambassadors at foreign courts to bring about a solution of the conflict between Russia and Persia, and gives an account of the assurances conveyed to him by M. Teharykow that Russia would not advance beyond Kazvin if Persia accepted the terms of her last ultimatum, and that she was as interested as Turkey in the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of that country.

Assim Bey added that he was convinced of the sincerity of the Russian assurances to him, and that he had received a mark of Persia's recognition of the efforts he had made in her behalf in the expression of gratitude which the Persian Ambassador had been officially instructed to make to him at the Sublime Porte.

The Chamber accepted Assim Bey's statement and decided to send replies to the telegrams received in the sense indicated therein.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 693.

Extract from the "Jenne Tur" of December 17, 1911.

STATEMENT IN THE OTTOMAN CHAMBER BY ASSIM BEY.

(Traduction.)

Messieurs,

DES que nous avons appris que les rapports entre nos voisins la Perse et la Russie avaient pris un caractère aigu et que le Gouvernement russe avait remis au

Cabinet persan un ultimatum portant les conditions connues, le Gouvernement ottoman, qui ne pouvait ne pas être ému par les événements politiques touchant la Perse, a fait, d'une part, des démarches pacifiques à Téhéran, et, d'autre part, il a donné des instructions spéciales aux Ambassadeurs ottomans en vue de chercher les moyens d'amener une solution, conforme aux intérêts et à la dignité des deux parties, de ce conflit que nous avons vu avec peine surgir entre deux Gouvernements, amis de la Turquie.

Quelques jours plus tard, M. Teharykow, Ambassadeur de la Russie à Constantinople, est venu chez moi, pour expliquer les motifs de la rupture des relations et pour déclarer officiellement, au nom de son Gouvernement, que la Russie regrette beaucoup qu'elle ait été obligée d'envoyer un détachement militaire à Kazvine, mais qu'elle ne pouvait pas rester indifférente, quand ses droits n'étaient pas pris en considération. Toutefois, la mesure prise par le Gouvernement russe étant provisoire, les troupes envoyées à Kazvine seront retirées, dès qu'une entente aura été conclue entre les deux pays. L'Ambassadeur a ajouté qu'une communication dans le même sens a été faite aux grandes Puissances.

Dans la conversation qui a suivi à cette occasion entre moi et l'Ambassadeur russe, il a été constaté que les Gouvernements ottoman et russe sont tous les deux pour le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de la Perse, et j'ai pris acte des déclarations de l'Ambassadeur, qui a fait de même pour les miennes.

Le maintien de l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de la Perse est le vif désir du Gouvernement ottoman, et nous estimons que nous devons nous fier sincèrement aux déclarations catégoriques du Gouvernement russe. D'ailleurs, ce point avait été défini par les dispositions de l'entente conclue entre l'Angleterre et la Russie une année avant la proclamation de la constitution.

Nous désirons et nous espérons vivement que les questions en litige entre nos voisins soient prochainement et entièrement résolues, grâce aux dispositions conciliantes dont feront preuve tous les deux Gouvernements et que des relations amicales garantissant les droits réciproques s'établiront entre eux.

Comme preuve des résultats obtenus par nos efforts, qui tendent à la bonne solution de cet incident fâcheux, je vais vous dire que l'Ambassadeur persan s'est rendu à la Sublime Porte, pour nous remercier officiellement au nom de son Gouvernement.

Voilà, Messieurs, ce que je puis vous déclarer pour le moment au sujet de la Perse, dont nous désirons sincèrement la prospérité et le maintien de son indépendance.

[51585]

No. 694.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 936.)

Sir,

Pera, December 18, 1911.

ASSIM BEY, at the close of the conversation which I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 348 of the 13th instant, on the subject of an intention on the part of Russia to cause caravans to be escorted by her troops in the contested zone over roads which Turkey claimed as hers, asked that Mr. Ryan should see Salih Bey in order that he might discuss more in detail the subjects of which his Excellency had spoken to me.

The first question I did not think necessary to mention in my telegram to you.

It concerned the caravan route from Khanikin to Hamadan, via Kermanshah, which Salih Bey said was so insecure that all caravans from Turkey were hung up at Khanikin, and dared not proceed further. The Minister's idea was that we should enable them to do so by providing suitable protection on the Persian side. Mr. Ryan said that he was not aware that these points were even in the British sphere, and that he did not, even if they were, think that we had any troops as far north which would enable us to undertake the protection of caravans.

With regard to the second point, Salih Bey was not very clear, but stated that on the road from Khoi to Dilman, both admittedly Persian, the caravan route would cross what the Turks conceived to be their territory. Mr. Ryan asked him to name places which the Turks claimed, but he was unable to do so, and Mr. Ryan was eventually taken in to see the Minister, who considered the matter of sufficient importance to summon the Minister of War to a conference before seeing him. The explanation then given was the following:—

[1524]

E C

The route in question is that connecting Khoi, Salmas, Dilman, and Urmia. The caravan route between Khoi and Salmas passes in part through a region which is effectively occupied by Turkish troops, which has been so occupied for the past few years, and which the Turks consider their territory. That between Dilman and Urmia passes partly through what is in like manner considered as Turkish territory, which territory in one part extends to the region of the shores of the lake.

After I had seen Assim Bey on the 13th, the Russian Ambassador had called on him and confirmed what Assim Bey had told me as to the presence of a large contingent of troops at Khoi. Later on the Minister of War had informed Assim Bey that the Turkish troops in the districts mentioned above, as being in Turkish territory, had instructions to refuse passage to the Russians, and to resist if necessary.

A situation of great gravity and urgency thus arose, and the Minister asked me to communicate these facts to you, which I did in my telegram No. 351 of the 14th instant, and begged that such representations should be made at St. Petersburg as would avert a conflict. His Excellency added that he entirely mistrusted the intentions of Russia. The frontier question was one between Turkey and Persia. Turkey was eager for a final settlement, and was willing to assure us that she would abide by the decision of The Hague Tribunal should the commission now contemplated fail to arrive at an agreement. If Russia was merely concerned for the safety of the caravans, she could achieve her object by entrusting them to Turkish troops, and she need not fear that by so doing she will be taken to have accepted a new *status quo*, for the Turkish troops would undertake the safe-conduct without prejudice to the eventual decision of the commission or The Hague Tribunal.

Mr. Ryan pointed out, in general terms, that the situation of fact which his Excellency now asked Russia to respect was one of very recent creation, and represented a recent Turkish advance towards the East, and he hinted that it was not necessary to suspect the Russians of treacherous intentions or to suppose that Persia was hesitating to sign the protocol under Russian influence, for the Russians, not recognising the new *status quo*, might well conceive the escorting of caravans as part of the work they had undertaken in Northern Persia, while the Persians might very well in their own interests hesitate to enter into negotiations while a recently created *status quo* much less favourable to them than that of a few years ago was maintained by the Turks.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 451, Mr. Ryan made it clear at the Sublime Porte, on the 17th instant, that the delay in signing the protocol was not in Tehran, but at Constantinople. Salih Bey was obliged to admit that the present delay was due to themselves, but declared that the delay in general had been due to the dilatoriness of the Persians and to the length of time that was allowed to elapse before the arrival of the new Ambassador.

I told my Russian colleague to-day the substance of my communication with Assim Bey, and he said that both here and at St. Petersburg it had been clearly explained to the Turks that Russia intended to protect the caravans over the route from Khoi to Urmia. He had left no doubt whatever on the subject, and it was out of the question that the Turkish proposal to escort the caravans over what they conceived to be their territory on that route could be accepted.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[51593]

No. 695.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 945.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Military Attaché at Constantinople, reporting on the rumoured concentration of Turkish troops in Salmas on the Turco-Persian Frontier.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 695.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir,

Constantinople, December 19, 1911.

WITH reference to the rumoured concentration of Turkish troops in Salmas, I have the honour to report that telegrams from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van show that there is no truth as yet in this report. Neither does there appear to be any truth in the reported Russian concentration at Kars.

The disposition of the Turkish troops on that part of the Persian frontier remains in fact much the same as it has been at any time during the past summer and autumn.

There are seven or eight weak battalions, and the newly formed frontier companies, amounting in all at the present moment to less than 3,000 men. Of course many of these are in what used to be, incontestably Persian territory.

As your Excellency is aware, there is a Russian regiment, probably 2,000 men, at Khoi, and it is the advance of these troops across a portion of what is now called the contested zone, which is causing a difficult situation.

There has lately been great activity in the despatch of ammunition, equipment, and military stores to Trebizond, and thence to Erzeroum for distribution among the corps of the third army inspection. But I do not consider that this is due to the situation which has now arisen. There is an equal movement in the opposite sense, and I regard it as simply a normal replacement of old stuff by that which was foreseen, by the new organisation, for the requirements of these army corps.

Similarly, the arrival of guns and machine-guns reported by His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum is what I have long been expecting, and has nothing to do with any friction arising out of the disputed frontier.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL.

[51761]

No. 696.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 248. Commercial.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 21, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 71, Confidential, of the 8th March last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Cooke, commercial attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the subject of the Julfa-Tabreez railway project.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 696.

Memorandum by Mr. Cooke respecting the Julfa-Tabreez Railway Project.

THE official "Commercial Gazette" of St. Petersburg of the 7th (20th) December states that the Tiflis Bourse Committee, with a view to facilitating more successful competition with the English and Germans in their gradual conquest of the Persian market, has submitted a report to the Council of Representatives of Trade and Agriculture on the necessity in the first place of building a railway line from Julfa to Tabreez. The Bourse Committee points out that the construction of this line is called for by the last Russo-German agreement, by which Russia undertook to improve the route to Kazvin-Hamadan-Bagdad, while, too, the existing Kazvin-Hamadan chaussée road has already succeeded in attracting to the north of Persia English textile goods competing with Russian. With the carrying out of the agreement, by the continuation of the road to Bagdad, Russian goods will be altogether supplanted by German. Only the construction of a rail line from Julfa to Tabreez can avert this. This line, 125 versts (84 miles) in length, would be a natural continuation of the Russian railway system, and its construction would present no difficulties, while the cost would not be very big. The Bourse Committee adds that traversing a thickly-peopled and rich region of Persia the line would be of enormous importance to Russo-Persian trade. The Bourse Committee, in conclusion, recommends at the same time, as auxiliary

means of communication, the construction of chaussée roads to Khoi, Salmast, and Urmia, or Sofian-Hiunei-Khoi-Salmast-Urmia. The latter road would exert very great influence in increasing Russian exports to the Van vilayet, bordering with Azerbaidjan.

HENRY COOKE,
Commercial Attaché.

December 20, 1911.

[51481]

No. 697.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 352.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, December 26, 1911.

PUBLIC opinion here is much excited by recent events at Tabreez and Resht.

"Novoe Vremya" and the press in general advocate the adoption of stern measures of repression, and violently attack the Government for its vacillating policy and want of foresight in not having sent a force strong enough to have rendered the occurrence of such incidents impossible. (End of R.)

I have again received assurances from M. Sazonow that he will not regard the Tabreez incident and the withdrawal of the expeditionary force as having any connection, but will treat them as entirely separate questions. At the same time he appears not to regard the assurances already given by the Persian Government as sufficiently binding to justify the issue of an order for the immediate withdrawal of the force. I fear that the apprehension of similar outbreaks occurring in other towns may make the Russian Government hesitate to withdraw their troops from Kazvin, at any rate until the complete re-establishment of order in the North. In the event of Russia temporarily postponing the withdrawal I think that, before pressing for the recall of the troops, we should wait until the present crisis is over.

[51573]

No. 698.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 751.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

MY telegram No. 745 of to-day.

Attitude to be adopted by Indian troops towards armed Persians.

Colonel Douglas has replied as follows:—

"I cannot allow my men to walk into a trap, carefully prepared for them, by acting on the assumption that the road guards are friendly. I am anxious at the same time not to render the political situation more complicated. The only duty performed by the guards is to blackmail passing caravans, and they have to be watched, if allowed to remain on the road, to prevent the muleteers with the troops from being interfered with. The local authorities should, therefore, I consider, be called in to withdraw their men when troops are passing; it might be pointed out to them that otherwise they may be mistaken for enemies. Such a step would meet the situation. Major Birdwood has some of Mohammed Ali Khan's men with him, and I have asked Mr. Smart to assist the officer commanding the party moving to-day through Tangi Turkan to assist him to distinguish between the natives encountered. Mistakes should therefore not occur. The officer commanding the party which is to assist Major Birdwood on his return was, he reports, fired on near Khaniginián from a distance."

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[51518]

No. 699.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 752.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

THE consular officer at Shiraz reported yesterday that a surgeon was wanted to attend Mr. Smart, who has been wounded in the leg, and is at present with Mohammed

Ali Khan. It is, however, believed that Mohammed Ali is desirous of having his own wound attended to, as a sowar asserts that he saw Mr. Smart killed with two shots in the chest. News to this effect was brought to Kazerun.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[51519]

No. 700.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 753.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

THE acting consul at Shiraz reports by telegram that our casualties are 2 killed, 7 wounded, and 3 missing, including Mr. Smart. Position at Kazerun is extremely dangerous. I have authorised the acting consul at Bushire to give effect to a recommendation he has made, that any available naval forces and the troops at Jask should be sent to Bushire. Colonel Douglas will set out for Kazerun on the 27th. Kawami has sent most stringent orders to the acting governor of Kazerun by telegram to furnish the troops with all they require and to see that they are not attacked.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[51922]

No. 701.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 754.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

THE acting consul at Shiraz reports that he is making great efforts to find means to ensure Colonel Douglas's safety, with the help of the Ilkhani of the Kashgais and Kawami, by means of hostages, &c.

Nothing definite is known about Mr. Smart. At midday Colonel Douglas leaves Shiraz with 100 men to join the force of 50 men (which I reported in my telegram No. 742 of the 25th had been sent out by him to hold the passes at Dashtarzin), and will endeavour to extricate Major Birdwood, who is at the Kazerun caravanserai with 100 men. The latter may at any moment have his supplies cut off, but is unlikely to be attacked while he remains at Kazerun. Before he starts for Shiraz it is essential that the caravanserais and passes should be properly secured, as he is almost sure to be attacked on his way up.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[51920]

No. 702.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 755.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair.

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

MY telegram No. 752 of 27th December.

Following from Shiraz to-day:—

"Reports from Acting Governor, Kazerun, give some hope that Smart is alive, and will be brought into Kazerun. Indian Medical Service surgeon is there."

[51923]

No. 703.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 756.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

MY telegram No. 738 of 24th December: Fighting at Tabreez.

Four guns, 100 Cossacks, and a regiment of Russian infantry arrived at Tabreez

[1524]

We induced our friends, Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., to enter into this contract, relying upon the assurances we received that we and our friends should be protected, because His Majesty's Government wished to have a contract completed, and although, as we have verbally repeatedly pointed out, it is not for us to say by what means His Majesty's Government shall redeem the promise made to stop shipment by others than Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., we feel we must put on record, in view of the statement now made to us that force cannot be used to secure the fulfilment of one of the obligations into which His Majesty's Government entered, that there is nothing in the correspondence between us to show that His Majesty's Government has tried by friendly representations, or by other means not involving the use of force, to procure that which we asked and which His Majesty's Government promised us should be done.

We are, &c.
ELLINGER AND Co.

[52053]

No. 708.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 757.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

I AM of opinion that unless a battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain guns can be sent to Shiraz before March it will be necessary to inform the British residents there that if they remain it must be at their own risk, as we cannot protect them, and close the consulate.

Four battalions of infantry and mountain guns would be required if a punitive expedition is undertaken and to open up the Shiraz-Bushire road.

The acting consul at Shiraz thinks that a battalion of infantry and a battery could proceed to Shiraz from Lingah or Bander Abbas without opposition, as friendly tribesmen could be enlisted in the districts on that route.

Colonel Douglas and the acting consul consider that at least one battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain guns should proceed to Shiraz before March, when general hostilities may be expected in the Shiraz valley where some 15,000 armed tribesmen will by that time be collected. The battalion and battery are independent of the forces which I authorised the acting consul-general at Bushire to collect immediately (see my telegram No. 753 of the 27th December), as to which he is in consultation with the Government of India.

It is not proposed that the Bushire force should co-operate directly at Kazerun with Major Birdwood, for the small force available could not in the acting consul's opinion attempt to fight its way through without disaster, but to make a vigorous demonstration on the Bushire side of the passes to draw off the tribesmen in the Kazerun valley in the event of Colonel Douglas being unable to effect a junction with the force at Kazerun.

I concur in the above views.

[52034]

No. 709.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 758.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

MY immediately preceding telegram of the 28th December.

The acting consul at Bushire has informed the Government of India by telegraph that the navy can land at Bushire 4 Maxims, 1—7-pr., 200 bluejackets and marines, and 250 native infantry. With the 50 cavalry now at Bushire the total force would be 500 men.

No transport is, however, available.

The sanction of the Government of India is required before action can be taken by the senior naval officer on these lines.

If by the time the troops reach Bahrein Colonel Douglas has joined up with the forces at Kazerun, it may be advisable not to land them at Bushire, but in spite of transport difficulties, I think that a landing, even if only for the purpose of a demonstration, may be of assistance to the force at Kazerun.

[52046]

No. 707*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 28.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, December 28, 1911.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 29th instant, from the commander-in-chief, East Indies, relative to the situation in Persia.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 707*.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Calcutta, December 28, 1911.

SENIOR naval officer, Persian Gulf, reported yesterday by telegraph as follows:—

"Following telegram received from resident, Bushire:—

"Please telegraph at once how many British officers and men could possibly be landed for up-country march, as affairs up-country in a very grave state; also number of Maxim guns, and whether you have mountain guns or weapons of the sort capable of transport by mules; how many mules (carrying 250 lbs. each) required for transport of supplies and ammunition for a fortnight. Roads impassable for wheeled traffic. How soon after receipt of orders could you take action? (Ships required to) proceed immediately to Jask to embark 7th Rajputs. How many days can you provide yourself? Wire answer *en clair* urgently."

"Replied as follows:—

"Have ordered "Philomel" Chahbar at once to embark troops. If they are ready, could arrive Bushire forty-eight hours after. Have ordered 79th Carnatics to be retained. This regiment would place 200 men and 6 officers at disposal; 200 men, 6 officers, 4 Maxim guns, and one 7-pr. could be landed Naval Brigade. Can supply own provisions; 41 mules required for provisions, ammunition, guns, and carriages; more mules proportionately if supplies for more than a fortnight required."

Commander-in-chief's reply to senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, the 27th December:—

"Approve retention of native regiment. Naval Brigade not to be landed without my orders. Preparations should be made for doing so."

[52050]

No. 710.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 759.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

IF you approve, I propose to tell the acting consul at Shiraz that he may, in the case of real necessity, inform the Ilkhani of the Kashgais and Kawam that they may count on our full diplomatic support as long as they are loyal to the Persian Government and friendly to our interests.

I am enquiring your views, as the acting consul has asked me how far His Majesty's Government would be prepared to go, since he may at any moment find it advisable to give far-reaching assurances to both chiefs. He says that Kawam is to be relied on absolutely as far as his means go, and that the two chiefs are the only accessible powers in Fars, and the only course open is to ensure their entire goodwill.

[52058]

No. 711.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 760.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

MR. SHUSTER'S successor as treasurer-general.

I and my Russian colleague are doing our best to persuade Persian Government to appoint Mornard, but the matter is no easy one. What the Persian Government want is that, until permanent appointment has been agreed upon, one of Shuster's staff should be designated as provisional treasurer-general. This would have been a convenient solution, since the delay which will be occasioned by waiting for Mornard's appointment, and further by the fact that the system of accounting used by Shuster (as also the English language) is strange to him, would be avoided if the machinery were handed over to a person acquainted with the previous system.

My Russian colleague is unable, however, to consent to this course, as it would, he fears, be difficult to get an American to vacate the post. He thinks it probable, moreover, that Shuster will publish in Europe statements attacking Russia and praising his own administration, and if he did so, the fact that he had been succeeded by one of his compatriots, who would naturally be inclined to make no difficulty in giving him a full discharge, would make it difficult to contradict his assertions. I have accordingly joined the Russian Minister in pressing the Persian Government to appoint Mornard without delay.

(Very Confidential.)

My Russian colleague's language leads me to suspect that his Government hope some flaw in Shuster's work will be discovered by Mornard.

[52156]

No. 712.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 761.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

REFER to your telegram No. 478 of the 27th December and my telegram No. 760 of to-day: Treasurer-general.

Persian Government informed Shuster of his dismissal on the 25th instant. As his successor will have to give him a proper discharge, he cannot go till appointment is made, and until he has actually left I suppose, in view of the last paragraph of St. Petersburg telegram No. 313 of the 1st December, that the affair (so far as Shuster is concerned) cannot be regarded by Russian Government as settled. Shuster also desires, I believe, to arrange, before he leaves, for the future of the Americans engaged to serve under him.

It is, however, important that Russia should begin at once to withdraw her troops from Kazvin, and the Russian Government might without impropriety, I think, be urged to do this. It appears from St. Petersburg telegram No. 352 of the 26th instant that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers Persian Government's assurances

are not sufficiently binding. I do not understand this. It might be intimated to Persian Government when withdrawal is begun that it will not be completed until Shuster has handed over to his successor.

[52059]

No. 713.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 762.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

MY telegram No. 752 of 27th December.

Acting consul at Shiraz reports that a letter has come in from Smart, who is in Mohammed Ali Khan's house, wounded in the thigh. He hopes to be at Kazerun to-day, where there is an Indian Medical Service surgeon.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to express deepest regret of the Regent and of the Persian Government for the incident. His Excellency assures me that the Persian Government have instructed the local authorities to take all possible measures to punish those responsible and to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[52057]

No. 714.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 353.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, December 28, 1911.

OFFICIAL communiqué published to-day states that, in consequence of attacks at Tabreez, Resht, and Enzeli, accompanied by brutal mutilation of the wounded and outrages on the dead, and in view of the fact that the Persian Government, though not implicated, is powerless to punish the offenders, the Russian Government have decided to take punitive measures in towns mentioned. Viceroy of the Caucasus was accordingly instructed on the 23rd December to order military commanders, in consultation with Russian consuls, to proceed to severest punitive measures. Measures suggested are arrest and trial by martial law of all Russians and Persians who took part in attacks; disarming of fedais and other turbulent elements; destruction of [group undecypherable] buildings from which opposition is offered to present measures; and any other necessary steps to restore order and punish offenders.

[52144]

No. 715.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 29.)

Sir,

India Office, December 19, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, and, in reply, to say that, in view of the fact that the specie is understood to be required for the payment of the Indian troops and for other necessary purposes, he concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to allow the caravan to be accompanied by the Indian guard which is escorting His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz from Bushire to his post.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[52187]

No. 716.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 29.)

Sir,

India Office, December 29, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 27th instant, and of the telegrams Nos. 757 and 758 from His

[52065]

No. 715*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 29.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, December 28, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of yesterday's date, and the telegram from commander-in-chief, East Indies, of to-day's date, of which a copy has already been transmitted to you, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a cypher telegram which has been addressed to the commander-in-chief.

2. I am to state that their Lordships desire to be consulted if possible before any landing of a naval force takes place, and they presume that in approving Sir G. Barclay's action the Secretary of State will make it clear that any steps in regard to such landing beyond those already approved by the commander-in-chief would require the sanction of His Majesty's Government unless the emergency is very grave.

I am, &c.

(For Secretary),

CHARLES WALKER.

Enclosure in No. 715*.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

(Telegraphic.) P.

December 28, 1911.

APPROVE your telegram No. 217, except that in grave emergency "Fox" should be at liberty to act. Otherwise he should obtain your previous sanction. You should consult Admiralty if possible.

[1524]

5 E°

Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated the 28th instant, regarding the situation in Southern Persia.

In reply, I am to say that the proposal to confirm Sir G. Barclay's action, reported in his telegram No. 753, is concurred in; as also is the proposal to land the troops, &c., at Bushire if Colonel Douglas thinks that their presence there will relieve the situation. But, having regard to the size and composition of the force described in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 758, I am to say that unless, in Colonel Douglas's opinion, the gravity of the situation at Kazerun or elsewhere on the road is such as to necessitate military operations from Bushire at whatever risk, it is considered that the force, if landed, should not leave the neighbourhood, since a demonstration sufficient to draw the tribesmen away from the Kazerun valley seems impracticable with an improvised force of 500 men working at a considerable distance from its base.

It is assumed that a detachment of sufficient strength will be left for the protection of Jask.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[52157]

No. 717.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 763.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

I LEARN from acting consul at Shiraz that, apart from the men killed and wounded in the recent attack, there were heavy losses of baggage, including eleven boxes of ammunition; also many horses and mules were lost.

[52158]

No. 718.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 764.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

I HAVE had a visit from Minister for Foreign Affairs, who begged me to believe that the restoration of friendly and normal relations with Russian Government was his ardent desire.

Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to alleged intention of Russia, as reported in the press, to take vengeance on Tabreez for what has happened there. He was much perturbed and pointed out that such action would cause lasting animosity. He asked that our good offices might be used to stop the execution of the threat, which, he added, was now particularly inopportune, since the Persian Government had just given evidence of their desire for reconciliation by submitting to demands of Russia. According to his Excellency, every effort had been made by the Persian Government to put an end to the fighting, but the authorities on the spot assured them that the Tabreezis were only fighting in self-defence.

The last news which Minister for Foreign Affairs had from Tabreez was that the deputy governor and other local officials were engaged at the Russian consulate in considering, in consultation with acting Russian consul, the best means of stopping the disorders.

Minister for Foreign Affairs would also be grateful if you could obtain from Russian Government the withdrawal of their troops at Kazvin. The departure of 200 of them for Resht cannot be considered as a first step in the withdrawal, as they have only gone to reinforce the troops at that place.

[52107]

No. 719.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 765.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

I AM informed by the Swedish colonel commanding gendarmerie that Lieutenant Demaphi, mentioned in Lord Kilmarnock's telegram No. 25 of the 16th December, has

been engaged by him, also two other Swedish officers, who, as their Government refused to second them from the army, have likewise been obliged to resign their commissions.

My Russian colleague does not see any objection to the employment of these young officers, whose services as instructors are urgently required by the colonel. I hope Russian Government will make no difficulty.

There are now ten Swedish officers employed with gendarmerie here. I think they ought to be able to turn out an efficient force in time, if money is forthcoming and they are given a free hand, as they seem to be capable officers. They ought now more than ever to receive support from us, as Shuster's gendarmerie will presumably disappear shortly, he himself having been dismissed.

[52135]

No. 720.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 766.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

His Majesty's consul, telegraphing on the 24th and 25th December, reported that local authorities were endeavouring, in co-operation with Russian consul, to stop fighting, and that no firing took place on the 25th.

It appears that communication between Russian consulate and commander of Russian troops had been cut off, as the troops, having failed to make any headway, had been compelled to concentrate in camp.

In his telegram of the 25th consul states that reinforcements (nearly 5,000 men, he thinks) have left Julfa to join Russian troops at Tabreez. The telegrams from consul only reached me yesterday evening.

[52206]

No. 721.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 767.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

REFER to your telegram No. 474 of the 25th December.

His Majesty's consul at Tabreez telegraphs as follows, 28th December:—

"No. 69. Alleged massacre by Russians.

"There is no truth whatever in the report; what happened was quite the reverse. Russian troops took into their camp about twelve or fifteen Persian women and children and treated them there with kindness. While a Russian officer was peacefully superintending their removal he was shot at by the revolutionaries and killed on the spot. Other Persian families have, it appears, asked the Russians for similar protection.

"I hear that Cossacks broke into some wine and provision shops and one or two others. I reported in my telegram No. 66 one case of killing of non-combatants in this quarter of the town without provocation; I am endeavouring to ascertain whether any cases have occurred in other quarters, and will telegraph further. I am also making enquiries as to alleged indiscriminate slaughter, but at present, while it is possible that some women and children were killed during bombardment, I do not believe there is any justification for the accusation of general inhumanity on the part of Russian troops, as to which no evidence has so far been brought forward."

[52204]

No. 722.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 768.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

HIS Majesty's consul at Tabreez telegraphs as follows on the 28th instant:—

"No. 70. The arrival on the 26th December of about 800 Russian troops and four guns—the first batch of reinforcements—has caused an immediate improvement in

the situation here. On the morning of the 27th the building was entirely evacuated by the revolutionary forces; it is now occupied by Persian Cossacks and Russian troops, and the Russian flag is flying over it. The population is moving freely about the town, and, with their assistance, arms are being collected, no armed men being visible in the streets to-day. Nearly all the leaders of the revolutionaries have fled from the town; the remainder are in hiding, as well as their followers, against whom the Tabreezis are showing much resentment. It is generally hoped that there will be practically no more disturbance.

"Zia-ed-Dowleh, the acting governor, finding himself without anyone whom he could trust, and having no resources to control the disturbances, took bast at His Majesty's consulate late on the 26th, and is still here."

[52058]

No. 723.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 479. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 29, 1911.

THE question of Mr. Shuster's successor mentioned in your telegram No. 760 of yesterday.

Mornard's appointment is being resisted by Colonel Beddoes, Sir T. Jackson, and Mr. Greenway. The last-named asserts that Mornard's corruption is a matter of common knowledge. As regards his ability from a financial point of view I find nothing in reports from the Imperial Bank to indicate that it is great. His appointment would cause very great unpopularity here. According to Colonel Beddoes, the Dutch Minister would not be opposed by the Russians, and Colonel Beddoes advocates his appointment.

[51575]

No. 724.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 480.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 29, 1911.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 742 of 25th December, 750, and 751 of 26th December. You should inform Colonel Douglas that his proposal to warn the local authorities, when troops are passing, to withdraw the road guards is approved. Of course, the rule not to use the troops as escorts except in cases of absolute necessity, and after reference to you, should be observed, and nothing in the nature of punitive operations undertaken.

As Mohammed Ali Khan's road guards are to blame for what has occurred, are there no means of holding him responsible? If so, Persian Government should be urged to adopt them.

[52107]

No. 725.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 870.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 29, 1911.

SWEDISH officers in Persia.

You should inform M. Sazonow of the views of Sir G. Barclay (see his telegram No. 765 of 29th December) expressing to his Excellency at the same time the hope of His Majesty's Government that the Russian Government will agree. If their reply is in the affirmative, we would suggest that Swedish Government should be informed accordingly by the two legations.

[1524]

[52300]

No. 726.

Lord Strathcona to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

(Confidential.)

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street,
London, December 29, 1911.*

Sir,

WITH reference to the report contained in to-day's "Times," in a telegram from Tehran, to the effect that the appointment of M. Mornard as successor to Mr. Shuster is being definitely supported by the British Legation, I beg on behalf of this company, and of British interests generally, to enter the strongest possible protest against such an appointment.

Apart from the fact that the Belgian Customs administrators are notoriously grossly corrupt, it is well known that M. Mornard's sympathies are strongly pro-Russian. Consequently, were he given the powers which have been held by Mr. Shuster it is beyond question that very serious difficulties would be created for this company (the chairmanship of which I only consented to take on the assurance of our Government's warm sympathy and support), and that British interests generally in Southern Persia would be most seriously affected.

Moreover, the appointment of M. Mornard would for the same reasons, in all probability, render it quite impossible to carry out the objects of the Persian Railways Syndicate, in which I and my associates have interested ourselves purely in British Imperial interests.

In view of the above facts, I trust that His Majesty's Government will see their way to strongly opposing an appointment which would be so prejudicial to British interests, and which, by perpetuating and extending the corruption which now prevails in the Customs administration, would be so detrimental to Persia itself.

I have, &c.

STRATHCONA, *Chairman,
Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

[52284]

No. 727.

*Persian Transport Company to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)**3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,
December 29, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer you to your letter of the 7th February last and to our reply of the 11th idem, referring to the extension of the period allowed in this company's concession for the construction of roads in Persia. We have recently been in telegraphic communication with our agent in Tehran, and received yesterday from him the following telegram under date of 27th instant:—

"We require assistance of His Majesty's Minister in Tehran. Please request Foreign Office to give the necessary instructions,"

which we submit for your information and for any action you may consider it desirable to take.

We have, &c.

(For Secretary),
FRED. W. PARRY.

[52307]

No. 728.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

Sir,

India Office, December 29, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India embodying resolutions passed by a Mussulman meeting under the auspices of the Madras Presidency Muslim League.

Subject to the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey, the Secretary of State would propose to approve the reply suggested by the Government of India.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 728.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

December 28, 1911.

WE have received a telegram dated the 14th December from Kazi (? Mullah) Obeidullah Shams-ul-Ulema as follows:—

At a large Mussulman meeting held under auspices of Madras Presidency Muslim League yesterday following resolutions were unanimously adopted:—

1. We earnestly beg his Excellency the Governor-General to forward resolutions by telegram to Foreign Minister.

2. *Resolution.*—That this meeting protests most indignantly against the unrighteous action of Russia in attempting to disintegrate integrity and independence of Persia at a time it deserves the full, sympathetic, and generous help of all civilised nations to complete work of its constitution, and begs that British Government, as the greatest Mahommedan Power in the world, will realise gravity of situation and use its high influence with Russia in preventing the dismemberment of that ancient Mussulman Empire.

3. *Resolution.*—That this meeting views with consternation advance of Russian troops in Persia, which, if allowed to continue unchecked, is likely to extend sphere of Russian influence to the very borders of India, a condition which in the best interests of the Indian Empire, should be avoided at all costs.

Reply we propose to give is that it would be out of the question to suggest intervention if, as His Majesty's Government have reason to believe, negotiations between the Persian and Russian Governments, which they have done their best to make smooth and to facilitate, are on the point of being concluded satisfactorily.

[52306]

No. 729.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from Viceroy, dated the 29th December, 1911, relative to affairs at Shiraz.

India Office, December 30, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 729.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

December 30, 1911.

PLEASE refer to my previous telegram of to-day's date regarding incident at Shiraz. Senior naval officer, with 250 native infantry from Jask with four Maxims and one 7-pounder gun, and about 200 bluejackets and marines, is proceeding to Bushire. Further orders will be awaited before landing bluejackets; native infantry will be landed at once. We have given instructions that express orders are to be awaited before any movement is made inland. Force in question is quite inadequate for forcing passage to Shiraz, though it should suffice for immediate protection of Bushire.

[52321]

No. 730.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th December, 1911, relative to the situation at Shiraz and Bushire.

India Office, December 30, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 730.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

INCIDENT at Shiraz.

Government of India have received telegrams from Bushire and Shiraz which show that contingency has now occurred which was foreseen as not unlikely, and that attack has been made by tribesmen on Indian cavalry detachments sent to Ispahan and Shiraz with some loss, and that a cavalry force of some 100 are at Kazerun in a precarious position. We note with satisfaction that Consul Smart has been wounded only, and that he appears to be in a caravanserai in safety. The question as to what action is to be taken now arises. Landing of a battalion of infantry at Bushire to hold town in pledge until effective measures for infliction of condign punishment on tribesmen who attacked the British cavalry have been taken by Persian Government is first obvious suggestion. Troops should seize and retain Customs, and should keep, as a contribution towards claim to be made on Persian Government, the surplus over what is due for the service of loans. If infantry were disembarked the ship now guarding the port would be freed, and a blockade of the coast, which would prevent tribesmen renewing their ammunition supplies, and would place them in an uncomfortable situation, would be rendered possible. If measures are to be taken this is very essential, and dispatch of infantry battalion should, in our opinion, be at once proceeded with.

There then arises the question whether any punitive measures against the offending tribes should be undertaken. Owing to precipitous nature of country and elusive character of tribes, measures would, in Government of India's opinion, be extremely hazardous and difficult. Only a large field force, with transport on a considerable scale, could, moreover, undertake the measures. It is necessary, however, to foresee a further contingency, namely, that main force at Shiraz may possibly find itself in an entirely isolated position, involving a certain amount of danger, even after the Kazerun detachment has succeeded in returning to Shiraz. Relief of detachment would then become necessary, and at least 5,000 men, consisting of four infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and two mountain batteries would be required in order to effect this without running new risks. Should force of circumstances and pursuit of a policy to which they have been opposed from the outset compel Government of India reluctantly to send a force of this size for the relief of the cavalry detachment of Shiraz, they hold the view strongly that force should return with least possible delay from Shiraz to the coast, bringing away with them members of consulate, Shiraz and Ispahan cavalry detachments, and any British subjects who might desire to avail themselves of escort of British troops in leaving Shiraz. Battalion of infantry could then hold Bushire until Persian Government have given satisfactory redress, the main body of troops returning to India.

Dispatch to Shiraz of an infantry regiment and a battery of artillery is not favoured by us, as risks, which it is desirable to avoid, would be involved in sending this inadequate force. Early orders are solicited if a battalion of infantry is to be sent to Bushire as we have proposed.

[3/12]

No. 734*.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 356.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 30, 1911.

IN conversation this afternoon with M. Sazonof, I said that I hoped the Russian force would be withdrawn from Kazvin at an early date.

M. Sazonof replied with an assurance that now that the three Russian demands had been accepted in writing by the Persian Government he did not wish to keep the troops at Kazvin any longer than was necessary. A body of about 1,000 men had already been brought back from Kazvin to Resht, but, so long as there was any risk of further disorders breaking out, it was impossible for Russia to withdraw the whole force. She could not risk a repetition of the surprise attack at Tabreez. It was therefore impossible for him at present to name any definite date for the withdrawal.

The complete restoration of order would doubtless take some time, but the troops now in Northern Persia would have to remain there until this had been accomplished. At the same time, he disclaimed all idea of a permanent Russian occupation. Those guilty of the attack at Tabreez would have to be severely punished as a warning to others. I expressed a hope that the innocent would not be made to suffer with the guilty, and M. Sazonof answered that he trusted that it would be possible to avoid this.

[1524]

5 G°

[52214]

No. 731.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 769.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, December 30, 1911.*

SMART arrived safely at Kazerun yesterday afternoon. His wound is apparently very slight.

[52312]

No. 732.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 770.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

PERSIAN treasurer-general.

Refer to your telegram No. 479 of the 29th December.

Unless there is actual proof of corruption on the part of Mornard, and the bank is willing and able to substantiate charge, I do not think I could now take the initiative in proposing another candidate. I am afraid I have committed myself too much with the Russian and Belgian Ministers and with Persian Government. I understood that you had consulted the bank before sending your telegram No. 436 of the 9th December, which was in answer to my telegram No. 666 of the 7th. The bank might still, if they do not mind risking hostility of Mornard, confidentially instigate Persian Government (who do not want to appoint Mornard) to suggest to the British and Russian legations that Oudendyck should be appointed. It is, however, desirable that there should be no interregnum, and Oudendyck is absent on leave.

I have never mentioned Oudendyck myself (see your telegram No. 422 of the 6th December). I do not know that he is an expert in finance. What made us favour Oudendyck was his experience and his readiness to be guided by the two legations. As to his financial ability I am hardly in a position to give an opinion.

[52305]

No. 733.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 771.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

IN reply to your telegram No. 480 of the 29th December, I submit that as I expect to receive further details, both as to the Kotal Dokhter incidents and as to the more serious attack of which we have since heard, it will be better to postpone for the present consideration of question of responsibility and nature of compensation to be demanded.

[2/12]

No. 734.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 355.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, December 30, 1911.

SWEDISH officers for Persia.

Your telegram No. 876 of the 29th December.

M. Sazonow informs me that his Government have no objection.

[52187]

No. 735.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 483.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 753 and 757 of 27th December and No. 758 of 28th December.

Your action as mentioned in the telegram is approved, as also proposal to land troops, &c., at Bushire if Colonel Douglas thinks their presence will relieve situation.

[1524]

5 G

But unless Colonel Douglas considers gravity of the situation at Kazerun or elsewhere on the road is such as to necessitate military operations from Bushire at whatever risk, the force, if landed, should not leave the neighbourhood, since a demonstration sufficient to draw tribesmen off Kazerun seems impracticable with 500 men.

Detachment of sufficient strength should be left for the protection of Jask.

Admiralty desire to be consulted, if possible, before any naval force is landed, and any steps regarding such landing, other than those already approved by the commander-in-chief, will require sanction of His Majesty's Government unless emergency is very grave.

[52328]

No. 736.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 484.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.

PERSIAN treasurer-general.

According to the Persian Minister, his Government are much opposed to the appointment of M. Mornard, and wish to offer the post to Cairns.

Russian Government would naturally object to the appointment of another American citizen, but it is possible that an opportunity for a compromise can be found in this. Let me know your views, and whether there is no other person who could be appointed with the approval of both parties. It is undesirable that a nominee to whom Persians object should be forced on them.

(Confidential.)

The oil company, bank, and others (whose names must not be given) say that Mornard is well known to be corrupt; are you yourself satisfied to the contrary?

[52034]

No. 737.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 485.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 758 of 28th December.

You will of course report as soon as you learn of Colonel Douglas's arrival at Kazerun.

[51992]

No. 738.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 170.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 22nd instant to say that the Persian Government had accepted in principle the three Russian demands, and that they had received verbal assurances from the Russian Minister that the troops would be withdrawn from Kazvin.

The Minister also read to Sir A. Nicolson telegrams as to fighting which was proceeding at Tabreez and at Resht between Russian troops and Persians.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[50110]

No. 739.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my letter of the 28th July, 1910, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of

His Majesty's Treasury, a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State for India in Council,* regarding the proposed establishment of wireless telegraph stations in the Persian Gulf.

It will be seen that the estimated initial cost of erecting five permanent stations will be some 2,78,800 rupees, with an annual recurring expenditure of 69,700 rupees, and that the initial cost of a portable station at Lingah is estimated at 7,500 rupees, although these estimates are only approximate.

In view of the fact that their Lordships, in their letter of the 29th September, 1909, agreed in principle to a moiety of such expenses being met from the Imperial exchequer, I am to express Sir E. Grey's confident hope that they will now sanction one-half of the cost being charged to the Imperial exchequer.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[6/12]

No. 740.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 772.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

ESCORT incident.

I have received the following telegram No. 475 dated to-day from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz:—

"I have just received a telegram from Smart at Kazerun to the effect that Mahomed Ali Khan promises to give full satisfaction; he is inclined to believe that Mahomed Ali did not instigate the second attack. Smart asks what terms we are to impose and what threats may be used. He adds that if the Kaskulis are hostile, he and his escort will be unable to effect a junction with Douglas, and he suggests that if punitive measures on a large scale are not to be undertaken, we should act on the supposition that neither attack was instigated by Mahomed Ali, but, as he is responsible for the safety of the road, make detailed demands of satisfaction from him.

"I entirely agree that, for the present at least, we should presume Mahomed Ali Khan innocent. As regards any threats to be made to him, I think that we ought to show considerable caution except as regards such threats as concern the safety of Smart's party on the road to Shiraz. Smart is, of course, in a better position to judge of this.

"As any demands for reparation which we formulate might be complied with and our hands be therefore tied, I am myself much opposed to formulating any at present. I am of opinion that we shall have to evacuate Fars altogether, unless an adequate punitive expedition is shortly dispatched; in any case, strong reinforcements would be absolutely necessary to escort British subjects to the coast. It is certain that attacks will be renewed at every opportunity with increasingly careful organisation unless the impression created by these two successful attacks is repaired by our own troops. There must be a certain movement of the troops to relieve, at all costs, the party at Kazerun, but, except for this, I do not think, under the present circumstances, that any further movement of escorts will be possible.

"Smart is very doubtful whether his party will get through safely.

"Smart, to whom I have telegraphed my views, agrees that a punitive expedition is necessary; he adds that Mahomed Ali Khan is very anxious to know what terms we are likely to require; he intends to procrastinate with the Khan."

I have sent the following telegram in reply, dated to-day:—

"Our terms will largely depend on whether another attack is made on our troops while proceeding to Shiraz or not; in any case, we must know more about who is responsible for the attack before formulating any terms. Smart should reply to Mahomed Ali Khan in this sense."

No. 741.

[7/12]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 773.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

ESCORT incident.

The present position of affairs is as follows:—

Colonel Douglas is at Dashtarjin with 150 men. Birdwood's party is still at Kazerun; Smart is also at Kazerun. This latter party has nine men so severely wounded that it is impossible to move them with safety. The whole party must, however, be withdrawn from Kazerun. This can only be done if the force under Douglas occupies the heights overlooking the road. The force at Kazerun must leave by the 2nd January at the latest, otherwise Douglas will be obliged to retire on Shiraz, as his supplies are running short. If Douglas had to retire to Shiraz a delay of at least eight days would result, and at this time of the year it is possible that the passes may become blocked by snow; the Kazerun party would, in consequence, be cut off from Shiraz for a longer period, and it is impossible to face this risk. It is therefore Douglas's intention to order the Kazerun party to start on the 2nd January. The wounded will be brought on with the party as best they can.

A force consisting of 269 native infantry was to be landed at Bushire on the 20th December; they are to await further orders before proceeding inland.

No. 742.

[8/12]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 774.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

TABREEZ.

His Majesty's consul at Tabreez telegraphs as follows, No. 72 of the 29th December:—

"My Russian colleague yesterday received an emissary of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who entered the town accompanied by thirty horsemen. I saw Miller later in the day; he said that, out of deference to the unanimous desire of the population, Shuja himself would come to Tabreez, but not before some four or five days. Miller added that as the Russians could not themselves undertake the administration of the town, and in view of this unanimous expression of popular opinion, he would be unable to oppose Shuja's coming, and that he would consider him as governor *de facto*. Shuja would, however, come in entirely at his own risk; he had given him no guarantee of any kind. I gathered from what Miller subsequently told me that it was improbable that Shuja would bring more than 200 of his men into the town.

"The feeling in the town is, so far as I can tell, undoubtedly as Miller states, and the opinion of such Europeans as I have been able to consult coincides with my own, namely, that there would be no opposition to Shuja's appointment provided the difficulties of his connection with the ex-Shah can be overcome and if his appointment is sanctioned by the Central Government. It seems in any case to be commonly agreed that no one else here is capable of undertaking successfully the government of the town."

Unless Shuja is prevented, it is possible that he may proclaim the ex-Shah at Tabreez. He has been besieging the town in the interests of His Majesty.

No. 743.

[19/12]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 775.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

I have sent the following telegram to His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz to-day:—

"I am informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that local authorities at Shiraz report that the men responsible for the second attack on Birdwood's party have been pursued by Mahomed Ali Khan and arrested.

"Do you confirm this?

"According to Persian Government, over 100 Persians were killed. I should wish to be informed as to the estimated number of Persian casualties, in order that I may know how extensive and with whom are the blood feuds raised. It is also important that I should know as soon as possible how the fighting began and other details.

"Were Maxims used?

"Please consult Smart before telegraphing your reply."

No. 744.

[9/12]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 776. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

SHUSTERS successor.

I have received your telegram No. 484 of yesterday, but have little to add to my telegrams Nos. 666 and 770 of the 7th and 30th instant respectively.

I cannot vouch for Mornard having any exceptional degree of probity, but I have never found him other than sincere and upright in his dealings with me.

His Russian sympathies, which are well known, are largely the cause of his disfavour in certain quarters.

Except for Mornard and Oudendijk, who is away from Tehran on leave of absence, I know of no available candidate from the minor Powers.

The difficulties as regards Shuster were largely due to his character, and I venture to point out that the same difficulties might occur again if we select a man of too strong character as his successor.

No. 745.

[5/12]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 777.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

ESCORT incident.

Please see my telegram No. 772 of yesterday.

I propose to talk with Smart by telegraph on his arrival at Shiraz, and until then I prefer to make no comment on the recommendations of Smart and Knox as regards a punitive expedition. As regards the suggestion made in my telegram No. 757 of the 28th instant respecting increase in consular escort, I should, after mature reflection, prefer that no steps were taken in the matter until Smart's return to Shiraz, when I will consult him on this point.